According to the poll I conducted, the majority of respondents (80%) when asked about their attitude towards these scandals with Korean Hallyu stars, chose the answer �The Korean stars who are involved disappoint me as personalities but it doesn't affect my overall opinion towards Korean popular culture�. Other 16.4% of the respondentsanswered that �such people discredit the whole industry and make me form a negative attitude towards Korean popular�See Appendix 2, question 22 of the poll..

Regarding the issues mentioned above, some have been pointing out the negative influence of Hallyu on the Chinese audience, especially the young population among who there are the most extremely passionate and enthusiastic fans of Korean culture. In the Chinese language, they have been called �Hanhanzu� (������) - literally �People crazy for Korea� - or �Hanmi� (����, �Korea maniac�). Some argue such a craze can mislead the youth, make them pick up wrong values, and prevent them from maturing in a normal way as Chinese citizens.Significantly, criticism of Korean Wave is more targeted not at the phenomenon itself but at its political, economic and sociocultural impact. Namely, China has always positioned itself as the source and the center of East Asian culture, thus, the rising domination of Korean popular culture has challenged this point of view and made China alert.

Moreover, some have been arguing that Korean nationalism is too aggressive, and Korean scholars have used media as platforms for their ungrounded accusations and claims about China's history, traditions and territoriesKang Nae-Young. Op. cit. P. 458-508.. The fact the Hallyu has been supported both directly and indirectly by the South Korean government led to some Chinese and other foreign critics perceiving itas a product of Korean cultural imperialism.Initially, Korean Wave as a cultural phenomenon was closely related to the growth of Korean transnational corporations. After the Asian Financial crisis, the South Korean government especially supported these corporations by providing them with subsidies, tax incentives and grants. The government's intention was to help the corporations and hegemonic media they own to strengthen their power and increase competitiveness in the global cultural industry.Embracing the unlimited potential of its cultural industry, Korean government created the Korea Foundation for InternationalCulture Exchange (KOFICE) in order to accumulate all state and private resources related to Hallyu and to use cultural industry as a tool to the country economic revival on the international arena.To measure the economic effect of Hallyu, there was also developed a �Korean Wave Index�Ibid. P. 220..

All these government's steps let cultural imperialism became a powerful and popular theoretical framework within the context of spreading of Korean pop culture. In terms of China-Korea cultural exchange, it especially emphasized �the unequal power relations in international communication, with respect to the nature, process, and outcomes of global communications�Nam Siho. The Cultural Political Economy of the Korean Wave in East Asia: Implications for Cultural Globalization Theories // Asian Perspective, Vol. 37, 2013. - �2. P. 214. Retrieved April 15, 2019 from https://proxylibrary.hse.ru:2078/docview/1365271266/C21A24D8CD52498DPQ/12?accountid=45451.That is why Moon Jae-in government's decision to move away from promoting and advertising Hallyu as simply an export industry is so important in changing China's attitude towards Korean pop culture and prevent it from being perceived as a product of cultural imperialism.In this case, cultural diplomacy, or the �soap-opera diplomacy� as it was called at the initial stage of Hallyu, can play its positive role in improving bilateral relations and positive perception of popular culture. From my point of view, I would call it Hallyu diplomacy. According to Kim Ji-Eun Kim Ji-Eun. Op. cit. P. 21.,Hallyu diplomacy can follow in the footsteps of the famous �Ping Pong Diplomacy�MutualexchangeofpingpongplayersbetweenChina and USA in the 1970s that led to the significant improvement of bilateral relations. where sport paved the way to recreating the relations between China and USA.

Some argue that anti-Hallyu sentiment in China is deeply rooted in the cultural and historical context especially taking into consideration such contentious China-Korea issues as China's Northeast Project or Korean Gangneung Danoje Festival becoming UNESCO cultural heritage.Northeast Project is a Chinese governmental academic project aimed at studying historical, anthropological, and geographical issues of China's Northeast region. Upon the announcement of the findings, theKorean government and society were highly dissatisfied with China's claim that ancient Korean kingdoms of Gojoseon, Goguryeo and Balhae, were a part of Chinese history.Similarly, a major dispute occurred in 2004when Korea submitted an application to register its Gangneung Danoje festival as UNESCO intangible cultural heritage. This festival is originated from the Chinese Duanwu (�����) or �Dragon Boat Festival� and is also celebrated on the fifth day of the fifth month according to the lunar calendar. Traditional activities for this holiday are eating Zongzi (����) - sticky rice stuffed with meat, vegetables or other different fillings and wrapped in bamboo leaves, and dragon boat racing. However, as a localized tradition, Korean Gangneung Danoje differs from the Chinese Duanwu. It is a month-long festival during which peopleworship the guardian spirit of a mountain, do mask dances, and traditional wrestling. Many Chinese netizens suggested the Korean festival was just a variation of the Chinese tradition and blamed Korea for stealing cultural traditions and registering Chinese cultural heritage as their own. This led to an increase in anti-Korean sentiments.

In the TV production industry, since 2006, there was also a strong criticism against the Korean Wave thattargeted the protectionist policies of the South Korean government. These policies influenced the overall cultural exchange between Korea and China. While Korean dramas flooded China, only a small number of Chinese TV productions were allowed to be exported to South Korea. None of them found their way to the prime-time on any major TV channels.Thus, a significant imbalance in the sphere of cultural exchange between South Korea and China took place, which worried the Chinese officials. China imported 10 to 15 times more of Korean cultural products than exported its own to Korea.For example, in 2005, China exported TV dramas worth 741 thousand USD to South Korea, while the import of Korean TV dramas accounted for 10,9 million USDYangYoung-gyun.History and Prospect of Exchange of TV Drama between Korea and China: Opening and Control // World Congress of Korean Studies. Mentioned in Kim Ji-Eun. Op. cit. P. 22.. This imbalance led to a problem. In the conditions when Korean popular culture dominates the cultural exchange, Chinese people who are known for their great cultural pride can ultimately alienate from Hallyu.Previous Korean governments did not pay much attention to this fact and continued to promote Hallyu as an export industry. However, Moon Jae-in's government realized this problem and stated that a significant cultural imbalance must be reduced in order to provide long-term stability of Hallyu in China. In spite of the fact that recently export conditions for the Korean Wave on the Chinese market have worsened significantly, China is still the largest and one of the most attractive markets for Hallyu. According to the Korea Creative Content Agency, China accounted for 27% of total Hallyu content in 20162016 Content Industry Statics. Korea Creative Content Agency, 2017..So the current task of the Korean government is to focus on creating the basis for the networks that will provide better relations between Korean and Chinese companies working with cultural content even under the conditions of Chinese government's tight control over Hallyu contentKim Hui-jeong. Op. cit. P.10..

According to �2016 - 2017 Global Hallyu Status� research by KOFICE, anti-Hallyu sentiment in 2016 rose up to 21.1% which is 4,9% higher than in 2015. The percentage was rather high in China, Japan, Taiwan, and India. Among the most common reasons for discontent were Hallyu content being�uniform�, �stale�, �too provocative�, �suggestive�, and �commercial�. As for the Chinese respondents, �Political and diplomatic tension between my country and Korea� was an often responseKim Hui-jeong. Op. cit. P. 6.. Thus, the anti-Hallyu sentiment in neighboring Asian countries can be related to the negative effect of diplomatic relationships between countries, not always by the Hallyu content itself.

One of such political issues that significantly hindered the spread of Korean Wave in China is China's 2016 tacitban on Korean entertainers and Korean pop culture products or �޺��� in Chinese (literally �Korea ban order�)The ban is not active in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.. This ban came after South Korea's agreement with the USA to deployTerminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system on its territory. On July 8^th, 2016, Korean Defense Ministry announced this decision, as a result, �THAAD�, �Korea ban order�, and �Chinese government� became the key words related to Hallyu policy in South Korea. News media quickly reported the response of China connected to the Korean entertainment business, beauty and tourism industries.Since 2016, no Korean drama has been broadcast on Chinese TV, no Korean pop artist has had a concert in China (except Hong Kong and Taiwan). The ban also led to the termination of cooperation projects in the cultural sphere. For example, the budget for �Building the Korea-China joint DB on cultural content� which received over 450 thousand USD in 2016, had to be cut entirely in 2017Kim Hui-jeong. Op. cit. P. 5..

While working on the survey for my thesis, I myself could fully make sure of the fact that Hallyu and Anti-Korea Banare currently �sensitive issues� for the Chinese government. My first attempt of making a survey failed because the Chinese website for online polls www.wjx.cn blocked my poll as a �containing sensitive content�.�As this questionnaire contains sensitive content, according to the relevant regulations of China and the requirements of the Network News Office, you need real-name certification [of a Chinese citizen], stamp the official seal of the organization and provide relevant approvals to view and download the data�Original text���ڴ��ʾ��а�����������?�������й���ط�����������Ű칫��Ҫ������Ҫʵ����֤�Ӹ����쵥λ���²��ṩ������IJ��ܲ鿴���������ݡ�See Appendix 1 for the screenshot., the message stated. As I had no chance to get access to the results, I had to make a second attempt by using Russian service of Yandex Forms. (I did not choose Google Forms because Google is blocked in China, and it would be harder for the participants to access the poll).

Although the ban on Korean cultural products at first seems to be China's political warning to South Korea after its decision to deploy THAAD, it also has a deeper intention to protect domestic culture and development of the Chinese cultural content on the global market Kyong-jin. Bigdata Review Analysis of media reports on Hallyu policy issues by regime. Hallyu Now. Korean Foundation for International Cultural Exchange (KOFICE) // Global Hallyu Issue Magazine, vol.21, 2017. - �11+12. P.27. Retrieved February 10, 2019 from

http://eng.kofice.or.kr/z99_include/filedown1.asp?filename=Hallyu%20Now%2011_12%20vol%2021.pdf.

However, according to the poll I conducted, some respondents think that the �Korea ban order� has a negative influence on China. Below are some of their answers. �The restrictions on the Korean language have made it impossible for the Chinese to understand current South Korea's development trends. K-pop is now a global trend, and the anti-Korean ban sets the barrier between the Chinese people and the development of the world�. � `Korea ban order' has hindered my understanding of the Korean Wave, as there are fewer channels for me to obtain information�. �In this situation [with the active ban] I feel that China's entertainment industry will never improve�See Appendix 2, question 28 of the poll.. Instead, over 54% of the people responded that the spread of South Korean cultural influence is more likely to be positive to China, along with 7.3% considering it definitely positive, compared to 30.9% who answered �Maybe not�See Appendix 2, question 26 of the poll..

The majority of the respondents, when asked in what way China's ban on South Korean pop culture affects them, mentioned the termination of activities involving Hallyu stars and the absence of their concerts in the Mainland China. Many mentioned that inability to meet their favorite Korean singers is the most disturbing thing for them. In order to see a concert of Korean stars, Chinese people need to go to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau or abroad which can be very problematic, especially considering the young age and low purchase power of Chinese Hallyu fansSee Appendix 2, question 28 of the poll..

Overall, only 1.8% and 3.6% of the respondents expressed their attitude towards the �Anti-Korean Ban� as �positive� and �strongly positive�, respectively. With the vast majority being �neutral� (70.9%), 20% are negative and 3.6% are very negative towards itIbid, question 27 of the poll..

In terms of economics, one of the factors hindering the Korean Wave in China is relativelylimited range of consumers Kim Ji-Eun. Op. cit. P. 16..Besides quickly gaining popularity in China, Hallyu did not manage to attract a wider audience from different regions and different social levels. For example, according to a survey, Korean dramas and pop music are more popular among the young urban population (especially female) with relatively high living standards. What is more, Hallyu as a phenomenon is also sometimes referred to the very limited part of Korean culture fans or �Hahanzu� mentioned earlier. Such people are obsessed not only with Korean pop culture but are also attracted to every aspect of this country - language, Korean products, fashion, etc. According to Kim Ji-Eun, the Chinese people accept Hallyu and Korean popular culture on different levels. Particularly, the most positive towards it are �Hahanzu� or �Hanmi� who contrast with people purposely denying Korean cultural products for various reasons. In between these two groups there are those who do not deny Korean pop culture but are not very interesting either. They can enjoy Korean cultural products from time to time but do not want to engage further into themKim Ji-Eun. Op. cit. P. 16-17..For example, the survey shows that the majority of the people who are attracted to K-pop consider it as a good hobby and are not extreme fans. In question 17, the respondents needed to choose one of three statements about their attitude to K-pop. 52.7% chose the option �K-pop is my hobby. I buy albums of my favorite groups and stuff from time to time. If I have a chance, I go to concerts�. While the rest of the people divided equally (23.6%) into those who chose that �K-pop is just good music, not more. It is just some interesting songs to boost the mood�, and those who consider that �K-pop is my whole life. I belong to a fandom, follow the news, read articles, comment online, download pictures and videos, vote for my favorite artists. I would go to every possible event and concert of my favorite singers, meet them at the airport if I had a chance�See Appendix 2, question 17 of the poll.. These results clearly illustrate the different levels in consuming Korean pop culture among the Chinese.

So one of the main challenges of the current South Korean Hallyu policy is to maintain a positive attitude within the Chinese population and try to attract a wider audience. According to the poll, the majority of the respondents (47.3%) are definitely positive that Korean Wave can help them understand Korea and Korean people more and relate to them, followed by 43.6% of those who consider it �more likely than not�Ibid, question 25 of the poll..

To cope with China's limitations of Korean Wave is a more complicated task. So even if Hallyu manages to keep the existing consumers, considering the 1.3 billion population of China, even partial involvement of the Chinese audience into consuming Korean cultural products can have significant cultural and economic consequences.

Several interrelated problems are also especially evident for the K-pop industry when it tries to come out into the Chinese market. Album sales face two challenges - the first one is low demand because the majority of K-pop fans are young Chinese whose purchase power is significantly limited, a more serious issue is piracy. �Infringement of copyrights is socially tolerated in China. Since the price gap between the real product and a pirated one is so large, piracy is prevalent�Soo Hyun Jang. Op. cit. P. 106.. As piracy is spread to such a scale, many Korean companies are not willing to invest in album releases in China.Organizing concerts is not an easy task either. Before 2016 when there was no ban on Korea, a lot of Korean singers held concert in China but few made profits from them for various reasons - like the need to share the money with Chinese agencies, strict approval procedures and sanctions of the Chinese government, etc. If it was not for Korean corporations' sponsorship, the problem could be even worse.Like physical albums, digital music sales do not bring much profit either because of chronic piracy. Common piracy preventing measures of the Chinese government and music industry have not been very efficient, so illegal downloads are still widely spread. However, with the introduction of new online music streaming services which provide legal access to digital music and strict governmental copyrighting policy, the situation is likely to become better and better in the future. Through these measures music industries of China and South Korea can strengthen bilateral cooperation in digital music sales.

Conclusion of Chapter III

Korean popular culture and Hallyu has become a representation of South Korean national image and brand over recent decades. Considering Korean Wave as a soft power and a good tool for the country's economic and political revival after the devastation of Korean War and the Asian Economic crisis, the South Korean government implemented various policies of promoting Hallyu as one of the export industries. In this regard, Korean Wave is a result of long-term hard work, planning and investment. However, such direct and evident support of Hallyu by the Korean government has led to some Chinese and foreign critics perceiving it as a product of Korean cultural imperialism. This provoked negative feelings and led to the emergence of anti-Hallyu movements in China and other countries of the world. That is why the present South Korean government has chosen to move away from promoting Hallyu as simply an export industry trying to diversify and balance cultural exchange with other countries and with China, in particular. This, however, is a very complex task as other political, economic, and socio-cultural factors intervene in the two countries' relations. China is still the biggest market for Hallyu, however, the strict governmental control and limitations have hindered Hallyu development in this country.Firstly, responding to some anti-Hallyu voices from the TV industry, the Chinese government significantly limited the number of Korean TV shows allowed to be broadcast on national TV, later it also tried to control online services through which Korean cultural products reach the Chinese audience and set various barriers for Korean entertainment companies making it highly problematic for them to operate in the Chinese market.The most representative example is the recent silent �Anti-Korean Ban� that the Chinese government imposed in 2016 as a response to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea. Since then, all official activities related to Hallyu havebeen terminated in Mainland China.Nevertheless, the Internet and Social Media still allows the Chinese people to catch up with the updates on Korean pop culture products and Hallyu celebrities. However, the range of Hallyu consumers is relatively limited to the young and mostly female fans. So attracting a wider audience is one of the challenges for Hallyu in China. Among other limitations are the remains of past conflicts and disputes on history and cultural heritage between China and Korea, as well as the chronic piracy still tolerated in China.



Conclusion

Since the late 1990s, replacing Japan, South Korea has become a center for the transnational popular culture production exporting its products and spreading its influence first to the countries of the Asian region and, more recently, to the rest of the world.The Chinese pop culture structure and the market demand for the Korean productions helped Hallyu quickly spread at the initial stage of its development.

Chinese language popular culture as a commercial industry structure within the East Asian cultural economywas initially centeredin Hong Kong and Taiwan. The domination of these territories was mostly prompted by the closed nature of the communist People's Republic of China and its exclusion from the global market. Only after the reforms and opening up, the Mainland China started to catch up with Hong Kong and Taiwanrealizing its great potential to become a dominant pop culture producer within the global Chinese speaking communityIn my thesis, I make a separation of these territories in terms of their different economic systems that lead to the different conditions in which the cultural industry is developing..

According to the purpose of my paper, I examined the Korean Wave as a cultural phenomenon within the context of China's modern popular culture. During my analysis, I defined modern-day China's popular culture as an integral part of the de-centered, multimodal, multilingual (in terms of different Chinese dialects), and well-integrated pop culture of the ethnic Chinese communities of different regions placed in broader terms of East Asian cultural economy.

After analyzing the reasons for Hallyu's popularity and its limitations in China, I draw conclusions that being a cultural phenomenon the Korean Wave can-not be reduced to a single cultural force. Instead, it is a multi-layered and multidimensional phenomenon with cultural, social, economic, and political implications.For instance, the economic aspect that contributed to the spread of Hallyu in China is the privatization of media enterprises in the 1990s, which, considering the weak domestic industry, had to fill the need in the relatively cheap and quality products by foreign (mostly Korean) imports.

In terms of cultural influence, Hallyu is not limited to the popularity of TV shows and musicbut is extended to the spread of Korean norms, values, sensibilities and lifestyles. Such complexity of the notion is due to the peculiarities of history and background of Hallyu in China. The term �Korean Wave� was coined by the Chinese media in the 1990s. At around that time, Korean TV dramas became hugely popular in China. These productions skillfully blended Eastern Confucian values with the Western individualist culture but were not as explicit and violent as American or Japanese productions.Thus, Korean dramas became a relatively safe cultural alternative for the US and Japanese pop cultures.In this sense, the Korean Wave managed to create a hybrid culture allowing different cultures to bond and communicate. Moreover, one of the most important factors is the cultural proximity of China and South Korea which allows Korean products to correspond to the spiritual and ethic need of Chinese consumers. The tendency to show a positive image of China in the Korean productions also contributed to the success of Hallyu in this country.And finally, high production quality (along with cheaper price in comparison to Japanese and American products) is one of the important reasons for the popularity of Korean pop culture products in China. Following the success of TV dramas, with the development of the Internet and social networks, K-pop became the primary agent of a Neo-Korean Wave in the 21^stcentury, spreading the cultural influence of Korean �idols� outside Korea. All these factors make the Korean Wave a cultural phenomenon in China.

However, various limitations for the Korean Wavestill exist in China. The South Korean government supported Hallyu in various ways regarding it as an image-maker, a great soft power tool, and a good instrument to strengthen the economic, political, and cultural influence of the country. This led to the emergence of the anti-Hallyu sentiment in different countries, particularly, in China where the government considered Korean Wave as the product of South Korea's cultural imperialism threatening to China's official socialist ideology.

The critics still regard Hallyu as a temporal phenomenon which affects only selected groups of the population. This problem of the limited range of Hallyu consumers in China exists, but the public opinion clearly shows that the phenomenon is likely to live due to the spread of Internet communications. Moreover, various critical voices in China and abroad condemn the Korean governmental direct involvement in advertising Hallyu as the national brand, while others criticize the excessive commercialization and a �factory-like� structure of Korean pop culture.

Over the past decades, the negative sentiment towards Hallyu in Chinahas also been heated up by various conflicts and disputes over some historical issues of shared cultural heritage. A recent Ban on South Korean cultural products in China has significantly limited the development of Hallyu there. Although the Internet still provides the Chinese audience with the channels to catch up with the Korean Wave, the official Hallyu-related activities in China have been totally terminated. Currently, South Korean entertainment companies face various obstacles in China and need to find other ways of going out to the Chinese market like making joint cooperations in TV production, using the Chinese sub-units in the K-pop industry, and etc. Gaining the Chinese Hallyu market back is one of the greatest challenges for the current South Korean government.

In the Chapters II and III and in Appendix 2 of my work I present the relevant results of the online survey among the Chinese university students on their attitude towards various aspects of Korean Wave. I think these results provide necessary figures to prove the conclusions outlined above.



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Appendix 1

Chinese Members of Korean Idol Groups

My goal in this analysis is to count the percentage of ethnic Chinese members of the K-pop groups. In this case, the people from Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan are included on the list as ethnic Chinese along with several members who are either Chinese raised abroad or of mixed nationality. To gather the information I used open Internet sources such as kprofiles.com, nowkpop.com, kpop.fandom.com as well as my personal experience and knowledge of Korean popular culture. Some of the groups presented in the analysis are already disbanded or reformed in some way. However, considering their input into the K-pop industry, their importance and popularity I feel it is necessary to include these groups into my analysis. The same situation is with the members themselves as some of them have already left the groups. However, most of them start a solo career either in China or in Korea, so they continue to be a part of the industry.

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