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Table of contents

• Introduction
• 1. The theoretical aspects of the EU foreign policy
• 1.1 The elaboration of common positions
• 1.2 The leading group in foreign policy
• 1.3 The handling of international crises
• 2. The European Union's handling of the Iranian nuclear crisis
• 2.1 The EU position on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
• 2.2 The EU-Iran relations
• 2.3 The EU-led negotiations with Iran
• 3. The Iranian nuclear problem as an example of European Union's handling international crises
• 3.1 “The European approach”
• 3.2 EU and its partners
• 3.3 The prospects of EU approach in the final solving of the Iranian case and in future international crises
• Conclusion
• Sources and Bibliography
• Sources
• Bibliography


Introduction

The European Union's common foreign and security policy has often become a subject of research for scholars. The EU is a new formation; many say it is a sui generis formation with no precedents in world history. The EU is no international organization, no state - yet, it tries to act in a way, which has traditionally been reserved to states, namely in the sphere of international relations.

The European common foreign and security policy has been studied quite often and mostly the discussion is about whether the EU has a potential to pursue an effective and active common foreign policy.

The major objective of this research is to find out, using the case of Iranian nuclear crisis as an example, whether the EU may have potential for successful handling of international crises, and whether it could be spoken of a `European approach” to issues of international peace and security. On the one hand, Iranian case demonstrates that the EU may act quite effectively on the international arena, but it remains unclear, whether this success is due to deepened cooperation among EU Member States and enhancement of CFSP's effectiveness or to some other reasons, and, consequently, whether it could have some lasting implications on European Union's common foreign policy. Iranian case here is of special interest, since it comprises both regional crisis (and EU relations with one particular country) and the global security issue, namely, the nuclear non-proliferation.

The research regards European foreign policy as intergovernmental and realist in its core, and shall be based on the neorealist paradigm of international relations. Thus, it is presumed, that European CFSP is driven by Member States, namely, by the most powerful and influential, and the development of CFSP as well as common actions by the EU are driven by Member States' necessity to pursue their interests more effectively.

In the research it shall be argued, that despite its intergovernmental nature, the EU common foreign policy may, in fact, be efficient and successful under certain circumstances and the EU may be regarded as an actor on the international arena. However, this happens not because of some institutional changes in the EU, but because Member States find this form more convenient for achievement of their goals.

Thus, the research question would be: taking Iran as a case, characterize the role of the EU in the crisis management and analyze how this case reflects the main characteristics of the EU common foreign and security policy, its strengths and weaknesses.

The research tasks shall be:

v To analyze the EU handling of Iranian nuclear crisis

v To analyze the EU politics on non-proliferation of WMD

v To analyze the process of elaborating common positions in the EU in the sphere of the CFSP

v To elaborate the notion “European approach” to handling international crises

v To elaborate possible outcomes for such approach in Iranian crisis and further

v To present generalized conclusions about the EU actions in crisis management

To reach the objectives of the research at first there shall be conducted an analysis of the way the EU common foreign and security policy functions, with the examples of the previous actions. Then, there will be presented an analysis of the case study in question, and finally, generalized conclusions, derived from the case study and suitable for application in other cases. The main resources for the research are the documents, related to the EU common foreign and security policy, and official documents issued on behalf of the EU and other E3+3 negotiators during the Iranian crisis.

The Iranian nuclear crisis has lasted more than a decade and only recently it could be spoken of a possibility of having it finally solved. The EU action during Iranian nuclear crisis has often been the object of research and it should be admitted that it had been described thoroughly, in various aspects, yet, the papers were concentrating either on sanctions as an instrument of European coercive diplomacy, or were trying to evaluate the impact of the EU to the Iranian crisis solvation, the effectiveness of the EU foreign policy towards Iran and the chances of parties coming to an agreement. Generally, the Iranian case is agreed to be a good example of the European CFSP in action, and it is often spoken of a so-called “European approach” to the crisis management, as different from approaches of other world powers, though rarely defined other than comprising diplomatic and coercive measures.

The following paper is taking all the previous research in consideration and aims at deriving some generalized conclusions about not only the EU impact on the Iranian crisis (presuming it to be close to final resolution), but an impact of this crisis on the European Union's common foreign and security policy, presenting the prospects this experience gives to the EU as an actor. It also tries to assess the European foreign policy from a realist positions, though the EU is usually denied the right to be considered an actor in a realist perception. Taking into account the current international situation, first and foremost, the Ukrainian crisis, which would demand of the EU some common action, the paper may add up to the debates about the EU action in crisis management, the scope of its capabilities and limitation to its common actions.

The paper consists of three chapters and is organized as follows. The first chapter is dealing with the theoretical aspects of European foreign policy, analyzing the way the EU elaborates and presents its common foreign and security policy. The second chapter represents a case study - analysis of the European handling of the Iranian nuclear crisis. The third chapter is dedicated to generalizing the actions of the EU during the Iranian crisis and driving out the perspectives for the EU actions in handling Iranian and future crises. The conclusion corresponds to the main aim of the research and speculates about the EU perspectives as an international actor according to the Iranian case.

1. The theoretical aspects of the EU foreign policy

The European Union is more and more often regarded as a single actor on the international arena. It should be remembered though that common foreign and security policy, which used to constitute the so called 2^nd pillar under the Maastricht treaty of 1992, is still the least integrated area of the EU architecture. It shouldn't be forgotten, that foreign and security policy is the most specific issue of country's sovereignty, which member states are not eager to pass on supranational level. Yet in changing and insecure environment the EU member states, even the most powerful, couldn't still be confident in their position and possibility to play significant role in the international system. Thus, common actions may be more effective and EU speaking with a single voice may be more efficient in promoting its values and positions on international stage. This may be regarded as a good reason for European countries to cooperate more closely under the auspices of Common Foreign and Security policy. The problem is, however, that there may be disagreement over some crucial questions of international relations among the 28 EU countries, as it happened in case of Iraq, Libya or Ukraine. Yet, there are some questions when public opinion and positions of governments of Member States are the same and it is possible to elaborate and define common position. The nuclear non-proliferation as in case of the Iranian nuclear programme seems to be a good example to examine.

According to the Treaty on the European Union, the EU “shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a higher degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: <…>( c ) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders”. Thus, dealing with international crises, including those related to matters of international security is supposed to be one of the EU tasks on international arena, and the Union has enough competences for acting in the sphere, since it is stipulated by the Treaties.

From it very beginning as European political cooperation, the sphere of common foreign policy was purely intergovernmental and there could hardly be named any attempts to bring it to complete supranational regulation. Yet, the European component has been increasing steadily, resulting in the formation of position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and European External Action Service.

Any discussion about European common foreign and security policy is usually preceded by the theoretical debates about what kind of international actor the EU constitutes. First and foremost, it seems appropriate to define our understanding of the actorness in the international relations. There have been many works dedicated to this issue and many scholars have given their own interpretation of the term and criteria of actorness. To sum all these notions it could be said, that being an actor of international relations means to be capable to behave actively, to elaborate and pursue interests, to act independently and to be recognized by other participants of the international systems. Mostly these criteria are applicable to states, having both interests and capabilities to be active on the international arena. Yet, the EU, though not being a state, has some characteristics, which allow applying the notion of actorness to it as well. Undoubtedly, the EU is an actor in the international system, yet the limits of its actions are determined by the individual Member States. Indeed, the EU activity in the world varies dependent on the sphere of action - which is best depicted by the saying that it's an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm. It is often said that the EU is a normative power, acting mostly through its “soft power”, trying to impose its idea of rights and freedoms on its partners, acting through norms and being guided mostly by norms, not by interests. Indeed, this concept presumes that the EU does not act as a typical world power, partly, because it simply does not have enough means for such kind of action.

The foreign policy has traditionally remained a part of national sovereignty, since it is based on each nation's specific interests and capabilities. No doubt, that such a complicated organism as European Union, with 28 states with quite a variety of means and goals may find it difficult indeed to elaborate any common position. As a result, among all classical theories of European integration, the intergovernmental theory seems the most applicable to the foreign policy, as it claims, that countries integrate as long as they find integration to be a suitable instrument for achieving their goals. This idea corresponds to the vision of neorealism, highlighting states as primary international actors, according to which the EU “acts as a vehicle for the collective interests of its member states'.

Thus, countries act independently most of the time and try to elaborate common positions when they find it more useful. Lately, however, we may notice, that the EU tries to come to some common position even when the positions of the nation-states are obviously quite different. Surely, “the EU is mainly active where internal consensus is easily achieved, not where external demands are most pressing”. There still exists a certain move towards the so called communitarization - of foreign policy, namely, the establishment of new offices such as EEAS and High Representative for CFSP, yet, these measures are merely technical and serve to improvement and, to some extent, complication, of the negotiation process among Member States, leaving the intergovernmental basis of the CFSP unchanged. Paradoxically, though European common foreign and security policy remains almost entirely in the hands of national governments, they tend to use the EU as a presenter of commonly agreed positions, which makes them sound more intensively on the international arena.

As a major cause for such development I would like consider not internal reasons of the European integration, but a set of external reasons, determined by international environment. Taking into account the growing instability in the world, the world economic crisis, the emergence of new powers, particularly in Asia, the lowering roles of international organizations and revival of force factor, turn to realpolitik, European countries seem to be losing momentum. None of them on their own, even such strong nations as the UK, France and Germany, due to their internal reasons, are no longer capable to conduct an independent foreign policy, based on force, as they do not have enough resources. However, the process of European integration has led to certain unity of European economies, making unilateral economic measures quasi impossible. Yet, as a whole, economically the EU presents a significant power, which couldn't be ignored, although any attempts to transfer such union on military aspects have been constantly unsuccessful, though still undertaken. European Union even as a whole does not represent a military power, but can be considered a powerful economic actor.

Though according to realistic theories, emergence of a truly common European foreign and security policy seems highly unlikely, if not impossible, it couldn't be ignored, that sharing common security interests and lacking capabilities to promote their positions on their own, European states will tend to use the EU framework on the international arena in order to ensure better security. This seems to be totally pragmatic and practical, and though there probably will not be any European Foreign Ministry in a traditional view, we may more and more often see common European positions articulated in response to international challenges.

1.1 The elaboration of common positions

It is considered, that “while the EU aspires to play a greater role, its actorness and effectiveness cannot be taken for granted given the nature of the EU as a multilevel and semi-supranational polity, encompassing 28 member states with diverse foreign policy preferences and positions”.

Since the European member states are the main actors determining the EU common positions, as long as CFSP remains highly intergovernmental, it is vital to pay attention to the variety of positions inside the EU. It goes without saying that European countries are quite different when it comes to interests and capabilities, their foreign policies also have different scales. For some countries, such as the United Kingdom, the European common foreign policy presents an additional option, a chance to extend its influence, but for some others, which are underrepresented in international organizations and fora, the EU dimension may be the only accessible, the only chance to make themselves heard.

To sum up, there is a “collective and persistent problem of reconciling the continuing, sometimes jealously guarded, capacity for national foreign policymaking with the declared aspiration, and the evolving infrastructure for a common effective European foreign and security policy”.

The process of taking decisions under the second pillar has been changing from Maastricht to Lisbon; yet, the leading role was always left with the Council, as the “most” intergovernmental institution of the EU. The Lisbon reforms, such as creation of the position of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security policy and the establishment of the EEAS were supposed to introduce certain level of communitarity in the CFSP, making it more “European” - one may remember, that initially, in the project of the EU constitution, the post of Baroness Ashton was supposed to be the minister of foreign affairs. Surely and predictably, states didn't go as far as to completely delegate their functions in the domain of the foreign policy to the Union's level.

All the actual work on elaboration of common positions is conducted in the Council, namely, its foreign affairs formation and the Political and Security Committee, where is conducted most of preparatory work. Particular attention should be paid to the fact, that it is elaborated by the countries' foreign ministers and other diplomats, acting on behalf of their states and governments, representing their positions. Since the number of countries reached 28, it is quite difficult to achieve a compromise, especially, taking into account the veto right, each country possesses in such questions. Thus, the very system of taking decisions in the field of CFSP demonstrates its intergovernmental nature and leads to the adoption of decision, which constitutes the least common denominator and can barely lead to some real consequences. Though the veto right is considered a major stumbling block in the process of taking decisions in CFSP there are several exemptions, listed in paragraphs 2,3 (Article 31, TEU), for example, in cases when Council adopts decision defining action or position, based on previously adopted decision about Union's strategic interests and objectives. Decisions, having military consequences may be taken only unanimously. Any Member State may declare its abstention, yet it accepts the decision to be binding to the Union. As it seems, these clauses are intended merely to facilitate the process and to avoid some inconveniences arousing form the obligation to act only unanimously. The core and principal decisions are taken unanimously.

According to the Treaty on the European Union, the European Council is the body defining strategic interests and objectives of the Union in the form of decisions, acting unanimously on a recommendation from the Council. As for the competence, it “should cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security”. It is important to note, that common foreign and security policy is to be put into effect by High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Member States, which, on the one hand, emphasizes the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, but on the other, de facto names the HR as a single voice, speaking for the Union as a whole. An interesting question though is how the HR and representatives of the Member States are supposed to cooperate and present commonly agreed positions.

As for the role of High Representative, it was generally supposed to bring together the Council, Commission and the EEAS, of which the HR is a head. Yet, the role of HR in the Treaty was described quite ambiguously, leaving space to different interpretations, and making the position quite dependent on the personality of a person, which is holding the post. In the case of Baroness Ashton, she seems to be more willing to work with the Council and doesn't seem to be trying to make EU foreign policy less intergovernmental, at least, when it comes to giving more power to supranational institutions.

1.2 The leading group in foreign policy

It is much said and written about the certain groups in the EU, as the system of votes is designed in a way, which prevents one country, however powerful it is, to act without regard of others. In foreign policy the situation is slightly different, due to its intergovernmental nature and veto right, granted to each member-state.

Yet, in the field of foreign policy we may say of a certain directoire, the E3, including Great Britain, Germany and France. This group has never been formally institutionalized, nor written down in the Treaties. It simply unites the 3 most powerful countries in terms of foreign presence. Most notable about this group is the presence of the UK, which is usually highly Eurosceptic and trying to keep as far as possible from any supranational initiatives. Yet, for the EU CFSP the UK's participation is essential, both because of its own political weight and the special relationship with the US. The UK participation is important to the country itself as well, since its position in EU affects its relations with the US, the main ally.

France has long been an active participant on the international arena, always trying to pursue its foreign policy independently. Being a nuclear power and a permanent UN Security Council member, France is used to perceive itself as a superpower,

“mais nous voulons agir en Europe, nous voulons que l'Europe s'affirme comme un acteur politique du premier plan”

Though being a powerful actor itself, France seeks the participation in EU to enhance its positions, to use the EU for reaching some goals, which it cannot reach on its own.

Germany is the most powerful economy in the EU and one of the strongest economies in the world. Politically, though, the country became known for its rational and moderate positions, being usually not supportive of military actions of any kind.

According to German Foreign ministry, European Union is a mean for countries to reach common objectives:

“Nur gemeinsam haben die EU-Mitgliedstaaten spuerbares internationales Gewicht: je grosser die Einigkeit und die Kohaerenz des EU-Aussenhandelns, desto groesser die Handlungsfaehigkeit der EU”.

Thus, the EU is a means of uniting efforts for the European Member States; it provides MS with more capabilities and instruments.

It is quite interesting to research the nature of the E3 group, whether it is going to be somehow institutionalized or, for instance, changed, in view of UK's desire to revise its relations with the EU as a whole. Also it can be studied, having access to specific sources, how do the three countries manage to come up with a single European position, since there are sometimes differences among them.

A specific attention should be drawn to the personality of the official, doing most of the EU representation in the world. After the Treaty of Amsterdam the position of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy was long held by Javier Solana, who proved to have added value to the position. His active diplomacy, though not always successful, has quite improved the visibility of the EU as a single actor.

Baroness Ashton, in her turn, is often criticized for being unable to find the agreement between the EU institutions or incapable of performing all her duties as stated in the Treaties. Yet, it should be taken into account the novelty of the position and number of issues the HR has to address. In terms of international presence, Baroness Ashton is certainly trying to speak in the name of united Europe on most occasions.

1.3 The handling of international crises

The capability of an actor to perform its policy on international arena is best seen during the crises, which demands of it maximum efforts and demonstrates its capacity to articulate and defend a certain position. In case of the EU it is of special importance since before presenting single position to the world it needs first to arrive to it inside, reach an agreement between 28 countries. In fact, crises, “when speed places a premium on policy-making capacity and the rapid exploitation of appropriate policy instruments” present major challenge for the EU ability to pursue common foreign policy.

As for the means to pursue an agreed policy, it should be said about the sanctions since due to the certain characteristics of the EU as an actor, it may be the only available and effective measure of coercive diplomacy at its disposal. The Council decision stipulates, that “if necessary, the Council will impose autonomous EU sanctions in support of efforts to fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and as a restrictive measure to uphold respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance”. Yet the sanctions are regarded as a part of a comprehensive approach, including various diplomatic measures.

The 2003 European Security Strategy enumerated several major threats to the world's and Union's security: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. As for the ways of addressing these issues, the Strategy speaks about “the full spectrum of instruments at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities”.

Thus, first and foremost the EU declares itself at international actor, being able to conduct is policy, protect its citizens and its interests in various regions of the world, though, particular attention is paid to Neighbouring regions, Balkans and Middle East. Also, though always highlighting the cooperation with NATO, especially in the sphere of security, since 2003 the EU also speaks about its own instruments, listing among them not only political and diplomatic, but also military.

The Israeli-Palestinian case presents a perfect example of how the EU acted throughout the time in finding solution to international crises. Since the establishment of European political cooperation, the countries of European Communities tried to elaborate common positions about the conflict. There have been different opinions and member states disagreed on many issues: France and Italy were more supportive of Arab positions, Germany and the Netherlands - of Israeli. Yet towards 1990-s the countries managed to arrive to a common position and even helped to “facilitate the emergence of a broad international consensus on Middle East peace-making, making it easier for other actors - including the US, Israel and key Arab countries - to later adopt similar views on core parameters of conflict resolution”. It should also be noted, that the EU managed to elaborate a position distinct from the US, although the EU is often blamed on being dependent on the US.

Yet, despite some success in 1990-s and 2000-s after enlargement there became more difficult to come to a common positions with some of the new member states being closer to the US and Israeli position. The EU became part of the Middle East quartet and strongly advocated the two-states solution. The decision of the Palestine Autonomy to apply for an observer-status in the UN again caused the division among European states. Thus, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a good example of EU conflict resolution, though it may be not considered absolutely successful.

Another famous case testing the EU capacity to conduct common foreign policy was the Iraq crisis of 2003, which brought to a serious division among member states by their attitude to the invasion to Iraq.

One of the latest examples of MS divisions over international crises, is Germany abstention during the vote in the “no-fly-zone” over Libya in UN Security Council, while France and Great Britain voted “yes”.

The Iranian case, however, managed to make European member states to arrive to consensus at least about the existence of a threat and necessity to deal with it. As it will be shown later, the discussion about the means existed but it could still be spoken about a single position.

Iranian case is of particular interest for the study of EU common foreign policy, not only because it includes both handling a global issue - nuclear non-proliferation and bilateral relations with a regional power, but also because it presents almost a unique opportunity to see the EU acting as a single actor with its specific position, interests and means of action.

In conclusion it should be said, that the goals and means of the EU CFSP are quite well explained by the intergovernmental theory of the European integration, yet the system of world politics returns to realistic basis, thus, only the actors having enough power, would be playing an active role in the future. Since no EU country has enough resources to be considered such an actor, it is expected to act as a whole, at least in cases, when the Member States positions do not vary dramatically. Thus, theoretically, the EU foreign policy remains intergovernmental, though in order to secure their interests in a better way, Member States may seek to elaborate common positions and lead common actions. Though the EU is traditionally criticized for its inability to “speak with one voice” and lack of common positions on many issues, de facto blocking the decision-making process, the case of Iranian nuclear programme may present a certain exception, which could have important consequences for the development of CFSP in the nearest future.

2. The European Union's handling of the Iranian nuclear crisis

Since it has been stated, that the Iranian case is of specific interest due to its dual nature, encompassing both an issue of international security and bilateral relations with a country of a strategically important region, it was considered logical to separate the following chapter into three parts. The first part covers the EU policy on a global issue of non-proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction, namely, the nuclear weapons. The second deals with the EU-Iran relations before and during the nuclear crisis, and the third part focuses on the negotiations with Iran concerning the nuclear programme and the EU's role in it.

2.1 The EU position on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destructions and above all the nuclear weapon is one of the most pressing issues of world security. As for the history of the question, when the world powers got nuclear bombs and ways of its delivery, it became evident that such weapon present a terrible threat to human race and its production and usage should be kept under control of international community. The basic document on non-proliferation remains the Non-Proliferation treaty, signed in 1968 and establishing the so-called non-proliferation regime. First of all, it prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons or it elements not to “assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices”. The right to have nuclear weapons was reserved to 5 permanent members of the UNSC, who managed to have nuclear tests done before 1968. Yet, the Treaty wasn't signed by all UN member-states and didn't prevent India and Pakistan from becoming nuclear powers, though not officially recognized.

There is one question, making the control over nuclear non-proliferation more difficult: the Treaty stipulates the right of every country to develop any peaceful nuclear activities in order to produce nuclear energy under the control and surveillance of International Atomic Energy Agency. Yet any peaceful nuclear programme can be potentially turned into a military, aiming at creating nuclear weapons. Thus the instrument of control seems to acquire special importance. The IAEA enforces its control mainly through the system of safeguards, intended to verify the information states provide about their nuclear activities, including access to nuclear facilities.

Undoubtedly, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and above all, the nuclear weapon, is one of the security priorities for the Union. Its importance was once again stipulated in the 2003 European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council and reaffirmed in its 2008 review. According to the Treaty on the European Union (Art.22) the European Council is bound to take decisions on strategic interests and objectives and may refer to specific country, region or issue.

According to the 2003 EU Security Strategy, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the most serious threats to the Union's security. Though the Security Strategy is merely a declaration, it outlines “the basis for an European WMD non-proliferation strategy”. In particular, it names the potential risky areas, such as Middle East, North Korea and South Asia, the way of action, enhancing international cooperation, via multilateral fora and organizations, and enumerating some of the instruments at Union's disposal.

Later in 2003 the Political and Security Committee presented the “Basic principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, where the WMD were characterized as extremely dangerous “not only because of their capacity to cause death on a large scale but also because they could destabilize the international system”. The plan of action against any potential threat of the kind is envisaged as follows: political and diplomatic preventative measures and appeal to relevant international organizations (IAEA in the case of nuclear weapons), political dialogue and diplomatic pressure. In case these measures fail, actions should be taken under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which, in turn, includes sanctions and other measures up to the use of force. The central role is to belong to the UN Security Council.

Thus, the EU once again proclaims its adherence to multilateralism, acting within international organizations, namely of the UN system, and in accordance with international law. Also the document once again declares the EU orientation on preventing the threats rather than dealing with it when it is already there.

In 2003 for the first time the EU has also adopted the EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD, where again, there were enumerated threats and ways of handling them. Of particular interest there can be possible instruments that EU has available: “multilateral treaties and verification mechanisms; national and internationally-coordinated export controls; cooperative threat reduction programmes; political and economic levers (including trade and development policies); interdiction of illegal procurement activities and, as a last resort, coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter”.

There should be mentioned, that the elaboration of a single position in case of nuclear non-proliferation was complicated since member states had and still have different approaches to nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. As already mentioned, two European countries have nuclear weapons, 4 NATO-members participate in the programme of “nuclear sharing”, hosting US nuclear weapons on their territory - Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Among EU member states there are also 4 countries, which are completely nuclear-free and strongly advocate disarmament: Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. Thus,

“nuclear non-proliferation action of the Union in terms fundamentally different from its role in averting chemical and biological weapons proliferation, as in these fields, all Member States are signatories to the relevant conventions and none possesses those weapons”.

Different nuclear statuses of EU member states certainly do not facilitate finding compromises and elaborating single positions.

Particular attention should be drawn to the two of EU member states possessing nuclear weapons under the NPT - the UK and France. Though their nuclear arsenal couldn't be compared to those of the US and Russia, it still presents a significant deterring power. It is important to study British and French nuclear strategies.

The UK strategy starts with admitting the fact, that traditional role of the nuclear weapons has changed significantly with the end of the Cold War, yet the refusal of nuclear powers to disarm multilaterally makes British government willing to preserve its nuclear potential in order to keep its ability to deal with existing and possible future threats. One of such threats the paper names “regional powers developing nuclear weapons for the first time”, a definition which may as well be applicable to Iran. Thus, nuclear weapons are a sort of insurance against all possible risks the future may present. The UK already has the smallest amount of nuclear warheads among all official nuclear powers and seeks to reduce its amount provided the success of multilateral efforts for preserving and enhancing the non-proliferation regime, keeping disarmament as a final objective.

As for France, it not only remains one of 5 legitimate nuclear powers, it has a wide range of nuclear capacities in the sphere of peaceful usage of nuclear energy. In fact about 80% of electric energy in France is produced on nuclear power plants, providing also huge amount of working places. Thus, nuclear energy for France is not only weapon, but a significant part of national economy.

While mentioning Iran and Korea as major threats to nuclear non-proliferation, official Paris states that:

“les violations par ces Etats de leurs obligations ont йbranlй la confiance de la communautй internationale et sont susceptibles de nuire au dйveloppement de la coopйration internationale dans le domaine des usages pacifiques de l'йnergie nuclйaire, au dйtriment de tous les autres Etats respectuex de leur obligations ».

For France international cooperation in the sphere of peaceful usage of nuclear energy is quite important for economic reasons. As for solution to the problem, French government speaks about the necessity for strengthening the non-proliferation regime, first and foremost through the IAEA.

As for Iran, France declares its adherence to a double approach, uniting

“ouverture au dialogue et fermetй face aux agissements iraniens, soutenue par l'adoption de sanctions de plus en plus fortes а l'йncontre de Tйhйran”.

To sum up, both European nuclear powers regard their nuclear weapons as deterrent against real and emerging threats, coming from proliferation. To fight it, they both suggest strengthening of multilateral mechanisms, based on TNP and IAEA.

It should also be mentioned previous nuclear crises and the way EU handled them. Before Iranian case there could be named 2 major crises of nuclear proliferation, related to India and Pakistan, and North Korea.

The crisis in India and Pakistan happened in 1998, when both countries led nuclear tests. The only European reply was given in several declarations issued months after the tests and urging countries to join NPT. There could be hardly said about any collective measures: “some Member States - notably Denmark, Germany and Sweden - froze their development aid, other countries like Spain or France abstained from any measures beyond condemnation, because they believe that, as non-signatories to the NPT, these countries were under no obligation to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons”.

In case of North Korea, the EU has donated a lot of money to a peaceful development of nuclear energy on Korean peninsula, namely to the KEDO - Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation, whose purpose was to persuade North Korea abandon its military nuclear programme in exchange for assistance in construction of reactors for peaceful purposes. Yet, political and diplomatic handling of the proliferation problem on peninsula remained with the US, the EU is not even presented among the participants of the Six-Party-Talks. Different from India and Pakistan, North Korea was a signatory of the NPT, yet withdrew it signature after the nuclear bomb testing.

In general, previous EU efforts in non-proliferation could hardly be considered persistent or especially successful until the Iranian case.

Iran signed the non-proliferation treaty and was going to start its atomic energy programme in 1970s, aiming at elaborating nuclear activities as source of energy. The Islamic revolution of 1979 changed not only the situation in the country, but its position in the world, making the regime of ayatollahs the arch-enemy of western democracies, namely the USA. At first Islamic government abandoned the nuclear programme, but later, especially in the 1990-s the country returned to the idea of elaborating nuclear energy. In 1995 when Russia and Iran concluded an agreement on building a nuclear power plant in Busher, the US immediately reacted by introducing unilateral economic sanctions on Iran. In 2000s there were numerous concerns about the peaceful character of Iranian nuclear programme, since the government persistently refused to let IAEA experts to its nuclear objects. For quite a long time there was no single opinion about the necessity to intervene in the nuclear programme of the sovereign country, especially taking into account the unstable situation on Middle East. In 2010 members of the UNSC managed to arrive to a resolution #1929, introducing economic sanctions on Iran. It marked a significant change, since for the long period of time two of 5 permanent SC members (Russia and China) opposed to using of sanctions and insisted on Iran's right to pursue its peaceful nuclear programme. For ten years the negotiations were led in the 6-party form, including permanent members of UNSC plus Germany on the one hand and Iran on the other.

During the session of 1^st Committee of the UN General Assembly, the EU representative envisaged the common position of the Union, to which aligned several non-members. The Representative stated that the main goals and means of the EU in the sphere of nuclear non-proliferation are “effective multilateralism, prevention and international cooperation”.

The EU once again stresses the importance of the NPT “as a cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and an important element in the further development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes”.

It may be concluded, that though the EU has always declared its adherence to the NPT and the non-proliferation regime, its actions during the previous proliferation crises were hardly united and did not have any considerable effects. Thus, Iranian case presents a first example of European successful action in the sphere of nuclear non-proliferation.

2.2 The EU-Iran relations

It is important to briefly characterize the EU relations with Iran before the emerging of the nuclear conflict. Contrast to the US, which never accepted the Islamic State, the EU has wide economic ties with the country and in 2002 was on a verge of signing the Trade and Cooperation Treaty. Moreover, the EU “has always expressed its wish to gradually deepen bilateral relations with the country”. That could be explained by several reasons.

First of all, Iran is one of the largest suppliers of crude oil in the world and the EU needs fuel. Secondly, the EU is closer to the Middle East region, in fact, after the last enlargement it is even considered as a neighboring region and some countries of the Middle East even participate in the ENP, such as Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria + Armenia and Azerbaijan (which are neighbours of Iran, though normally are referred to as South Caucasus, rather than Middle East). Thus, the EU is interested in preserving peace and stability at its borders and seeks cooperation with all regional powers, to which Iran does belong without any doubt.

It should always be remembered that for the EU constructive relationship with Iran is very important in order to “achieve its common security and defense objectives while safeguarding its commercial and energy interests”.

Immediately after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the relations were nonetheless almost non-existent and they are still very much dependent on the internal situation in the country and its readiness to participate in any form of dialogue. Being unable to ignore some peculiarities of the new Iranian regime, yet needing to establish some form of communication, during the 1990s the EU adopted a form of “critical dialogue” with Iran, criticizing it for human rights problems, support for terrorism and uncompromising position on the Middle East peace process, while still having economic and political relations. After the end of the Cold war, death of Ayatollah Khomeini, and election of Akbar Rafsanjani, the relations between Iran and Europe started to develop progressively:

“Iran viewed Europe as a source of badly needed credit and investment, while Europe saw Iran - newly free of Soviet influence and still isolated by the US - as an open source for trade and energy resources”.

Election of more moderate Mr. Khatami in 1997 helped to turn the “critical dialogue” into a “comprehensive” dialogue. The period of Mr. Khatami's presidency may well be considered as the apex of the EU-Iran relations. The dialogue included meeting in Troika format every 6 month and exchange of opinions on global and regional issues. The EU also launched a Human Rights Dialogue. The sharp decline followed in 2002 when Iranian nuclear programme became an issue of international concern.

Being a signatory of NPT, Iran nevertheless refused to sign an additional protocol providing a better safeguard system for nuclear plants, also, in the same time, the IAEA proved, that Iran was building two facilities for production of nuclear weapons.

It was the EU, and namely the EU-3, who managed to persuade Iran to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Additional Protocol in 2003 in Paris, paving the way to increase of the IAEA inspections to Iran nuclear objects and, more broadly, to a search of diplomatic and multilateral solution to the problem. This success was a result of a quite unusual diplomatic action by leading European countries - “although they acted in their capacity as individual states rather than by troika delegation acting on behalf of the Union”. The Foreign Ministers of the UK, France and Germany visited Tehran and managed to persuade Iranian government to a compromise, including signing of the Additional Protocol and suspension of uranium enrichment. This success became a great chance for European diplomacy to establish itself as chief negotiator for Iranian nuclear programme, though the actions of E3 were in no way institutionalized by European institutions.

From the very beginning of the conflict over Iranian nuclear programme the EU got a more weighted position, contrast to the US, eager to condemn any nuclear activity of the Islamic State. The EU leaders, surely, understood, that Iran nuclear programme may present threats to peace and security, but were bound by contracts and economic ties. Yet with time their official position was only becoming tougher, especially with Mr. Ahmadinejad being elected as the President of the Islamic republic. Not only the anti-Israeli rhetoric of the new President, but also an announcement of the plans for uranium enrichment made it even more difficult for the EU to continue its diplomatic efforts. Javier Solana, the then-European Union's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy was the chief western negotiator with Iran and was constantly trying to promote peaceful solution to the problem. Unfortunately, all proposals were rejected by Iranian government. In 2006 the Iranian nuclear dossier was for the first time sent to the UNSC, which eventually led to the introduction of the UN sanctions on the Islamic republic.

In general, 18 European member-states have embassies in Tehran, including France, Germany, Spain, Italy and others. Iran has embassies in 21 EU MS. The UK is the only big European countries which does not have diplomatic relations with Iran on ambassadorial level. The embassies of two countries remain closed. Yet, recently after a progress in nuclear talks, in November 2013 the UK and Iran both appointed non-resident chargйs d'affaires, which may be regarded as a step towards enhancing bilateral relations.

Germany has strong bilateral relations with Iran, economic and cultural ties.

As is noted by French ministry of foreign affairs,

“Les relations diplomatiques avec l'Iran ont connu une continuitй, y compris au plus fort des tensions politiques. Le bon fonctionnement de nos emprises diplomatiques, afin que le lien direct entre Tйhйran et Paris soit maintenu, a toujours constituй une prioritй”.

French diplomatic service declares that despite any problems and disagreements, the direct contact between European countries and Iran should always exist, that is a priority, which could not be simply rejected.

Economic relations with Iran were the key reason to avoid introduction of oil-related sanctions - the main instrument of coercive diplomacy the EU had at its disposal. It is interesting to mention, that within the EU there was no single opinion on the necessity of sanctions. In 2006 there were first sanctions on Iran introduced under the auspices of the UN. In 2007 France and Great Britain were supporting the introduction of even more European sanctions, but the coalition of Italy, Germany and Austria didn't support this initiative. In 2010 when the sanctions were reinforced the discussion within the EU remained. New set of sanctions were aimed not only at the nuclear activities, but to the oil export, that constitutes the base of EU-Iranian economic and trade relations.

“The EU27 as a combined entity was Iran's second-largest trading partner, with 27 billion Euros worth of bilateral trade - just over 16% of total Iranian trade. The EU served as Iran's second-largest export market and third-largest source of imports. During the same year, Iran was the eighth-largest exporter of fuel to the EU”.