On the constitutional regulation of the accession clause of hungary to the European Union

According to Article E) Paragraph (2) sentence 2, “Exercise of competences under this paragraph shall comply with the fundamental rights and freedoms provided for in the Fundamental Law and shall not limit the inalienable right of Hungary to determine its territorial unity, population, form of government and state structure.” According to the Constitutional Court, the seventh amendment to Article E) lays down constitutional control in the first phrase; and sovereignty and identity control in the second phrase. This is done on the level of Fundamental Law. (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.), Reasoning [25]).

The second sentence of Article E) Paragraph (2) therefore formulates further constitutional-level requirements and content limitations in relation to the joint exercise of powers within the framework of the Union, i.e. it only allows the delegation of the exercise of powers under certain conditions, subject to the enforcement of certain provisions. These requirements and limitations obviously do not apply to the European Union or its member states, but to the Hungarian state, more specifically to state organs and officials participating in the exercise of EU powers. The Fundamental Law of Hungary is not binding on either the Union or other member states, as neither its territorial nor its personal scope extends to them. At the same time, it is the duty of the Hungarian state to bear in mind these requirements of the Fundamental Law when exercising its powers within the European Union, to act in accordance with the constitutional provisions, to comply with those, because the framework set by the Fundamental Law must also be respected in the case of jointly exercised powers (Decision of the Constitutional Court 2/2019. (III. 5.), Reasoning [23]).

This general definition does not clarify the situation when the exercise of EU powers (jointly with the other member states, through Union institutions) conflicts with the requirements laid down in the Fundamental Law. It is clear that in case the joint exercise of powers is not consistent with the fundamental rights and freedoms laid down in the Hungarian constitution, or in case it limits the inalienable right of Hungary to make decisions related to its territorial unit, population, form of government and state structure, then a violation of the Fundamental Law will occur. According to Article R) Paragraph (4) of the Fundamental Law, “the protection of the constitutional identity and Christian culture of Hungary shall be an obligation of every organ of the State.” The seventh amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary added the following sentence to the National Avowal: “We hold that the protection of our identity rooted in our historic constitution is a fundamental obligation of the State.” Article 3 of the amendment added the following paragraph to Article R) of the Fundamental Law: “(4) The protection of the constitutional identity and Christian culture of Hungary shall be an obligation of every organ of the State.” This constitutional order makes it clear for the Hungarian state organs that they may no longer participate in the joint exercise of powers in violation of the prescribed constitutional conditions, otherwise they must bear the constitutional responsibility. The Constitutional Court made it clear that the respect and protection of the constitutional identity of Hungary is mandatory for everyone (including the Parliament, participating in the decision-making mechanism of the European Union, as well as the Government, directly participating therein). According to Article 24 Paragraph (1), the principal organ for the protection of the Fundamental Law is the Constitutional Court (Decision of the Constitutional Court 22/2016. (XII. 5.), Reasoning [55]). In case there is a probability that human dignity, other fundamental rights, the sovereignty of Hungary or its identity based on its historical constitution are infringed due to the exercise of powers based on Article E) Paragraph (2), the Constitutional Court may examine whether the presumed infringement is real (Reasoning [69]). Therefore, when jointly exercising powers within the Union, the organs of the Hungarian state are to act in such a way that no EU decision could be made that violates the provisions of the Fundamental Law of Hungary. They must create a situation where the obligations of the European Union may be completely fulfilled without violating the Fundamental Law. This means a constitutional command and standard for the participation of Hungary as a member state in the EU decision-making process. On one hand, it has an impact on the activities of state organs as a mandatory norm of conduct and a standard of action. On the other hand, it also serves as a restriction and a point of reference whereby the participation of Hungary in the exercise of EU powers may be controlled. It should be noted, however, that the term “state structure” in Article E) Paragraph 2, sentence 2 of the Fundamental Law, and especially the concept of constitutional identity established by the practice of the Constitutional Court (such as the constitutional self-identity of Hungary), allows for a fairly broad interpretation of whether the joint exercise of powers through the institutions of the European Union meets the aforementioned requirements. Nevertheless, from the point of view of clarifying the concept of “necessary measure”, this provision may mean a more specific normative content and thus a more precise point of reference, since the aspects formulated here form part of the “necessary measure”.

The Constitutional Court also examined whether the incomplete enforcement of jointly exercised powers based on Article E) Paragraph (2) could lead to the loss of sovereignty and constitutional identity of Hungary, or to the infringement of the fundamental rights and freedoms laid down in the Fundamental Law (with special regard to human dignity, bearing special relevance in the context of constitutional identity) (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.)). Regarding this Decision, Blutman states that it reserves the possibility of acting unilaterally in case of insufficient implementation of European Union law. However, this reservation is made on the concerning ground that the insufficiently implemented Union act is an ultra vires act, as the execution of power in such case is not appropriate. Therefore, the Hungarian delegation of powers is not applicable based on Article E) Paragraph (2) (Blutman, 2022, p. 5).

First of all, the Constitutional Court examined whether the joint exercise of powers, or its incomplete enforcement, could violate the fundamental rights and freedoms laid down in the Fundamental Law - the protection whereof is the primary obligation of the state. The Constitutional Court established that the joint exercise of powers through the institutions of the European Union, according to the authorisation given in Article E) of the Fundamental Law, may neither directly nor indirectly lead to the enforcement of a lower level of fundamental rights protection than that required by the Fundamental Law. The same applies to those cases where an EU norm binding the member states meets the fundamental rights protection requirements of the Fundamental Law, but its implementation is insufficient (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.), Reasoning [47]). “If, as a result of the incomplete enforcement of the joint exercise of powers defined in Article E) Paragraph (2) of the Fundamental Law, a foreign population remains permanently and en masse in the territory of Hungary without democratic authorisation, it may violate the right to self-identity and self-determination of the people living in Hungary, which derives from their human dignity. This is because, as a result of the incomplete enforcement of the exercise of powers, the traditional social environment of persons living in the state territory of Hungary may change without democratic authorisation, without any influence of the concerned, and without state control mechanisms.” (Reasoning [51]). Therefore, if the incomplete enforcement of the joint exercise of powers may lead to consequences causing the infringement of the right to self-identity of persons living in the territory of Hungary, the Hungarian state is obliged to ensure the protection of this right (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.), Operative part Point 2, as well as Reasoning [60]). As part of its obligation of institutional protection, the state “must ensure that, as a result of an international commitment of the state, no act of another institution outside of the Hungarian state organ may carry out an interference from which the state itself is obliged to refrain (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.), Reasoning [38]).” However, the decision does not specify the form, nor the means and method thereof. According to the Constitutional Court, the obligation of institutional protection is to be regarded as a state function pertaining to the public order of Hungary, and thus shall be respected by the European Union according to Article 4 Paragraph (2) of the TEU. (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.), Reasoning [43]).

The Constitutional Court also examined the impact of the shortcomings of joint exercise of powers on the sovereignty of Hungary and the joint exercise of powers itself (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.), Reasoning [61]). The Constitutional Court stated that “the presumption of reserved sovereignty excludes all competences that are not classified as competences by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In these cases, not only the Fundamental Law, but also the TFEU itself stipulates that member states are entitled to exercise the specified scope of powers even after the termination of the TFEU (Decision of the Constitutional Court 2/2021. (XII. 20.). Reasoning [66]).” The European Union and its institutions do not only exercise the delegated powers in accordance with the purpose set by the EU treaties if they constitute secondary sources of law. The condition for the exercise of the powers is also to ensure the effective enforcement of the secondary legal sources. According to the Constitutional Court, only in this case the exercise of power complies with the conditions laid down in Article E) Paragraph (2) of the Fundamental Law. (Decision of Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.), Reasoning [78]). Article E) Paragraph 2 of the Fundamental Law may not be interpreted to mean that Hungary has definitively delegated the right to exercise the certain power to the institutions of the European Union in case the institutions of the European Union manifestly ignore their obligation to exercise the delegated power, as well as this joint exercise of power is carried out in a way that it obviously does not ensure the requirement for the effective enforcement of EU law (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20), Reasoning [79]). However, the Constitutional Court also emphasised that the presumption of reserved sovereignty may only be applied exceptionally and only in the event when the lack of exercise of the relevant joint powers, or incomplete exercise thereof, obviously does not ensure the requirement of effective enforcement of EU law, and leads to the infringement of fundamental rights, or may lead to restrictions on the fulfilment of state obligations. Even in this case, Hungary will only be entitled to solely exercise a jointly exercised power as long as the European Union and its institutions create guarantees for the effective enforcement of EU law (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.), Operative part Point 1). The exercise of powers is to be carried out in accordance with the EU treaties, with the aim to promote those (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.), Reasoning [80]). According to Blutman, in the event of incomplete enforcement of EU regulations adopted under non-exclusive powers, the state becomes entitled to unilateral action. In this case, such European Union regulation may be interpreted unilaterally, its execution may be suspended, or even a differing national regulation may be adopted (Blutman, 2022, p. 5-6). The Constitutional Court also stated that an obstacle of the enforceability of mandatory European acts may be the inefficient enforcement of powers exercised jointly with the European Union (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.), Reasoning [84]). According to the Constitutional Court, in case the enforcement of the joint exercise is incomplete, Hungary may (in accordance with the presumption of reserved sovereignty) exercise its specific, non-exclusive powers as long as the institutions of the European Union do not take the necessary measures for the effective enforcement of the joint exercise of powers (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.), Reasoning [85]). It should be noted that this statement only applies to Hungarian state organs, as EU organs are not bound by the decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, nor by the Fundamental Law of Hungary.

Finally, the Constitutional Court examined how the consequences of the possible incomplete enforcement of joint exercise of powers are related to the constitutional identity of Hungary. As already discussed, in the interpretation of the Constitutional Court, constitutional identity and sovereignty are not complementary, but interrelated concepts in several aspects. On one hand, the preservation of the constitutional identity of Hungary (as a member state of the European Union) is made possible by its sovereignty and the preservation thereof.

On the other hand, constitutional identity is primarily manifested through a sovereign act. Thirdly, taking into account the historical struggles of Hungary, the effort to preserve its sovereign decision-making powers is itself a part of national identity and of its constitutional identity (through constitutional recognition). Fourthly, due to the historical conditions of the country, the main criteria of state sovereignty recognised in international law are closely connected with the constitutional identity of Hungary (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.), Reasoning [99]). The Constitutional Court also noted that the issues covered by Article E) Paragraph (2) of the Fundamental Law regarding the inalienable right of disposal show a close connection with several criteria of statehood itself. The Constitutional Court stated that according to Article 1 of the convention on the rights and obligations of the member states (signed on 26 December 1933, in Montevideo), “states as subjects of international law must bear the following attributes: (a) permanent population; (b) defined territory; (c) government; and the ability to contact other states. The disposal right regarding these issues and the ability to effectively exercise such right is undoubtedly a fundamental state function. This is also reflected in Article 4 Paragraph (2) of the TEU.” (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.), Reasoning [100]). “The values that make up the constitutional self-identity of Hungary evolved during the historical development of the constitution. They are considered to be legal facts that could not be renounced neither by an international treaty, nor by amending the Fundamental Law, as legal facts may not be changed by means of legislation (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.), Reasoning [101]).” The achievements of the historical constitution are listed in Points [102]-[105] of the Reasoning. In this regard, the Constitutional Court established that the protection of the inalienable right of Hungary to dispose of its territorial unity, population, form of government and state organisation is part of the constitutional self-identity (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.), Operative part Point 3, Reasoning [110]).

The interpretation of Article E) Paragraph (2) of the Fundamental Law by the Constitutional Court therefore came to the conclusion that in case “the enforcement of the joint exercise is incomplete, Hungary may, in accordance with the presumption of reserved sovereignty, exercise its specific, non-exclusive powers as long as the institutions of the European Union do not take the necessary measures for the effective enforcement of the joint exercise of powers.” In this decision, however, the Constitutional Court did not examine whether the incomplete enforcement of the joint exercise of powers is realised in the specific case. The Court stated that this abstract constitutional interpretation may not become a position applicable to the specific case under motion, nor it is possible to draw up a sufficiently abstract solution to the problem that could serve as a precedent in subsequent cases (Decision of the Constitutional Court 32/2021. (XII. 20.), Reasoning [21]). Consequently, the incomplete enforcement of the joint exercise of powers, requiring a case-by-case interpretation, may only be investigated in specific cases. Nevertheless, this raises several problems. On one hand, the determination (by the Constitutional Court) of whether the joint exercise of powers is incompletely implemented in a specific case has consequences only for the organs of the Hungarian state, as the interpretation of the Hungarian Constitutional Court does not apply to the organs of the Union. On the other hand, the decision of the Constitutional Court binds the Hungarian state organs participating in the joint exercise of powers, as well as the organs implementing the decisions made in this context. For them, the provision of the Fundamental Law prescribes the protection of the sovereignty and constitutional self-identity of Hungary, as well as the fundamental rights and freedoms contained in the Fundamental Law, which may be infringed in case of insufficient enforcement of joint powers.

In such a case, Hungarian state organs shall take the steps that they are entitled to under EU law. This may result in a dispute between the EU bodies and the Hungarian state organs regarding the assessment of the effectiveness of the joint exercise of powers. Ultimately, the dispute may only be resolved by the Court of Justice of the European Union, given that the power in question is that of the EU. Another source of problems may be if the organs of the Hungarian state participating in the exercise of joint EU powers may exercise the joint powers, then such decisions may be made that alter from the decisions made by the EU or by other member states. This may result in the reduced effectiveness of EU decision-making and EU law, possibly causing further conflicts. The Constitutional Court also established that the enforceability of EU acts recognised as mandatory may be hindered by the inefficient enforcement of powers exercised jointly with the European Union, thus creating an opportunity to postpone the implementation of mandatory EU acts. Since the final decision in this case is also with the Court of Justice of the European Union, this solution may only gain time corresponding to the duration of the court proceedings.

Conclusion

According to the majority of Hungarian constitutional legal scholars, the integration of the Europe clause into the constitution was indeed necessary. Without that, the accession to the European Union and the application of EU law in Hungary would not have been constitutional. Also, there would have been a lack of normative authorisation for the delegation of powers. The interpretation of the accession clause of the Fundamental Law of Hungary points out that these stipulations prescribe and concretise the conditions and limitations of the delegation of powers between the European Union and the Hungarian state. It attempts to define the boundaries of the integration process, i.e. to set the “necessary extent” to which Hungarian state organs may delegate their powers, and what are the powers that may not be delegated. Despite their concretisation, these constitutional stipulations are rather abstract, hence the interpretations of the Constitutional Court are of great importance. It should be noted that political practices have a fairly great room to manoeuvre within constitutional legal boundaries. Therefore, the question of the actual transfer of powers largely depends on the current political considerations of the governing body.

Bibliography

1. Blanke, H-J. & Mangiameli, S. (eds). (2013).

2. The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) - A Commentary. Berlin/Heidelberg, Springer.

3. Blutman, L. (2017). Szurkuleti zona: az Al- aptorveny es az unios jog viszonya. Kozjogi Szemle, Vol 1, Р. 1-14.

4. Blutman, L. (2019). Az Alkotmanybhosag szuverenitaskepe: problemak es ellentmondasok. Jogtudomanyi Kozlony, Vol 12, Р. 469-478.

5. Blutman, L. (2022). Az unios jog elsobbsege: alkotmanybhosagok lazadasa. Kozjogi Szemle, Vol 1, Р. 1-10.

6. Chronowski, N. (2009). Szuverenitas az Europai Unioban - utolso bastya vagy szertefoszlo remeny? A koztarsasagi alkotmany 20 eve (eds. Kocsis Miklos and Zeller Judit). Pecs: PAMA.

7. Chronowski, N. & Vincze, A. (2017). Ona- zonossag es europai integracio - az Alkotmanybhosag az identitaskereses utjan. Jogtudomanyi Kozlony, Vol 3, Р. 117-132.

8. Csuhany, P. & Sonnevend, P. (2009). 2/A. § [Europai Unio]. Az Alkotmany kommentarja I. (ed. Jakab Andras), Budapest: Szazadveg Kiado.

9. Drinoczi, T. (2017). A 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB hatarozat: mit nem tartalmaz es mi kovetkezik belole. Az identitasvizsgalat es az ultra vires kozos hataskorgyakorlas osszehasonlito elemzesben. MTA Law Working Papers, Vol 1. URL: http://real.mtak.hu/121486/1/2017_01_Drinoczi.pdf.

10. Fazekas, F. (2015). Az unios tagsag alkot-manyos alapjai az Alaptorveny elott es utan. Pro Futuro, Vol 1. Р. 29-47.

11. Hillion, C. (2011). EU enlargement. The evolution of EU law (eds. Craig, Paul and De Bhrca, Grainne). Second edition. Oxford University Press.

12. Jaenicke, G. (1962). Supranationale Organization. Worterbuch des Volkerrecht. (eds. Karl Strupp and Hans-Jurgen Schlochauer), Berlin: De Gruyter.

13. Kecskes, L. (2005). EU-jog es jogharmo-nizacio. HVG-ORAC. 952 p.

14. Kecskes, L. (2003). Magyarorszag EU-csat-lakozasanak alkotmanyossagi problemai es a szukse-gesse valt alkotmanymodoshas folyamata (Part I). Europai Jog, Vol 1, Р. 21-30.

15. Kecskes, L. (2003). Magyarorszag EU-csat-lakozasanak alkotmanyossagi problemai es a szukse-gesse valt alkotmanymodoshas folyamata (Part II). Eu-ropai Jog, Vol 2.

16. Mohay, A. (2014). A nemzetkozi jog es az unios jog kapcsolodasi pontjai. Scriptura, Vol 1, Р. 269-281.

17. Mohay, A. & Toth, N. (2017). Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB on the Interpretation of Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law. American Journal of International Law, Vol 2. Р. 468-475.

18. Petretei, J. (2009). Az alkotmanyos demokracia alapintezmenyei. Budapest-Pecs: Dialog Campus Kiado. 472 p.

19. Petretei, J. (2014). Magyarorszag alkotmany-joga II. Allamszervezet. Pecs: Kodifikator Alapftvany. 420 р.

20. Prodromos, D. (1966). Souveranitat. Evangelisches Staatslexikon (eds. Roman Herzog, Hermann Kunst & Wilhelm Schneemelcher), Kreuz-Verlag.

21. Somogyvari, I. (2001). Az unios csatlakozas alkotmanymodoshast igenylo kerdesei. Magyar Jog, Vol 1, Р. 22-25.

22. Stern, K. (1980). Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Part II, Munchen: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.

23. Szabo, M. (2012). Az europai jog es a nemzetkozi jogrend - Hierarchia es osszefonodas. Allam- es Jogtudomany, Vol 2-3, Р. 191-211.

24. Vincze, A. & Chronowski, N. (2018). Magyar alkotmanyossag az europai integracioban. 3rd edition, Budapest: HVG ORAC. Р. 518-588.

25. Weiler, J.H. (1991). Transformation of Europe. Yale Law Journal. Vol. 100. P. 2403-248.

26. Act XX of 1949 on The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary. URL: https://www2.ohchr.org/ english/bodies/cescr/docs/e.c.12.hun.3-annex2.pdf.

27. Act LXI of 2002 on the Amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary. URL: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_isn=62930&p_lang=en.

28. General Reasoning of Act LXI of 2002. URL: https://jogkodex.hu/jsz/2002_61_torveny_4515458.

29. The Fundamental Law of Hungary. URL: https://www.parlament.hu/documents/125505/138409/Fundamental+law/73811993-c377-428d-9808-ee03d-6fb8178.

30. Treaty on European Union. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/collection/eu-law/treaties/treaties-force.html.

31. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-europe-an-union.html.

References

1. Blanke, H-J. & Mangiameli, S. (eds). (2013).

2. The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) - A Commentary. Berlin/Heidelberg, Springer, [in English].

3. Blutman, L. (2017). Szurkuleti zona: az Al-aptorveny es az unios jog viszonya [Twilight zone: the relationship between the Basic Law and EU]. Kozjogi Szemle [PublicLaw Review]. Vol 1. [in Hungarian].

4. Blutman, L. (2019). Az Alkotmanybnosag szuverenitaskepe: problemak es ellentmondasok [The image of sovereignty of the Constitutional Court: problems and contradictions.]. Jogtudomanyi Kozlony [Journal of Jurisprudence]. Vol 12. [in Hungarian].

5. Blutman, L. (2022). Az unios jog elsobbsege: alkotmanybnosagok lazadasa [The primacy of EU law: rebellion of constitutional courts]. Kozjogi Szemle [Public Law Review]. Vol 1. [in Hungarian].

6. Chronowski, N. (2009). Szuverenitas az Europai Unioban - utolso bastya vagy szertefoszlo remeny? A koztarsasagi alkotmany 20 eve [Sovereignty in the European Union - last bastion or fading hope?. 20 years of the republican constitution] (eds. Kocsis Miklos and Zeller Judit). Pecs: PAMA. [in Hungarian].

7. Chronowski, N. & Vincze, A. (2017). Ona-zonossag es europai integracio - az Alkotmanybnosag az identitaskereses utjan [Self-identity and European integration - the Constitutional Court on the way to the search for identity]. Jogtudomanyi Kozlony [Journal of Jurisprudence]. Vol 3. [in Hungarian].

8. Csuhany, P. & Sonnevend, P. (2009). 2/A. § [Europai Unio]. Az Alkotmany kommentarja I. [[European Union]. Commentary on the Constitution] (ed. Jakab Andras), Budapest: Szazadveg Kiado. [in Hungarian].

9. Drinoczi, T. (2017). A 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB hatarozat: mit nem tartalmaz es mi kovetkezik belole. Az identitasvizsgalat es az ultra vires kozos hataskor-gyakorlas dsszehasonlUo elemzesben [AB decision: what it does not contain and what follows from it. The identity examination and ultra vires exercise of common powers in a comparative analysis]. MTA Law Working Papers, Vol 1. Available from: http://real.mtak.hu/121486/1/2017_01_Drinoczi.pdf [in Hungarian].

10. Fazekas, F. (2015). Az unios tagsag alkot-manyos alapjai az Alaptorveny elott es utan [Constitutional foundations of EU membership before and after the Basic Law]. Pro Futuro [Pro Futuro], Vol 1. [in Hungarian].

11. Hillion, C. (2011). EU enlargement. The evolution of EU law (eds. Craig, Paul and De Bdrca, Grainne). Second edition. Oxford University Press. [in English].

12. Jaenicke, G. (1962). Supranationale Organization. Worterbuch des Volkerrecht [Supranational Organization. Dictionary of International Law]. (eds. Karl Strupp and Hans-Jurgen Schlochauer), Berlin: De Gruyter. [in German]

13. Kecskes, L. (2005). EU-jog es jogharmo-nizacio [EU law and legal harmonization]. HVG-ORAC. [in Hungarian].

14. Kecskes, L. (2003). Magyarorszag EU-csat-lakozasanak alkotmanyossagi problemai es a szukse-gesse valt alkotmanymodosftas folyamata (Part I) [The constitutionality problems of Hungary's accession to the EU and the process of the necessary constitutional amendment (Part I)]. Europai Jog [European Law]. Vol. І. [in Hungarian].

15. Kecskes, L. (2003). Magyarorszag EU-csat-lakozasanak alkotmanyossagi problemai es a szukse-gesse valt alkotmanymodosftas folyamata (Part II) [[The constitutionality problems of Hungary's accession to the EU and the process of the necessary constitutional amendment (Part II)].]. Europai Jog [European Law], Vol 2. [in Hungarian].

16. Mohay, A. (2014). A nemzetkozi jog es az unios jog kapcsolodasi pontjai [Connection points of international law and EU law]. Scriptura, Vol 1. [in Hungarian].

17. Mohay, A. & Toth, N. (2017). Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB on the Interpretation of Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law. American Journal of International Law, Vol 2. [in Hungarian].

18. Petretei, J. (2009). Az alkotmanyos demokra- cia alapintezmenyei [Basic institutions of constitutional democracy]. Budapest-Pecs: Dialog Campus Kiado. [in Hungarian].

19. Petretei, J. (2014). Magyarorszag alkotmany-joga II. Allamszervezet [Constitutional law of Hungary ІІ State organization]. Pecs: Kodifikator Alapftvany. [in Hungarian].

20. Prodromos, D. (1966). Souveranitat. Evan-gelisches Staatslexikon [Sovereignty. Evangelical State Lexicon] (eds. Roman Herzog, Hermann Kunst & Wilhelm Schneemelcher), Kreuz-Verlag. [in German].

21. Somogyvari, I. (2001). Az unios csatlakozas alkotmanymodosftast igenylo kerdesei [Issues of EU accession requiring constitutional amendment]. Magyar Jog [Hungarian Law], Vol 1. [in Hungarian].

22. Stern, K. (1980). Das Staatsrecht der Bundes-republik Deutschland. PartII [The constitutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Part II]. Munchen: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. [in German].

23. Szabo, M. (2012). Az europai jog es a nemzetkozi jogrend - Hierarchia es osszefonodas [European law and the international legal order - Hierarchy and entanglement]. Allam-es Jogtudomany [Political Science and Law], Vol 2-3. [in Hungarian].

24. Vincze, A. & Chronowski, N. (2018). Magyar alkotmanyossag az europai integracioban [Hungarian constitutionalism in European integration]. 3rd edition, Budapest: HVG ORAC. [in Hungarian].

25. Weiler, J.H. (1991). Transformation of Europe. Yale Law Journal. Vol. 100. [in English].

26. Act XX of 1949 on The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary. Available from: https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/e.c.12.hun.3-an-nex2.pdf [in English].

27. Act LXI of 2002 on the Amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_isn=62930&p_lang=en [in English].

28. General Reasoning of Act LXI of 2002. Available from: https://jogkodex.hu/jsz/2002_61_tor- veny_4515458 [in English].

29. The Fundamental Law of Hungary. Available from: https://www.parlament.hu/documents/125505/138409/Fundamental+law/73811993-c377-428d-9808-ee03d6fb8178 [in English].

30. Treaty on European Union. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/collection/eu-law/treaties/treaties-force.html [in English].

31. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/treaty-on-the-function- ing-of-the-european-union.html [in English].

Размещено на Allbest.ru