Comments on the Tom Rockmore’s article "Some consequences of Kant’s Copernican turn"

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Comments on the Tom Rockmore's article “Some consequences of Kant's Copernican turn”

Sergey L. Katrechko - CSc in Philosophy,

associate professor. State Academic University

for the Humanities (SAUH)

What is the main idea of Kant's transcendental philosophy and Copernican Revolution? The Kantian transcendentalism is the first theory of experience related to the solution of the semantic problem set in his letter to M. Hertz (02.21.1772) about the ground of the relation of our [a priori] representation to the object. There are two ways to solve it: realism (the empirical vector from the real things/objects to representations) and constructivism (the vector from the a priori form (or “representations”) to the objects). But Kantian transcendental idealism is not constructivism, because Kant keeps the empirical (realistic) vector by affixing our sensibility with things/objects and says that his theory of experience is an empirical realism. The Kantian transcendentalism as altered method of human thinking in metaphysics is associated with the splitting of the thing/object into the actual/real object (Kantian thing-in-itself) and object of experience (Kantian appearance), that mediate the relationship between things and representations, or the transcendental triad “object (thing- in-itself) - appearance - representation”. Unlike modern epistemic constructivism as a procedure for constructing objects, Kant develops transcendental constructivism in mathematics as cognition through construction of concepts in intuition, i.e. constructivism regarding appearances, but not things-in-themselves.

Keywords: transcendental idealism (Kant's transcendentalism), Copernican turn, epistemic, constructivism, transcendental constructivism, thing-in-itself, object of experience (appearance)

Комментарии к статье Тома Рокмора «Некоторые следствия коперниканского поворота Канта»

Катречко Сергей Леонидович - кандидат философских наук, доцент. Государственный академический университет гуманитарных наук

Какова главная идея кантовской трансцендентальной философии и его коперниканского переворота? Кантовский трансцендентализм является первой теорией опыта, которая связана с решением семантической проблемы соответствия, изложенной в кантовском письме М. Герцу (21.02.1772) об основании отношения [априорных] представлений к предмету. Кант выделяет два способа ее решения: реализм (эмпирический вектор от реальных вещей/объектов к представлениям) и конструктивизм (вектор от априорной форм (или представлений) к объектам). Однако кантовский трансцендентализм не является идеализмом/конструктивизмом, поскольку Кант оставляет реалистический вектор воздействия вещей на нашу чувственность (resp. представления) и говорит, что его теория опыта является эмпирическим реализмом. Кантовский трансцендентализм как «измененный метод мышления» связан с расщеплением «вещи/объекта» на реальный предмет (кантовскую вещь-в-себе) и предмет опыта (кантовское явление), которая опосредует отношения между вещами и представлениями, или трансцендентальной триадой «объект (вещь в себе) - явление - представление». В отличие от современного конструктивизма как совокупности процедур конструирования объектов Кант развивает трансцендентальный конструктивизм в математике как познание посредством конструирования понятий в [чувственной] интуиции, т. е. конструктивизм относительно явлений, а не вещей-в-себе.

Ключевые слова: трансцендентальный идеализм (кантовский трансцендентализм), ко- перниканский переворот, эпистемический конструктивизм, трансцендентальный конструктивизм, вещь сама по себе, предмет опыта (явление)

In his earlier works [Rockmore, 2006; Rockmore, 2007] and in his paper (in this volume) T. Rockmore correlates Kant's transcendental philosophy with his Copernican revolution and characterizes his transcendentalism as epistemic construc-tivism and as a kind of German idealism. These characteristics are not entirely accurate. When interpreting Kant's transcendentalism, one should take into account the specifics of transcendental discourse and/or Kant's wordings such terms (notions) as “Copernican revolution/turn”, “constructivism”, “[transcendental] idealism”, etc.

§1. Regarding the Kant's `Copernican revolution'

кant transcendental philosophy

The Copernican revolution appears as a Kantian solution to the problem of conformity from Kant's letter to M. Hertz of February 21, 1772. In this letter, in which the conception of “Critique of Pure Reason” (or the “idea of transcendental philosophy” [A1]) is presented, Kant defines the main task of his transcendentalism as a solution the following [semantic] problem of conformity of a priori representations to the real things/objects:

As I thought through the theoretical part, <...> I noticed that I still lacked something essential, something that in my long metaphysical studies I <...> had failed to consider and which in fact constitutes the key to the whole secret of metaphysics. I asked myself this question: What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call “representation" (Germ. Vorstellung) to the object (Germ. Gegenstand)? [Kant, 2009, p. 312 (AA, 10: 130)].

According to Kant, “there are only two possible cases in which synthetic [a priori] representation and its objects can come together, necessarily relate to each other, and, as it were, meet each other [i.e. solution of the conformity problem]: either if the object [of experience] alone makes the representation possible (vector of cognition `from [external] object to [internal] representation'; the representations corresponds to the objects; empiricism), or if the representation alone makes the object [of experience] possible (vector of cognition `from [a priori] representation to object'; the objects corresponds to a priori representations¹; apriorism) (inserts in brackets mine. - K.S.)” [see Kant, 1998, p. 223 (B124-5)²]; inserts in brackets mine. - K.S.)³.

However, “transcendental” solution as a way to solve the conformity problem, which Kant co-relates with his Copernican Revolution [BXXII f], differs from these two ways: he chooses a kind of middle path between empiricism and constructivism ([Kant, 1998, p. 264 (B167)] and develops the transcendental idealism, which is compatible with empirical realism ([see Kant, 1998, p. 426 (A369-71)]). At the same time, when Kant says that objects must comply with human a priori principles, one should take into account that in the quotes above Kant speaks not about objects (things-in-themselves), but about objects of experience (or appearances), i.e. See also: “.hence a priori [forms of our sensibility and understanding] to which all objects of ex-perience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree” [Kant, 1998, p. 111 (BXVIII)]. All references to the Kant's Critique of Pure Reason are to the standard A/B pagination of the 1^st (A - edition; 1781) and 2^nd (B - edition; 1787) editions and cite the translation of Critique of Pure Reason [Kant, 1998]. We note that the second of them corresponds to the epistemic constructivism. Comp.: “we can cog-nize of things [germ. Dingen] a priori only what we ourselves have put into them” [Kant, 1998, p. 111 (BXVIII)]. the fact of difference between objects and objects of experience. Only appearances comply with a priori principles, but not real things/objects. In this way Kant is quite realistic and his transcendentalism is related not to the construction of objects, but only objects of experience, and thereby it's a constructivism regarding appearances, but not things-in-themselves. Thus, Kant's transcendental metaphysics is the “scientific” metaphysics of appearances and the Kantian concept appearance is the “key” to solving the problem of conformity: appearance lies at the basis of the relation between object and representation, it mediates the relation between them.

On the other hand, “Copernican revolution” is only a metaphor for Kant [Kant, 1998, p. 113 (BXXII f)] In this connection, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that for Kant not the Copernican hypothesis (or “Copernican turn”) acts as an example, but rather Newton's theory [of gravity], which proves the hypothesis of Copernicus ([see Kant, 1998, p. 113 (BXXII f)]. Gravity is an entity, or thing-in-itself, of the observed appearances. And this is a more revealing example of the relation of appearance and thing-in-itself, than Kant's analogy “rainbow vs. drops of rain” from passage [Kant, 1998, p. 169 (B63)], because gravity is nothing at a phenomenal level (it is invisible) and does not resemble anything. Thus, the difference between the appearance and the thing-in-itself is perhaps more radical.. Its goal is not to completely overturn the relation between object and representation as it happens in case of the Copernican Revolution itself, especially since Kant's Copernican turn does not change radically the direction of cognition and Kant keeps the empirical (or realistic) vector “from object to representation” by affixing [Germ. Affizierung] our sensibility with things-in-themselves (see diagram):

Schema 1

While the goal of transcendental philosophy is to look for “transcendental condition(s)” [A106] behind the appearance: in the case of the Copernican hypothesis the Newton's theory of gravity, which justifies this hypothesis, acts as transcendental ground (condition). And as I showed earlier [Katrechko, 2015], Kant's transcendental philosophy, his “altered method of way of thinking ” [BXVIII], which he corelates with Copernican Revolution, corresponds not to epistemic constructivism, but to deductive-nomological model of science (or scientific explanation) of C. Hempel - P. Oppenheim, which involves the use of theories as relative a priori (H. Reichenbach - R. Carnap) to explain the observed [appearances].

§2. About the Kant's transcendental constructivism

Kant's Transcendental constructivism differs from the understanding of [epis- temic] constructivism in modern epistemology. Unlike [epistemic] constructivism as a procedure for constructing objects (for example, pointwise construction of a straight line ([see Kant, 1998, p. 249, 258 (B154, B138)], Kant in Critique uses the term constructing in describing mathematics (mathematical activity) as cognition “through construction of concepts in intuition ” [Kant, 1998, p. 635 (B752); see also (B741-2)]. But “to construct a concept - means to exhibit a priori the [nonem- pirical] intuition [in universal validity, i.e. scheme [Kant, 1998, p. 273-4 (B179- 81)]] corresponding to it (inserts in brackets are my. - K.S.)” [Kant, 1998, p. 630 (B741)]; inserts in brackets are my. - K.S.) See: “Philosophical cognition is rational cognition from concepts, mathematical cognition that from the construction of concepts. But to construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition corresponding to it. For the construction of a concept, therefore, a nonempirical intuition is re-quired, which consequently, as intuition, is an individual object, but that must nevertheless, as the construction of a concept (of a general representation), express in the representation universal va-lidity for all possible intuitions that belong under the same concept. Thus, I construct a triangle by exhibiting an object corresponding to this concept, either through mere imagination, in pure intu-ition, or on paper, in empirical intuition, but in both cases completely a priori, without having had to borrow the pattern for it from any experience. The individual drawn figure is empirical, and nevertheless serves to express the concept without damage to its universality, for in the case of this empirical intuition we have taken account only of the action of constructing the concept, to which many determinations, e.g., those of the magnitude of the sides and the angles, are entirely indiffer-ent, and thus we have abstracted from these differences, which do not alter the concept of the trian-gle» (italic mine. -- K.S.) [Kant, 1998, p. 630 (B741-2)].. In a sense, this is the antipode of modern constructivism, since Kant calls to check our rational constructions through sensual (imaginary) models. So in geometry, we model the concept [of a triangle] by its scheme, by drawing a triangle design (as picture), with which we prove mathematical theorems (for example, “how the sum of its angles might be related to a right angle” [Kant, 1998, p. 631 (B744)].

Thereby, Kant's “constructivism”, or Kantian idea of constructing concepts stands as fundamental and key one for his conception (understanding) of mathematics For more details see [Katrechko, 2015].. In this case mathematics is conceived by Kant as a complex two-level (two- component) way of cognition. It begins with the creation by using definitions “pure sensible concept” [Kant, 1998, p. 274 (B180)]. Their specificity is that they are formed by “arbitrary synthesis” [Kant, 1998, p. 638 (B757)], i.e., contain some mathematical [mental] action. Further, when we constructing concepts we implement descent to the level of (quasi)sensuality (imagination) and relating of the concept to universally valid contemplation - scheme. Here, as if upon the reverse reading (from left to right) of the Hume's principle, happens the decoding (or construction) of the concept, i.e., the transition to a deep information level: from rational - declarative level of the concept on contemplative - procedural level of schemes. This can be represented as an expansion of the original abstract concept to lower - level objects that are in some [space-time] environment and with which we can perform certain mathematical operations (like drawing the line, division of numbers, etc.). We can say that in this “descent” through sensory intuition the egress beyond the original concepts and the [synthetic] increment of knowledge occurs, as any [dynamic] action (as opposed to static concepts) is a synthesis of at least two views In structural terms, any action can be represented as the synthesis of pair of representations ini-tial state - final state (as the result of the action). Therefore, any action is synthetic. This clari-fies the Kantian thesis that the expression “5 + 7 = 12”, symbolizing the operation of addition of two numbers, has a synthetic character (see “Mathematical judgments are all synthetic” [Kant, 1998, p. 143 (B14-7)]. Its synthetic nature is connected with the action of addition, which is synthesized into a coherent whole the members of adding: “action” [addition] and gives the syn-thetic nature to the amount. Accordingly, the mathematical sign “=” means not equity of left and right sides of the formula, but the justification of the transition from the left side of the expres-sion to its right side.. The result of this synthesis by reverse return (rise) on the cerebral (conceptual) level is fixed as a formal result of the construction. Schematically, mathematical acts can be represented as follows.

Schema 2

Thus, unlike the modern epistemic constructivism, Kant's transcendental constructivism acts as an inverse procedure for correlating concept and intuition, as “consideration the concept in concreto” [Kant, 1998, p. 631 (B744)], rather than embedding our a priori notions in objects/things. Therefore, the interpretation of transcendental constructivism as epistemic constructivism is not entirely accurate.

§3. About Kant's “Idea of Transcendental Philosophy”

The most important presupposition of Kant's Copernican Revolution and the cornerstone for his transcendentalism is distinction “thing-in-itself vs. appearance” For more details see [Katrechko, 2014; Katrechko, 2018b]; see also [Katrechko, 2017; Katrechko, 2018a]., according to it one should be able to see the “true” [aprioristic] causes/ground of what is happening behind, for example, such appearances as the movement of the Sun over the sky (in this case such ground is a gravity). Thus, the “idea of transcendental philosophy” [Kant, 1998, p. 127 (A1)] is given by the transcendental triad “object (thing- in-itself) - appearance - representation” in which appearance mediate the relationship between thing-in-itself and representations. On the one hand, the appearance differs from both thing-in-itself and the representation [“in us”], and, on the other hand, the appearance as “undetermined object of an empirical intuition” [Kant, 1998, p. 155 (B34)] is connected both with the real object and with the representation, while mediating their relation.

In this regard, Kant criticizes classical metaphysics (as ontology of things-in- themselves) and develops the theory of possible experience, or so-called descriptive metaphysics (P. Strawson) of appearance. We must limit the claims of the metaphysical reason, which is trying to make a breakthrough to the transcendent, to the cognition of the world itself. Kant teaches that we can study not the world itself and its structure, but only the “conceptual scheme” (D. Davidson) or “categorical grid” (R. Collingwood) of the description of the world See: “Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure” [Strawson, 1959, p. 8].. It seems that this thesis is the leitmotiv of contemporary philosophy of science.

References

Kant, 1998 - Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason, transl. and ed. by P. Guyer, A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 512 pp.

Kant, 2009 - Kant, I. “Fourth Letter: From Kant to Herz, February 21, 1772”, in: Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials, transl. and ed. by E. Watkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 312-316.

Katrechko, 2014 - Katrechko, S. L. “Kant's transcendentalism as transcendental paradigm of philosophizing” [Transcendentalizm Kanta kak transcendental'naja paradigma filosofstvovanija], Kantovsky sbornik / The Kantian journal, 2014, vip. 48 (2), pp. 10-25. (in Russian)

Katrechko, 2015a - Katrechko, S. L. “Transcendental'naja argumentacija Kanta i gipotetiko- deduktivnaja model' nauchnogo issledovanija Poppera - Gempelya” [Kant's transcendental arguments and Popper - Hempel's hypothetical ltabc deductive model of scientific research], Ratio.ru, 2015, no. 14, pp. 44-55. (in Russian)

Katrechko, 2015b - Katrechko, S. L. “Transcendental Analysis of Mathematics: the Transcendental Constructivism (Pragmatism) as the Foundation of Mathematics”, in: Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP109/HUM/2015 (https://publications.hse.ru/preprints/146137968). Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2676626). Preprint (October 20, 2015).

Katrechko, 2016 - Katrechko, S. L. “Transcendentalizm Kanta kak realisticheskaja teorija opyta/poznanija (analiz struktury kantovskogo kopernikanskogo perevorota)” [Does the Kant's Copernican Revolution Lead to Idealism? (Structure and Dialectic of Kant's Copernican Revolution], in: Filosofija i nauka: problemy sootnesenija. Kinga 1. Moscow: RGGU Publ., 2016, pp. 213-226. (in Russian)

Katrechko, 2017 - Katrechko, S. L. “Kantovskoe javlenie ob'ektivno-ob'ektnoe (predmetnoe) predstavlenie” [Kant's Appearance as an Objective-Objectual [gegenstдndlich] Representation], Kantovsky sbornik / The Kantian journal, 2017, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 7-20. (in Russian)

Katrechko, 2018a - Katrechko, S. L. “The Nature of Appearance in Kant's Transcendentalism: a Semantico - Cognitive Analyses”, Kantovskiiy sbornik / The Kantian journal, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 31-55. (in Russian)

Katrechko, 2018b - Katrechko, S.L. “Transcendentalism as the Special Type of Philosophizing and the Transcendental Paradigm of Philosophy”, in: Natur und Freiheit. Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Im Auftrag der Kant-Gesellschaft herausgegeben von V L. Waibel, M. Ruffing, D. Wagner. Band 1. Berlin/Boston, 2018, pp. 1073-1082.

Rockmore, 2006 - Rockmore, T. In Kant's Wake: Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. London: Wiley Blackwell, 2006. 224 pp.

Rockmore, 2007 - Rockmore, T. Kant and Idealism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. 294 pp.

Strawson, 1959 - Strawson, P. F. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: Methuen, 1959. 255 pp.

Список литературы

Катречко С.Л. Трансцендентализм Канта как трансцендентальная парадигма философствования // Кантовский сборник. 2014. № 2(48). C. 10-25.

Катречко С.Л. Трансцендентальная аргументация Канта и гипотетико-дедуктивная модель научного исследования Поппера--Гемпеля // Рацио.ш. 2015. № 14. C. 44-55.

Катречко С.Л. Трансцендентализм Канта как реалистическая теория опыта/познания (анализ структуры кантовского коперниканского переворота) // Философия и наука: проблемы соотнесения. Кн. 1. М.: РГГУ, 2016. С. 213-226.

Катречко С.Л. Кантовское явление как объективно - объектное (предметное) представление // Кантовский сборник. 2017. Т. 36. № 3. C. 7-20.

Катречко С.Л. Природа явления в трансцендентализме Канта: семантико-когнитивный анализ // Кантовский сборник. 2018. Т. 37. № 3. C. 31-55.

Kant I. Critique of Pure Reason, transl. and ed. by P. Guyer, A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 512 p.

Kant I. Fourth Letter: From Kant to Herz, February 21, 1772 // Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials, transl. and ed. by E. Watkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. P. 312-316.

Katrechko, S.L. Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 109/HUM/2015 (https://publications.hse.ru/preprints/146137968). Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2676626). Preprint (October 20, 2015).

Katrechko S.L. Transcendentalism as the Special Type of Philosophizing and the Transcendental Paradigm of Philosophy // Natur und Freiheit. Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant - Kongresses. Im Auftrag der Kant-Gesellschaft herausgegeben von V.L. Waibel, M. Ruffing und D. Wagner. Band 1. Berlin/Boston, 2018a. P. 1073-1082.

Rockmore T., In Kant's Wake: Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. London: Wiley Blackwell, 2006. 224 p.

Rockmore T. Kant and Idealism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. 294 p.

Strawson P.F. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London: Methuen, 1959. 255 p.

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