Human morals in the retrospective of cognitive-anthropological analysis

The materialist morality of Marxism seduced the worker with good due to the idea of the strength of ties between things. Communicating with nature, he moves away from the world of bourgeois courtesy and begins to realize the urgent need for things. This real determinism - recognizable to workers in labor - met the needs of revolutionary doctrine, allowed to determine the consequences of certain actions and seemed to give a person the opportunity to transform reality globally, and allegedly helped to help people find the law of their own activities and conditions of its effectiveness. change the existing order of things. In short, several existentialist ideas have been proposed as a philosophical justification for Marxist morality: the recognition of the reflexive climate of subjectivity; acceptance of the fact that the human consciousness always feels dissatisfied and with the same movement reveals the reality and seeks to surpass it; the human mind is within the situation; man as something accidental has no basis for being, but he «exists»; moral values - something historical; man is free, although he is recognized to serve the revolutionary will, because it presupposes freedom as a metaphysical fact, without depriving the significance of the desire for liberation. Freedom as such can never be eliminated, but it is always in danger of being subjected to violence or coercion [16, p. 76, 81]. Here it is appropriate to note AF Kony, who in the 19th century claimed that «punish the subject when he breaks the law, but do not kill the sense of self-worth in man» [17, p. 515]. the human mind is within the situation; man as something accidental has no basis for being, but he «exists»; moral values - something historical; man is free, although he is recognized to serve the revolutionary will, because it presupposes freedom as a metaphysical fact, without depriving the significance of the desire for liberation. Freedom as such can never be eliminated, but it is always in danger of being subjected to violence or coercion [16, p. 76, 81]. Here it is appropriate to note AF Kony, who in the 19th century claimed that «punish the subject when he breaks the law, but do not kill the sense of self-worth in man» [17, p. 515]. the human mind is within the situation; man as something accidental has no basis for being, but he «exists»; moral values - something historical; man is free, although he is recognized to serve the revolutionary will, because it presupposes freedom as a metaphysical fact, without depriving the significance of the desire for liberation. Freedom as such can never be eliminated, but it is always in danger of being subjected to violence or coercion [16, p. 76, 81]. Here it is appropriate to note AF Kony, who in the 19th century claimed that «punish the subject when he breaks the law, but do not kill the sense of self-worth in man» [17, p. 515]. because it presupposes freedom as a metaphysical fact, without depriving it of the significance of the desire for liberation. Freedom as such can never be eliminated, but it is always in danger of being subjected to violence or coercion [16, p. 76, 81]. Here it is appropriate to note AF Kony, who in the 19th century claimed that «punish the subject when he breaks the law, but do not kill the sense of self-worth in man» [17, p. 515]. because it presupposes freedom as a metaphysical fact, without depriving it of the significance of the desire for liberation. Freedom as such can never be eliminated, but it is always in danger of being subjected to violence or coercion [16, p. 76, 81]. Here it is appropriate to note AF Kony, who in the 19th century claimed that «punish the subject when he breaks the law, but do not kill the sense of self-worth in man» [17, p. 515].

Thus, it was from Soviet times that the decline of morality began, which began with an attempt to combine moral theory and practice into a common universal standard as a rational justification for politics: «The party does not approve of this, so do not approve». This led, in fact, to the fact that manifestations of immorality (cruelty, injustice, etc.) were approved and supported if they were justified by party policy. Not surprisingly, it was after the Soviet era of «dictatorial morality» that many philosophical treatises with different views on morality emerged. Scholars raise a dispute about the origins of morality, and the debate unfolds over whether morality is a product of reason (common sense) or its origin from human feelings (R.G. Apresyan, A.A. Huseynova, V.V Vasilyev, O.F. Gryaznov, etc.) [18, p. 623-625; 19, p. 145; 20, p. 38]. But if this question remains debatable, then a new one arises: does humanity use its own ideas of reason or cognition of the senses to find the difference between virtue and vice? [21, p. 498]. It should be noted that the question of morality, in any case, implies only its active nature, while according to D. Hume, the mind - is a cognitive ability, which is aimed at bringing ideas (judgments based on the demonstration of evidence) and / or the relationship between objects that we know from our own experience (judgments based on probabilities). And only in the second case, in his opinion, the mind participates in the act, however, its role is seen as secondary. Revealing the relationship between cause and effect, the mind is able to direct, adjust the impulses that motivate action, but does not generate them [21, p. 499]. So we can say.

The most striking thing is that in modern society there are no guarantees or rational ways to the moral consent of society. There can be no such ways also because in modern society there are no possibilities and ways to establish a clear hierarchy of preferences among moral requirements. Modern morality is a philosophical and legal chimera, because it begins with the level of personal choice of behavior in free space, the boundaries of which are determined only by legal norms. Recently, the individual choice of a person of «moral foundations» prevails agreed in certain social groups «moral attributes». For example, a survey of law students (48 people) showed that 68% of students believe that «only their personal definition of bad and good matters to them», 30% agree to obey the social requirements of morality, but with a certain purpose of achieving something «, the rest of the students recognize that» moral precepts must be rooted in a person from childhood, and must be unique for the whole society. «Thus, the majority today recognizes itself as an independent person in the moral field and even the author of the moral law, without thinking at all about the value of moral postulates on which it is based».

The current state of morality in Western countries is defined as abandoned, and the remnants of moral values are reminiscent of a once-existing culture in which no one wants to believe and accept. By changing the inner world of man through distorted notions of good and evil, people build new conditions for their existence. Yes, those manifestations of the human psyche that were once considered immoral are now protected by law. We can say that the era of cognitive distortion of morality has come - that is, a gradual and constant deviation from moral principles, which is manifested in the behavior and thinking of individuals. These failures are due to a number of reasons: prejudices, stereotypes, inability to analyze information, indifference.

Today, each person asks himself the question «why should I do just that and what will happen to me if I do things my own way»? And really, is it possible to make a person love to self-sacrifice, to bear his professional burden not only within the law but also morally? If the ancient man knew that for evil, immoral actions, the Lord's punishment awaits him, then the need to obey the earthly law, which does not contradict the divine law, there is no doubt. What is it like today, when man is detached from the law of God, actually deprived of memory and open to committing all kinds of lawlessness? We completely agree with the opinion of scientists on this issue, because neither analytical philosophy nor phenomenological tradition can help to establish order in the world of morality and science [15, p.7], especially when morality is «fictional».

Morality today is on a slippery slope of perfectionist self-presentation, characterized by a demonstration of one's own perfection. The world, detached from the virtues and precepts by which the ancestors lived, becomes a fiction of each of its pseudo-scientific dimensions. The word morality is thus in chaos, just as much as the word law (which we see in the example of the changing rule of law). The conceptual foundations of moral laws, today, are increasingly prone to the emergence of «morality somewhere in the middle», «morality of coherence» or «neutral morality». This phenomenon was born in the field of «legal loyalty» and tolerance, which was the result of the final erosion of the integrity of moral postulates that have been formed over the centuries.

Conclusions

Thus, we can conclude that the phenomenon of the category of «morality» opens on the following provisions:

1) morality has always been interpreted as a good that is in harmony with the soul (feelings) and affects behavior;

2) modern rethinking of morality necessarily adds to the past its own meaning, that is, modernizes it. A completely different approach will be the analysis of moral phenomena in terms of their role in the life of the past, ie the actual historical research using methods that characterize the ideas and values of the past in relation to the circumstances that gave rise to them, and in the future - to understand specific actions motivated by these moral (cultural) guidelines. Such priorities are characteristic of the modern paradigm of moral and intellectual history.

References

1. Bibliia abo Knyhy Sviatoho Pysma Staroho Zapovitu [Bible or Books of the Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament]. (2011). Ukrainian biblical society [in Ukrainian].

2. Svyatoye Evangeliye na tserkovno-slavyanskom yazyke s parallelnym perevodom na russkiy yazyk [The Holy Gospel in the Church Slavonic language with a parallel translation into Russian]. (2016). Publisher: Spiritual Transfiguration [In Russian].

3. Chrysostom, J. (1902). Conversations on the Gospel: Selected Works. St.Petersburg: edition of the Theological Academy [in English].

4. Aristotle (2011). Evdemova etika [Eudemian Ethics]. Oxford University Press [in Russian].

5. Aquinas, Thomas (2011). Sochineniya (sbornik) [Essays (collection)]. Publisher: Editorial URSS [in Russian].

6. Locke, J. (1985) The experience of human understanding [Opyt o chelovecheskom razumenii ]Essays in 3 volumes. M.: Thought. Vol.1. p.394 s.

7. Daniels, N. (1979). Moral Theory and the Plasticity of Persons. The Monist, 62 (3) [in English].

8. Parfit, D. (1973). Later Selves and Moral Principles. Philosophy and Personal Relations: an Anglo-French Study. Ed. A. Montefiore.London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 137-169 [in English].

9. Grotius, G. (1994). On the law of war and peace [Oprave voyny i mira] / Per.s lat. A.L. Sacketti: Reprint. with ed. 1956. Moskva: Ladomir [in Russian].

10. Kant, I. (1997). «Osnovopolozheniye k metafizike nravov» «Kritikaprakticheskogo razuma» [«Fundamentals of the metaphysics of morals» «Critique of practical reason»]. Essays in 4 volumes. Volume III. Moscow Philosophical Foundation [in Russian].

11. Spinoza, B. (1925). Opera. Ed. Carl Gebhardt. Vol. II. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, [in English].

12. Bentham, I. (1998). Introduction to the foundations of morality and law. Moscow: ROSSPEN [in English].

13. Mill, J. (2009). Rech v zashchitu smertnoy kazni [St. Speech in defense of the death penalty] (translated by OV Artemyeva). Eticheskaia mysl - Ethical thought, 9 / under ed. A.A. Huseynova. Moskwa: IF RAN, 183192 [in Russian].

14. Flori, J. (1999). Ideologiya mecha [The ideology of the sword]. St. Petersburg: Eurasia [in Russian].

15. McIntyre, A. (2000). Posle dobrodeteli: Issledovaniya teorii morali [After Virtue: Studies in the Theory of Morality]. Translated. with English V.V Tselishcheva. Moskwa: Academic Project; Ekaterinburg: Delovaya book [in Russian].

16. Gentile, G. (2000). Vvedeniye vfilosofiyu [Introduction to philosophy]. Per. with Italian, introduction. article, commentary, index by AL Zorin. St. Petersburg: Aletheia [in Russian].

17. Connie, A. F. (1956). Izbrannyyeproizvedeniya[Selectedworks]. Moskwa [in Russian].

18. Apresyan, R. G. (2003). Istoriya ticheskikh ucheniy [History of Teachings]. Europe: New Time [Chapter Six]. Ed. A.A. Huseynova [in Russian].

19. Vasiliev, V. V. (2010). Filosofskayapsikhologiya v epokhu Prosveshcheniya [Philosophicalpsychology in the Enlightenment]. Moskwa [in Russian].

20. Gryaznov, A. F. (1996). Razumnyy skeptitsizm v zhizni ifilosofii [Reasonable scepticism in life andphilosophy]. Hume D. Soch.: In 2 vols., vol. 1. Moskwa [in Russian].

21. Hume, D. (1996). Traktat o chelovecheskoy prirode [A treatise on human nature]. Translated. with English S.I. Tsereteli. Hume D. Soch.: In 2 vols., vol. 1. Introduction. Art. A.F. Gryaznova; note. S. Narsky. 2nd ed., Additional and corrected. Moskwa [in Russian].

22. Jung. K. G. (1996). Struktura psikhiki i protses individuatsii [The structure of the psyche and the process of individuation]. Moskwa: Nauka [in Russian].

Размещено на Allbest.ru