On the Possibility of a Dual-Natured Self

8. A modal approach to the debate over compatibilism

As I noted earlier, modal arguments contain either a modal premise or a modal conclusion. Valid modal arguments typically have at least one modal premise when there is also a modal conclusion. Can a modal argument be used as a guide to discovering whether or not the self can be both a subject and an object in the same awareness? Consider the following argument.

If it is inconceivable that p, then it is impossible that p.

It is inconceivable that the self is both a subject and an object in the same awareness.

So, it is impossible that the self is both a subject and an object in the same awareness.

Without making this modal argument explicit, Chakrabarti, actually engages it. Prior to articulating the debate over incompatibilism, he says, “I will examine whether there is any conceptual impossibility or incoherence in the idea of the self being an object. [6: P. 141]” And importantly he points out that the kind of possibility he is interested in investigating is conceptual impossibility and incoherence. The strategy he deploys, as I noted earlier, is one of unhinging the arguments of Sankara, Shoemaker, and Armstrong. The strategy is powerful because, were it successful, it would show that the arguments in favor of conceptual impossibility are not persuasive. The pendulum would swing in favor of the conceptual possibility of compatibilism. My strategy has been to engage his rebuttal to those arguments and to point out potential gaps.

However, there is another move that is available, which Chakrabarti does not explore. Rather than attempting to show that the arguments in favor of the conceptual impossibility of compatibilism fail, one can simply question the significance of conceptual impossibility in relation to what is actually true about the complete self being both a subject and an object in the same awareness. The approach can be drawn out and made clear by making a connection between conceptual impossibility and other varieties of impossibility, such as physical and metaphysical impossibility. Consider the following links.

If it is conceptually impossible that p, it is metaphysically impossible that p.

If it is conceptually impossible that p, it is nomologically impossible that p.

By denying (a) one could argue that the conceptual impossibility of the self being both a subject and an object in the same awareness doesn't show that it is metaphysically impossible for the self, in a state of self-awareness, to be both a subject and an object at the same time. By denying (b) one could argue that the conceptual impossibility does not show that it is nomologically impossible for the self to be both a subject and an object in the same awareness at the same time. Let us consider each move.

Metaphysical modality is spooky to some. Would Sankara have accepted such a notion? Arguably not, for he would not have even understood the notion, if it is distinct from conceptual modality. Shoemaker [13] has already argued that metaphysical modality just collapses into physical modality. So, denying (a) is not the best way to set up the debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism. Can one make good on denying (b)?

One way to do so is to show that outside of the case of compatibilism about the self being both a subject and an object in the same awareness state, one can find ways to refute (a) that are methodologically interesting for the debate over compatibilism. I will use the following claim, which embeds a fact from quantum mechanics.

It is conceptually impossible that light is both a particle and a wave at the same time. Nevertheless, because it is actual that light is both a particle and wave at the same time, and what is actual is possible, it is possible that light is both a particle and a wave at the same time.

The example immediately provokes the skeptical question: in what sense is it conceptually impossible for light to be both a particle and a wave at the same time? The skeptic might argue as follows. Look! It is actual that light is both a particle and wave at the same time, and you agree with physicists when they tell you that that is how things are, so how can it be conceptually impossible? But this is no response at all. The fact that something is actually true does not tell us that it isn't conceptually impossible. We would need a theory that relates our concepts and understanding to reality. Rather, it suggests that there is a tension between what our concepts are, the background logic that we accept when investigating conceptual compatibility, and the structure of scientific theories, evidence, and confirmation. The sense in which it is conceptually impossible is the sense in which we simply don't understand how something can have opposing natures at the same time. While we can assert it based on evidence, and say that must be how things are, it does not follow that we conceptually understand it.

However, the last response might not satisfy a skeptic that is an advocate of dialethism See [14] for an introduction to, and discussion, of dialethism., either in the mode of a logical monist, who holds that only dialethism is the correct logic, or a logical pluralist, who thinks that dialethism is one of a plurality of true logics. But, the skeptics advance via dialethism cannot work either.

The dialetheist will argue that there are true contradictions and that explosion is false -- it isn't true that everything follows from a contradiction. However, the claim that there are true contradictions and explosion is false is insufficient for explaining the view that we can conceptually understand how light is both a particle and a wave at the same time. If we grant that light being both a particle and a wave at the same time is a true contradiction, it might only follow that it is nomologically possible for light to exhibit such a nature, not that we conceptually understand it. What can be conceded to the dialetheist is that within dialethism there is a model under which we can ground the nomological possibility of light being both a particle and wave at the same time. What need not be conceded to the dialetheist is that the model also shows that it is conceptually possible. While we have empirical evidence and scientific theories that require us to hold to the dual nature of light, those do not show us that we conceptually understand the claim. Dialethism is a kind of logic, and it plays a role in how we talk about logical impossibility, so we can say that the dual nature of light is logically possible within a dialethic logic because there are true contradictions. However, that fall short of showing that we conceptually understand the claim so as to ground the conceptual possibility of the dual nature of light. That is, dialethism does not have authority over conceptual possibility.

The upshot of this is that there is a way to vindicate the compatibilist position that Chakrabarti admirably aims to defend. The approach simply attempts to show two things through an analytical and empirical strategy that is informed by cross- cultural philosophy. At least one advantage of this approach is that it allows for an abductive argument to be made on the basis of conceptual, analytical, and empirical arguments. The base of the abduction is the total set of phenomena that needs to be explained, and the conclusion is that compatibilism, although we don't conceptually understand it, is the best explanation. Here are the two central claims.

“The self is both a subject and an object at the same time” is conceptually impossible because like a knife that cannot cut itself, the self cannot act (as an agent) upon itself where it plays the dual role of simultaneously being completely a subject and an object at the same time.

Nevertheless, because it is actual that we have self-awareness, and what is actual is possible, it is nomologically possible for the self to be both a subject and an object in the same awareness at the same time.

On this approach one aims to show that there is a distinctive kind of self-awareness that we have. In this self-awareness we are both subject and object at the same time. The evidence for this would have to be empirical as opposed to merely conceptual in the way in which physicists tell us we know that light is both a particle and wave at the same time.

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