A Russian Bank in the Khanate of Khiva of Novo-Urgench Branch of the Russo-Asiatic Commercial Bank

Personnel of the Novo-Urgench branch of the Russo-Asiatic commercial bank. The Novo-Urgench branch of the bank desperately needed skillful professionals. In February 1911 in a letter to F. Miliashkevich to Samarkand, the division's director V. Komarovskii described the situation with personnel worriedly: “due to truly dreadful conditions of living, we are going to face a number of similar transfer requests from our employees and thus I humbly request to make it known to us whether there are any employees that are free and would be willing to relocate to our branch”. Employees of the division constantly complained to their superiors and inspectors about the harsh climate, illnesses in their families and absence of doctors. A. Slutskii during the inspection in 1911 gave uncomplimentary characteristics to some of the branch's employees. In particular, “first attorney, I. G. Levenstein, who was hired by the bank relatively recently, is little familar with banking practices and accounting. Second attorney, I. V. Stoliarov, unfortunately, paid no attention to anything around him. Shmidt, accountant, did not, as a matter of fact, have an opportunity to keep his professional affairs in order due to, firstly, his own lack of experience, secondly, lack of experienced employees, and thirdly, due to the fact that he did not receive timely information pertaining to conditions of transactions with clients and thus could not make accurate records”. A. F. Forst, a foreign correspondent, was described as a man of “moderate abilities but highly conscientious, responsible and loyal to work”. The appraisal of the rest of employees was “good”.

A. Slutskii paid attention to hard conditions of life in Urgench: “cost of living is frightfully expensive, by way of example: bread costs 10 kopecks per pound, kerosene during my presence there went up to 40 kopecks per pound, saksaul fire wood is up to 50 kopecks per pood, which is the equivalent of 15 roubles per square sazhen 10 vershok of regular firewood or almost 75 roubles per cubic sazhen; most unqualified servants are worth at least 15 roubles per month, almost no clothes or household goods can be bought in Urgench and one has to go to Petroaleksandrovsk, and even there pay a big extra. In case of vacation, anemployeehastospendalmost3 weeks only on the journey to Chardzhui and back, which means more expenses. Due to such conditions, given an opportunity to break away from Urgench, an employee of the branch would flee”. The inspector suggested that salaries of the division's employees be increased and their weaknesses should be treated with more indulgence. 1.1. Fruhling, the successor of V. Y. Komarovskii, was forced to ask for a salary increase for his employees: for A. M. Kisliakov -- from 1500 to 1800 roubles, for A. V. Podoprigora -- from 1500 to 1800 roubles, for V. N. Sitnikov -- from 1200 to 1500 roubles, for N. A. Rodzaevskii -- from 900 to 1080 roubles.

By 1916, personnel of the Novo-Urgench branch of RACB consisted of the director, 2 attorneys, an accountant, 7 employees, a collector of money, a clerk, a translator and 8 servants. Among the personnel, only I. I. Fruhling, the director, could communicate -- orally, not in writing -- with the local population in the Uzbek language. From the justified perspective of the inspectors, ignorance of the local language and legal intricacies restrained the development in the entire Khivan oasis. However, the inspectors regarded vulgar corruption as the main problem in 1916 as well as in 1911. Most of the newly arrived employees of the bank, namely E. K. Trumpf, Brinkman, H. G. Ivanova-Abel' and her husband V. I. Ivanov were relatives of the wife of the branch's director, Fruhling; a relative of Fruhling himself, an Altergot, was also employed by the branch.

Indignant inspectors pointed out the voluntarist methods of administering the branch: “Fruhling held the keys to trading operations only to himself and even the bank's attorneys saw no applications from clients, dispatches received and sent, orders and even some copybooks -- owing to all of the above, even the bank's attorneys themselves are little acquainted with the dealings of our division”. The inspectors noted that “I. Fruhling lays down conditions impossible for the client with the view to consequently offering his own funds at interest and, moreover, a share in the profit, which is done both directly and through Khadzhi Aga (a Persian merchant)”.

Thereby, by 1916 I. I. Fruhling no longer advocated interests of the bank but rather pursued his own. Personal finances of I. Fruhling, according to the analysis of the inspectors, reached an impressive amount of between 150 and 200 thousand roubles. The branch's director owned a large amount of real estate in Urgench and Khiva as well as several current accounts in the bank. As a result of the revision, I. I. Fruhling was dismissed, and P. P. Moskvin was appointed to take his position.

Conclusion

The Novo-Urgench branch of the Russo-Asiatic bank failed to become a driving force of the economic development of the region. The main reasons behind that were the “adjustment” of the division to the actual economic relationships existing in Turkestan and “autonomies”, the Khivan khanate and the Emirate of Bukhara, the special status of the bank's clients at the courts of the local rulers, and issues with personnel.

Concurrently, the Novo-Urgench branch of the Russo-Asiatic bank did not exploit the region's economy but rather helped the local merchantry to increase export and enter both the empire's and international markets. The Novo-Urgench branch of the RACB attempted to control the main exports and even incite development of processing industry in cooperation with local merchants. As can be seen from the reports, in reality the bank's branch could only bring 20 % of cotton export under control, and for a short time, 4045 % of all alfalfa yield, which was pregnant with financial losses. Mainly the operations of merchants well acquainted with the local market were effectuated through the branch, namely, those of the Bakkalov brothers, Mad'iarov, Manuilov and the Rizaev brothers.

Directors of the division endeavoured to participate in commodity operations on an equal footing with merchants and companies (I. I. Fruhling was fairly successful with machinations at the bank's expense, V. Y. Komarovskii was accused of the same). Owing to external circumstances such as scarce current assets, underdeveloped infrastructure of the region, stock exchange fluctuations and problems with personnel, the Novo-Urgench branch of the Russo-Asiatic bank could not capture and control the Khivan market. On the whole, as evidenced by contemporaries, the banking sphere had no significant effect on the social structure and culture of the khanate. However, there were half-hearted attempts to mend the situation of the local population: in 1911, the division requested the administration for permission to allot funds to build a school for both Russians and locals in Urgench.

The activities of the Novo-Urgench branch of the RACB largely facilitated growth of profiteering with cotton and alfalfa. As in entire Turkestan, the persistent problem of small loans was not yet solved in the region concerned, due to which revenue from cotton-farming was received not by cotton farmers but by usurers and engrosses. By force of objective and subjective circumstances, after the beginning of the World War I, prospects of economic modernization in the Russian Central Asia became nebulous. Contrary to the wide-spread opinion of the Soviet historiography, by the beginning of the 1917 the Russian banking system had not created an economic hierarchy in Khiva.

“Colonial” periphery at a glance from Petersburg-Petrograd seemed an attractive sphere for investment and generation of abnormal profit, but the profiteering nature of Turkestan commodity-based economy and corruptness of employees hampered natural development of the banking sphere.

References

1. Akifumi S. Who Should Manage the Water of the Amu Daria? Controversy over Irrigation Concessions between Russia and Khiva, 1913-1914. Explorations in the Social History of Modern Central Asia (19th -- Early 20th Century). Leiden; Boston, 2013, pp. 111-136.

2. Aminov A. M. Economic development of Central Asia (Colonial period). Tashkent, Uzbek SSR State Print, 1959, 298 p. (In Russian)

3. Gindin I. F. Banks and Economic Policy in Russia (19th -- beginning of 20th c.). Collection. Essays of history and typology of Russian banks. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1997, 622 p. (In Russian)

4. Kastelskaia Z. D. From the history of Turkestan territory (1865-1917). Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1980, 120 p. (In Russian)

5. Kitanina T. M. Military-inflationary concerns in Russia 1914-1917. Concern Putilov-Staheev-Batolin. Leningrad, Nauka Publ., 1969, 180 p. (In Russian)

6. Kitanina T. M. Penetration of large Russian financial capital into the economy of Central Asia at the end of 19th -- beginning of 20th centuries. St. Petersburg, Humanitarian book Publ., 2019, 224 p. (In Russian)

7. Khotamov N. B. The role of bank capital in the social and economic development of Central Asia (the beginning of the 90s of the 19th century -- 1917). Dushanbe, Donish Publ., 1990, 319 p. (In Russian)

8. Mamaev A. V. Imperial project of Hungry steppe settlement. Quaestio Rossica, 2019, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 12591274. (In Russian)

9. Mamaev A. V. Preparation of the management reform in Turkestan territory in the beginning of the 20th century: economic aspects. Nauchniy Dialog, 2019, no. 11, pp. 388-406. (In Russian)

10. Makhkamova N. R. Social structure of society in Uzbekistan: traditions and transformations (late 19th century to 1920s). Tashkent, Aloqachi Publ., 2009, 323 p. (In Russian)

11. Pogorelsky I. V. Essays of economic and political history of Khiva Khanate in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. (1873-1917). Leningrad, Leningrad University Press, 1968, 148 p. (In Russian)

12. Potapova N. Y. History of entrepreneurship in Turkestan (second half of the 19th -- beginning of the 20th centuries). Tashkent, UMED Publ., 2011, 152 p. (In Russian)

13. Sadykov A. S. Russia and Khiva in the late 19th -- early 20th century. Tashkent, Fan Publ., 1972, 209 p. (In Russian)

14. Sadykov A. S. Economic relations of Khiva with Russia in the second half of 19th -- beginning of 20th centuries.

15. Tashkent, UzSSR Nauka Publ., 1965, 183 p. (In Russian)

16. Salomatina S. A. Russian and Soviet banks in countries of Middle and Far East 1890-1920s: transformation of imperial traditions. Economic history: yearbook, 2014, vol. 2013, pp. 568-624. (In Russian)

17. Sokolov V. V. Colonial Turkestan: economic and industrial condition and development. Moscow, Plekhanov Russian Economic and Industrial Academy of Sciences Press, 2002, 98 p. (In Russian)

18. Yuldashev A. M. Agricultural relations in Turkestan (end of 19th -- beginning of 20th centuries). Tashkent, Uzbekistan Publ., 1970, 256 p. (In Russian)

19. Yuldashev A. M. Penetration of Russian monopolistic capital in economy of Turkestan (1900-1917). Avtoref. diss.... kand. econom. nauk. Tashkent, 1961, 20 p. (In Russian)

20. Vekselman M. I. Russian monopolistic and foreign capital in Central Asia (end of 19th -- beginning of 20th c.). Tashkent, Fan Publ., 1987, 143 p. (In Russian)

Размещено на Allbest.ru