Elite Giving in Ukraine: State Relations and Legitimacy

Yes, you can interpret it as PR. On the other hand, it is good PR. a lot of people come to see it. It is free, but it is a grandiose and expensive project. Of course we have less expensive projects, of a religious type, for example - a lot of money goes to the restoration of churches (representative, Poroshenko Foundation, October 31, 2011).

As he says, image-building can go hand in hand with the public good. When supporting the ArtPole music festival, they invited thirty-four journalists from Vinnytsia to write about it. Similarly, the Kolesnikov Foundation and the Feldman Foundation actively work to involve the media. However, the representative at the Feldman Foundation claims that it pauses six months before elections, although this is something that Vladimir Salenkov, a donor-businessman in the same city of Kharkiv, contested, saying, “this is the time when the Feldman Foundation is the most active" (November 13, 2013). The Kolesnikov Foundation denies any PR strategy; according to its representative, Kolesnikov does not need it, stating that as he is already famous and respected in Europe: “All of Europe knows him. I think he has a good reputation in Europe among people in the sports community” (October 16, 2013).

On the outskirts of Kharkiv, the Feldman Foundation opened Eco Park, a large public zoo that is accessible to disabled or ill children. At the Kolesnikov Foundation, there is no typical hyperproject; however, in 2010 Kolesnikov was appointed the minister in the Mykola Azarov government responsible for the UEFA 2012 Championship in Ukraine (shared with Poland). The foundation supports this sport, for example, by installing football fields all over Ukraine, and supports culture, for example, by setting organizing grant competitions for musicians and photographers (October 23, 2013).

The Victor Pinchuk Foundation runs its programs on both national and international levels, associating with liberal European and American communities, seeming to focus on getting its message out to these audiences. This is in contrast to the “OP” giving organizations, which are not at all so communicative or easily accessible in English. The VPF organizes public lectures in Kyiv and Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk) with celebrities like British Labour politician Tony Blair, Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute of International Economics, Nobel laureate Mu- hammed Yunus, former US president Bill Clinton, and former Israel president Shimon Perez, who speak to multitudes of students, “so people here can see some of the best thinkers, leaders in the world today” (interview, October 14, 2013).

When confronted with the question of whether these activities can controversially have a positive effect on the reputation of their donor, the representatives often acknowledge this and say, “But what's wrong with that?” In fact, it is usually PR for the foundation but not for the donor or founder, if he is a politician (e.g., Open Ukraine). Teresa Yatsenyuk (November 3, 2011) implies that giving is good, so then there is no need to dig into how people made their money: “We were told [by PR consultants] that if we want to do PR we should do social work - that would make us popular.” Nevertheless, she claims that Open Ukraine is not devoted to image building. Representative 1 said that after the Revolution of Dignity, when Yatsenyuk became the new prime minister, he was “ready to sacrifice his political image in these post-revolutionary times, which is not easy for any leader” (Representative 1, Open Ukraine, May 25, 2014).

The Ukraine's Future foundation representative said, “Of course there is an understanding of these initiatives as `whitewashing' the past, but it destroys the meaning of philanthropy” - and yet both Akhmetov and Pinchuk reject it as a motive. Representative 2 (DoU May 28, 2014) said they have no statistics on public opinion regarding the foundation (but according to other sources it is something they do have, which indicates their interest in the matter). Instead, he stresses the national pride that these types of projects bring. The VPF representative admits that a good reputation is nice and adds that working for Pinchuk helped to improv his own image (May 27, 2014).

Others argue that while Pinchuk needs social legitimacy, his programs support a “brain drain” of Ukrainian talent. Bohdan Hawrylyshyn (October 28, 2013) and

VPF ex-employee Mikhail Minakov argue that these initiatives are more PR than philanthropy, which was the reason for the latter to leave the organization after only one year. However, he also admits that some of the projects are sincere - for instance, the neo-natal program (October 26, 2011).

Based on the statement of a project manager at the Bohdan Hawrylyshyn Charitable Foundation, political philanthropy is about money from parliamentary deputy candidates going to daycare institutions and other similar areas (October 3, 2013), implying a legitimization motive behind the welfare support, combined with visibility. Others claim that these projects are positive for Ukraine's international image, and that while they might have been initiated as image-building projects, in time they developed into patriotism and genuine good will (DoU associate, October 21, 2011; ex-employee VPF, September 21, 2017).

Organizational Structure

The definition of a foundation in English often entails a commitment to endowed capital. Usually, it is structured so that the principal amount is kept intact while the investment income is available for use, or only part of the principal is released each year, allowing more effective donations over a longer period than if the principal was to spend all at once. The endowment may come with stipulations regarding its usage. In our Ukrainian study, the majority of the selected giving organizations lack any endowment. Ukrainian law does not require the founder(s) to transfer any minimum capital or specific types of assets to establish a charitable or private foundation. Instead, the official act incorporating the foundation should specify some assets assigned for designated purposes. Alexander Vinnikov, “Charitable and private foundations in Ukraine,” The international journal of not-for-profit law 8, no. 3 (May 2006). The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law. The reasons why most of the studied organizations are not based on endowments may be that the donors: (1) prefer annual control over their expenditures; (2) prefer to invest in Ukraine now with all their strength; or (3) are young individuals and who therefore are not yet ready to bind their capital assets. When asked about an endowment, Representative 2 at DoU said they have discussed it over the years with the founder, Rinat Akhmetov, but he never recognized “the advantage of an endowment... that it is more sustainable and not dependent on conjunctures.” Part of his explanation includes the rhetorical statement that “on the other hand, if your business was going well, where would you put the money - back into your own business or in the foundation market?” (Representative 2, DoU, November 26, 2013). The VPF ex-employee Mikhail Minakov believes the behaviour of these foundations to be consequently unpredictable, and too dependent on their owners:

I would really stipulate an endowment as a criterion for Ukrainian philanthropists. If you think that an organization should do some public good, then endow it; make it independent. Establish the foundation, endow the foundation, and articulate the goal for this endowment. Then step back.

If you want to have a puppet and to please some of your emotions, it shouldn't be called philanthropy (October 26, 2011).

Private foundations are established in Ukraine under the Civil Code. Until 2014, they were not exempt from paying taxes on non-assigned donations from residents of Ukraine, and were not entitled to any VAT-exempt donations of inkind and/or humanitarian assistance. Since 2014, individual and corporate donations to charities are deductible for up to 4 per cent of the taxable income/previous year's net profit; for corporations, only 70 per cent of payments are tax deductible. Olga Zhogova, “Oblik blahodiinoi dopomohy na pidpryiemstvi,” Nezalezhnyi AUDYTOR (2015), http://n-auditor.com.ua/uk/component/na_archive/789?view=material.

Since institutional settings and giving cultures vary so greatly internationally, researchers of organizational philanthropy worldwide have shifted from labelling these organizations “foundations” and instead call them “institutional philanthropy” (ISTR 2016). My opinion is ambivalent concerning not only the term foundation but also the term philanthropy; since the latter is value-loaded, I prefer to use the more neutral term giving. However, since the organizations I am studying are often labelled “foundations,” they will be referred to as such if the particular organization identifies itself with that term.

Organizational control is the strongest factor among the “PPO” organizations. DoU's Representative 2 stated, “You need to look closely at the factors that influence the problem you are wishing to solve, and carefully follow progress to see if it is developing in the way you wish.” To maintain control is thus highly valued. When the foundation operates its own projects to a large degree, a wider audience is probably intended at the national or international level. PPOs tend to have large, operative projects at the national level, supporting education, culture, and social welfare. A high degree of control often reflects a general fear of and distrust in society, and/or a belief that the team are the ones best suited to implement the programs. This implies something about their attitude to other actors in society, the state, and civil society, and also suggests that controlling image is important.

Attitudes toward the Public Sector

In our research, the representatives who most often expressed distrust toward the authorities were from the “OP” giving organizations, which all had one funding source that was sole for their activities. A Poroshenko Foundation manager said that they never co-fund anything; they always try to ensure that there is no other partner involved: “We never receive money from the state and they never receive money from us. We have only one funding source, in order to keep track.” Yaroslav Rushchyshyn, a donor-businessman said, “I would never cooperate with state institutions” (October 9, 2013), and the Foundation for Promotion of the Arts representative expresses pride for never having received money from the state (March 19, 2012).

Before the Maidan protests in 2013-14, most foundations expressed distrust toward Ukrainian state institutions, describing them as “not results-oriented” (representative, Bohdan Hawrylyshyn Charitable Foundation, October 3, 2013). The Poroshenko Foundation respondent said: “The state is very inefficient. Taxes are not returned to the people, not in Kyiv nor in Vinnytsia... I believe that these private charity projects are extremely important for the well-being of our society, since the state is not able to provide due to theft” (October 31, 2011).

Money in Ukraine can only be earned by violating the law. Otherwise, we are forced to live below the poverty line. Top management receives huge salaries illegally, big salaries. Small employees receive small salaries. I know this from my own experience, since I worked in the system of the Ministry of Defense (project manager, Bohdan Hawrylyshyn Charitable Foundation, October 3, 2013).

Attraction of Resources

Now let us examine how the fundraising organizations attract funds, and the role in this of a powerful name. The Klitschko Foundation fundraises through gala dinners with auctions, where the boxing brothers sell their prizes, clothes, belts, paintings, and items donated by their celebrity friends, such as Sylvester Stallone and Arnold Schwarzenegger. The Scorpions played at one gala, and donated a guitar that was bought for 300,000 USD. This form of celebrity fundraising is unique in my sample, but is in line with the general phenomenon of a public figure attracting resources - like the rest of the “P” foundations, such as Ukraine's Future, `Ukraine 3000, and the Foundation for Promotion of the Arts. These organizations, which are based on fundraising, have seen enormous vacillations in their resources as a consequence of the changing political positions of their founders. For example, Ukraine's Future was established in 2010, but it was only in 2013 that Serhiy Arbuzov, then first deputy prime minister, agreed to chair the board so that it could launch a big project, which was a grant competition aiming at rather unspecified “change” in Ukraine. The winning project could be in arts, education, health care, or any other field; and there were no defined sectors of interest or sums for running the project. Arbuzov's name functioned more as an attractor of resources than as the funder, because of his position as a government official. The manager of Ukraine's Future said:

[Arbuzov] as chairman of the board opens doors and opportunities to have discussions with business. Ukraine is that kind of country: if you do not have a big boss, business will not talk to you. Along with a big boss come opportunities for us to hold productive negotiations with big business. Only then will they possibly listen to us (November 20, 2013).

Anatoliy Tolstoukhov's Foundation for Promotion of the Arts, which is affiliated with the Party of Regions, shows a similar pattern. It was created 1994, employing hundreds of specialists and collaborating with a wide range of important actors and institutions. It was the “presidential foundation,” sometimes called the ` mini-ministry of culture.” However, after the Orange Revolution, when the Party of Regions faction lost much of its support, the monthly donations from businessmen and philanthropists quickly waned (interview November 20, 2013).

Similarly, the president of Ukraine following the Orange Revolution in 2004, Viktor Yushchenko, initiated the `Ukraine 3000' foundation. It was later taken over by his wife, Kateryna Yushchenko, as chair of the foundation. After being accused of embezzling several million hryvnias that had been collected from oligarchs and the Ukrainian public, designated for the building of a children's hospital on the outskirts of Kyiv, the foundation was struck hard financially. Additionally, after Yushchenko approached the end of his political career and lost trust among the Ukrainian public, it became very hard for the foundation to attract funds. The foundation is shrinking continually, but it still exists. When I had my final interview with their representative (November 22, 2013), they were still running their education projects, and their main and most stable funding source was the multinational corporation McDonald's. By April 2018, however, their website was down.

It is striking how these organizations function parallel to the state, and how their sources of funding have a strong tendency to increase and decrease in direct dependence on the political leadership. They can be interpreted as competing with the state, when resources come from public funds and are channelled through the private sector. Ukraine has had more of these “power foundations” that not studied here since they have ceased to exist. The Fund for Effective Politics and Centre for Effective Politics (CEP) were established in the early 2000s with the aim of improving former Ukrainian president Kuchma's image. Accord-ing to the British political scientist Taras Kuzio, “the CEP also had an illegal side, being ultimately responsible for preparing the temnyky [covert instructions] sent to television stations, advising them what to report on and what to ignore” (Taras Kuzio, “Oligarchs, Tapes and Oranges: `Kuch- magate' to the Orange Revolution,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 23, no. 1 (2007): 42).

Yushchenko had several projects that drew together big businessmen and their resources to organize social welfare outside Ukrainian state structures. This can be interpreted as an alternative method of what the `Ukraine 3000' representative described as “forced cooperation” (although he disliked the term). State bodies at the central appeal to the private sector with requests for financial help to solve social problems. Businesses cannot realistically object, since it is “practically impossible to do successful business without the cooperation of political authorities.” This he interprets more like “filling social gaps” with the help of business, rather than “effective philanthropy.” The term is not perfect, since it not only enforces the political levers of power but also the structural necessity of the businesses to operate.

To day you can provide solutions to road conditions or financing kindergartens, but tomorrow you will have a problem that needs to be solved by the authorities... and of course it will be easier for you to talk to the authorities if you already had some good relations (Ukraine 3000, November 22, 2013).

What the interviewee describes is a variety of reasons to engage in philanthropy in Ukraine. There are: (1) more or less voluntary business activities; (2) forced cooperation; and (3) philanthropy in order to establish and continue good relations with the authorities. A given company can engage in philanthropy based on all three reasons. This reflects one angle of the complicated relations between business and politics, and emphasizes the interdependency between state and market. Vladimir Salenkov, a donor-businessman in Kharkiv, also mentions the practice of “forced cooperation”:

Yes, charitable foundations are being created at state institutions. This practice is common in Ukraine. I have transferred money to these funds, although I do not consider it an act of charity, and I regretted every penny. Nevertheless, without such income their work is impossible, since the employees have small salaries and there are no capital assets or office equipment. As a result, it is impossible for them to live and work. That is, independently donations are an additional source of financing. This is undoubtedly bad, but if there is no money in the state budget to fund them, then nothing can be done. A good illustration of this situation is the proverb “necessity is the mother of invention (November 13, 2013).

The Feldman Foundation representative, also located in Kharkiv, said: “We always respond to the needs of the authorities.” To the question of whether this is “forced cooperation” she replied, “Yes, we can make a deal with the authorities when something big comes up,” pointing also to their support of the Yushchenko initiative (November 13, 2013). The Kolesnikov Foundation speaks in favourable terms of “social contracts between government authorities and charities when their goals coincide” (October 16, 2013), while Andrey Palchevsky, a donor-businessman in Kyiv, explains how philanthropy could be abused in various ways:

A philanthropy foundation is the best instrument for whatever political action you could have in Ukraine. You want to win an election? Philanthropy. You want to bribe somebody? Philanthropy. You want to get great sweetheart deals with any ministry? First thing you do is go to the Ministry of Health, say, and come up with a philanthropic project (October 3, 2013).

There is a strong tendency by Ukrainian philanthropists to compensate the state by supporting it whenever necessary. However, in this section it is shown that this compensating behaviour is not always desirable for private actors. Furthermore, it can be a means of abusing power, both on the side of the businessman and the politician.

Discussion

Being based on interviews with donors, foundation representatives, and external actors, this exploratory study of elite giving organizations in Ukraine cannot be generalized statistically. However, it can make analytical generalizations that go beyond the specific setting for the cases of elite giving in Ukraine and possibly in other institutional settings. Mario L. Small, “How many cases do I need? On science and the logic of case selection in field- based research,” Ethnography, Vol 10, no. 1 (2009): 5-38; Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods, Sixth Edition (SAGE Publications, 2018). My argument is that this study of ten crucial cases increases our understanding of the elite giving landscape in the Ukrainian context by highlighting differences between the foundations - and also, more importantly, similarities, depending on political standing. Political factors in elite giving mean that relations between politics and business in Ukraine are still very much intertwined. I also show how the foundations claim to compensate for state failure, and how these organizations may function as legitimacy creators, for different reasons and in various ways.

Compensating for State Failure

Can it be argued that these initiatives are a way to compete with the state? The institutional setting in Ukraine is poorly developed, and most of the organizations are not based on endowed capital. Upon this weak institutional base, the personal-kingdom risk is intensified, as their existence is dependent on yearly donations from the founders. The state can be interpreted as being challenged by the oligarch-politicians - who have a regional focus, express distrust toward the authorities, and provide social welfare for their beneficiaries, similarly to patron-client relations. The state is depicted as inefficient and bureaucrats as thieves. OPs are most harsh in their attitude toward the state, while the other organizations and donors express a wish to support the state in these difficult times, heavily coloured by “sistema practices”. Alena V. Ledeneva, Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange (Cam-bridge: Cambridge Universty Press, 1998); Alena Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernize? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2013).

What about changing the state? Patriotism, pride, and hope are expressed regarding an abstract “future Ukraine.” Some of the organizations, mostly headed by PPOs and Ps, are ostensibly working for this. However, since dependency on the donors is high due to the lack of endowments, and political power is so important for the ability of the foundation to function, the sustainability of these projects is not secured. Something that cannot be contested is that these giving organizations all, to a greater or lesser degree, compensate for state failure by providing some social welfare to targeted audiences.

Political Power Dependency

This study shows that relations with the Ukrainian governing elite are important for giving organizations. The political position behind each of the founders is noticeable, both in relation to the state and to other groups in civil society. While Yat- senyuk (in opposition to Yanukovych) and Akhmetov (in support of Yanukovych) both run think-tanks aimed at reforms, the Poroshenko Foundation had no interest in supporting the government, “which has no future anyway” Poroshenko was later elected president, after the Maidan revolution that ousted former president Viktor Yanukovych. This study also reveals some post-Soviet peculiarities. In the Ukrainian context, again, where state and market relations are tightly interwoven, business is not always the most powerful.

Attitudes and relations to the state and local authorities are characterized by distrust, but also compassion in trying to support the state. The distrust of authorities is not only due to the incapability of the state to deliver, but to the way the state enforces “cooperation” with private entities, using their power to collect material resources supposedly for public good causes. The importance of political power is also evident in the manner some foundations talk about the need for a public figure to attract resources. While some organizations' representatives were repelled by the thought of the state, others were not above proposing “Public-Charity Partnerships” or creating projects meant to be transferred to the state, treating seriously the innovative function of a civil society.

Representatives of big business are dependent on maintaining good relations with the governing elite, and the very existence of some of the giving foundations can be interpreted as an outcome of regime change and perhaps even the values of the governing regime. While most OPs established their foundations in the late 1990s during Leonid Kuchma's presidency, Pinchuk and Akhmetov established theirs just after the Orange Revolution, when the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko stood for something new, with more democracy and hope for socio-political reforms. Engaging in programs aiming at reform or democratization, as they both did, can be interpreted as a way of the following dynamic norms in society. This means that what is seen as legitimate changes with different political leadership. Moreover, audiences and strategies will vary depending on the donor's position in relation to current political leadership. Note that the study at hand is focused on the time of Yanukovych presidency.⁴⁸

Legitimization strategies

Since legitimization is a two-way dynamic process, we need to look at the presumed audiences. Based on project character and geographic location, I have identified the following audiences:

Table 2. Geographical and social groups as targeted audiences

Geographical audience	Social audience
Regional	Electorate, citizens
National	The national political elite, intellectual elites, in some cases citizens and the electorate, recognition among peers
International	Economic and political elites

See Hanna Söderbaum, From Oligarch to Benefactor? Legitimation Strategies among the Wealthy Elite in Post-Soviet Ukraine (Uppsala Studies in Economic History 113, Acta Universitatis Upsa- liensis 2018) for an analysis of dynamic legitimization strategies over the regime change in 2014.

In the literature, targeted audiences include recognition among peers Francie Ostrower, Why the wealthy give: The culture of elite philanthropy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995)., while international political and economic elites are, to my knowledge, rarely specified. PPOs who distance themselves from the label “oligarch,” wanting to be presented as some kind of respected “post-oligarchs,” target the broader public and peers; in only one case was the international political and economic elite specified. OPs, meanwhile, tend to target citizens at the regional level, but over time they also aim at the national intellectual elite. They have less productive foundations and work for image reputation with the help of hyperprojects, embracing domestic values such as responsibility (positive) or clientelism (negative) through ad hoc welfare assistance. Finally, the queried Ps target the national intellectual elite; in one case, the interests crossed the border to the international sphere.

The patterns crystallized between the different types of economic-political elites suggest a close connection between the background of the donor and his giving strategy. It seems that we cannot neglect where the money comes from when trying to understand the role of these initiatives, and not only the public role but also the private one, and what function it has for the donor. The patterns of giving strategies that I trace suggest that in order to understand these organizations' roles in society, we are helped by information on their donors' profiles - which challenges the argument that no attention need be paid to the origin of the money. Moreover, we see clear differences within the power elite between those with financial power and those without, which is in line with Winters' argument about the necessity to distinguish the very wealthy elite from other elites. My study shows the need to differentiate between oligarchs, and highlights patterns in their giving strategies.

The giving can be interpreted as a legitimization strategy, although of varying kinds. While politicians seek to legitimize their future power aspirations, oligarchs seek to legitimize their assets obtained in the past. Both types of groups need to legitimize their extraordinary positions in society. “PPO” organizations show a portfolio of projects that touch on all three spheres. I interpret it as a way of maximizing their giving strategies in order to maximize influence. The wealthiest and most influential oligarchs use multiple legitimization strategies in order to reach multiple audiences. This is similar to what they do in politics: support diverse parties simultaneously. In a quantitative analysis of the Ukrainian super-rich, Markus suggests that “wealth is more resilient against various shocks... for oligarchs who pursue `flexible' strategies aimed at legitimacy [via media and political parties] than for oligarchs who rely on direct power or asset mobility”. Stanislav Markus, “The Atlas That has Not Shrugged: Why Russia's Oligarchs are an Unlikely Force for Change,” Daedalus, 146, no. 2. (2017): 110. See also Stanislav Markus, and Volha Char- nysh. “The Flexible Few: Oligarchs and Wealth Defense in Developing Democracies,” Compara-tive Political Studies 50, no. 12 (2017): 1632-1665. These “chameleon strategies” of the wealthiest oligarchs' organizations, as shown in the present study, point in the same direction as Markus' argument and enhance it with additional findings.



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Original interviews

70. Associated, (Rinat Akhmetov) Development of Ukraine, October 21, 2011. Kyiv.

71. Representative 1 (Rinat Akhmetov) Development of Ukraine, October 2011. Kyiv.

72. Representative 2 (Rinat Akhmetov) Development of Ukraine, March 23, 2012; November 26, 2013; May 28, 2014. Kyiv.

73. Representative 1, Open Ukraine, October 31, 2011; November 3, 2011; May 25, 2014. Kyiv.

74. Representative 2, Open Ukraine, October 31, 2011. Kyiv.

75. Teresa Yatsenyuk, Open Ukraine, November 3, 2011. Kyiv.

76. Representative, Petro Poroshenko Foundation, October 31, 2011. Kyiv.

77. Representative, Ukraine 3000, November 8, 2011; November 22, 2013. Kyiv.

78. Representative, Foundation for the Promotion of Arts, March 19, 2012. Kyiv.

79. Representative, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, October 13, 2013; May 27, 2014. Kyiv.

80. Representative, Borys Kolesnikov Foundation, E-mail interview, November 14, 2011; October 16, 2013; May 23, 2014. Kyiv.

81. Representative, Klitschko brothers Foundation, October 23, 2013; May 29, 2014. Kyiv.

82. Representative, Oleksandr Feldman Foundation, November 13, 2013. Kharkiv.

83. Representative 1, 2 (two respondents) Ukraine's Future Foundation, November 20, 2013. Kyiv.

84. Receiver/Student, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, November 21, 2013. Kyiv.

85. Previous employees, potential recipients, non-focus giving organizations' representatives, donors-businessmen

86. Mikhail Minakov, Associate Professor at Kyiv Mohyla Academy, founder of Foundation for Good Politics, previous employee at Victor Pinchuk Foundation, October 26, 2011. Kyiv.

87. Dmytro Ostroushko, Analyst, Gorshenyn Institute, previous employee at Victor Pinchuk Foundation, October 26, 2011; June 4, 2016; September 21, 2017; November 15, 2017. Kyiv.

88. Artist, November 5, 2011. Kyiv.

89. Evhen Bystrytsky, Director of the Renaissance Foundation, November 11, 2011. Kyiv.

90. Project manager, Anti-AIDS Foundation, March 20, 2012. Kyiv.

91. Andrey Palchevskiy, donor-businessman, October 3, 2013. Kyiv. Representative 1, Bohdan Hawrylyshyn foundation, October 3, 2013. Kyiv. Yaroslav Rushchyshyn, donor-businessman, October 9, 2013. Kyiv.

92. Bohdan Hawrylyshyn, donor-businessman, October 28, 2013. Kyiv.

93. Employee, K. Kondakov Foundation, November 11, 2013. Kyiv.

94. Vladimir Salenkov, donor-businessman, November 13, 2013. Kharkiv. Representative 2, Bohdan Hawrylyshyn Foundation, May 30, 2014. Kyiv. Representative, New Donbas, June 7, 2016. Kyiv.

95. Researchers, practitioners, analysts

96. Svitlana Kuts, expert in civil society and philanthropy, International Fundraising Consultancy Ukraine, March 7, 2011. Kyiv.

97. Anna Gulevska Chernysh, Ukrainian Philanthropists Forum,November 2011; March 13, 2012; November 19, 2013, May 27, 2014, December 16, 2016. Kyiv.

98. Ella Libanova, National Academy of Science, March 19, 2012. Kyiv.

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