Multilateralism and Nationalism in an Era of Disruption: the Great Pandemic and International Politics

As far as relations between Russia and the US are concerned, there is little evidence of a new "reset." There had been a long-term deterioration in relations, interspersed by periods when a crisis provided an opportunity to reset ties. This had been the case after 9/11, and with D. Trump - a transactional president who favoured great power deals and personal relations - the Great Pandemic provided an opportunity for a new opening. There were more telephone calls between V. Putin and D. Trump in spring 2020 than in the whole previous period of D. Trump's presidency. A call on 30 March helped pave the way for an OPEC++ deal on oil production cuts to stabilise the precipitous plunge in prices caused by the collapse of the previous deal of December 2016 and the catastrophic decline in demand, accompanied by huge oversupply. In that call, Putin offered Russian assistance with medical equipment, which D. Trump gratefully accepted. However, D. Trump's room for manoeuvre to strike a "grand bargain" was extremely limited. Not only were the Democrats in Congress resolutely opposed to any concessions, but a large part of the traditional

Republican Party did not share D. Trump's view that Russia was a potential ally in the struggle against China. The sanctions regime was now locked in by Congressional acts, which D. Trump had been forced to sign into law. These included not only on Russian companies and individuals, but also third parties who had purchased Russian military equipment or helped build the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.

With Russia beset by the greatest combination of crises since V. Putin came to power in 2000, "proponents of great power competition within the US national security apparatus would argue that it is ludicrous for the United States to throw Moscow a life preserver when the virus, the oil crisis and the economic aftermath has the real possibility of transforming Russia from a near-peer into a non-peer competitor."1 D. Trump's options were very limited, while the Democratic nominee (the winner of the 2020 presidential election), J. Biden, pledged "to impose real costs on Russia for its violation of international norms and stand with Russian civil society, which has bravely stood time and again against President V. Putin's kleptocratic authoritarian system." There was not much that V. Putin could offer in Ukraine and Syria, or on other divisive policy issues such as NATO enlargement, without losing status and prestige abroad and undermining his position at home. The multitude of problems besetting Russia certainly encouraged the "Putin is doomed" school of thinking, but while he faced the greatest challenge of his presidency, there was no reason to believe that the crisis was terminal. The national vote on the constitutional amendments passed by parliament in March 2020, which would allow V. Putin to run for two more terms after his current period in office ends in 2024, was postponed from 22 April to early July.

This raises the fundamental question of why the stasis prevailed despite the fact that COVID-19 represented a major shock to international and domestic governance. The Black Lives Matter protests against the killing of G. Floyd in Minneapolis on 25 May, just as the US COVID-19 death was hitting 100,000, became a global phenomenon. Along with this came increasing questions regarding history, remorse and reparations for slavery, as well as the issue of enduring injustice. These are crucial topics, but shifting the terrain of debate to questions of identity and even "culture wars" overshadowed many fundamental structural questions of power and purpose. Some in the anti-war movement welcomed D. Trump as a "tactical ally against American imperialism," but "they failed to see that he wanted to wage war at home." The fight for justice at home does have the potential to change the terms of debate over foreign policy, but in the short term the focus on domestic failings only reinforced the stasis in international affairs. The impasse in relations was too deep and the absence of alternative institutional, ideational or policy choices on all sides suggested that the deadlock would endure.

The B. Obama White House staffer B. Rhodes termed the foreign policy establishment "the Blob." This group, mostly located in Washington and its environs, was preoccupied with the apparent decline of American hegemony: "It has been distinguished by its unwillingness, or inability, to reconsider or reprioritize nationalinterests that were first defined after World War II, and then continued, by and large, on auto-pilot after the end of the Cold War."1 M. Glennon argues that the structural development of the American state after 1945 in Cold War conditions created a "deep state." In foreign and security policy, the country is governed by "Trumanite" entities: the ramified national security structures and associated corporations spawned by the Cold War that survived and proliferated afterwards. The effectiveness of constitutional control has withered because of the inherent complexity of national security issues, as well as the enduring bipartisan ideological consensus on America's "leadership" (reformulated in the Trump era as "greatness") in world affairs.

The fundamental paradox is that "The deep state, once an object of suspicion among liberal Americans, has turned into an object of longing under Trump."

Although D. Trump came to power as the great disruptor, he fulfilled his promises to reduce US involvement in the structures of multilateralism. However, when it came to the positive part of his agenda, including "getting on" with Russia, he signally failed. Trump's foreign policy options were constrained by Russiagate, and above all by the national security state.

Trump challenged what he considered to be the ossified and anachronistic "Trumanite" multilateral formats of the national security state abroad, notably NATO, which seemed only to confirm the concerns of the military intelligence community. It would take more than the Great Pandemic to undermine the power of the Trumanite state or to change the views of its ideological defenders, with Democrats and Republicans competing to be the most militant.

Together, they turned their attention to China, launching a new Cold War that would be more complex than the first, as complex processes of supply chain interdependence fostered in the era of globalisation were painfully dismantled.

The Second Cold War would be a full-spectrum conflict as two near-peer competitors struggled for primacy, with few rules on how such a conflict should be fought.

Conclusion

The impasse is complete, and no viable exit is visible. A return to the liberal internationalism that was already being disrupted by its inherent contradictions does not offer an escape route, while the outlines of an alternative to the disruptive third phase of the LIO remain undeveloped. Russia and China defend a model of sovereign internationalism and guarded multilateralism, and on this basis the outlines of a new bipolarity are emerging. The ghosts of nationalism are once again unleashed, restrained only by the structures of post-war multilateralism.

D. Trump was the great disruptor, and the inadequacies of his leadership were exposed by his management of the pandemic. He also questioned America's multilateral commitments. When it came to rethinking the established patterns of the Cold War, this was welcomed by Russia and international peace movements. However, when it concerned the global (not necessarily liberal) institutionalism developed in the post-war years, his disruptions were less welcome. The EU proved too weak to respond to the positive elements of that disruption, while lamenting its negative features. It was able to mitigate some of the latter, primarily by investing in responses to the global health crisis, and after a shaky start it did invest in some new solidarity mechanisms with the hard-hit southern member states like Italy and Spain. Nevertheless, the pandemic only exacerbated the various political fissures, with right wing nationalists using the crisis to advance national agendas, sometimes in the paradoxical guise of defending civil liberties against lockdown restrictions.

The crisis deepened the Russia-China alignment, and with disruptions expected to continue to emanate from Washington irrespective of the outcome of the 2020 presidential election, there has even been talk of this becoming a formal alliance. Russia, as always, was ready for rapprochement with any Western power that was prepared to return to normal diplomatic engagement, but the institutional and ideological inertia of Cold War structures meant that even a major crisis like the Great Pandemic could do little to change entrenched patterns. However, the crisis has been a trial for all countries. State capacity and competencies have been tested everywhere, revalidating state activism and social welfare. One of the main lessons of the pandemic is that the character of a regime - liberal democratic or authoritarian - is not the main measure of effective governance. Rather, it is the quality of its ruling elite and governance structures. In terms of global governance, the G7 once again proved itself too narrow a body to have a significant impact on managing the crisis, while the G20 group was unable to assume the leadership role that it had taken following the financial collapse in autumn 2008. The ultimate result of the pandemic was to intensify the disruptive elements in national and global affairs while highlighting the weakness of multilateral institutions. The crisis has accelerated moves towards the creation of a diffuse yet probably enduring bipolarity in international affairs. In short, everything changed and nothing changed - at least in the short term.

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Аннотация

pandemic china russia

Многосторонность и национализм в эпоху кризиса: глобальная пандемия и международная политика

Глобальная пандемия 2020 г. стала источником потрясений для международной системы.

Но стала ли она причиной её перестройки и изменения логики внешнеполитического поведения игроков на международной арене? Анализ последствий пандемии показывает, что она лишь ускорила существующие тенденции, но не привела к каким-либо существенным преобразованиям. Трехуровневая международная система, созданная после 1945 года, сохраняет свою структуру, но борьба между двумя конкурирующими моделями мирового порядка (либеральным международным порядком и группой суверенных незападных держав) усилилась и может закрепить зарождающуюся новую биполярность. Принцип многосторонности в международных делах уже давно находится под угрозой, но его деградация ускорилась по мере того, как такие органы, как ВОЗ, столкнулись с проблемой борьбы с пандемией коронавируса, а возрождение национализма ускорило процесс деглобализации. Легитимность государства как единственного эффективного субъекта, способного преодолеть глобальный кризис, была переоценена. Но это сопровождалось усилением национал-популистских вызовов не только либеральному универсализму, но и суверенному интернационализму. Возвращение великодержавной конкуренции влечет за собой эрозию «плотных» структур международного сообщества, сложившихся в послевоенные годы, и может свидетельствовать о возвращении к похожему на венский периоду, подошедшему к концу в первые годы XX столетия. Критика ООН и других многосторонних институтов Ялтинско-Потсдамской системы означает, что борьба между соперничающими моделями мирового порядка будет сдерживаться ограждениями международной системы в меньшей степени, и поэтому «новая холодная война» вполне может оказаться более опасной, чем противостояние СССР и США.

Ключевые слова: глобальная пандемия, международная система, мировой порядок, холодная война, Ялтинско-потсдамский порядок, ускорение.

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