Phoenix Risen: The Resurrection of Global Finance

Is cooperation feasible? Skepticism would appear justified by recent history. During the 1980s, the so-called Group of Seven industrial states (the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan) repeatedly declared their commitment to principles of mutual surveillance of their macroeconomic policies and a coordinated management of exchange rates. Yet for all their promises to curb unilateralist impulses, the governments involved more often than not ended up going their separate ways as policymakers wearied of the frequent concessions required. Collaboration in practice tended to ebb and flow like the tides. Apparently, as I have written before, international monetary cooperation, like passionate love, is a good thing but difficult to sustain. ⁵³ The episodic quality of such efforts has also been demonstrated by more recent events in Europe. The march toward a European monetary union, which Goodman approvingly discusses in considerable detail, has seemingly been stalled by currency crises occurring since the completion of his study. Goodman's barely qualified positive tone plainly reflects the enthusiasm and sense of momentum generated by passage of the Maastricht treaty in 1991, when he was writing. Today, it seems fair to say, prospects for a single European currency and central bank appear rather dim.

Reasons for the problematic quality of cooperation are not difficult to find. At the domestic level, as indicated, financial globalization remakes political coalitions and creates vested interests in the new status quo. In the words of Goodman and Pauly, "Global financial structures affect the dynamics of national policy-making by changing and privileging the interests and actions of certain types of firms. Once those interests have been embedded in policy, movement back is not necessarily precluded but is certainly rendered much more difficult." ⁵⁴ At the systemic level, states are always tempted to vie for advantage at the expense of rivals. To the extent that governments act as "defensive positionalists," ⁵⁵ compromise will be inhibited by fears of noncompliance abroad as well as of relative loss at home. Factors at both levels enhance the attractiveness of policies of unilateralism and even aggressive neomercantilism in financial matters. For some observers, they virtually guarantee a world dominated by the "competition state." ⁵⁶

Yet again, some caution is warranted in the face of such bold generalizations. If the extensive literature on international regimes teaches us anything, it is that even the most self-interested of states will on occasion find it advantageous to voluntarily limit their own autonomy. ⁵⁷ This will especially be so when governments are confronted with what Arthur Stein calls "dilemmas of common aversions" rather than "dilemmas of common interests." ⁵⁸ Dilemmas of common aversions, or coordination games, exist when all actors share a concern to avoid a particular outcome. The only question is how to establish a norm, or focal point, around which behavior may coalesce. Beyond agreeing to play by some standard set of rules (for example, driving on the right-hand side of the road), no compromise of underlying preferences is called for. This is in contrast to dilemmas of common interests, or conflictual games, where reciprocal concessions are indeed required to avoid suboptimal (Pareto-deficient) outcomes. Collective action in such situations will obviously be more difficult to achieve or sustain. The difference between the two classes of dilemma is reflected in the distinction economist Peter Kenen draws between two types of cooperation --the "policy-optimizing" approach, where governments seek to bargain their way from suboptimality to something closer to a Pareto optimum; and the regime-preserving, or public-goods approach, where mutual adjustments are made for the sake of defending existing arrangements or institutions against the threat of economic or political shocks. ⁵⁹ The more difficult of the two is clearly the policy-optimizing approach. Happily, though, not all of the challenges posed by global finance are quite so demanding.

In fact, many of the issues involved clearly are more in the nature of coordination games, where "regime preservation" rather than "policy optimization" is at stake. One example is the problem studied by Kapstein, international banking regulation. Prudential supervision, Kapstein suggests, presented a "challenging case" because it is an issue-area in which state power appears to be relatively weak and ineffective. If, despite these unpromising background conditions, states have somehow managed to build a reasonably sound structure for the regulation and supervision of [banks], maybe this tells us something of more general importance. (p. 178)

In reality, the case may have been less challenging than alleged. ⁶⁰ All states, after all, share an interest in ensuring prudent behavior in the banking sector, owing to the industry's central role in the operation of the payments system. None was eager to become enmeshed in a competition in laxity. As Kapstein's own analysis demonstrates, few truly serious compromises were actually required to reach agreement on common standards for capital adequacy, accounting rules, and the like. Nonetheless, the case does tell us something of more general importance -that cooperative action is indeed feasible, at least in circumstances where states find themselves confronted with common aversions rather than fundamentally divergent interests.

Such circumstances can be found at both the micro and macro levels. In Sobel's analysis of securities markets, the evidence clearly points to opportunities for regulatory agreements parallel to those highlighted by Kapstein in the banking sector. "The greater the frequency of international trading, the greater the demands for national regulators to coordinate internationally. The more such regulators coordinate, the more regulatory styles will converge" (p. 159). ⁶¹ Likewise, even in the G-7's disappointing record of performance in the exchange-rate area, experience testifies to the willingness of governments to act together effectively when broader collective goals have appeared at risk (for example, the Plaza Agreement of 1985, the joint response to the stock-market crash of 1987). While genuine policy-optimizing cooperation in the monetary area remains rare, regime-preserving collaboration has not proved impossible. ⁶²

Hence, here too the interesting question is not whether but how and under what conditions. The difficulties of coordinating state action, whether at the micro or macro level, should certainly not be underestimated. Neither, however, should the problematic quality of cooperative strategies be exaggerated. Some issues by their nature require little more than agreement on mutual recognition of standards. Even in areas where conflicts of interest are more directly involved, it may be possible to preserve or promote a collective approach by switching the focus of attention from one class of policy instruments to another. ⁶³ Short of a genuine systemic crisis, governments may never be willing to pay the undoubtedly steep price that would be required to tame the phoenix completely. But it does appear feasible to arrange life so that states and markets may cohabit a bit more comfortably.

The End of Geography

There is no question that the globalization of finance is one of the most striking political-economy developments of the post-World War II era. Governments have clearly been thrown on the defensive. For many analysts, the rise of the phoenix means a possibly irreversible erosion of state authority. For some, it signifies much more: a fundamental change in the meaning of the state itself in relation to transcendent market forces-in effect, a transformation of geography as we know it. No longer is economic activity bounded by the political jurisdiction of the traditional territorial state. Increasingly, the globe itself is the only domain that matters. As economist Richard O'Brien puts it, "The closer we get to a global, integral whole, the closer we get to the end of geography." ⁶⁴

Is this the end of geography? At least three intepretations can be attached to O'Brien's proposition. In one sense it could be construed in material terms, to mean a decline in the importance of place-physical location-as markets are increasingly integrated by the forces of competition and technical innovation. New communications and information technologies already permit market actors to operate with impunity across national frontiers. A future could be imagined where financial services are provided and transactions conducted solely in cyberspace, regardless of specific location. This is evidently the meaning that O'Brien mainly has in mind: "As markets become integratedthe need to base decisions on geography will alter and often diminish." ⁶⁵ In effect, business will be done anywhere.

Such a scenario, however, tends to strain credulity. In reality, the importance of place is unlikely to be erased completely as long as economies of agglomeration can still be gained from concentrating operations in close proximity. Benefits include the more efficient use of information where contact between market actors is facilitated, the spreading of costs of needed public services, and the ready availability of specialist skills and supporting cognate functions. Even O'Brien admits that "certain activities will still be transacted within a relatively limited physical area, in which a collection of expertise is valuable. Where deals require the personal touch location of the players will still matter." ⁶⁶ It is no accident that financial markets historically have always tended to gather together in a few select locales; nor that financial centers, once established, generally resist encroachment from newer rivals for long periods of time. As Paul Krugman has reminded us, "increasing returns and cumulative process are pervasive" in influencing the placement of economic activity. ⁶⁷ Rational actors will continue to be attracted to certain locations as long as gains exceed the costs of congestion.

In a second sense the end of geography could be understood in political terms, as referring to the decline of state authority brought on by financial globalization--the transfer of effective sovereignty from national governments to "stateless" markets. The more public policy is hemmed in by private activities, the less relevant are the legal boundaries that have traditionally been drawn between political jurisdictions. Ultimately, all power might be drained off in favor of transnational capital. The nation-state, as Charles Kindleberger once predicted, would be "just about through as an economic unit," ⁶⁸ but this interpretation too tends to strain credulity. As the preceding discussion has sought to make clear, the more plausible scenario is rather more mundane-a world of incomplete discipline and constant tension on both sides of the state-market divide. While national sovereignty is undoubtedly being challenged, it is not yet ready to be tossed quietly into the dustbin of history.

Finally, in a third sense, the end of geography might be interpreted in cognitive terms, as a shorthand expression for a required long-term shift of intellectual paradigm. Traditionally, in political economy studies of global finance, the central problematique has been the uneasy dialectic between states and markets. As in the books reviewed here, scholars typically focus on the challenge posed by mobile capital to the autonomy of national governments. The existence of an international system, based on state sovereignty as the central organizing principle of world politics, is taken more or less for granted, with markets assumed to operate within a framework defined in terms of the familiar territorial state. As financial activities become increasingly integrated, however, arguably a new organizing principle could be needed, a competing transnational model, ⁶⁹ based not on political space but on economic space, which is becoming truly global in character. For a widening circle of scholars today, the key to understanding contemporary finance is indeed globalization. As Cerny has contended: "It is not merely the erosion of state financial power, but also the way that separate national currencies themselves are increasingly inextricably locked into wider financial trends and structures, which has become the central issue." ⁷⁰ Geography has ended in the sense that the very meaning of borders has allegedly dissolved.

In essence, this final interpretation is just another way of arguing for the exogeneity of global finance-the notion that capital mobility must now be regarded as a truly structural constraint on state behavior. The limitations of that perspective have already been addressed. Insofar as the integration of financial markets remains contingent on government calculations of costs and benefits, the traditional statecentric paradigm continues to be relevant. Nonetheless, for students of IPE the competing transnational model is not easy to ignore. It represents, in fact, but one tributary of a much broader stream of criticism of standard international relations scholarship that has been gathering force in recent years. ⁷¹ The focus of debate is the "territorial trap," ⁷² the deceptively simple notion that world politics can be best understood in terms of "neatly divided spatial packages." ⁷³ In reality, as Stephen Rosow argues, "the entire territorial imagery of current IPE has been rendered ambiguous. Modern conceptualization fails to illuminate the networks and flows of power, and the paths people attempt to carve out within them, which operate in global economic life." ⁷⁴ To stay useful, contemporary IR scholarship must take more serious account of alternative and potentially complementary conceptualizations of rule and dominion in the modern world-nonterritorial "spaces-of-flows," in the language of John Ruggie, as well as the more traditional territorial "spaces-of-places." ⁷⁵ The resurrection of global finance can be fully comprehended only in this much broader context.

Benjamin J. Cohen is Louis G. Lancaster Professor of International Political Economy at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His most recent books include In Whose Interest? International Banking and American Foreign Policy (1986) and Crossing Frontiers: Explorations in International Political Economy (1991). He is also editor of The International Political Economy of Monetary Relations (1993).

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Notes

* I am indebted to David Andrews, Joe Grieco, Miles Kahler, Helen Milner, and Louis Pauly for helpful comments and suggestions. The able assistance of Kathleen Collihan is also gratefully acknowledged.

1 See, e.g., Howard M. Wachtel, The Money Mandarins: The Making of a New Supranational Economic Order (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1990); Richard B. McKenzie and Dwight R. Lee, Quicksilver Capital: How the Rapid Movement of Wealth Has Changed the World (New York: Free Press, 1991); Joel Kurtzman, The Death of Money: How the Electronic Economy Has Destabilized the World's Markets and Created Financial Chaos (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993); Gregory J. Millman, The Vandals' Crown: How Rebel Currency Traders Overthrew the World's Central Banks (New York: Free Press, 1995); and Steven Solomon, The Confidence Game: How Unelected Central Bankers Are Governing the Changed Global Economy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995).

2 Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

3 Other recent contributions of note include Stephen R. Gill and David Law, "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital," International Studies Quarterly 33 (December 1989); Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, "Markets beyond Politics? The State and the Internationalisation of Financial Markets," European Journal of Political Research 19 (March-April 1991); Tariq Banuri and Juliet B. Schor, eds., Financial Openness and National Autonomy: Opportunities and Constraints (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); John B. Goodman and Louis W. Pauly, "The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets," World Politics 46 (October 1993); Philip G. Cerny, ed., Finance and World Politics (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1993); David M. Andrews, "Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International Monetary Relations," International Studies Quarterly 38 (June 1994); Stuart Corbridge, Nigel Thrift, and Ron Martin, eds., Money, Power and Space (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1994); and Eric Helleiner, ed., "The World of Money: The Political Economy of International Capital Mobility," Policy Sciences 27, no. 4 (1994).

4 Jeffry A. Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," International Organization 45 (Autumn 1991), 429.

5 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Frankel, On Exchange Rates (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), chap. 2; Barry P. Bosworth, Saving and Investment in a Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993), chap. 1; William F. Shepherd, International Financial Integration: History, Theory and Applications in OECD Countries (Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing, 1994), chap. 4; Richard J. Herring and Robert E. Litan, Financial Regulation in the Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), chap. 2; and Atish R. Ghosh, "International Capital Mobility amongst the Major Industrialised Countries: Too Little or Too Much?" Economic Journal 105 (January 1995). Country (or political) risk refers to the possibility that assets may be treated differently by different sovereign governments; currency (or foreign-exchange) risk, to the possibility of exchange-rate movements that may alter the rate of return on investments. For some useful discussion, see Richard J. Herring, ed., Managing International Risk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

6 Though unacknowledged by Sobel, use of the terms "outside-in" and "inside-out" to describe alternative approaches to the study of international relations was pioneered by Kenneth Waltz. See Waltz, Theory of World Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 63.

7 For parallel arguments concerning the critical role of domestic politics in shaping distinctive national patterns of financial liberalization, see Louis W. Pauly, Opening Financial Markets: Banking Politics on the Pacific Rim (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Financial Politics in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989); and Sylvia Maxfield, Governing Capital: International Finance and Mexican Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).

8 Philip G. Cerny, "The Deregulation and Re-regulation of Financial Markets in a More Open World," in Cerny (fn. 3), chap. 3.

9 Each of these levels of analysis has its analogue in one of Kenneth Waltz's three "images" of international relations--respectively, the third, second, and first image. See Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

10 Ralph C. Bryant, International Financial Intermediation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), 69.

11 Andrews (fn. 3). See also Philip G. Cerny, "The Dynamics of Financial Globalization: Technology, Market Structure, and Policy Response," Policy Sciences 27, no. 4 (1994).

12 Eric Helleiner, "Post-Globalization: Is the Financial Liberalization Trend Irreversible?" in Daniel Drache and R. Boyer, eds., The Future of Nations and the Limits of Markets (forthcoming).

13 Andrews (fn. 3), 197. See also idem, "Capital Mobility and Monetary Adjustment in Western Europe, 1973-1991," Policy Sciences 27, no. 4 (1994); Philip G. Cerny, "The Political Economy of International Finance," in Cerny (fn. 3), chap. 1; and idem (fn. 11).

14 Louis W. Pauly, "Capital Mobility, State Autonomy and Political Legitimacy," Journal of International Affairs 48 (Winter 1995), 373, 385. Andrews himself (fn. 3) admits that "this is not to say that the current degree of capital mobility cannot be reduced, but instead that reduction is likely to be both difficult and costly" (p. 198).

15 Scott C. James and David A. Lake, "The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846," International Organization 43 (Winter 1989).

16 Uniquely, Japan was the object of considerable and quite direct pressure from the United States to liberalize its financial markets, particularly during the 1980s. For detail, see Rosenbluth (fn. 7), chap. 3. Overt exercise of influence by the U.S. as well as Britain has been much more evident in the negotiation of regulatory responses to financial globalization, as Kapstein emphasizes (chap. 5).

17 Ron Martin, "Stateless Monies, Global Financial Integration and National Economic Autonomy: The End of Geography?" in Corbridge, Thrift, and Martin (fn. 3), 271.

18 Cerny (fn. 8), 51. Andrews (fn. 3), similarly speaks of the critical role of "widely shared ideological commitments" and "mindsets" (pp. 200-201).

19 Gill and Law (fn. 3), 483-84.

20 Cerny (fn. 8), 79.

21 Goodman and Pauly (fn. 3), 79. Andrews (fn. 3) criticizes Goodman and Pauly for this suggestion, charging that, by stressing both market forces and preexisting levels of financial integration, they in effect "treat capital mobility as both an independent and dependent variable" (p. 197). In fact, this is a bit unfair, since Goodman and Pauly clearly have in mind a kind of dynamic sequencing model or step-function in which today's dependent variable is tomorrow's independent variable (and vice versa).

22 Goodman and Pauly (fn. 3), 79.

23 McKenzie and Lee (fn. 1), xi.

24 Millman (fn. 1), 24.

25 Benjamin J. Cohen, "The Triad and the Unholy Trinity: Lessons for the Pacific Region," in Richard Higgott, Richard Leaver, and John Ravenhill, eds., Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict? (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner, 1993). Adding free trade to the equation produces what Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa calls the "inconsistent quartet." See Padoa-Schioppa, "The European Monetary System: A Long-term View," in Francesco Giavazzi, Stefano Micossi, and Marcus Miller, eds., The European Monetary System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

26 Cohen (fn. 25), 147.

27 See esp. Michael C. Webb, "International Economic Structures, Government Interests, and International Coordination of Macroeconomic Adjustment Policies," International Organization 45 (Summer 1991); Goodman and Pauly (fn. 3); Cohen (fn. 25); Andrews (fn. 3).

28 Andrews (fn. 3).

29 Ibid., 203.

30 Thomas A. Friedman, "Don't Mess with Moody's," New York Times, February 22, 1995, p. A15. For a more general analysis of the role that credit-rating agencies may play in constraining public policy, see Timothy J. Sinclair, "Between State and Market: Hegemony and Institutions of Collective Action under Conditions of International Capital Mobility," Policy Sciences 27, no. 4 (1994). For more specific detail on the Mexican experience, see Moises Naim, "Mexico's Larger Story," Foreign Policy 99 (Summer 1995).

31 Sylvia Maxfield, "International Portfolio Flows to Developing/Transitional Economies: Impact on Government Policy Choice" (Manuscript, Yale University, 1995).

32 Barry Eichengreen, International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), 5-6.

33 Ibid., 60.

34 C. Randall Henning, Currencies and Politics in the United States, Germany, and Japan (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994).

35 Goodman and Pauly (fn. 3), 51.

36 Andrews (fn. 3), 206-7.

37 For recent surveys of OCA theory, see Paul R. Masson and Mark P. Taylor, "Currency Unions: A Survey of the Issues," in Masson and Taylor, eds., Policy Issues in the Operation of Currency Unions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and George S. Tavlas, "The 'New' Theory of Optimum Currency Areas," World Economy 16 (November 1993).

38 Frieden (fn. 4), 433.

39 Ibid.

40 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

41 Gill and Law (fn. 3), 486-88.

42 See, e.g., Thomas I. Palley, "Capital Mobility and the Threat to American Prosperity," Challenge (November-December 1994).

43 Robert H. Bates and Da-Hsiang Donald Lien, "A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government," Politics and Society 14 (March 1985), 57. Bates and Lien note that their argument leads them to precisely the opposite conclusion from Hirschman, who reasoned that it was owners of immobile resources who would be more likely to take the political initiative. Hirschman's error, they suggest, was to focus on the motivations of private groups alone without regard to their strategic interaction with government. Political authorities anxious to preserve their tax base will always pay more attention to the owners of mobile resources. Ibid., 61.

44 Jonathan W. Moses, "Abdication from National Policy Autonomy: What's Left to Leave?" Politics and Society 22 (June 1994), 140-42.

45 Sven Steinmo, "The End of Redistribution? International Pressures and Domestic Tax Policy Choices," Challenge (November-December 1994), 17.

46 Thus Ton Notermans criticizes Jonathan Moses for his preoccupation with capital mobility in explaining the Swedish and Norwegian experiences, to the exclusion of what Notermans regards as even more important domestic factors. Notermans, "Social Democracy in Open Economies: A Reply to Jonathan Moses," Politics and Society 22 (June 1994).

47 Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, "Political Responses to Interdependence: What's 'Left' for the Left?" International Organization 45 (Autumn 1991).

48 Ibid., 541.

49 Louis W. Pauly, "National Financial Structures, Capital Mobility, and International Economic Rules: The Normative Consequences of East Asian, European, and American Distinctiveness," Policy Sciences 27, no. 4 (1994).

50 Frieden (fn. 4), 430.

51 Helen V. Milner, "Bargaining and Cooperation: Domestic Games and International Relations" (Manuscript, Columbia University, 1995).

52 Pauly (fn. 14), 373.

53 Cohen (fn. 25), 134.

54 Goodman and Pauly (fn. 3), 52.

55 Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization 42 (August 1988).

56 Cerny (fn. 8); and idem, "The Infrastructure of the Infrastructure? Toward 'Embedded Financial Orthodoxy' in the International Political Economy," in Ronen P. Palen and Barry Gills, eds., Transcending the State-Global Divide: A Neostructuralist Agenda in International Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1994).

57 For a useful recent survey, see Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

58 Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), chap. 2.

59 Peter B. Kenen, Managing Exchange Rates (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), 75-77.

60 Herring and Litan (fn. 5), chap. 5.

61 For evidence of developing cooperation in the regulation of securities markets, see Tony Porter, States, Markets and Regimes in Global Finance (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); and William D. Coleman and Tony Porter, "Regulating International Banking and Securities: Emerging Co-operation among National Authorities," in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, eds., Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994). For some observers, regulatory convergence amounts to a "re-regulation" of financial markets. See Underhill (fn. 3), Cerny (fn. 8).

62 Cohen (fn. 25); Kenen (fn. 59).

63 Webb (fn. 27).

64 Richard O'Brien, Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992), 5. See also Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in an Interdependent Economy (New York: Harper Business, 1990); Martin (fn. 17).

65 O'Brien (fn. 64), 2.

66 Ibid., 76.

67 Paul Krugman, Geography and Trade (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 25.

68 Charles P. Kindleberger, American Business Abroad (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 207.

69 Marcello De Cecco, "Financial Relations: Between Internationalism and Transnationalism," in Roger Morgan et al., eds., New Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World: Essays for Susan Strange (New York: St. Martin's, 1993).

70 Philip G. Cerny, "Money and Finance in the International Political Economy: Structural Change and Paradigmatic Muddle," Review of International Political Economy 1 (Autumn 1994), 591.

71 John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International Organization 47 (Winter 1993); Stephen D. Krasner, "Westphalia and All That," in Judith D. Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Janice E. Thomson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research," International Studies Quarterly 39 (June 1995).

72 John A. Agnew, "The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory," Review of International Political Economy 1 (Spring 1994).

73 John A. Agnew, "Timeless Space and State-Centrism: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory," in Stephen J. Rosow, Naeem Inayatullah, and Mark Rupert, eds., The Global Economy as Political Space (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner, 1994), 89.

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