Investigation of accounting manipulation using the Beneish model: Hungarian case
Study of the level of manipulation of Hungarian corporate financial statements using the eight-variable Benisch M-score model for the period 2017–2021. Comparative analysis of the UM/LM ratio for a number of regions according to financial statement data.
Рубрика | Финансы, деньги и налоги |
Вид | статья |
Язык | английский |
Дата добавления | 04.09.2024 |
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Investigation of accounting manipulation using the Beneish model: Hungarian case
Veronika Fenyves
Department of Controlling, University of Debrecen,
Debrecen, Hungary
Tomasz Pisula
Faculty of Management,
Ryesyow University of Technology, Ryesyow, Poland
Tibor Tarnoczi *
Department of Finance,
University of Debrecen,
Debrecen, Hungary
Abstract
financial statements benisch model
The study examined the manipulation level of Hungarian corporate financial statements using Beneish's M-score model with eight variables between 2017 and 2021. The research also investigated whether the financial statement manipulations depend on the type of sector, company size and age, and region. The research sample was comprised of 32,024 financial statements each year. Statistical tests were used to compare the M-score values of several groups. The proportion of companies with possibly manipulated financial statements varied between 46.43% and 51.67% in the five years. It can be concluded that the manipulation of Hungarian companies' reports is very high. The analysis showed that the ratios of unlikely manipulated (UM) and likely manipulated (LM) reports were improved at size category 1-4, and size category five significantly improved. The comparison by regions revealed that the UM/LM indicator is lower in more developed regions than in less developed ones. The results draw the attention of government decision-makers to pay more attention to checking financial statements. In addition, it shows to the companies' stakeholders that the reliability of the financial statements must also be considered during their decision preparations and risk assessment.
Keywords: Beneish model, accounting manipulation, financial statements, Hungarian companies
Introduction
Given that company performance measurement heavily relies on financial statements, instances of accounting manipulations can significantly erode investor confidence and bias business analyses for corporate performance. Manipulation activities related to preparing financial statements gained heightened attention, particularly after the Enron scandal in the USA (Nigrini, 2005). Table 1 shows the ten most severe accounting scandals involving companies manipulating their financial statements.
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) report in 2020 stated that accounting manipulations caused an unrealised 5% annual sales revenue. The ACFE defines accounting manipulations as fraud and other manipulated acts committed by accountants or manipulations associated with an organisation's accounting methods and practices. The cumulative losses from 2,504 accounting scandals from 125 countries exceeded $3.6 billion. The consequences of accounting scandals extend far beyond company stakeholders, affecting economies, investor confidence, and the accounting sector. The financial welfare of companies may also depend on preventing accounting manipulations and rapidly detecting and responding effectively (ACFE, 2020). Other widely publicised scandals include cases of Parmalat, Ahold (Rezaee, 2005), Xerox, Sunbeam, Adelphia, Global Crossing (Coates, 2007), and Lehman Brothers (Grove and Basilico, 2011).
Table 1. Top 10 worst accounting scandals
No. |
Company name |
Year |
|
1 |
Enron |
2001 |
|
2 |
Tyco |
2002 |
|
3 |
WorldCom |
2002 |
|
4 |
Freddie Mac |
2003 |
|
5 |
HealthSouth |
2003 |
|
6 |
American Insurance Group |
2005 |
|
7 |
Lehman Brothers |
2008 |
|
8 |
Bernie Madoff |
2009 |
|
9 |
Satyam |
2009 |
|
10 |
General Electric Co. |
2016 |
Source: own editing using data from Wallstreetmojo Team: Accounting Scandals
It is crucial to predict potential issues to avert future damages, and several methods are available to make them. The values generated by these methods indicate whether it is worth conducting a more thorough investigation when investors and suppliers engage with a company. Therefore, applying these methods aims to bring attention to potential problems.
Financial statement manipulations can occur across all sectors of the economy. The possibility of financial manipulations may prompt stakeholders to reconsider their behaviour concerning the company. The deceptive financial statements because of accounting manipulation can have significant adverse consequences for information users.
In Hungary, several factors can cause the manipulation of financial reports, for example, the high corruption index and limited controls over financial statements. Controls over financial statements have a low level in Hungary. Businesses must make their financial statements public on a designated website (e.beszamolo.hu). However, strict verification is lacking during the uploading. It is also possible that incorrect data will be uploaded, leading to reporting errors. The reporting errors may not always indicate manipulation; they could also stem from incorrect data entries. The high corruption index also can potentially impact companies' financial reports.
The authors applied Beneish's M-score model to analyse the potential manipulation of Hungarian financial statements. This model was selected considering its successful applications in various types of research involving companies from different countries.
The research estimated the proportion of likely manipulated reports for Hungarian companies based on a significant sample. The study also revealed how the likely manipulated reports are distributed for sectors, company size, age, and regional location.
At the same time, the research was also inspired to determine to which extent corporate financial reports are manipulated in Hungary, where the corruption index (CPI) is very low. CPI does not always reflect the real situation with informal relations (Mishchuk et al., 2018). In addition, unfounded and impromptu governmental decisions often compel businesses to manipulate their financial statements as a survival strategy.
Literature review
The Hungarian economic background inspiring the research
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measured by Transparency International for Hungary was very low in 2012, 55 compared to the best of 90 points (Denmark and Finland). Hungary ranked 46th globally by the CPI index and 19th in the EU. By 2022, the CPI score dropped to 42 points, so Hungary ranked 77th in the world and 27th in the EU. This change is very significant but in the wrong direction. Figure 1 shows the CPI scores of the best (Denmark) and worst (Bulgaria) EU member states, the average scores of EU and former socialist EU member states, and four other member states. Figure 1 also shows that the CPI scores fell off significantly only in Hungary. In 2022, even Bulgaria overtook Hungary. No other EU member
Figure 1. The development of CPI scores in some EU member states between 2012-2022. Source: own editing using data from Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022.
Austria is included in the examination because Hungarian politicians always emphasise getting closer to Austria. However, it can be seen that Hungary is very far from Austria concerning this indicator, and the distance is increasing. Regarding Romania, the earlier opinion was that corruption was high there, as seen in the graph for the first year. The figure also shows that by 2022, the Romanian CPI score improved and reached value 46 (4 better than Hungary). Poland was chosen because Poland and Hungary are the “rebellious” countries of the EU. The figure shows an improvement in the CPI score between 2012 and 2022, but it was only slightly above the starting point by the end of the period. However, it was above the average CPI value of the former socialist countries each year.
Accounting manipulations
Companies are essential contributors to the long-term sustainable wealth of societies and are vital for social development. Reliable reports disclosures are related to long-term company values and influence the stakeholder value approach (Irwandi and Pamungkas, 2020; Lizinska and Czapiewski, 2019).
Literature on manipulations draws heavily from Sutherland's pioneering work (Sutherland, 1949), which focused on studying manipulations caused by corporate leaders against stockholders. He created the term “white-collar crime” to represent the criminal activities of business people.
Jones (2011) invited researchers from 12 countries (Europe (7), Asia (3), the USA, and Australia) to present manipulations that occurred in their countries as case studies. Thus, 58 accounting manipulations were presented, which attempted to provide a complete picture of the motivations for manipulation and to present the role of creative accounting and accounting manipulation. Halilbegovic et al. (2020) described significant, high-damage corporate accounting scandals of the last 20 years. Since then, more and more authors have been dealing with this topic, and the investigation of accounting report manipulations has brought the focus.
According to Cooper et al. (2013), it is crucial to deal with accounting manipulation because it can significantly affect public trust in various organisations. Manipulations can affect several organisations' legitimacy and impact innovation, entrepreneurship, regulatory compliance, society, and the economy (Belas et al., 2015). Karajan and Ullah (2022) investigated how disclosing the company's accounting manipulations affects the company's profitability. They found that the earnings of these companies were a significant decrease. However, the quick change in managers and auditors after the disclosure positively impacted the longer term.
Zhang et al. (2020) examined the relationship between the firm and its employees and the perpetration likelihood of manipulation. They found that firms with proper relations with their employees had a lower probability of manipulation perpetrating.
Vladu et al. (2017) stated that accounting manipulations are morally reprehensible, prejudicing stakeholders, leading to an unrealistic power exercise, and reducing the belief in accounting regulators. They also concluded that ethical erosion has occurred in the accounting profession because if accounting professionals acted ethically in all cases, manipulations would not happen.
Mohammed et al. (2021) examined the earnings manipulation and corporate governance. According to them, earnings manipulation tries financial statements to put storefront, mainly earnings, because it can impress the stakeholders. It is unacceptable behaviour because the financial statements are tools of the firm governance and are related to value creation.
1.1. Beneish model
The literature has several methods for estimating the probability of accounting manipulation (e.g., ratio analysis, Beneish model, Benford's law, data mining, and others) (Zack, 2013; Kliestik et al., 2022; Mantone, 2013; Tutino and Merlo, 2019; Gruszczynski; 2020; Rad et al., 2021; Isakovic-Kaplan et al., 2021).
Two versions of the M-score model exist: the 8-variable and 5-variable models. The difference between the two models is that in the case of the 5-variable model, the last three variables (SGAI, LVGI, TATA) of the 8-variable model are omitted. The processed literature used the variables defined by Beneish in all cases. Even those authors (Svabova et al., 2020; Sabau et al., 2021) used the same variables, trying to create their model using Beneish's variables, and only the model coefficients changed. Some authors used the 8- and 5-variable models together (Durana et al., 2022).
Several authors have applied the M-score model to reveal whether the investigated companies manipulate their accounting reports. Repousis (2016) applied the eight-variables M- score model to test the financial statement manipulation likely using 25,468 non-financial Greek companies between 2011 and 2012. It was found that 33% of companies had a signal of likely manipulation. The F-test showed that the DSRI, AQI, DEPI, SGAI, TATA, and LVGI ratios significantly affected M-score model values. Anning and Adusei (2022) examined financial statement manipulation with 19 manufacturing and trading companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange between 2008 and 2017. They revealed that most firms manipulated their financial statements. Hasan et al. (2017) analysed the financial data of 84,000 listed companies from Asia between 2010 and 2013. They found that 34% of companies selected from seven Asian countries are affected by financial statement manipulations. They stated significant differences among countries on a 5% level. They determined four key variables that impacted the manipulation level: DSRI, DEPI, AQI, and TATA. Durana et al. (2022) analysed Slovak companies using the Beneish and Jones models. They used both 8-parameter and 5- parameter M-score models. They diagnosed the `Agriculture, fishing, forestry' sector and identified creative accounting practices in the companies examined. They established that the 8-parameter M-score model proved more effective.
Some studies have looked at the strength of the M-score model. Tarjo (2015) examined the ability of the M-score model to detect financial manipulations. The analysis results showed that the M-score model could detect financial manipulations. Shakouri et al. (2021) applied the M-score model to predict and detect financial statement manipulations. They used the financial statements of 161 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange between 2009 and 2018. The applied statistical tests verified the usefulness of the M-score model in separating manipulated and healthy companies, confirming the model's effectiveness. Kamal et al. (2016) stated that the M-score model helps measure likely earnings manipulation in companies' financial statements. The model effectively determined 76% of earnings-manipulated firms detected by the US Securities and Exchange Commission. This model also discovered 71% of the US's greatest financial reporting scandals before the disclosure.
Some researchers have created a model similar to the M-score model to study a specific area. Timofte et al. (2021) determined a discriminant function using the 5-parameter M-score model to separate tax-evading and non-tax-evading firms. They found that about 77% of the firms with accounting manipulations committed tax evasion.
Kaminski et al. (2004) state that manipulated financial statements can cause severe social and economic problems. They aimed to determine whether the financial ratios differ in manipulated versus non-manipulated companies. They investigated 79 firms and used 21 ratios, from which they found 16 significant ratios, but only three were significant for entire periods.
The discriminant analysis used to classify manipulated firms achieved 58% to 98%. Their results showed empirical evidence of the limited useability of financial ratios to reveal fraudulent financial statements.
According to Ibadin and Ehigie (2019), despite the appreciable developments in the prediction methods of financial manipulation, the research results still did not provide adequate evidence or tools to predict manipulation. Therefore, researchers have applied different methods with different successes. The authors reviewed the models used in the various investigations. They stated that there is a crucial changing trend in research because it started to apply computer-aided artificial intelligence tools to predict financial manipulations.
It is difficult to assign an exact value to the financial reports' manipulation ratio based on the analyses performed in different countries. Tarjo (2015) found that the model performed well between 71% and 85%. Those who investigated manipulated financial statements (Repousis, 2016; Hasan et al., 2017; Svaboda et al., 2020; Wadhwa et al., 2020) showed that 32-34% of the companies probably had manipulated financial reports.
Methodological approach
Data
The database was purchased from Opten Kft. and contains data from four years (20162021). The companies included in the database were selected by Opten Kft using the conditions given by researchers. First, the companies were classified into five size categories per sector: 0 employees, 1-4 employees, 5-9 employees, 10-49 employees, and 50 or more employees. The database included only operating enterprises. The company with 0 employees had no employees. In Hungary, it often also happens that the company employees work under a commission contract.
Then, the companies were selected from the upper, middle, and lower thirds of the five size categories ranked by sales revenue. The selected firms were proportional to the total number of companies per sector and category. The database only contained companies with financial statements for all four years. Table 2 shows the number of selected companies by sector and size categories. The database contains the same number of companies every year. This type of analysis using such an extensive dataset was unprecedented in Hungary.
Table 2. Distribution of companies by sector and size category
Sectors of the national economy |
Size categories |
Total |
|||||
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
|||
A - Agriculture, forestry, and fishing |
177 |
457 |
184 |
187 |
22 |
1027 |
|
C - Manufacturing |
319 |
1251 |
667 |
901 |
338 |
3476 |
|
F - Construction |
427 |
1629 |
804 |
632 |
54 |
3546 |
|
G - Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles |
1208 |
4697 |
1758 |
1156 |
134 |
8953 |
|
H - Transportation and storage |
168 |
611 |
276 |
296 |
66 |
1417 |
|
I - Accommodation and food service activities |
141 |
578 |
400 |
419 |
40 |
1578 |
|
J - Information and communication |
349 |
792 |
179 |
180 |
28 |
1528 |
|
K - Financial and insurance activities |
107 |
226 |
34 |
26 |
7 |
400 |
|
L - Real estate activities |
867 |
901 |
192 |
132 |
12 |
2104 |
|
M - Professional, scientific and technical activities |
862 |
2065 |
519 |
334 |
45 |
3825 |
|
N - Administrative and support service activities |
250 |
631 |
223 |
244 |
88 |
1436 |
|
P - Education |
60 |
173 |
40 |
25 |
0 |
298 |
|
Q - Human health and social work activities |
183 |
1210 |
147 |
103 |
16 |
1659 |
|
R - Arts, entertainment, and recreation |
89 |
204 |
63 |
58 |
16 |
430 |
|
S - Other service activities |
44 |
170 |
75 |
51 |
7 |
347 |
|
Total by size category |
5251 |
15595 |
5561 |
4744 |
873 |
32024 |
Source: own edition
Methodology
The description of the M-score model can be found in many literary sources (Ozcan, 2018; Sabau et al., 2021). The model correctly identifies potential manipulators for 76% of cases in the first year and 66% in the second year after the profit manipulation. The M-score model applies three ratio groups to estimate the manipulation of financial data: future company performance, cash flows and accruals, and managers' motivations (Ibadin and Ehigie, 2019).
The M-score model is a regression model using eight ratios to determine whether a company manipulates its profit (Beneish, 1999). Beneish assumes that the following factors inspire the companies to manipulate their profits: high sales growth, decreasing gross margins, increasing operating expenses, and growing leverages. They will probably manipulate their earnings by quickening sales recognitions, growing cost deferrals, increasing accruals, and decreasing depreciations. The regression function of the M-score model (Halilbegovic et al., 2020)
M = -4.84 + 0.92 * DSRI + 0.528 * GMI + 0.404 * AQI + 0.892 * SGI + 0.115 * DEPI -0.172 * SGAI - 0.327 * LVGI + 4.679 * TATA
where
DSRI - Receivables Turnover in Day Index - A significant increase in receivable days can suggest speeding up revenue recognition to raise profits.
GMI - Gross Margin Index - A decreasing gross margin shows a negative signal about the firm's prospects and inspires it to raise profits.
AQI - Asset Quality Index - Increase in long-run assets - except property, plant, and equipment - compared to total assets, a sign that a firm potentially raised deferred costs to increase profits.
SGI - Sales Growth Index - Companies with high growth are more likely to commit financial reporting manipulation because their financial position and capital needs put pressure on the leaders to achieve profit. If growing firms face big share price losses at the first sign of a slowdown, they may have greater inspiration to manipulate their earnings.
DEPI - Depreciation Index - A decreasing depreciation compared to net fixed assets suggests the possibility that a firm has modified the estimated asset applicable upwards or applied a new method to raise its income.
SGAI - Sales, General, and Administrative (SG&A) Expense Index - Analysts can interpret a disproportionate rise in SG&A compared to sales as a negative sign concerning a firm's prospects that motivates it to raise profits.
LVGI - Leverage Index - Leverage is measured as total debt compared to total assets. A rise in leverage inspires the manipulation of earnings to meet debt covenants.
TATA - Total Accruals to Total Assets - Total accruals calculated by working capital - except cash - minus depreciation compared to total assets. Accruals, or their portion, show the extent to which managers make decisions to change earnings. Therefore, a higher level of accruals can be associated with a higher probability of earnings manipulation.
The M-score values were classified into three classes:
0. UM - unlikely manipulated, M-score < -2.22
1. PM - probably manipulated, -1.78 > M-score < -2.22
2. LM - likely manipulated, M-score > -1.78
The variables (indicators) found in the 8-variable Beneish model were used during the analysis since this analysis aimed not to create a new model. The analysis database contained data for the years 2016-2021. The M-score model's six indicators (variables) must be calculated using two years' data, which shows the changing rate compared to the previous year. So, such indicators could be calculated only for 2017-2021.
Conducting research and results
Table 3 summarises the distribution by the M-score ratios of companies classified by M-score types and years. The table shows that the financial statements of likely manipulated (LM) companies represent a relatively high proportion, and their value is between 39.19% and 44.55% per year. The rate of probably manipulated (PM) financial statements exceeds 6%, and in 2019-2021 even 7% yearly. There is also a high proportion of financial statements in which the ratios required to determine the M-score could not be calculated due to zero or missing values. If the missing values were omitted, each class would increase, but their relative proportion would not change.
The analysis focused on the UM and LM groups because determining the ratio of manipulated reports within the sample was the primary research objective. The proportion of companies in the LM and UM classes is relatively high compared to the proportions in the literature. One reason for this is unfounded (ad hoc) economic policy decisions; in many cases, legislation is issued in a few days without substantive consultation. Companies have challenges in adapting to the changed circumstances. In addition, the financial statement disclosures are also not sufficiently controlled, which is also a problem.
Table 3. Distribution of the companies by M-score classes and year
Years |
LM |
PM |
UM |
Missing |
|||||
Firms |
% |
Firms |
% |
Firms |
% |
Firms |
% |
||
2017 |
13,618 |
42.52% |
2,045 |
6.39% |
10,699 |
33.41% |
5,662 |
17.68% |
|
2018 |
13,318 |
41.59% |
2,223 |
6.94% |
11,753 |
36.70% |
4,730 |
14.77% |
|
2019 |
12,551 |
39.19% |
2,241 |
7.00% |
12,210 |
38.13% |
5,022 |
15.68% |
|
2020 |
14,169 |
44.24% |
2,324 |
7.26% |
13,736 |
42.89% |
1,795 |
5.61% |
|
2021 |
14,267 |
44.55% |
2,299 |
7.18% |
13,248 |
41.37% |
2,210 |
6.90% |
Source: own compilation
Economic regulations agreed upon with all interested parties would be necessary to reduce the number of manipulated reports. Since disclosure is already done online today, it would be possible to incorporate stricter control into the uploading software. Table 3 contains the statistical characteristics of the filtered M-score values by years and M-score classes. The standardisation method was used to determine outliers, so the absolute value of the z ratio greater than three was considered outliers (Suri et al., 2019).
The values of the statistical characteristics were significantly changed, excluding outliers. The following changes occurred in the statistical indicators (Table 4):
1. The minimum value did not change, and the median decreased slightly.
2. The maximum value has been reduced to 1/33 of the original value.
3. The mean has decreased to 41%, and the standard deviation to 11%.
4. The relative standard deviation (CV%) decreased from 2,571.81% to 695.12% (83% decrease).
5. The skewness ratio decreased to 19% of the original value, and the kurtosis ratio to 3.8%.
Table 4. The main statistical characteristics of the LM and UM classes by years.
Statistical |
2017 |
2018 |
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
||||||
indicators |
LM |
UM |
LM |
UM |
LM |
UM |
LM |
UM |
LM |
UM |
|
Number of companies |
13,618 |
10,699 |
13,318 |
11,753 |
12,551 |
12,210 |
14,169 |
13,736 |
14,267 |
13,248 |
|
Outliers |
22 |
14 |
31 |
14 |
27 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
36 |
7 |
|
Minimum |
-1.78 |
-230.9 |
-1.78 |
-193.1 |
-1.78 |
-1,667.8 |
-1.78 |
-13,786.4 |
-1.78 |
-1,606.8 |
|
Maximum |
2,165.05 |
-2.22 |
1,792.7 |
-2.22 |
1,572.8 |
-2.22 |
395,169.7 |
-2.22 |
2,087.1 |
-2.22 |
|
Median |
0.03 |
-3.47 |
-0.07 |
-3.46 |
-0.12 |
-3.51 |
0.04 |
-3.64 |
-0.01 |
-3.58 |
|
Mean |
11.33 |
-5.19 |
11.73 |
-4.85 |
9.47 |
-5.51 |
128.29 |
-9.76 |
11.29 |
-7.52 |
|
Standard deviation |
80.2 |
9.2 |
75.9 |
7.6 |
65.9 |
23.4 |
4,552.6 |
149.9 |
78.9 |
43.4 |
|
CV% |
708% |
-179% |
647% |
-157% |
696% |
-425% |
3,548% |
-1,536% |
699% |
-577% |
|
Skewness |
15.07 |
-11.77 |
12.22 |
-12.74 |
14.15 |
-45.18 |
63.46 |
-68.03 |
15.38 |
-24.44 |
|
Kurtosis |
282.89 |
183.65 |
182.71 |
221.02 |
242.34 |
2,681.26 |
4,714.19 |
5,578.25 |
299.99 |
703.57 |
Source: own editing
Table 4 shows that initially, in 2017-2019, the number of LM-class companies decreased slightly yearly, so it can be concluded that the number of non-manipulated financial reports is increasing. However, in 2020-2021, the number of LM-class companies is significantly increasing yearly. Therefore, it can be concluded that in the last three years the number of manipulated financial reports is widely increasing. Growth of UM reports was nearly 28.4% in 5 years. However, the number of LM-class enterprises is still high, but the difference is only 7.69% between LM and UM reports in 2021, while it was 27.28% in 2017.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed that the LM and UM classes have non-normal distributions each year because the entire distribution was divided into three parts. High skewness and kurtosis values in Table 4 also support the test results. The LM class represents the right side of the distribution (skewed to the right), the UM class is left (skewed to the left), and the PM class has a near-zero skewness ratio. Since the classes have non-normal distributions, the pairwise Wilcoxon test was used to compare their yearly M-score values, and its results are shown in Table 5. The table indicates that the LM class has no significant difference (at the 5% significance level) only in four cases, between 2017 and 2020, 2017 and 2021, 2018 and 2019, 2018 and 2021. For the UM class, there are no significant statistical differences in three cases between 2017 and 2018, 2017 and 2019, 2018 and 2019.
Table 5. Results of pairwise Wilcoxon test
Source: own compilation
Table 6 contains the annual average values of the ratios in the M-score function, grouped by LM and UM classes. The table shows that the first three ratios of the two classes significantly differ. The last five indicators have also differences, but they are smaller than in the first three. The DSRI ratios of the LM class differ appreciably from the values of the UM class, at least at the 5% significance level.
Table 6. M-score average values per year and ratios of the Beneish model
Ratios in the |
LM |
UM |
|||||||||
M-score function |
2017 |
2018 |
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
2017 |
2018 |
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
|
DSRI |
5.74 |
7.46 |
6.32 |
20.23 |
8.34 |
0.89 |
0.96 |
0.89 |
0.99 |
0.75 |
|
GMI |
3.54 |
2.54 |
2.06 |
-0.81 |
2.31 |
-0.84 |
-0.27 |
-0.85 |
-2.58 |
-1.35 |
|
AQI |
12.18 |
12.56 |
12.71 |
65.30 |
11.59 |
0.70 |
0.71 |
0.65 |
0.65 |
0.62 |
|
SGI |
3.86 |
2.78 |
1.62 |
97.82 |
2.06 |
1.26 |
1.08 |
1.08 |
-0.76 |
1.26 |
|
DEPI |
2.31 |
2.72 |
2.35 |
3.27 |
1.99 |
1.15 |
1.16 |
1.14 |
1.06 |
1.13 |
|
SGAI |
1.04 |
1.26 |
1.15 |
-1.59 |
1.29 |
1.09 |
1.42 |
1.87 |
2.68 |
2.49 |
|
LVGI |
1.17 |
1.10 |
1.15 |
1.19 |
1.19 |
1.92 |
1.72 |
1.96 |
4.14 |
3.23 |
|
TATA |
0.20 |
0.23 |
0.24 |
0.22 |
0.23 |
-0.31 |
-0.28 |
-0.31 |
-0.51 |
-0.57 |
Source: own compilation
The change in the receivable collection policy could cause the high average values of the LM-class DSRI ratios, but it cannot force a difference of 6.5-8 times. The intention to overestimate sales and profits can also produce high value. These remarkable differences between the values of LM and UM classes raise the question of manipulation. The LM-class GMI ratios are higher than one, so the gross margin values have deteriorated, meaning that the LM-class companies' gross margin decreased yearly. On the other hand, growth can be observed in the UM-class companies. The relatively high positive values of the LM class may indicate profit manipulations, too.
In Table 6, the LM-class AQI values are very high and positive, indicating that companies have increased their cost deferrals, which may also allude to earnings manipulation. The higher the SGI value is than one, the greater the probability of earnings manipulation. In all years, the LM-class SGI values appreciably exceed one. The UM-class SGI values also exceed one (but they are already very close to it), except for 2020, when the SGI value dropped to -0.76. Therefore, the financial statement manipulations of the LM-class companies are likely considering the SGI indicator. Since the LM-class DEPI ratios are greater than one, it indicates that the depreciation expenses have been slowed down, which may also show earnings manipulation. The values of the SGAI and LVGI ratios are also greater than one to a small extent, so they do not indicate the financial statement manipulations. The UM-class ratios for these two indicators are higher than those of the LM class, so that the manipulations may occur more in the UM class concerning these two indicators. The average values of the LM-class TATA indicators are relatively small positive values, and they can sign manipulation. Considering all the indicators, it can be concluded that the M-score function also confirms the classification in the given class.
Companies would have to use the indicators used by the M-score model and disclose them in their business reports. The stakeholders could make better decisions based on the accurate picture of the company.
Table 7 shows the development of the M-score values by the national economy sectors. The fewest companies are in the national economic sector P, about 290 per year, and the most are in the G sector, which exceeds 3,500 in the LM class and 2,400 in the UM class yearly. Table 7 shows that the highest LM class M-score values are found in sector L, followed by K, which has a high value. The average value of the M-score ratio for the L sector was approximately halved by 2019. Similarly, the K sector values decreased in 2017-2019 but increased in 2020 to a very high level of 384.5 (like in the L sector 384.5). Generally, in 2020 (COVID-19 pandemic time), it can be seen that financial statement manipulation occurred in almost all sectors of the national economy. The greatest financial statement manipulations are likely in the L sector in 2020. The smallest earnings manipulations are in sector G, where the average M-score values are 5.7 (in 2017), 6.9 (in 2018), 5.5 (in 2019), 149.2 (in 2020) and 7.2 (in 2021). It is worth noticing that in 2020, sector G obtained the third highest result for M-
score values in the LM class. This proves that during the spreading COVID-19 pandemic, this sector also experienced high financial statement manipulations. The M-scores by sectors in Table 7 can draw the attention of inspection bodies to which sectors should focus more attention. In addition, they can also help corporate stakeholders assess the given industry.
Table 7. M-score average values per year and sectors of the national economy
Sectors |
LM |
UM |
||||
of the national economy |
2017 2018 2019 |
2020 |
2021 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 |
|||
A - Agriculture, forestry, and fishing |
10.6 |
12.9 |
11.9 |
10.4 |
7.9 -6.2 -4.8 -4.9 -8.7 -5.8 |
|
C - Manufacturing |
8.8 |
11.4 |
7.9 |
58.6 |
7.8 -4.2 -4.2 -5.0 -7.3 -6.6 |
|
F - Construction |
11.1 |
8.2 |
7.6 |
58.8 |
11.3 -6.7 -4.7 -4.5 -11.7 -6.9 |
|
G - Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles |
5.7 |
6.9 |
5.5 |
149.2 |
7.2 -4.8 -4.9 -5.2 -7.1 -8.0 |
|
H - Transportation and storage |
7.5 |
20.0 |
9.6 |
90.8 |
12.7 -4.3 -3.9 -4.4 -6.8 -6.69 |
|
I - Accommodation and food service activities |
7.5 |
17.5 |
11.8 |
63.5 |
18.6 -7.3 -6.8 -6.4 -10.3 -9.8 |
|
J - Information and communication |
16.5 |
13.2 |
10.8 |
34.6 |
12.7 -5.3 -4.9 -9.1 -6.6 -10.6 |
|
K - Financial and insurance activities |
32.9 |
23.6 |
3.7 |
146.1 |
12.7 -6.2 -5.2 -4.8 -4.9 -6.9 |
|
L - Real estate activities |
34.8 |
24.6 |
17.4 |
384.5 |
21.8 -5.3 -5.1 -5.8 -13.3 -5.7 |
|
M - Professional, scientific and technical activities |
12.5 |
15.6 |
11.2 |
256.1 |
15.4 -5.5 -4.9 -6.7 -18.3 -7.3 |
|
N - Administrative and support service activities |
14.8 |
11.9 |
19.2 |
53.5 |
13.7 -5.2 -4.8 -4.8 -15.8 -7.8 |
|
P - Education |
8.2 |
10.9 |
12.9 |
26.9 |
11.2 -4.3 -3.7 -4.3 -5.4 -6.5 |
|
Q - Human health and social work activities |
15.9 |
10.1 |
13.9 |
23.8 |
15.2 -4.1 -4.6 -4.5 -5.2 -6.1 |
|
R - Arts, entertainment, and recreation |
18.4 |
20.4 |
16.2 |
79.7 |
17.8 -4.9 -4.9 -8.9 -9.7 -8.8 |
|
S - Other service activities |
5.9 |
3.8 |
21.0 |
56.2 |
8.2 -4.9 -4.7 -5.5 -6.6 -14.1 |
Source: own compilation
Table 8 shows the average M-score values of the LM and UM classes per year and size category. It can be seen from the table that the values are deteriorating for both classes with the size increasing. In 2020, the LM class M-score average value was much higher than in the other four years. Similarly, the UM class had relatively large negative values this year.
Table 8. M-score average values per year and size category
Size |
LM |
UM |
|||||||||||
category code |
2017 |
2018 |
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
5-year average |
2017 |
2018 |
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
5-year average |
|
1 |
18.7 |
17.9 |
14.6 |
232.9 |
17.5 |
60.3 |
-6.9 |
-6.2 |
-6.7 |
-13.5 |
-8.7 |
-8.4 |
|
2 |
12.4 |
11.1 |
10.3 |
84.3 |
11.6 |
25.9 |
-5.3 |
-4.9 |
-5.8 |
-8.7 |
-8.4 |
-6.6 |
|
3 |
9.2 |
9.9 |
6.2 |
170.6 |
10.7 |
41.3 |
-4.6 |
-4.5 |
-4.5 |
-6.9 |
-6.5 |
-5.4 |
|
4 |
6.1 |
6.0 |
7.9 |
104.9 |
6.5 |
26.3 |
-4.3 |
-3.9 |
-5.1 |
-12.2 |
-4.7 |
-6.1 |
|
5 |
5.0 |
41.0 |
1.6 |
206.4 |
6.4 |
52.1 |
-3.7 |
-3.4 |
-3.5 |
-13.0 |
-4.9 |
-5.7 |
|
Average |
10.5 |
16.3 |
8.3 |
154.6 |
10.7 |
-4.9 |
-4.6 |
-5.2 |
-10.7 |
-6.8 |
Source: own compilation
Table 8 shows that the companies of all categories had above-average M-score values in 2020.
For companies suspected of manipulating their financial reports (LM class), the average M-score values for smaller companies are further from the critical value. Table 9 shows that more than 60% of the companies belonging to the LM class are in the first two categories. The question may arise about whether smaller companies tend to manipulate their reports. Considering the state of the Hungarian economy, the probability of this can be high enough. The Hungarian government's economic policy decisions are made in a very ad hoc manner. The rules for companies have been changed many times (e.g. tax laws several times within a year). It is much more difficult for smaller businesses to adapt to these changes than larger ones. Small companies have a narrower scope of activities and fewer resources, so it is more difficult for them to manage changes.
Table 9. The distribution of companies between size categories by year in the LM and UM classes
Size category code |
LM |
UM |
|||||||||
2017 |
2018 |
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
2017 |
2018 |
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
||
1 |
13.07% |
13.16% |
12.81% |
14.27% |
13.89% |
15.51% |
14.71% |
13.92% |
15.3% |
15.19% |
|
2 |
47.82% |
47.39% |
49.15% |
48.69% |
48.82% |
47.91% |
49.61% |
48.92% |
50.96% |
50.53% |
|
3 |
18.73% |
19.36% |
18.39% |
18.77% |
18.33% |
17.87% |
17.26% |
18.55% |
17.04% |
17.31% |
|
4 |
17.39% |
17.42% |
16.86% |
15.49% |
16.33% |
15.45% |
14.87% |
15.42% |
14.35% |
14.05% |
|
5 |
2.99% |
2.67% |
2.8% |
2.79% |
2.63% |
3.27% |
3.54% |
3.19% |
2.34% |
2.92% |
Source: own compilation
In many cases, the detected manipulations are not intentional but may also result from small businesses having fewer well-prepared managers or accounting specialists who can properly follow the changes. Smaller enterprises that probably do not manipulate their reports (UM) are also further from the critical value (Table 8). Table 9 shows that even in the case of the UM class, more than 50% of the enterprises are found in the first two categories. It can be concluded that businesses with appropriately trained professionals can also handle occasional extreme situations without financial statement manipulations. So, by training company professionals and providing expert advice to small businesses, the proportion of manipulated financial statements could probably be significantly reduced.
Figure 2. The changes in the ratio of the company numbers in UM/LM ratios by year and size category
Source: own data
Figure 2 shows that the ratio of the number of companies, comparing the two classes (UM / LM), decreased until category 4th, and a significant increase occurred in the fifth category every year. Thus, the proportion of companies manipulating financial statements decreased from 2017 to 2021. Except for the first and fifth categories, the number of LM-class companies was larger than in the other categories. The figure also shows that, except for the last category, the proportion of UM-class companies increased yearly in 2017-2019 and even in 2020. In 2020-2021, a decrease in the proportion of UM-class companies was observed. There was a drop of over 20 percentage points between categories 1 and 4, followed by an increase of almost 20 percentage points between categories 4 and 5, considering the average number of companies.
Looking at Table 10, we can see an astonishing result. Generally, in each region, the UM/LM ratio indicator values increased in 2017-2019 (in some regions, they also increased in 2020 and 2021). Considering the five-year average, the lowest UM/LM ratio indicator is found in the Central Hungary region. The Central Hungary region comprises two parts, Budapest and Pest counties. In this region, the GDP per capita calculated at purchasing power parity was 108% in 2018, compared to the EU average.
However, in Budapest, the previous value was 145%, while in Pest County, it was only 56%. Only the Central Transdanubia and Western Transdanubia regions have higher values than the 56% in Pest County (66% and 72%). The highest values are in the Southern Transdanubia and Northern Hungary regions, where the value of the previous indicator is only 49% in both counties, which makes the Northern Great Plain region have a lower value (46%).
Table 10. The changes in the ratio of the company numbers in the UM/LM ratios by year and region
Region |
UM/LM ratio |
GDP per capita |
||||||
2017 |
2018 |
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
Average |
100% = EU average* |
||
Central Hungary |
73.07% |
82.07% |
92.48% |
91.59% |
87.73% |
85.39% |
108 |
|
Southern Transdanubia |
73.04% |
84.38% |
93.22% |
95.4% |
87.14% |
86.64% |
49 |
|
Southern Great Plain |
89.58% |
100.12% |
111.56% |
103.24% |
101.24% |
101.15% |
52 |
|
Northern Hungary |
78.88% |
93.03% |
96.45% |
97.26% |
93.32% |
91.79% |
49 |
|
Central Transdanubia |
87.92% |
98.06% |
101.85% |
109.33% |
100.84% |
99.60% |
66 |
|
Western Transdanubia |
86.15% |
95.38% |
106.9% |
104.14% |
104.97% |
99.51% |
72 |
|
Northern Great Plain |
82.22% |
90.42% |
104.31% |
99.92% |
104.05% |
96.18% |
46 |
Source: own compilation based on own data and and szazadveg.hu*
(https://szazadveg.hu/hu/2021/03/29/budapesti-es-a-videki-teruletek-feilettsegenek-osszehasonlitasa~n1768).
Based on Table 11, it can be concluded that the companies' ages do not have a determining role in the UM/LM ratio. Although the indicators of companies older than five years are close to each other, only 1-5 years old indicators are lower.
Table 11. The company numbers' ratio changes in the UM/LM ratios by year and company age
Company age |
UM / LM |
||||||
2017 |
2018 |
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
Average |
||
1-5 years |
69.72% |
81.79% |
93.46% |
95.17% |
90.64% |
86.16% |
|