Turks in Germany

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Introduction

According to the World Bank's Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, Turkish migration to Germany is the third largest international migration in the world, after Mexican migration to the United States and Bangladeshi migration to India. In terms of world migration history, the Turkish migration to Germany and to other European countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands and France is relatively recent, a product of the 1960s and early 1970s, when bilateral recruitment schemes brought hundreds of thousands of Turkish workers, mainly young men at first, to work in German factories and construction sites. Whilst some did return, most did not and they were subsequently joined by other family members, especially spouses, and thus the so-called `second generation' - German-born Turks, or very young children brought over as part of family reunion migration - was formed. Now, more than fifty years after Germany's first labour recruitment agreement with Turkey in 1961, the third generation is reaching maturity, adding their numbers to a Turkish heritage population in Germany which is increasingly difficult to enumerate because of the complications of birthplace, naturalizations, and problematic definitions of who, exactly, is a `Turk'.

In this work I focused on two main issues: the motivations and migration processes which `produce' this particular migratory form; and the `post-return' experiences of these mostly young-to-middle-age men and women who have relocated to Turkey.

Turkish migration to Germany and the `Euro-Turk' phenomenon

Turkish migration to Germany in the postwar decades of reconstruction and industrial prosperity can be regarded as the exemplary case of European labor migration. Turkey soon overtook Italy as the main `supply' country for migrant workers to Germany; and Germany was by some measure the principle destination for Turkish migration. Bilateral recruitment agreements between the two countries were signed in 1961 and 1964. Migrants were recruited for work mainly in industrial employment, filling the low-skill jobs that native Germans chose not to do, thereby plugging an important manpower gap that otherwise would have held up economic growth. In the early stages of this migration regime, the Turkish migrants were mainly men aged 20-40, relatively skilled and educated compared to the average working population in Turkey, and mainly from urban and more developed areas of the country.

Towards the later years of the 1960s and through the years of maximum recruitment flow during the early 1970s, the labour migrants came mostly from rural areas and had lower levels of formal education (Abadan Unat 1976; Martin 1991). By this time, European and German social legislation favoured the immigration of family members. Between 1974 and the early 1980s, three principles of migration policy were implemented during the Social Democratic government under Helmut Schmidt. These were: 1) the continuation of the November 1973 ban on the recruitment of non-European Economic Community (EEC) workers; 2) measures to promote the `integration' of those foreigners who had the right to live in Germany; and 3) financial incentives to encourage migrant workers to return to their countries of 8 origin (Bade and Mьnz 2000). Under this `promotion of return law voluntary returns received a bonus payment equivalent to €5250. Some 250,000 migrant workers took the payment and returned to their home countries.

After the migrant-worker and family-reunion phases, a new inflow of Turkish migrants entered Germany in the 1980s. These were refugees and asylum-seekers escaping from the regime imposed by the 1980 military intervention in Turkey. Family-reunion migration continued, alongside clandestine migration . At the same time, the German-born second generation reached maturity, presenting, along with second-generation Italians, Greeks etc., a new sociological group in German society - an increasingly numerous cohort of young people with ambivalent identities and loyalties. The 1990s brought a new phase in the nature of the ambiguous and contradictory relationship between Germany and its now-large immigrant and immigrant-heritage population. Up until then, German citizenship law had been based on the principle of (“jus sanguinis” - a rule that a child's citizenship is determined by its parents' citizenship), which excluded immigrants from the `national' population and the political community by virtue of their not sharing the ethno-cultural background of the host society.

The victory of the Social Democrats and the Greens in the 1998 German national elections brought this controversy centre-stage. One of the first actions of the new government was to break with the forty-year-old yet increasingly untenable claim that `Germany is not a country of immigration' by acknowledging the reality of the presence of millions of so-called guestworkers as permanent immigrants. A landmark initiative introduced at this time was the right of foreigners to obtain German citizenship. Since January 2000, immigrants' children born in Germany, who had at least one parent who has been continuously resident in Germany for at least eight years, can gain automatic citizenship according to the jus soli principle. They hold dual citizenship until the age of 23, when they must decide between German citizenship and that of the country of their parents' origin. The new provisions also include an easier access to citizenship for first-generation immigrants, reducing the residency requirement from 15 to eight years.

Access to naturalization has made the statistics on the number of Turks in Germany, which are recorded on the basis of citizenship, increasingly problematic. During the early 2000s, Turks applying for naturalization as German citizens ran at between 50,000 and 100,000 per year, compared to fewer than 10,000 per annum in the early 1990s. However since 2003 there has been a marked decrease in the number of Turks being naturalized. This is because German Turks are already content with their `denizenship' status, which gives them civil, social and cultural rights (but not political rights), and because they were hoping for a more open ruling on dual citizenship.3 Nonetheless, naturalizations have continued, and are thought to be the main reason for the 9 per cent drop in the number of Turks recorded in the German Central Register of Foreigners between 2005 and 2011 (Sirkeci et al. 2012).

Meantime, a combination of ambiguity and stereotype characterizes the perception of Turkish migrants and their families in Germany, both on the part of the `homeland', Turkey, and the `hostland', Germany. One might add that this ambivalence is part of the self-perception of the `Euro-Turks' themselves. It is still commonly believed in Turkey that migrants of Turkish origin and their descendants in Europe are gurbetзi, with a strong orientation to the homeland that will one day bring them back.4 On the other hand, they are also called Almancэ, a term that depicts such individuals as being rich, eating pork, having a comfortable life abroad, losing their Turkish identity and becoming increasingly `Germanized'. Yet they are resolutely regarded as `foreigners', `Turks' and `Muslims' in their countries of settlement, where their lack of integration is lamented. This `between two worlds' feeling, which is especially strong, it could be argued, amongst the second generation, 10 has been powerfully, and also playfully, exhibited through different genres of art - for example in cinema, literature, music and comedy. As we shall see in the rest of this paper, sometimes this ambiguity is resolved, and in other cases it is heightened, when the second and subsequent generations return `home' to Turkey.

The fall of the Berlin Wall

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the unification of West and East Germany led to a broad public debate on issues of national identity and citizenship, including the location of the Turkish minority in the future united Germany. These debates were accompanied by manifestations of xenophobia and violence on ethnic grounds against the Turkish population. Anti-immigrant sentiment was particularly strong in the former East Germany, which have undergone significant social and economic transformation in the process of unification. Turkish diaspora feared for their safety in Germany, as there were about 1500 cases of violence on ethnic grounds. Political rhetoric, calling for the establishment of zones free from immigrants and the rise of neo-Nazi movement has caused widespread support among liberal Germans opposing the idea of Germany as a 'multicultural' society. Laws on citizenship by place of birth and not birth were adopted only in 2000, and restrictions on dual citizenship are still in effect. However, the number of second-generation Turks, to opt for German citizenship, is increasing, and they are more actively involved in political life.

The degree of assimilation of Turkish immigrants in Germany varies depending on factors such as age, education level, religion, place of birth, and so on. D. Since the bulk of Turkish immigrants over the years were not city residents and people from the villages of Anatolia, their Assimilation has been especially difficult and long. Poorly educated, very religious and not prone to social contacts with Germans older people mostly lived a fairly isolated within their communities and in contact with the Germans, mostly only during operation. Their children and especially grandchildren much more assimilated and often feel like full-fledged citizens of Germany. For example: A typical representative of the younger generation of immigrants is a 23-year-old Mete Kaan Jaama who became the winner of the beauty contest Miss Germany in 2009/2010. German speakers without any accent and his mentality is not different from the young Germans, in my opinion he is an example of successful assimilation. And Djema Ozdemir also is an example of good successful assimilation. He has become a statesman politician, co-chair of the Green Party. However, in general, the Turkish community in Germany is only the first steps towards full integration.

Demography

According to analysis at December 31, 2009 in Germany there were 1,658,083 Turkish citizens (870,472 men and 787,611 women), accounting for 24.8% of all foreigners, thus being the largest minority in Germany. The official number of Turks in Germany who have Turkish citizenship is reduced mainly due to the fact that many take German citizenship, and since 2000 children born in Germany, are eligible for German citizenship.

In 2005, there were 840 000 German citizens of Turkish origin. The total number of people in Germany, who have Turkish roots, was in 2009 about 2,812,000 people, or 3.4% of the German population. Other estimates show that currently live in Germany, more than 4 million people of Turkish origin.

Structure

The age structure of the Turks in Germany is fundamentally different from the German population. At that time, the Germans make up a quarter of people over 60 years among the Turks of only 5%. 1973 is a milestone in connection with the historical development and the changes that have taken place in the social structure of Turkish migrants. This is due primarily to the process of family reunification. Approximately 53% immigrated to Germany through family reunification and for 17% of Turks living in Germany were born in the country.

The proportion of men and women to balance around 1960.

54.2% of Turks in Germany are men, 45.8% - women. 50.5% - people aged 14 to 29 years, whereas among Germans of only 25%. 33.8% - aged 33 to 49, among the German population of 32%. Only 15.7% of Turks over 50, while among the Germans of 43%. Thus the Turks in Germany, on average significantly younger than the Germans. The Turks live in Germany, mainly in large urban agglomerations. About 60% of Turkish immigrants living in big cities, even in small about a quarter. The vast majority live in the former West Germany. Most live in industrialized regions, such as North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Wuerttemberg, in working-class suburbs of major cities such as Berlin (especially in Kreuzberg, which is known as Little Istanbul and Neukцlln), Cologne, Duisburg, Dьsseldorf, Frankfurt, Mannheim Mainz, Munich and Stuttgart.

Culture

Due to the geographical proximity of Germany and Turkey, cultural exchange and the impact of the country of origin are still significant among the Turkish minority. In addition, most of the second generations of Turks have a cultural and emotional ties with the country of origin as the parents and the country where they live and which are going to stay. Most Turks live in two conflicting cultures with different behaviors. At work or at school, as a rule, dominated by German culture, while spare time social connections occur within the ethnic groups of the Turkish culture. In the first generation of migrant social networks were almost entirely Turkish, and now for the second and third generation of this division remains no less significant.

Language

Turkish language - second language in Germany. The second and third generation Turks usually speak Turkish with a German accent and even the influence of German dialects. Some change their language Turkish the addition of German grammar and syntax. Most teach Turkish language at home, communicating with our neighbors and in the Turkish diaspora. Some attend Turkish classes in local schools, while others teach Turkish as a foreign language; such a possibility is now available in many German schools. In some German states, even Turkey formally approved the list of items for delivery at the end of the school. turkish labor migration germany

Religion

Religion has always had a deep influence on people and their culture. 95% of Turkish people who live in Germany belong to Islam. Their religious practices and behaviour make them very much unlike German society. 55% of the Turkish population in Germany say that they are religious, and 40% say they do not practice their religion or they do not believe in this religion. Islam is of deep importance to these people. 43% act according to the rules of Islam, 27% act partly to the rules and 27% do not act in accordance with Islam. If the people live with the Islamic practices, it has a far-reaching effect on their daily lives, from their nutrition to their education of children, up to the treatment of their wives. In the time of Ramadan, they are not allowed to eat between the sunrise and sunset. Also, they are not allowed to eat pork meat.

They educate their children according to the principles of the Koran. These practices are quite different from liberal Western European behaviour. These differences may bring problems. According to Islam, these immigrants believe they are behaving as part of a religious mission. They believe that Islamic practices must dominate the lives of Muslims. Some radical Islamic groups believe this is also true for Muslims living in Germany. Those who speak against this position are attacked for being hostile to foreigners. On the other hand, many Islamic believers see themselves more as an ethnic group than a religious group. The intolerant attitude of some Islamic believers prevents them from integrating into German society.

Identification with Germany

How well the Turkish migrants are able to identify with Germans is shown in the rank of integration. The attitude of the state is important in this case. Reports state that 25% of the Turkish migrants want to go home. 65% want to stay in Germany and 15% do not have an opinion. Those planning to go back base their decision mostly on their satisfaction with Germany. When they are satisfied with Germany they mostly want to stay. In spite of this, 32% Turkish feel closer to Turkey than to Germany (21%). Most of the Turkish people, 42%, feel at home in both countries. Only a small minority do not feel at home in either of the countries.

Around 2/3 have lived more than 20 years in Germany. 61% have the Turkish nationality, 30% have the German and 7% have both nationality. 45% do not want to have German citizenship, 8% are asking for it and 30% want to ask for German citizenship, the rest are not sure.

The Turkish people who were born in Germany feel very integrated in German society and live between both cultures, integrating their own traditions into everyday life. They feel closer to Germans than to those in Turkey. The Turkish population think that the order of the German society is fair. Only 9% think it is unfair in comparison to 48% of the German population. Overall, Turkish people think positively about the order of German society. Around 75% are satisfied with German democracy and say it is in general the best way for a government.

It seems that the Turkish population are satisfied with the German society and government. They especially trust government institutions, like the justice system and the police more than the Germans do. Although they become 65% discrimination and the Turkish people who are born in Germany in 52%.

There is no real identification with Germany, but they prefer the German government and the German social institutions more than the Germans do. There is integration in their heads, now we need this integration in fact.

Conclusion

The Turkish people do not have any legal advantage. The advantages which they have confirmed to other foreigners are the result of the association agreement between Turkey and the EWG. The effort, which the German government is making, is very slight. They only offer some German language courses and Turkish school children get integrated at school.

From the Turkish side there is a big discrepancy. Their integration depend upon the individual, and if they want to stay in Germany or if they want to go back. Most Turkish people want to stay in Germany, but they do not want to lose their identity. So they try to integrate themselves into German society while keeping their own cultural traditions. This is often an impossible. A main reason for this is living in “ghettos” where life is very much like their home country. Sometimes integration takes place at work or at school or with the neighbours. But these families seldom seek contact with Germans or with German culture. They have distant relationships with Germans. Turkish people who seek contacts with German society do sometimes manage to integrate. It is possible to overcome problems with German society. Some even become part of the political system. But the political side must offer more help for integration, especially for young Turkish people. Otherwise they will become a third generation of guest workers. Low education levels and a high rate of crime are proofs that there is still much to do. The development in the last few years shows that there are good reasons for hope that the Turkish population could integrate. The young generation is now more influenced by German culture than by the Turkish one.

References

1. Abadan Unat (1976); Martin (1991) Causes of International Migration; p.157/ Access date: 10.12.2015

2. Bade and Mьnz (2000); Migrations report 2000; Access date: 08.12.2015

3. Matthias Bartsch, Andrea Brandt and Daniel Steinvorth: Turkish Immigration to Germany; Access date: 07.12.2015

4. Postimees;

5. Russell king & Nilay Kэlэnc;`Euro-Turks' return: the counterdiasporic migration of german-born turks to turkey; Access date: 08.12.2015

6. Sirkeci et al. (2012); Turkish migration in Europe: EU accession and migration flows; Access date: 16.12.2015

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