Coverage of the question of moral and psychological state of the soviet troops during the struggle for Kyiv in 1943 in scientific papers

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UDC 355.43: 355.311.2 (477) «1943»

Coverage of the question of moral and psychological state of the soviet troops during the struggle for Kyiv in 1943 in scientific papers

Volodymyr Kydon

Volodymyr Kydon. Average of the question of moral and psychological state of the soviet troops during the struggle for Kyiv in 1943 in scientific papers. The author has attempted to assess the completeness and accuracy of scientific works of scientists as for the coverage of the issues of moral and psychological state of the Soviet troops during the struggle for Kyiv in 1943. Some negative factors of the socio-political situation in Ukraine and their impact on moral and psychological state of the Red Army based on previously closed archival sources of the Communist Party of Ukraine have been analyzed. The article reveals the state of the research carried out by historians of the problems of mobilization, poor attitude of local authorities towards the solution of the problems of soldires family members in the Soviet rear and historical facts of manifestations of banditry, desertion, looting, extortion of local people, thefts of food, clothing and other property have been given.

Key words: 1943, socio-political situation, the Soviet troops, moral and psychological state.

Владимир Кидонь. Освещение в научных работах вопросов моральнопсихологического состояния советских войск во время борьбы за Киев в 1943 году. Автором предпринята попытка дать оценку полноты и достоверности научных работ историков по освещению проблематики морально-психологического состояния советских войск во время борьбы за Киев в 1943 году. Для этого на основе ранее закрытых архивных источников ЦК КП(б) Украины проанализированы отдельные негативные факторов общественно-политической обстановки в Украине и их влияние на морально-психологическое состояние красноармейцев. В статье раскрыто состояние изучения историками мобилизационных проблем, неудовлетворительное отношение местных органов власти к решению проблем членов семей фронтовиков в советском тылу и приведены конкретные факты проявлений бандитизма, дезертирства, мародерства, поборов с местного населения, хищения продовольствия, вещевого и другого имущества.

Ключевые слова: 1943, общественно-политическая обстановка, советские войска, морально-психологическое состояние.

Володимир Кидонь. Висвітлення у наукових працях питань морально-психологічного стану радянських військ під час боротьби за Київ у 1943 році.

Автором здійснено спробу дати оцінку повноти та достовірності наукового доробку вчених з висвітлення проблематики морально-психологічного стану радянських військ під час боротьби за Київ у 1943 році. Для цього на основі раніш закритих архівних джерел ЦК КП(б) України проаналізовано окремі негативні чинників суспільно-політичної обстановки в Україні та їх вплив на морально-психологічний стан червоноармійців. У статті розкрито стан вивчення істориками мобілізаційних проблем, незадовільне відношення місцевих органів влади до вирішення проблем членів сімей фронтовиків у радянському тилу та наведені конкретні історичні факти проявів бандитизму, дезертирства, мародерства, поборів з місцевого населення, розкрадання продовольства, речового та іншого майна.

Ключові слова: 1943 рік, суспільно-політична обстановка, радянські війська, морально-психологічний стан.

At the time of crossing of the Dnipro and offensive operations from bridgeheads the task of strengthening the moral and psychological / in Soviet historiography often used as moral and political / state of the Soviet troops (hereinafter - MPS) gained special importance. This issue was addressed by all those who, to some extent, attempted to cover the Kyiv offensive of 1943. If the native historians of the Soviet period glorified a moral factor and its role in achieving the victory over the forces of the Wehrmacht, in modern Ukrainian and Russian historiography¹, in our opinion, there has been a bias in the opposite direction.

The focus has shifted to insufficiently lit segment in terms of analyzing the negative impact on MPS of the troops and socio-political situation in the front rear, namely mobilization problems, weaknesses in the work of the Soviet state, party, Komsomol bodies and bodies of military control, poor attitude towards the solution of the problems of soldires' family members, manifestations of banditry, desertion, looting, extortion of local people, thefts of food, clothing and other property.

The hypothesis of our study is simple - the truth lies somewhere in between, and historical events and processes are more complex than their interpretation of scholars of different schools and directions. The purpose of the article is to evaluate the scientific results highlighting the issues of moral and political state of the Soviet troops and to use the archive sources for this.

A famous researcher of social and political attitudes of the population of Ukraine during World War II Vladislav Grynevich², on analyzing significant historiographical and source base, concluded that the inhuman Nazi occupation regime significantly influenced the social and political mood of the bulk of the Ukrainian population, caused strengthening of the pro-Soviet sympathies of one part of population and nationalist preferences of the other part. Despite the extremely negative attitude to the Nazi occupation regime, the prospect of the return of Soviet power was estimated by the population of Ukraine extremely ambiguously. For residents of eastern cities that had more than others suffered during the occupation and who were practically doomed by the Nazi policy to extinction, the restoration of the Soviet power meant a revival of hope in life, hope for a stable job and salary, renewal of the inherent to the Soviet system of certain social benefits (issuing rations, financial assistance to families of soldiers, free education, medical care). On the other hand, a considerable part of Ukrainian society without much optimism was expecting the return of the Stalinist regime. That meant not only the hundreds of thousands of people who collaborated with the German administration, taking part in various occupating institutions and organizations, police and military units. Hundreds of thousands of men who deserted parts of the Red Army in 1941 were afraid of persecution; women who have had intimate relations with the Germans; tens of thousands of Communist Party members who remained in the occupied territory; representatives of the accused of disloyalty to Soviet rule of certain ethnic groups (Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Germans, Romanians and others).

A large part of the Ukrainian peasantry was also afraid of the prospect of the return of Stalin's power, primarily for fear of a return of the old collective farm system. Restoration of Soviet power in Ukraine was accompanied by ideologically motivated violent mobilization activities and mass repression.

To improve the morale of troops and to demonstarate the power of Soviet state to the local population in the central squares of many cities there were mounted the gallows for the execution of German prisoners of war and enemy minions³.

Socio-political situation clearly influenced the moral and psychological state of troops. In terms of methodology, we emphasize that historic scientific works differently interprete the concept of morale. So, at the beginning of the coverage of basic material we consider it necessary to turn to intersectoral approaches to this issue, to highlight the current views of experts on the above mentioned issues.

Even in ancient times it was known «... not the number of troops, not its strength but its fighting spirit leads to victory in war,» Xenophon «Anobasys» kn.3, I, 42 (p. 360 BC.). The problem of the troops'morale has been the focus of military theorists and practitioners from ancient times.The writings of Herodotus, Xenophon, Thucydides and other ancient philosophers contain practical recommendations for the analysis and consideration of this category. We all know the words of Napoleon that victory in three quarters depends on the morale of the troops and only in one quarter on the numerical value of the adversaries.

Modern science and practice proves that without a real estimation of morale of troops it is impossible to manage the spiritual and social processes in the daily activity of military groups, to achieve moral superiority over the enemy, to predict the likely completion of the battle, to control the fighting units successfully. MPS of the troops is one of the important components of the combat potential of the army. Fighting Spirit is a spiritual readiness and capability to endure hardships of war, difficulties of military service, to achieve victory over the enemy. Mutually connected morale of the troops (forces) and its manifestation is a moral and psychological potential of the troops⁴. The moral and psychological potential is a collection of toops'spiritual possibilities, their consciousness, professional training which may be a factor of the victory during the battle. Morale is an active part of moral and psychological potential, available spiritual forces of soldiers, their degree of mobilization to perform specific military tasks, moral and psychological factor in achieving victory⁵.

National military scientists give the following definitions of MPS⁶. According to Y. Moskovchuk, MPS is a complete, integrated set of political, spiritual values and attitudes, needs and interests, feelings that prevail and dominate the minds of soldiers currently or within a certain period. That is, MPS is a generalized form of political expression and spiritual consciousness of soldiers, their moral and psychological stability. From the view of V. Kashyrin, moral and psychological state of troops is the influence of social, logistical and natural factors, relatively stable and limited in time condition and mental readiness of soldiers to solve military tasks, the degree of psychological readiness and ability to perform these tasks⁷.

Analysis of a large amount of literature of the Soviet period shows: from the abstracts Stalin proclaimed during the war and published in 1947⁸ to the collapse of the USSR the postulate that that the Soviet troops in 1943 after victories at Stalingrad and Kursk had undeniable moral superiority over the enemy became canonical. Casual party and political work in military units strengthened high MPS of Soviet soldiers. It was the source from which soldiers and army officers took power for a fierce fighting with the enemy, mass heroism. According to Soviet politicians, soldiers, scientists all these accumulated in the battle for the Dnipro and liberation of Kyiv⁹.

Here is the assessment of the Chief of the Political Department of the 1^st Ukrainian Front K. Kraynyukov. As it was instructed according to the operation plan to seize Kyiv by the end of November 5, the party-political work in the army was focused on the study of the calls of the CPSU (b) as for the 26^th anniversary of the October Revolution. Front Military Council put forward a call to «Let's free Kyiv to the 26th anniversary of the Great October Revolution!» Under this slogan in military units meetings and rallies were held, leaflets were produced. This slogan was printed in front and army newspapers, political lessons and conversations on the subject were held¹⁰.

The high moral and fighting qualities shown during the battles for the Dnipro by Soviet generals, officers, sergeants and soldiers were admitted even by the enemies. Former Nazi general Dёrr in an article published in a book edited by the British military historian Liddell Hart wrote that the German command always marveled at the ability of Soviet infantry overcome water obstacles. He noted that «Where the position of German and Soviet troops was divided by the river forcing could be expected at any moment <...> no vigilance could prevent the Russians by various means to force the river at night. Quite often Russians were suddenly found in places where they could be least expected. They acted with incredible speed. They had just one night to turn a small foothold in a strong bridgehead from which it was difficult to dislodge them. Once the bridgehead accumulated enough forces an offensive began»¹¹.

According to Communist Party functionaries morale of the Red Army had to be boosted by the appeal of the Military Council of the 1st Ukrainian Front, specially prepared on the eve of the offensive on Kyiv. «In front of us there is Kyiv, the mother of Russian cities, the cradle of our country - said the appeal - here many centuries ago, our powerful Rus originated. Here our fathers and mothers, our grandparents and forefathers with arms in their hands defended freedom and independence of Russian and Ukrainian people from the enemies¹². « In it the capital of Ukraine was presented as a symbol of unity of the Russian and Ukrainian people against the common enemies, it also mentioned the atrocities committed by the Germans and their collaborators in occupied territory, calls for speedy freeing and defeat of the enemy¹³. To ensure secrecy only at 18.00 on 2 November 1940 the army received the appeal of the Military Council of the front.

Many contemporaries of those events including general Martirosyan Sarkis Soho monovych (Armenian), who in autumn 1943 commanded the 50^th Infantry Corps, took part in the battle for Kyiv, recollect on the effective action and the impact on MPS of the troops of various appeals, slogans, speeches, leaflets, posters of Soviet propaganda¹⁴.

Valery Shaykan while examining the problem of the ideological struggle in Ukraine during the Second World War, confirms the strong influence of Soviet ideological structures on public consciousness, but notes: «the beginning of the liberation of Ukrainian lands from Nazi occupation, along with the strategic goal - to defeat the invaders, the Soviets had to solve the problem of updating and strengthening the dominant position of the Bolshevik ideology, which required some changes in emphasis and more effort»¹⁵.

The literature of the Soviet period states that before the Kiev offensive a large number of soldiers joined the ranks of the Communist Party. So in a short description of the history of the Kiev military district «Kyiv Red Banner» (1969) it is stated that within 30 days from the start of the forcing of the Dnipro river party organizations of the 1^st Ukrainian Front accepted to their ranks about 18 000 people¹⁶. All in all,in the troops before the operation, there were 101,396 Communists and 86,156 Komsomol members as it is claimed in the book of the Moscow military historians published in 1968¹⁷. And the work of the Institute of history of Central Committee of the Communist Party, written at the same time (1968), without any guidance on sources of information says about 135 thousand Communists among the soldiers of the 1^st Ukrainian Front¹⁸. Arbitrary manipulation of numbers is another illustration of the manipulation of historical consciousness of society.

After significant losses in crossing the Dnipro before Kyiv offensive troops of the 1^st Ukrainian Front were reinforced by mobilized population of liberated territories. As for the number of military contingent of communists, important factual material, based on documentary sources is given to us by Patryliak I. and M. Borovik. Out of 150 thousand members of the CP (B) remaining on the occupied area 46.5 thousand were killed by German authorities. Most of the 113,890 members of the CP (B) U, who survived the occupation, not only didn't fight with the Germans, but also occasionally collaborated with the occupiers. Almost 22 thousand of them signed up for the Gestapo, over 6 thousand abandoned their party affiliation, more than 34 thousand destroyed their party tickets. After liberation, they were subjected to checks and excluded from the party during cleansing. Totally over 62 thousand former Communists were denied recovery in the ranks of the Communist Party in the process of the revival of party organizations¹⁹.

One of the determining factors of the socio-political situation, and therefore MPS of the troops was mass mobilization. Since the beginning of the expulsion of German forces from our land, the Red Army began to grow due to the contingent of liberated territories of Ukrainian SSR. These were young men of military age, members of the guerrilla and the clandestine movements of war, found deserters, criminal elements and so on. A separate category of recruits were women mobilized for auxiliary military service. Besides, from the autumn of 1943, there was carried out an extra mobilization call (born 1926). Although the military training of youths was to be longer than for other recruiting years, many of them immediately after the call appeared in the army.

Researcher V. Grinevich said that the conditions under which mobilization in Ukraine in 1943 was conducted, both in military and political, as well as moral and psychological terms differed significantly from the mobilization of1941. This time, the attack was led by the Red Army, exhausted fighting regiments and divisions of which needed constant replenishment. However, «the trust» of the Soviet leadership to the local population, which almost two years had been influenced by enemy propaganda was destroyed. All this affected both the nature and the forms of mobilization in Soviet Ukraine²⁰. The same circumstances were mentioned by Colonel General K. Kraynyukov in his memoirs, «in mass political work we considered that some recruits experienced the horrors of the German occupation, their minds for two years had been poisoned by Nazi propaganda»²¹.

Authors of «Victory and sacrifice. Ukrainians on the fronts of World War II» emphasize that the first wave of recruitment was carried out, usually by frontline and army bodies as military-administrative apparatus was just being restored. Already on July 1, 1943 units and the connections of the 1^st Guards, 13^th, 18^th, 27^th, 38^th, 40^th, 60^th, and 3^rd Tank Army, 234 FZSP were joined by 416,052 new soldiers and commanders. The researchers found out that during 1943 the Ukrainian SSR twice carried out verification of registration for military service, military and recruites . The reason for it was the order of NCO USSR number 0316 (June 1943); at the same time the data on all men to 47 years of age and unfit for military service and those who had been deferred due to sickness were verified. On October 21, 1943 resolution of the CC CP (B) U «on measures for carrying out military service registration of all men bound to military service and the call to the Red Army of the citizens born in 1926 came into force»²².

A special feature of mobilization in Ukraine in 1943-1944 was that it was car-ried out not only by military. The local military offices could resume their activities only a month or two after the liberation of the areas from German occupation. So, in order not to waste time, the army was actively involved in the mobilization. Conscription was performed directly by headquarters of units by the decisions of the military councils of armies. In Soviet historical science prevails misconception that conscription was performed by «field recruitment offices». The author carried out a thorough analysis of the documentary base on these issues refuted these positions. We believe that some local historians emotionality leads to the creation of new myths.

So in the works of V. Korol emphasis is on negative aspects: «field recruitment offices», deliberate destruction of mobilized Ukrainians by the leaders of the Red Army, punitive and assault battalions, defensive squads. Victor Yukhymovych randomly operates facts and figures, referring in his scientific worsk to his own newspaper publishings and private conversations with veterans and witnesses of the events²³. The famous Ukrainian researcher says: «Today a document was published - evidence of Y. Kovalenko known as a participant of taking captive of Field Marshal Paulus. During the battle for the Dnipro he was appointed an officer for special orders of the commander of the Voronezh and from 20^th October 1943 of the First Ukrainian Army Front General M. Vatutin and was present at a meeting in the village Trebukhov where the question of forcing the Dnipro and liberation of Kyiv was discussed. Then Zhukov when a question of giving weapons and clothes to these 300 thousand youths arose, said: «They will fight in what they came». Then sounded a short phrase of Zhukov: «Why should we, my friends,consider this. Why should we give outfit and equip these men. All of them are traitors! The more of them sink in the river, the less we will have to send to Siberia after the war. ««So it's not a war, but genocide of people» - said Rokossovsky»²⁴. While publishing these very serious allegations of evidence in magazine «Military History» V. Korol refers to his own publication in the journal «History in school».

The works of L. Rybchenko impress by depth and authenticity. Lyudmyla Viktorivna believes that in Left-Bank Ukraine the action of Headquarters' order №089 from 09.02.1942 which allowed the Red Army to replenish their own troops on the liberated territories had the most tragic consequences. This is where new massive replenishment were engaged into the most complex strategic operations of the Soviet- German war - the battle for the Dnipro. The practice of execution of the order showed that the decision to give the army the right to mobilize people on the liberated territories significantly reduced the quality of selection of recruits, negatively affected the level of their training and facilitated irresponsible not justified use of local recruites in offensive combats. Up to 50% of recruited people were mobilized by the army and immediately went to the front. Conscription in 1943 had tragic demographic consequences for Ukraine. The death toll is hidden. Frauds found in accounts for losses give reason to believe that most of the newly mobilized soldiers who died in the first weeks of his stay at the front, credited missing only in April - May 1944. Such actions are a manifestation of the totalitarian methods of warfare and crimes of the Soviet system against its own people²⁵

However, the researcher Lyudmyla Rybchenko (analyzing issues of morale of the population of Left-Bank Ukraine in 1941-1943 and their attitude to the Soviet military mobilization) believes that common in modern historiography thesis that Ukraine's population suffering from the repression of the Stalinist regime at the beginning of the German invasion pinned some hope on the Germans, and after the mass murder of civilians by the invaders turned away and joined the resistance movement, is too simplified. Analysis of memoirs, letters, diaries of the war period gives reason to believe that among the population of Left-Bank Ukraine thoughts, feelings, political views, both of civilian and soldiers of the Red Army neither at the beginning of the occupation, nor after the liberation was the same. They depended on life experience, ethnicity, education level, place of residence, results of Soviet and German propaganda and so on. In general, the attitude of the population of the occupied territory to the return of the Red Army differed significantly. People considered the army to be the savior and sincerely were waiting for it. The majority of ex-servicemen in 1941 and the war captives, on the one hand sought to avenge the enemy, on the other - as soon as possible to legalize and protect themselves and family from the persecution of Soviet power. Youths, who during the years of occupation reached military age, were primarily characterised by the determination and sincere desire to fight in the ranks of the Red Army. Men who were older mostly went to the front with a belief in democratic changes in the country. They cherished the hope that, together with its citizens, having gone through such terrible trial, the government will improve, there will be changes in the social and economic spheres. However, the realities were such that the Red Army had become a tool of a totalitarian regime. The mobilization carried out by the Army of the population that for some time was ruled by another political system was considered by the part of the command as another punitive function, such as an execution of alarmists, deserters and others without trial²⁶.

In the second half of 1943 mobilization campaigns in Left Bank Ukraine regions became of a large scale. The proportion of citizens of the republic in the units and formations which liberated Ukraine from invaders, steadily increased. Out of 1728 people that entered the 181^st Infantry Division of the 13th Army in the first half of October 1943, 1577 were called by the recruiting office of Chernihiv region²⁷. According to I. Lysenko and E. Mukovskyi only from five regions in the second half of 1943 regional recruitment offices sent to the Red Army almost 250,000 men of all ages and 129,500 former prisoners. This amount will increase by 2.5 thousand people when accounting mobilization of women, targeted mobilization - to the NKVD to protect industrial facilities in Kharkiv, Stalin, Voroshylovhrad, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv regions according to the order of the CC CP (B) on September 17, 1943²⁸.

Scientific thesis of O. Lysenko, I. Mukovskyi, L. Rybchenko, I. Patryliak and other researchers on the use of not prepared and not properly equipped people in the battles are proved by a significant array of sources. This is confirmed by German documents. So in a report of intelligence of 198 Infantry Division was on 11.25.1943 it is said that that near Bila Tserkva Soviets are significantly weakened. In battalions there are listed 30-50 people and 90% of them with no combat experience just recruited Ukrainians aged 17, poorly armed and untrained²⁹.

In liberated from the Nazis areas authorities conducted virtually total «combing» to identify people who declined the service and deserters and saboteurs. The scope of operation is indicated by the number of its participants: 774 NKVD officers and police, 5539 soldiers, 1 595 village and party activists, 1,077 soldiers of assault battalions³⁰.

Naturally, the conduct of the mobilized replenishment was not always «deeply patriotic» to the Soviet regime. In particular, it is reported in the documents by the Head of Political Department of the 1st Ukrainian Front Lieutenant General S. Shatilov. Private of the 121^st Infantry Division Tyrchan in the circle of friends said: «The Germans had not mobilized us for three years, but the Russians did. They are not right that make us fight. What shall we fight for? We will fight». The soldier of the 121^st Infantry Division Sendun during the political lessons said «Comrade Captain, when I come home and mother asks me what did you son fight for. Tell me, what to answer»³¹.

Discords in the family negatively affected the moral and psychological state of the soldiers and commanders. Special Service for Supervision of correspondence of the Red Army soldiers signaled hundreds of messages of family members about unfair treatment received by them from the local authorities. Here are some excerpts from these letters. A letter from a citizen A.T. Krasnaya, Sumy region, Morypilskyi district, village Yunakovka. «... I am 58 years old, three sons are in the Red Army. Collective farm's head Kolesnichenko T. N. provided me with the beet area that I could not handle. Consequently, the collective farm's head expelled me from the collective farm and took away my private garden,so I was left without a piece of bread ... «A letter from a citizen Makarenko A. P. Kharkiv region, Valkovskyy district, village Kovyahy. «... Hrytsko Yemets under the Germans worked at the commission to appoint people to Germany and he is now a secretary of the Komsomol organization ...». From the letter of the citizen S. Gorbenko, Dnipropetrovsk region, Nomoskovskyy district, village Gubynyha. «... Those who lived under the Germans now live and build houses <...> Our men put their heads for them and fight for them, and they drink and walk. Zamkovyy Nikifor <...> Volokita Zahar <...> They are bastards. Under the Germans they ran and now run the village <...> «. From the letter of the citizen Gavrylenko L. D., Sumy region, Hrunskyy district, village Kuzenyn. «... Head of the collective farm Stoma Gregoriy Dmytrovych. (22 years old) mocks farmers, applies the measures of physical restraint <...> I was pledged to subscribe for 10 000 rubles...» (meaning government loans)³².

However, defense funds collected were not always directed to the coffers of state. The negative factors were the corruption of officials in the rear. Thus, prosecutors revealed facts of stealing gifts and money collected for the army and the families of soldiers. Out of the money and food collected to help orphans Kopyakov (the first secretary of the district committee of LKSM) stole: over 6 thousand rubles in cash, more than 400 eggs, 7 kg of butter, soap, sugar, candy and other products³³.

The issue of providing quality health care in the rear hospitals remained problematic. It became the subject of attention both of frontline leadership and party and government bodies. Only in liberated Kiev, there were 38 emergency hospitals of the Commissariat of Health of the USSR, and the All People's Commissariat of Defense. In Kharkov, there were 26, and in the region 43. There was a large number in other regions as well. The was a lot of work done to ensure the quality functioning of hospitals, but there were significant shortcomings. State control inspections, Political Department of the 1^st Ukrainian Front and the military prosecutor's office investigation found that the chief sanitary of the ambulance unit №483 Demyaniv and storekeeper of the same unit Smirnov, entering into criminal conspiracy with each other, during November 1943 - March 1944, systematically inflated in the notes the number of sick and wounded who were transported by the ambulance and thus obtained products were stolen and sold. The total cost of the food stolen was 101,394 rubles. The Head of the ambulance unit Demyaniv was sentenced to death by the military tribunal³⁴.

Using official status many officials of health institutions knowingly allowed «nepotism». At the base hospital number 3614 a former hospital chief Kryson and medical head Kovtun employed to serve in the hospital 22 families consisting of 60 people, including 15 people who were dependents and lived at the cost of the hospital. By surrounding themselves with relatives, appointing them to positions of responsibility, criminals brazenly robbed the wounded. Only the cost of the material property stolen was 643,477 rubles³⁵.

Troubles in the sanitary facilities of the 1^st Ukrainian Front were discussed at the military council³⁶. Resolution of the Military Council of the Front removed the chief of the front sanitary control General Major of the medical service Semek. A number of health care workers were prosecuted for the criminal, disciplinary and party liability.

Serious adverse impact on the socio-polytical situation in the front rear and on the moral and psychological state of the army was caused by the cases of looting and desertion. Hundreds and thousands ofpeople who avoided military service and deserters lounged in the areas of the front rear of the army, engaged in robbery of local people.

With regard to criminal offenses among soldiers of the 13^th and 60^th armies Khrushchev had to apply in writing to the commander of the front. The letter was supported by submissions of the NKVD of USSR on cases of looting. In particular cattle, food, personal items were illegally withdrawn from the local population³⁷. Commander of the 1^st Ukrainian Front approved of the decree number 089 «On strengthening the fight against the illegal military action,» which defined the stringent measures³⁸.

Secretary of Chernigiv Regional Committee of the CP (B) M. Kuznetsov, reported mass atrocities to the command of the Kiev military district troops. In particular, a soldier of the 48^th individual correction avia scuad Lieutenant Azhyhin while beling drunk shot an 11-year-old daughter of the head of district needs union Demchenko. Secretary of the provincial party committee confirms: «market is always visited by a number of military personnel. Some privates and sergeants, and officers sell military property, rubber wheels of aircrafts, fuel, household items, dealing with speculation «Shooting occurs day and night. Drunken soldiers commit crimes <...> He petitioned the introduction of curfew in Priluky»³⁹.

The military prosecutor of the 1^st Ukrainian Front, Colonel of Justice B. Shaver reported to the military council: «... It is not an exaggeration to say that atrocities, looting have become a mass phenomenon. In areas of Zhytomyr region for the last month were commited more than 400 robberies of local people by military personnel and those who pretend to be soldiers. There are proved facts <...> when whole departments and even units led by their commanders, were engaged in looting and robbery of local people. For example, personnel of the 494 mortar regiment, stationed in the area Kochetovo - Darnytsya systematically were engaged in robbery of local people and seizure of their cattle, vegetables and other property. At the head of these atrocities was the regimental commander, Major Kuznetsov and chief of headquarters - captain Kozey <...> Recently there have been established numerous facts which show that the looting under the guise of military personnel was commited by different kinds of gangs, deserters from the Red Army and other criminal elements lurking in areas of the troops deployment front and its rear...»⁴⁰ Parts of the NKVD that protected the rear of the front captured a few thousand deserters monthly. It is obvious that these thousands of «stray» deserters and other criminals in uniform lived at the cost of the population, were engaged in robberies and so on.

Banditry, desertion, looting, extortion of local people, stealing food, clothing and other property, poor attitude to solving problems of family members of the Red Army soldiers brought havoc in the front rear and negatively affected the moral and psychological state of the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army. Whether it was Did the Soviet sources contain negative factors of MPS of the troops?To be honest we should note that negative phenomena and processes in society and the army in particular were closely traced by Soviet military, government and party leadership, law enforcement bodies. Decisive actions were taken to restore order. However, an analysis of the negative factors of socio-political situation and its impact on MPS of the personnel of military units, for obvious reasons, had closed nature. This thesis is confirmed by archived documents.

In Soviet historiography there dominated a position supporting the positive facts of the matters mentioned in this article. The manipulative techniques of Soviet historical science are paid attention to by modern scientists, including O. Lysenko, V. Grynevich, L. Rybchenko V. Vyatrovych, I. Patryliak, O. Zinchenko, Y. Shapoval.

However, high morale of the vast majority of Soviet soldiers, in the battle of Kyiv, including troops of Ukrainian Front made up over 50% of Ukrainians⁴¹, is recognized even by radical modern domestic historians. For example, V. Korol writes: «Nevertheless, the decisive factor that led to the victorious end of the Battle for the Dnipro and the liberation of Kyiv was exceptional heroism and self-sacrifice of our soldiers, 17,500 of which from the 1st Ukrainian Front were awarded orders and medals, and 668 received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Among them 32 were from Kiev»⁴².

So, in general positively assessing the achievements of researchers in the study of the Kiev offensive, we have to emphasize one of the issues of not very well covered segments - namely, the morale of troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. In the works of a general nature exist polar positions on the issue. Transformation of attitudes in modern domestic historiography on the assessment of negative factors of MPS, critical attitude to the activities of the military leadership, punitive and repressive organs, and so on is noted. At the same time, the indisputable factor of MPS, according to both domestic and foreign scientists, was the heroism and sacrifice of Soviet soldiers in crossing the Dnipro and the exile of Nazi occupants from Kyiv.

Areas for future scientific research may be the use of modern methods, including mathematical, evaluating of the effectiveness of moral and psychological support in forming a proper level of the MPS and their adaptation to the study of historical issues, including the implementation of reasonable estimates of MPS of the Red Army. The problem of researching the morale of soldiers of the Wehrmacht and the SS remains a «white spot» in modern national historiography. Existing research potential demonstrates the potential opportunity of fulfillment of these scientific fields.

red army kyiv banditry desertion

Notes

1. Гогун А. Между Гитлером и Сталиным. Санкт-Петербург : Издательский дом «Нева», 2004. 416 с.; Его же. Сталинские коммандос. Украинские партизанские формирования, 1941-1944. 2-е изд., испр. и доп. Москва : Российская политическая энциклопедия (РОССПЭН), 2012. 527 с.; Соколов Б. Цена победы (Великая Отечественная: неизвестное об известном). Москва : Московский рабочий, 1991. 192 с.