History Teaching, Textbooks and Historical Memory in Russia

I was immediately intrigued by Konstantin Evgenievich's teaching style, in comparison to other history classes that I had spent time in, it felt more like a lecture than a secondary school history lesson. He introduced the topic under discussion in today's class, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, through a brief narrative of the context surrounding, and the events leading up to, Soviet troops entering the Hungarian People's Republic and crushing the revolution. He described how events in Hungary had unfolded following the Second World War, including the factors contributing to Rakosi's dictatorship. In addition to this, Konstantin Evgenievich described how the death of Stalin, and Krushchev's infamous speech of February 1956, coupled with a dire economic situation in the country and important international events, namely Austria's declaration of neutrality establishing it as a demilitarised and neutral country, emboldened many Hungarians to hope for similar concessions for Hungary. The impression that I got was that Konstantin wanted his students to understand the way in which these numerous combined factors, and sentiments, contributed significantly to the highly charged political climate that prevailed in Hungary in the second half of October 1956.

When his monologue ended, we were made aware that we would now watch a Russian documentary film outlining the bloody events in Hungary in 1956. The film, Венгерский КапканВадим Гасанов, Венгерский Капкан. Film. (Россия: Пятый Канал, 2006)., was made by пятый канал, and its synopsis describes how it is a film depicting the fierce battles fought on the streets of Budapest, in which hundreds of Soviet soldiers and Hungarians died. It goes on to state that at that time, both sides believed that they were fighting for a just cause. It would seem appropiate at this point to make the comparison between the teaching techniques on display at the two schools I spent time at. Both teachers appeared to opt for a combination of multimedia and lecture style desciptions of events. I was yet to see a history textbook in a classroom. Further to this, neither my time spent in the school, nor the teachers I spoke to, indicated that history might be used as a tool of discipline; as Borisiak has suggested with reference to how classical Russian literatureis taught in schools.Borisiak, Nlobooks.Ru. The teachers were reluctant to enforce ideas upon their students, and in turn encouraged their students to think for themselves and question competing narratives. This leads me to believe that, in Saint Petersburg at least, a significant gap exists between state-oriented visions of the countries past and the reality of what is exercised in classrooms.

Nevertheless, my time in the two schools was accompanied by dissimilarities in experiences. In Klassicheskaya Gymnasia the majority of students, in stark contrast to the students in the school I previously sprent time in, 608, appeared to be meticulously taking notes, particularly while Konstantin Evgenievich was speaking. It would be easy to jump to conclusions and suggest that the academic trajectories of students from `better' social backgrounds contributes to their willingness to learn, but simulateously it is something definitely worth considering. With regards to the documentary film, one thing struck me immediately. Despite an impressive amount of footage from the events in Budapest, all oral accounts of what happened there were given by Russians. In addition to this, the narrative being offered made a clear empahsis on the Cold War context of the time, and suggested that, by 1956, a fundamental tension had appeared in US policy towards Hungary and the Eastern Bloc generally. Seemingly, the United States hoped to encourage European countries to break away from the bloc, and as such was largely to blame for the social unrest that ensued. Similarly, the actions of the Soviet troops appeared to be glorified, with Soviet commanders negotiating local cease-fires with the revolutionaries, and ultimately,the film suggested that order was restored thanks to their efforts.

The second half of the lesson was dedicated to a discussion of the documentary, during which the students took an impressively active role in proceedings. Konstantin Evgenievich wanted the students to use analytical skills to assess whether or not the documentary that we just viewed had historical value. The students all seemed to think that it did, arguing that the film footage allowed us to see the events firsthand. He then went on to ask the students whether or not this film could be deemed propaganda. Again, after a short silence, the overwhelming consensus was `no'. In Andre Bazin's article, On Why We Fight, he criticizes the role of documentary reporting in exploring historical events, and outlines the creation of a new genre: `the edited ideological genre.' Andre Bazin, "On Why We Fight: History, Documentation And The Newsreel". In The Documentary Film Reader: History, Theory, Criticism, 348-352. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). Bazin explores the idea that documentary films have become a kind `history for the masses', often providing a single historical narrative using carefully edited shots of a given historic event. It was exactly this apparent `didactic' role of the documentary film Венгерский Капкан that Konstantin Evgenievich wanted his students to consider. Not only was there only Soviet footage shown, but also all the interviews given were by Russians. In addition to this, we were asked to consider the idea that it has become an increasingly common historical tendency in Russia to explain any opposition movement against Russian authorities as the result of the cynical interference of foreign states: `ljuboe narodnoe dvizhenie protiv pravitelstva voznikaet ne izvne.' Given recent political developments in Russia, with consistent suggestions of `a master narrative', developed and spread by politicians and pro-Kremlin intellectuals, that describes an enemy of the people aiming to destroy the country in the interest of an external forceSee for example: - Ilya Yablokov, Fortress Russia: Conspiracy Theories In Post-Soviet Russia. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018)., I found this comment to be significantly striking.

The history teacher was evidently making the point that memory of historical events can easily be manipulated using formats such as documentary film. If we do indeed understand `memory' to mean the sum total of ideas of the past that lay the foundation of a shared interpretation of history Maria Ferretti, Memory Disorder, (Russian Politics & Law, 41:6, 2003), pp.38-82., then we can argue that documentaries such as these are an attempt in Russia to create a generalized framework that is then supposed to impart a specific meaning to the past. This `specific meaning' has been tackled by a surprisingly small amount of scholars, but perhaps most convincingly by Miquel Vasquez Linan, a Professor at the University of Seville, and head of the Research Group “Memory and Communication: the political uses of the past”. He argues that the version of history being promoted in Russia tends to reinforce old ideas, such as the uniqueness of the Russian past. Furthermore he suggests that this version of history promotes the idea that `Russia is different, and its historical development comes hand in hand with authoritarian governments', and that `this version holds that the alternative can only be chaos or submission to foreign powers.'Miguel Vazquez-Linan, Historical Memory And Political Propaganda In The Russian Federation. Communist And Post-Communist Studies 50 (2017). Accessed online 20th January, 2018: doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.05.004. This alternative that Linan mentions helps us to make sense of the reintegration of Stalinism in public memory that has taken place in recent years. Maria Ferretti outlines how in recent times there has been a strategy of fusing the memory of the Great Patriotic War, to which Stalin in invariably linked, in a nationalistic context. She goes on to argue that there has been an acknowledgment that Russian citizens are suffering from a memory disorder, and in order to narrow the gap between public and collective memories, a reconciliation of Soviet heritage has been adopted.Ferretti pp.69-70.Melancholy toward the past, it would appear, is linked invariably to loss and suffering. Russia's political elite recognises the efficacy with which this pensiveness toward the past can be used to guide historical memory and create collective identities, while simultaneously using the idea of a hostile foreign environment to create narratives that form a shared interpretation of history.

Upon arriving for a second day of classes at Klassichaskaya Gymnasia I was told that today it would be possible to interview a select number of students after classes. The students found out at the end of our discussion of the Hungarian Revolution that today we would be talking about the opposition to Krushchev in the late 1950's, something which could partly be explained by the events in Hungary themselves: ``Vengerskij krizis imel ochen' ser'eznye posledstvija dlja vsej vnutrennoj politicheskoj zhizni sovetskogo sojuza''. Konstantin Evegenievich again delivered a lecture style class in which he discussed the political climate in the Soviet Union in the late 1950's, and the attempts of the Антипартийная группа (Antipartiynaya gruppa) within the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to depose Nikita Khrushchev as First Secretary of the Party in June 1957. It was explained to us that many members of the Soviet leadership, led primarily by former Premiers Georgy Malenkov and Vyacheslav Molotov, rejected both Khrushchev's liberalisation of Soviet society and his denunciation of Joseph Stalin. Furthermore, this period also laid witness to a dissident movement within both Culture and Art, perhaps most famously culminating in Boris Pasternak's widely acclaimednovel Dr Zhivago. After receiving extensive criticism at a politburo meeting at the beginning of summer 1957, we were told that leading members called for Nikita Krushchev's resignation: `vyskazali za otstavku'. Konstantin Evgenievich described the intelligent politicalmaneuvering of Krushchev, in which he argued that only the plenum of the Central Committee could remove him from office, and subsequently quickly moved to see that Zhukhov delivered all members of the Central Committee, who were located all over the country, to Moscow with use of special military aviation. These central committee members were ultimately bureaucrats, and as such relied heavily on Khrushchev to consolidate their positions.

While there was perhaps less room for discussion in this class, it was similarly balanced in its approach, and once again the history teacher decided not to use textbooks as a teaching aid. Russian philosopher Nikolai Rozov has described the dilemma before teachers of Russian history as `a contradiction between the ugliness of many periods and events in Russian history and an actual necessity to educate a personality who loves his/her country, its history and culture, and who is a patriot and a responsible citizen of Russia.'Nikolai Rostov, Alternativny Podkhod k Prepodavaniyu Otechestvenoi Istorii (An Alternative Approach to Teaching National History). Prepodavanie Istorii v Schole, 5 (2014) p.19. I decided to ask Konstantin Evgenievich about his thoughts on this supposed`dilemma' that he is faced with. He replied that personally he doesn't see the connection between history education and patriotism. He instead views his role as a history teacher to encourage his students to think critically about facts and sources presented to them, and to stimulate his students intellectually. He went on to state that he by no means considers an aspect of his role to expose his students to the right version of history. At the end of the lesson he had given the students a home task of researching the transfer of `Crimea' in 1954 (Peredacha Krima). This is a topic that has received increased attention from Russian policy makers in recent years. Scholars investigating the role of history teaching have suggested that students are subject to learning about the `political mistakes' made by Nikita Krushchev who gifted Crimea to Ukraine, and an act that Crimean Slavic party leader Vadim Mordashov called `a national tragedy.' V. K. Mordashov, Krym I Sevastopol eto est Simvol Polnotsennosti Rossii [Crimea and Sevastopol are the symbols of the usefulness of Russia], Crimean Republican Organization of the Slavic Party. (2014) Retrieved from http://krokrim.narod.ru/LITERAT.KRIM2.simvol.htm. Futhermore, Tsyrlina and Lovorn have suggested that `many in-class discussions appear to be clearly biased, contextualizing the events of the previous crisis with the current one, and defined the historic role of President Putin who returned Crimea to its original homeland.'Tsyrlina and Lovorn, p.4. Such discussions are unlikely to be taking place in Klassicheskaya Gymnasia, and significantly the article fails to mention exactly where and in what schools such discussions were taking place.

After classes on my second day at the school I had a discussion with Ilya, a 16 year old currently preparing for the school-leavers exam in Russia `ЕГЭ.'

I asked Ilya about whether or not he enjoyed history classes at school, and if and when history is important for him personally. Ilya described how history is an important subject in Russian schools, [u nas v rossii istorija dostatochno vazhnyj predmet v shkole, v nashej shkole sootvetstvenno s pjatogo klassa prohodim], and how conversations about history (he mentioned Soviet history specifically) arise at home [v nashem dome istoricheskie voprosy passivno voznikaet kogda my obshhaemsja, naprimer, nad kakim to voprosom, sovetskuju istoriju inogda obsuzhdaem i sporim v poslednee vremja]. Ilya is applying to study law at Saint Petersburg University, and as such is required to pass the History state exam. Although he clearly takes his studies seriously, the school environment,and his mechanical responses, gave me the impression that he felt as though he felt pressure to perform, and therefore that his responses didn't necessarily reflect what he really thought.

I understood that what I really needed to do was to pose these questions to students in an informal setting. As such I arranged `to teach' a conversation class at a school number 307 in the Admiraltejskij region of Saint Petersburg.The school, `Business Wave' (Delovaja Volna), specializes in foreign languages. I used the opportunity with the students, who were all studying in the 10th/11th grades, to explore whether or not history does play some sort of a role in shaping their individual and national identity.Anton, 17, talked at great length about how `history is important for us as Russians because we like to pass down stories through the generations. My great grandfather served during the great patriotic war and is often the subject of conversations at home.' Similarly, Katya, who is 16 years old, spoke of how history also occupies a significant role in her household. She explained how she thinks that `Russia's history is dramatic because it contains so many events that have had a fundamental impact on the whole of Russian society.' She went on to tell me that she lives with her grandparents, who `constantly make comparisons between the Soviet Union and contemporary life'; comparisons which `are often used to criticize present-day issues.' The most surprising comment from the class came from a 16 year old named Pyotr, who expressed the view that `in the 20th century this country died twice and was reborn only in the 21st century when Putin came to power.' Pyotr told me that he discusses history at home with his father.

If a post-totalitarian society, such as Russia, is to address previous crimes, then the process of public memory must reconcile collective and individual participation and complicity in ways that provide both penitence and catharis.Benjamin Forest, Juliet Johnson and Karen Till, "Post?Totalitarian National Identity: Public Memory In Germany And Russia". Social & Cultural Geography 5:3 (2004).As such, when looking to see how Russians have dealt with the past after the fall of the Soviet Union, it is worth exploring how public participation and citizen interest has affected the youth generations, and in what ways. Benjamin Forest et al have suggested that for a successful transition from totalitarianism to democracy to take place, then a public discussion about how a society remembers its recent past, including how the previous regime repressed civil society through fear, silence and violence. Benjamin Forest et al., p.358.Clearly this has not happened in Russia, and my interviews show that Russian students are unsure about what narratives to adopt. Crisis of memory and representation means that the students struggle with familiar narratives of self-belonging and identity. Comments such as Pyotr and Anton's use a pastiche of sources at hand to create a coherent narrative of memory and history. They move between the school and home (Pyotr's comments strongly reflect media representations) to create narratives that make sense to them.

Furthermore, my classes at Klassicheskaya Gymnasia give further credence to the argument that relying on arguments about state adopted narratives and textbooks does not provide us with an accurate picture of what history Russian schoolchildren are exposed to. Konstantin Evgenievich indicates that the relationship between state directed policy and what is actually being taught in schools is indeed much more complicated than has been suggested by many Western academics. More importantly though, such arguments do very little to inform us of the importance of the role that history plays in weaving narratives of identity for young Russians. Whether for understanding the feats of relatives (Anton), explaining important events for Russian society (Katya), or justifying the need for a strong state and leader (Pyotr), each uses history to shape ideas and make sense of the contemporary.

The state's role in the creation of discourse, or public memory, largely perceived as a political process that both creates and responds to relations and identities, is complicated in Russia at best. I contend that because of how complicated, and in many respects reactionary it is (there is a distinct lack of will to confront and critically reflect on this past, instead people prefer to variously justify, rationalise and sentimentalise it) schoolchildren often feel confused about how they should perceive Russia's past, but ultimately simultaneously understand the need to be patriotic. Unlike in Germany, where discussions of its totalitarian past are common at both state and public level, the question in Russia has not been how to recognize and memorialize the totalitarian past, but whether it should be openly acknowledged at all. In post-Soviet Russia there has been no legal assessment of the Soviet crimes (no Soviet “Nuremberg” or equivalent of the Frankfurt trials has ever taken place.)According to Forest et al, this lack of acknowledgement can be attributed to two reasons at both elite and public level. Firstly, political elites had held high positions in the Soviet party and states apparatus, and this often translated into a desire to downplay or simply `move past' the past. And secondly, much of the surviving Soviet generations did not see the past as something, on balance, to be ashamed of.Benjamin Forest et al. p.367-368. A survey in 2003 by the well respected agency VTsIOM backs up the second argument, in which it was found that over half of Russians polled viewed Stalin's role in Soviet history as `probably' or `definitely' positive. Overall, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it can be argued that no majority understanding emerged that saw such public remembering as necessary for the future of the state.Ronald Suny, Provisional stabilities: the politics of identities in post-Soviet Eurasia, International Security 24 (1999), pp.139-178.There appears to be very little conflict between the elites and the public in Russia, and Nora's arguments that largely focus on elite roles in public formation and reformationresonate in Russian society. Social groups that challenge official depictions of national identity and memory discourses gain little traction in contemporary Russia; the organization Memorial is the perfect example of this. Unfortunately, all available evidence appears to point towards the idea thatbecause of underlying issues with history education and media representations of history, for the foreseeable future at least, the public's role in shaping narratives will continue to play second fiddle to the states'.

Concluding Chapter: History as a means of building identity in post-Soviet Russia

This thesis has hopefully demonstrated how over the last 20 years in Russia there has been a conscious effort to construct a very specifichistorical memory.The ways in which historically formed discourses of identity and legitimacy are circulated in contemporary Russian society have rightfully received considerable attention from scholars over the last few decades. With a strong focus on education, the state has reassumed an active role with the interest of realigning the role of history with the vital requirements of national development.Joseph I. Zajda, `International Handbook On Globalisation, Education And Policy Research' (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer, 2005), p.173. The process by which history centralization took place, and a new, recommended list of textbooks that focused on the history of Russia as a `single historic space, a single state, firmly linked together by historical destiny', has similarly been tackled fairly extensively by scholars. In addition to this, textbooks have also been heavily investigated by academics, who tend to agree that the content of which is largely subordinated to particular control mechanisms by the state and dominant elites in the process of nation building and the creation of loyal citizens.Robert, Blackman, Hanna Schissler, and Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, "The Nation, Europe And The World: Textbooks And Curricula In Transition". The History Teacher 39 (3): 418. (2006), p.1. Nevertheless, one must be extremely careful when suggesting a causal relationship between the views of Russia's youth and the textbooks used by them in schools. Not least because such an approach would be fraught with methodological pitfalls, but also because of the simple fact that students do not solely consume information about history via textbooks, but draw on a range of sources, and varyingly, decide what information to critically analyze, interpret or ignore. As a result, the purpose of this research was to explore to what extent history education in contemporary Russia plays a role in the creation of historical memory that communicates specific agendas to instill particular ideas about the virtues of the nation. Furthermore, I wanted to investigate the importance of history for the youth of Saint Petersburg, and to analyze whether or not the disproportionate role of history, a legacy of the Soviet past, lingers in contemporary Russian society.

History has indisputably played a pivotal role for transitional societies as they have attempted to establish, or reestablish, a new national identity. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the transition to a market democracy, this was invariably the case in Russia, with sweeping changing taking place in historical studies, and internal conflicts and ideological debates about what should be taught in schools. These debates, as outlined by the first chapter of this thesis, resulted in the role of history being rewritten in a way that would legitimize the democratic path that Russia was on. Coinciding with the de-legitimization of the communist ideology was the forced reconsideration of the past, and the need for Russians to redefine their historical consciousness. Perhaps the most popular model for which was to reestablish continuity between the new democratic Russia and its pre-revolutionary predecessor. Kaplan, p.254.However, since the early 2000's attempts to unify textbook content with a very different version of the national past have become more and more entrenched. The early 2000's saw the exclusion of liberal textbooks by authors such a Dolutskii, one which contained explicit condemnation of Stalinism and more sympathetic interpretations of the 1990's.Ekaterina Levintova, "Past Imperfect: The Construction Of History In The School Curriculum And Mass Media In Post-Communist Russia And Ukraine". Communist And Post-Communist Studies 43:2 (2010), p.126.Whereas in the 1990's textbook adoption and financing were decentralized to the regions and production transferred from Soviet era ministerial control to the post-Soviet marketplace, under Putin it was brought back under the control of the state. It has been suggested that the new version of history, being promoted by textbooks at least, is used to instill civic values and loyalty to the authorities whose actions are constantly undermined by a hostile international environment.

Ronald Suny has highlighted how the problem of forging relatively stable political and national identities in particularly acute at the present time in much of post-Soviet Eurasia.Suny, p.140. However, unlike in other post-Soviet states, in Russia the problem is less one of changing national identity than of a chronic failure to construct one. The second chapter was dedicated to an analysis of how Russian school children interpret history, and the role that what they learn about in school plays in constructing their historical consciousness. The particularities of each child's experience aimed to give texture to an otherwise superficial analysis of the role of textbooks and the state in the promotion of certain historical narratives. My conversations with students shed light on the difficulties associated with constructing narratives for contentious historical issues, and as such the potential failure of certain politics of historical representation in the sphere of history education. Nevertheless the interviews drew on the idea that identities are embedded in the stories we tell ourselves individually and collectively, and provided evidence that supports the notion that for school children historical myths and narratives are a palpable source for giving meaning to the present.

Historical myths that appear to have flourished under the presidency of Vladimir Putin draw on much of the language used during the cold war and tend to focus on ideological themes of patriotism, national identity and the perceived entrenchment of Russia by hostile powers abroad.History is an effective counterweight to politics of ideology and can be used by citizens for identification with the imagined political community. Importantly, however, my time spent in schools in Saint Petersburg has shown that state level induced ideas of commonalities based on shared historical experience often don't filter down to the level of schools as effectively as some political elites might wish. The teachers at the schools I spent time at were often unwilling to use a generalised framework that is supposed to impart a specific meaning to the past. Rather, they would draw on their students to think critically and analytically about how different representations of historic events might tell us more about a given phenomenon than by simply interpreting a single narrative. Despite there being a clear attempt to narrow the gap between public and collective memory through a reconciliation of the Soviet past, this isultimately a past that plagued by controversy and debate. For children growing up in contemporary Russia navigating these various versions of the past is often guided as much by the home they grow up in, as by their secondary school education.

It might seem odd that the state in Russia still faces this problem of relatively stable political and national identities, particularly given the fact that this process began under Mikhail Gorbachev, a time in which Soviet self images and images of the other were radically reversed. Treatment of the Soviet era remains an important feature of the historical discourse in contemporary Russia, and the importance that the state attaches to it seems logical; the creation of a unified past is a penultimate staple of any national idea. This research, however, shows that when the Russian federation emerged as an independent state, the process by which Russians as a nation tried to incorporate and recognise the Soviet aspect of history into their public memory, was fraught with problems and disagreements. For the Russian state there seem to be numerous issues when it comes to implementing a centralised (state) history education system. Firstly, schools in Russia, as in most the world, are ceasing to be the privileged place of first contact for historical knowledge. And secondly, identities are never completely fixed, but to some degree are fluid, multiple, and overlapping, and therefore predicting from identities is extremely difficult, if not impossible.Suny, p.141. My research outlines how although children in Russia think about the past and, in many ways, rely on the past, their views can easily move between contested visions of history depending on what they are exposed to.

To conclude, this research has attempted to tackle some issues that are particularly acute at the moment in post-Soviet nations. To what extent do the opinions and world-views of Russia's youth reflect the recently emerged, nearly ubiquitous interpretation of recent history as presented in the high school curriculum? And what is the state's role in the creation of discourse, or public memory, something largely perceived as a political process that both creates and responds to relations and identities? Though it might not have provided any concrete answers, it has certainly shown that the current state of history in Russia is mired with politics, and as such, while plurality of ideas are not encouraged, to accuse all Russian history teachers of being Kremlin robots would be misleading. History in Russia is used, and will continue to be used, to legitimize political decisions. Perhaps what really matters for the future is that debate over the past continues. As long as there remains a plurality of opinion about the past, and importantly a plurality at municipal school level, there is every chance that `advantageous versions' of `patriotic' history and `interference in memory politics' will eventually be discredited.

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