Increasing historical problems in Polish-Ukrainian relations in 2015-2017

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УДК 327:316.482:94(438+477)

Increasing historical problems in Polish-Ukrainian relations in 2015-2017

Petrashchuk A.O.,

master of political science, University of Warsaw, Institute of political science (Poland, Warsaw), anatoliy.petrashchuk@gmail.com

The paper analyzes relations between Ukraine and Poland in context of the «Volhynian problem» exacerbation. The reasons for the deterioration of relations and possible consequences of this process have been identified. Conclusions represent measures aimed at normalizing of bilateral relations. The study results demonstrate that «Volhynian conflict» does not have the capacity to make radical changes in Polish--Ukrainian relations.

Keywords: Poland and Ukraine, historical problems, nationalism, Volhynian conflict, eurointegration.

(стаття друкується мовою оригіналу)

Петращук А. О., магістр політичних наук, Варшавський університет, Інститут політичних наук (Польща, Варшава), anatoliy.petrashchuk@gmail.com

Підвищення історичних проблем польсько-українських відносин на 2015-2017 роки

Проаналізовано відносини України і Польщі в контексті загострення «волинської проблеми». Було визначено причини погіршення відносин і можливі наслідки даного процесу. В висновках пропонується ряд заходів, направлених на нормалізацію двосторонніх відносин. За результатами дослідження було встановлено, що «волинський конфлікт» не має потенціалу до радикальної зміни сутності польсько-українських відносин.

Ключові слова: Польща і Україна, історичні проблеми, націоналізм, Волинський конфлікт, євроінтеграція.

volyn relation ukraine poland

Historical problems between Poland and Ukraine are largely due to events in Volhynia in 1943, which affect the two-tier relations even in 21st century. The situation is complicated by the fact that Volhynian conflict is interpreted in different ways in both countries. In addition to historians, the politicians of the highest level were engaged in the solution of this problem.

In 2003 the presidents of Ukraine and Poland adopted a joint statement «On reconciliation on the 60th anniversary of the tragic events in Volhynia». In July 2003 President Leonid Kuchma and President Alexander Kwasniewski presided over the opening of the monument of Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation in the village of Pavlivka, Volhynia. This step has given a positive impetus to the development of Polish- Ukrainian relations. Despite the efforts of nationalist forces in Poland and Ukraine, the status quo was maintained (with few exceptions) by2015.

After the victory of Euromaidan 2014 and announcement of a clear course on European integration, the importance of Polish-Ukrainian relations for Kyiv and Warsaw has increased. Ukraine was Poland's largest potential ally for in Eastern Europe. Poland was important for Ukraine in terms of Kyiv's European aspirations.

The growing significance of good neighboring relations with Poland was emphasized by the fact that the new Ukrainian president P. O. Poroshenko made his first foreign visit to Warsaw. In less than one year Polish president Bronislaw Komorowski visited Kyiv for four times (in June and December of 2014, and in February and April of 2015). During his last speech in Kyiv on April 9, 2015, B. Komorowski reminded people of the common pages in the history of Poles and Ukrainians in the I Rzeczpospolita. The President emphasized that both countries participated in many wars as allies. Past conflicts between Poles and Ukrainians have been characterized by the word «fratricide». This statement gives understanding that the political establishment of Poland was interested in the rapid reforming of Ukraine and the strengthening of its ties with the EU countries (first of all with Poland).

After long lifting in relations between Poland and Ukraine, the deterioration of bilateral relations began. It was caused by Ukrainian parliament adopting the law «On the Legal Status and Honoring the Memory of Fighters for Ukraine's independence in the Twentieth Century». This law recognized the soldiers of the OUN-UPA as fighters for the independence of Ukraine and was adopted on April 9,2015. In polish society, this law got the name «the law on the heroization of the UPA» and was perceived negatively. The Polish side considered that in 1943 the UPA killed about 50-60 thousands of Poles in the framework of ethnic cleansing on separate territories of the former Volhynian Voivodeship ofll Rzeczpospolita.

According to professor of Vmnytsia Trade and Economic Institute N. M. Chernoyi, the date of adoption of the «UPA Glorification Law» (the day of the Polish president's speech in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine) caused a resonance in Poland. The researcher believes that this law was absolutely correct from the perspective of Ukraine, but unacceptable for Poland. The existence of such difference in this law interpretation will lead to exacerbating bilateral relations [l,c. 54].

The associate professor at the Naval Academy in Gdynia, Andrzej Drzewiecki, believes that the main problem is not the mere fact of giving the status of a hero to certain organizations, but the role these organizations will play in forming the national consciousness of Ukrainians. The researcher is convinced that the Ukrainian lobby has a strong influence on modern Polish politics. Polish authorities are acting too passive against Ukrainian nationalists that demands to revise the history [2, c. 34-35].

Experts from the Mark Karp Center for Oriental Studies (Poland) believe that the Ukrainian authorities are trying to change the historical consciousness of Ukrainians, ignoring the opinion of their own population with possible implications on the international scene. Kyiv does not worry about the possible deterioration of relations with Poland or Israel. Such position of the Ukrainian leadership will worsen the international image of Ukraine [3, c. 48-49].

The issue of «OUN-UPA recognition» had never been in the programs of the parties «Petro Poroshenko Bloc», «People's Front», «Samopomich» and other parties, which were in the «European Ukraine» coalition and supported this bill. Therefore, it can be assumed that the deputies of the ruling coalition used the long-standing pre-election idea of the «Svoboda» party in order to increase their own rating.

According to research conducted by the sociological group «Rating» (2016), 35% of Ukrainians demonstrate a positive attitude to Stepan Bandera, 46% - negative [4]. The results of the study confirmed the scholar's opinion about the heterogeneity ofideological sympathies of Ukrainians.

Shortly after B. Komorowski's visit to Kyiv, significant changes took place in Poland, which also influenced the nature of the Polish-Ukrainian relations. Presidential elections were held in Poland in May of 2015, and parliamentary elections were held in October. In the parliamentary elections, the conservative party «Law and Justice», which received 51% of seats in the Polish parliament, received the opportunity to independently manage the state (without need to enter a coalition with other political forces). Andrzej Duda (a politician from the «Law and Justice» party) became the new president of the country. In his inaugural speech, the President of Poland did not mention Ukraine, although the eastern vector is traditionally important for Polish foreign policy. Some experts, including Marek Poznanski the deputy of the Polish Sejm, noticed changes in relations between two countries, predicting a reduction of «romantic» motives and a concentration on economic issues within the framework of bilateral relations.

The first visit of the Polish president (December 14-15, 2015) took place five months after his inauguration. Unlike his predecessor, the Polish president did not talk about common pages in the history of both peoples; instead, he focused on the need to intensify trade relations and to increase economic cooperation between Ukraine and Poland. At the joint conference in Kyiv, A. Duda cautiously hinted at the difference in interpretation of history in Ukraine and Poland, obviously bearing in mind the status of the UPA soldiers in Ukraine: «Our relations should be based on historical truth, even if that truth is quite painful» but emphasized that the problems of the twentieth century should not spoil the present relationship. Immediately after his visit, Polish authorities represented their plans to allocate a loan of PLN 4 billion (EUR 1 billion) to the Ukrainian side.

This meeting revealed that despite the existence of problems in historical issues, Poland was interested in strengthening economic and political cooperation with Ukraine.

Next year (2016) Ukrainian-Polish relations has been facing a new challenges. On July 22, the Polish Sejm adopted resolution which recognized events in Volhynia in 19431945 as «a genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists against the Poles». Polish side accused UPA of killing more than 100,000 Poles [5]. The Sejm also establish July 11 as the National Remembrance Day for victims of Genocide.

Some Ukrainian politicians proposed to answer symmetrically by adopting their own law. Oleh Musiy, a Ukrainian parliament deputy, registered a draft resolution on the establishment of the «Remembrance Day for Ukrainians who were victims of the genocide committed by the Polish state in 1919-1951». According to the author of the bill, in the II Rzeczpospolita tens of thousands Ukrainians were murdered and hundreds of thousands were deported [6]. That bill was not adopted by the Ukrainian parliament. We can assume that most Ukrainian deputies did not take such an initiative seriously.

According to the assistant professor of Vadym Hetman Kyiv National Economic University E. P. Bilonozhko, such a sharpening in bilateral relations could have been avoided. «In February 2016, appeared information that revealed Polish parliament plans to adopt a law which ... will set July 11 as a day of remembrance of the victims of the Volhynian crime. Ukraine has had five months of time, but that time has not been used by the Ukrainian politicians to reduce tension between two states». E. P. Bilonozhko explains such state of affairs by the fact that «the number of Ukrainian experts and deputies which specialize in Polish-Ukrainian relations is limited to several individuals» [7].

That arguments looks quite logical, for example, due to the fact that the «UPA Glorification Law» passed in April 2015 was not changed, despite promises from Kyiv.

In the second half of 2016 several anti-Ukrainian incidents took place in Poland. On November 11, on the Independence March in Warsaw, the Polish nationalists burnt a flag of Ukraine.

During the march of «Przemysl and Lwow eagles», conducted on December 10 in Przemysl, some radicals shouted anti-Ukrainian slogans. It should be emphasized that both actions were condemned by Polish authorities. The Mayor of Przemysl Robert Нота said that «some incidents have a negative impact on Polish-Ukrainian cooperation, but they do not reflect the general state of our relations».

Polish political scientist Michal Potocki believes that, despite some problems, 2016 was the year of fruitful cooperation between Ukraine and Poland. During the year, Polish and Ukrainian ministers carried out about 20 visits to Kyiv and Warsaw. Furthermore, at the NATO Summit in Warsaw (July 8-9) was signed an «Agreement on military cooperation between Ukraine and Poland», which, by the way, provided for weapons delivery.

Some scientists have rated Polish-Ukrainian relations in less optimistic way. Oleksandra Ivanyuk, researcher at the Maria Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin, noted the emergence of new challenges for Ukrainian organizations, acting in Poland. On December 2016, the Polish government stopped financing PROstir.pl - the portal that belongs to Ukrainian community in Poland. Moreover, most organizations that specialize in assistance, counseling and integration of Ukrainian migrants in Poland have been left without financing [8]. These facts reveal that historical issues went far away from theoretical discussions between politicians and began to affect the lives of simple people.

In 2017, the trend toward gradual exacerbation of bilateral relations has been extended. Polish President, speaking on TVP1, acknowledged that history influences Ukrainian- Polish relations. Andrzej Duda also told reporters that he asked P. O. Poroshenko to annul the law, which recognized soldiers from OUN and UPA as «fighters for Ukraine's independence». A few months later, this issue became the center of the media attention again. Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski in an interview with the newspaper «wSieci» (July 3, 2017), stated that, Ukraine will not enter EU with Bandera.

Experts of the Polish-Ukrainian Dialogue group believe that in the current relations between Kyiv and Warsaw there are no long-term priorities, and the relations are in a state of «strategic regression». Specialists emphasize that in order to improve relations, both states need to strengthen the counteraction to nationalism, to promote common pages of the history of Poland and Ukraine, and to expand the cooperation oflocal self-governments [9, с. 1].

Problems of a historical nature are clearly negatively influencing the Polish-Ukrainian relations. In order to normalize the situation, the author considers following measures necessary to implement:

to develop a common strategy (short-term, medium- term and long-term) in Ukraine and Poland, in the field of bilateral relations and determining the main priorities of these relations;

to cancel or substantially change the «UPA Glorification Law» from 2015 (Ukraine) and «the resolution on Volhynian genocide» from 2016 (Poland);

to terminate popularizing of OUN-UPA in Ukraine conducted by state authorities (renaming the streets, installing monuments, etc.);

to conduct a series of educational events in Poland organized by Ukrainian scholars to show the events of 1943 in a wider context. An absolute majority of Ukrainians fought in the ranks of the Red Army and in Soviet partisan detachments against the troops of the Third Reich, and therefore the stereotype (which is gaining strength in Poland): «Ukrainian = Banderivets and Polonophobe» is incorrect. The effect of this stereotype must be minimized;

to increase the number of specialists specializing in Polish-Ukrainian relations (both in Ukraine and in Poland). This includes conducting interstate exchanges of personnel for the improvement of qualification and establishment of personal contacts. Experts should give advice for the presidential administration. Political decisions should take into account the opinion of specialists.

Unresolved historical problems can greatly complicate the Polish-Ukrainian relations, as well as create new obstacles for Ukrainian European integration.

It should be noted that historical problems do not change the geopolitical and economic importance of Ukraine for Poland. Close relations with Ukraine, economic and political domination of Warsaw in Kiev will help Poland to strengthen its position in the EU [10, c. 68]. In the case of the theoretically possible renouncement of Ukraine from the European integration, Poland will not win anything. That is why Polish politicians consistently repeat that the door to the EU must remain open to Ukraine.

For Ukraine, the importance of Poland is explained by the presence of a large number of migrant workers, as well as by the role of Warsaw in lobbying Ukrainian interests within the EU. Western European states are more skeptical about the possible accession of Ukraine to the EU, and close political cooperation with Kiev is less important for them than for Warsaw. So rapprochement with Poland is beneficial for Ukraine, whose leadership stresses the need for European integration of Ukraine and its exit from the post-Soviet space.

Thus, despite possible changes in the rhetoric and the growing influence of nationalist forces, it can be argued that the essence of the relations between Ukraine and Poland will remain unchanged (the exception may be a situation where a full revision of national interests will be conducted in both states, but the probability of such a development of events is quite low).

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