The institutionalization of the politics of memory

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The institutionalization of the politics of memory

Dodonov Roman

Formulation of the problem. The post-Maidan condition of the Ukrainian value-spiritual environment revealed how insecure it is when facing external interventions and, at the same time, actualized theoretical studies of many concepts, contributing to humanitarian security system development. Those are concepts of historical consciousness, national identity, value consciousness, cultural heritage, discourse management, conflict design, historical justice, historical memory, etc. Events, similar to Crimean annexation and Donbass situation demonstrate that history has always been a significant factor for most of our fellow citizens that performs mobilization functions in preconflict situations. In the realm of historical science, where, indeed, the branch of memory study (memoria studies) was formed, this issue transferred to social philosophy, social psychology, cultural studies, political science, and sociology. Moreover, the historical memory content becomes subject of state policy, substantially affecting international relations even up to the appearance of so-called "memory wars." The necessity to take the people's historical memory under control helped turn it into an object of manipulation. "Memory policy" became an integral part of political management, means of influencing mass consciousness and identity as well as a source of legitimacy of state and supra-state institutions. Under those conditions it is necessary to analyze the process of historical memory institutionalization with isolation of its stable and potential institutional forms.

Research analysis and research publications on this issue. French religious scholar Ernest Renan was one of the first who drew attention to the possibility of effective use of the tragic past elements for national interests. In his Sorbonne report entitled as "What is nation?" (1882), he proclaimed: "Heroic past, great figures, glory (but true) are the main force on which the national idea is based ... nation means great solidarity that based on the already brought sacrifices and those ones which will be brought in future" [1]. Therefore, it is not surprising that historical memory classification has the richest tradition in French humanities. It is enough to name Maurice Halbwachs, who was a pioneer in studying social memory [2], and Pierre Nora, who proposed the "place of memory" concept [3].

Representatives of such school as "Annals" paid their attention to the study of such phenomenon as historical memory. They also drew attention to the ways by which people of the past endowed their actions with the meanings; to the motives which they guided in their actions. The Annalists actively sought sources, through which- historian can "penetrate" into the consciousness of the individual, distant from him in time.

Later, historical memory was studied by A. Assmann [4], F. Graebner, M. Eplle [5], O. Etkind, G. Kasyanov, P. Connerton, A. Miller, A. Novak, T. Ranger, I. Riuzen, K. Wike, D. Fentress, M. Ferretti [6], D. Schnapper, etc. In Ukraine, this issue is in the spotlight of such researchers as Y Hrytsak, V. Gorobets, S. Yekelchik, Y. Zernyi, S. Kogut, S. Kulchytskyy, L. Nagorny, V. Fadeev, O. Shtokvysh, N. Yakovenko etc.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the directions and logical stages of the historical memory institutionalization in Ukraine.

Presenting main material. In our society, the meaning of "historical memory" concept is filled with, on the one hand, theoretical developments of specialists who carefully examine this issue, primarily by foreign historians, and, on the other hand, it happen thanks to own assessments of historical events, which are called "folk memory "or" memory of the people". These concepts are commonly used to refer to the information block that relay to the official version of history, which is considered to be, in the best case, as additional, oppositional, semi-marginal phenomenon. The generally accepted interpretation of history may not correspond to the assessment that spontaneously developed among participants and which was conveyed orally to descendants.

In particular, the Holodomor of 1932-33 was not officially mentioned in Soviet times. But this information was kept in people's memory. Unlike official history, which is "written" by professional scholars, historical memory is based on testimonies, personal experiences and experiences of participants of those events. And their testimonies are transmitted from generation to generation, creating an alternative version of history. So individual memories become a collective property.

It is worth admitting that historical memory is a very unstable element of historical consciousness. Static memory does not exist. Any socio-political changes lead to transformation of historical knowledge, assessments, memory, and representations. The image of the past never freezes. It is constantly changing, some features are erased, while others emerge. It depends on the actualization of the ongoing problems of our time. Therefore, historical memory is powered both by the present and the past. As M. Ferretti notes, memory, as itself, as well as past, does not exist. It is always a pattern, a result of continuous and invisible activity, sometimes conscious, and sometimes unconscious interaction of many people and diverse forces. Memory is plural, and often its various manifestations are contaversory [6]. Exactly these memory characteristics turn it into object of state policy, which, for its part, involves its institutional design.

In sociology, institutionalization is interpreted as a process of defining and consolidating social norms, rules, statuses and roles, bringing them into a system capable to satisfy certain social need. The process of institutionalization involves several successive stages, such as: emergence of needs, satisfaction of which requires joint organized actions, formation of common goals, emergence of social norms and rules during spontaneous social interaction, carried out by trial and error; acceptance of procedures related to these norms and rules, imposing sanctions system to maintain these norms and rules, differentiation of their application in individual cases, creation of statuses and roles system applicable to all institute members without exception. The result of institutionalization is the emergence of social institutions.

The first step towards the historical memory institutionalization demands the incorporation its content into literary works of writers, the appearance of feature films, depicting events in alternative way, the disclosure of archives, journalistic investigations, etc. With the development of information and communication technologies, official history loses its monopoly on truth, numerous versions of historical events undermine the dominant metanarrative on which the legitimacy of the incumbent power is based.

For example, the Holodomor, the Stalinist repressions, some episodes of the Second World War in Soviet times turned into "black holes" and "whites of spots" of history, and truth about those events began to be widely known thanks to the writers who, in the 90's, started to include testimony of participants of those events in their works. The fact that official Soviet historiography was interpreted as a manifestation of the "general preference of the social system" was in fact a series of miscalculations and mistakes that were corrected at the cost of human lives.

In general, writers and poets, journalists and publicists of the Perestroika era "awakened" the sleeping historical memory. Before them, the Soviet Union did not know the ethical discussions of intellectuals, as it happened in Western Europe. Families kept silent about the true circumstances of the deaths of their relatives, and those who stayed on the occupied territories or was imprisoned were suspected in collaboration and betrayal. Instead, the lacquered myth about the Great Victory and the victorious nation was created.

After collapse of the USSR, the process of folk memory institutionalization started to develop in many ways. In the Russian Federation, publications aimed at reinterpretation of the Second World War had been releasing. Historical journalism was widely spread thanks to V. Besanov, P. Bobylova, T. Bushevoy, M. Veller, V. Danilov, V. Doroshenko, V. Karpov, V. Kiselev, J. Latinina, M. Meltukhova, I. Pavlova, B. Rezun (Suvorov), A. Sakharov, M. Semiyryagi, B. Sokolov, M. Solonin. It was presented an alternative version of the beginning of the war. In Russian society, the discussion began with aim to find out to what extent Stalin was responsible for plunging Europe into the war.

But after Vladimir Putin came to power, these discussions were artificially slowed down. The Great Victory has become a sacred symbol of the nation as well as ground for national identification. Today, according to the Russians themselves, "the heroization of the war, the monumentalization of its collective image is not considered to be an evidence of memory, but an evidence of "black holes" in history, amnesic trace or "scar"... ,We can say it is a kind of cenotaph, a kind of "black hole" in consciousness, lack of awareness if we speak about this phenomenon. It is a monument, but not memory. And this means that the traumatic event of the Second World War in Russia, is not really experienced unlike, for example in Germany" [7].

On the contrary, in Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries was continuing the process of filling the white spots of Soviet history. Moreover, it happened with renewed wig our. Next steps of the institutionalization memoria studies institutionalization included: declassification of archives, conducting expeditions in the places of mass graves, establishing new and reviving old memorial sites, revision of the national heroes pantheon, introducing various programs aimed at studying spoken history, including interviewing veterans who are direct witnesses and participants of those event as well as bearers of historical memory.

Last but not least, the mentioned popularity was caused with the fact that the ruling elites of the post-Soviet countries separated from the Stalinist regime and did not want to be associated with it .References to the mistakes and crimes of the Soviet era did not have an ideological obstacle, because the moral responsibility for it was completely shifted to Moscow. This logic was clearly outlined by the Lithuanian writer Ruta Vanagayte: "we have such history that turns out the Lithuanians as victims. During the whole life they had been suppressing by someone, whether it was Soviets, Poles, or Germans. And then we, brave people, threw out this oppression and became heroes, because we destroyed the Soviet Union. We rose, victims became heroes, and remained as victim / hero" [8]. A similar system is typical for Ukraine, where one can see an ethical conflict in historical memory. On the one hand, most citizens are proud of Victory and offended by the statements made by Russian leader that Russia without Ukraine would still have defeated in that war. But on the other hand, the tendency of Ukraine's victimization is becoming more and more visible. That means the desire of authorities to present Ukraine not as a winning hero, but solely as a victim of the Stalinist regime.

This conflict has internal and external dimensions. The internal component is that in the process of institutionalizing the memory of people about historical events, which, I recall, originally arose as opposition to official history, and itself turns into such opposition. The rapid and uncompromising formation of the "correct" official version of historical memory provoke appearance of a new alternative in the mass consciousness of Ukrainians, opening a new cycle of commemorative practices.

In addition, the functioning of several variants of historical memory in society , several "truthful scenarios " contributed to the creation and rapid growth of schizmo- genetic tendencies in Ukraine. For example, in 2006 during the discussion of the Ukrainian Law "On the Holodomor of 1932-33 in Ukraine", Verkhovna Rada experienced rough confrontation which deepened the split of the country conditionally into East and West. This violent reaction was caused by the order of 12.06.2009 on general dismantling of monuments and memorials dedicated to people involved both in the organization and execution of Holodomor and political repressions in our country during Soviet times, by signed Viktor Yushchenko. Equally notable were disputes over the recognition of OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) and UIA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) soldiers as fighters for Ukraine's independence which led to the adoption of the relevant Law only in 2015.

An important stage in the historical memory institutionalization was the creation of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINR) in 2006, which is similar to such institutions in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. According to its first director, academician Igor Yukhnovsky, the main task of this institution is "implementation of measures aimed at consolidation and growth of the Ukrainians state-building patriotism" However, from the very first days of its existence, with full support of the President Viktor Yushchenko, UINP promoted not so much consolidation of society but intercession, with tendentious approach to the interpretation of the historical past.

The UINPR activity was imperfect from the normative point of view, as it provided the ideological indoctrination of Ukrainian citizens by the state authority. Moreover, the implementation of such activities could not but contribute to the escalation of schizogenesis, as the version of Ukrainian history, promulgated by the UINR, which was not shared by all in Ukraine. Almost all achievements and official advantages of the Soviet era "fell into oblivion", while attention was focused on Stalinist repressions, the Holodomor, the rethinking of the role of the OUN and UIA, etc. In fact, a kind of "memory war" was announced, which became especially noticeable when Volodymyr Vyatrovych, a former director of the Ukraunian Security Service Archives became a director of the UINR.

The best result of the institutionalization memory policy has been achieved after adoption of several normative documents on decommissioning. On April 9, 2015, during Verkhovna Rada session, V. Vyatrovych presented a package of drafts of four laws on decomunization: "On the legal status and honoring the memory of the fighters for the independence of Ukraine in the 20th century" (Law No.314-VIII); "On the Perpetuation of the Victory over Nazism in the Second World War in 1939-1945" (Law No.315-VIII); "On access to the archives of the repressive bodies of the communist totalitarian regime in 1917-1991" (Law No.316-VIII); "On the Conviction of the Communist and National-Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes and the Prohibition of the Promotion of Their Symbols" (Law No.317-VIII). All bills were adopted, but they caused ambiguous reactions in Ukraine and abroad.

Thus, the Law "On the Conviction of the Communist and National-Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes ..." actually identified these two ideologies, not even taking into account the fact that the communist regime had been dominated in Ukraine for more than 70 years, and the socialist one lasted less than four years. According to the norm of this Law, "a public denial, in particular in mass media, the criminal nature of the communist totalitarian regime of 1917-1991 in Ukraine", considers as a propaganda of the communist totalitarian regime, which is prohibited. That is, propaganda is a denial of crime. In fact, our grandfathers and parents who, under the red flags, selflessly built Ukrainian cities, created a large industry, cultivated bread, raised children, protected their native land from the Nazi invasion, were accomplices of the crimes together with the Soviet authority. And that one who denies it, is offender himself.

Too categorical articles of this law does not take into account the fact that for the population of South-Eastern industrial cities in Ukraine, it was exactly Soviet industrialization that became the most important period in their historical development. If we forget about this period then we will have only some memories about the colonization of "Wild Fields", the Cossacks and the imperial-Orthodox age. This is clearly demonstrated by the deccommunization campaign, which swept the wave of renaming through the geographical map of Ukraine. And instead of "Lenino", "Kirovo", "Ordzhonikidze" we have "Pokrovski", "Voznesenivski" and "Bogorodytski". However, this campaign is full of irrational and ambiguous elements, in order to assess this phenomenon in certain way ...

The external component of the memory policy is connected with the general reorientation of Ukraine to the European Union, which cause the harmonization of the basic values. The foundation of modern Russian policy of memory is the recognition and cultivation of powerful nation which gained victory. The triumphant idea inspires plenty of people, generates confidence and optimism. Not accidently, that apart from the Soviet Union, such ideology of triumph was also typical for other winning countries in the Second World War (the United States of America and Great Britain). It would seem that such sentiments are natural for Ukraine as well.

But we should not forget that if there are winners, then they must be losers. And among them there are most countries of Central-Eastern Europe such as Germany, Austria, Italy, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Finland, France, etc. As Ivan Krastev notes, "European liberalism of the 50's of the twentieth century is based on completely different principles than the idea of triumph". This liberalism ...was based on defeat. It was universalism, based on empathy, sympathy and understanding of humanism but not on the doctrine of power" [9].

The key point of European liberalism was based on the feeling of a common blame for killing Jewish people. This period was called the Holocaust. And while in postwar Germany there was a serious intellectual and moral "work on mistakes", the Holocaust was thoroughly avoided in the Soviet Union. "Following the Second World War, when the countries of Western Europe was getting closer, sharing the memory of common suffering, the USSR of Eastern Europeans, and thus quickly turned into their dictator. Such attitude prevented nation who defeated Nazi regime, who released prisoners from Auschwitz and who was one of the main prosecutors during the Nuremberg process from taking the leadership in general European memorial policy" [5].

After the collapse of the USSR, Ukrainian orientation towards the European Union and the gradual refusal to follow Russia symbolically excluded this country out of the winning party and put it to the losing party. Ukrainian "memory politicians" still managed to balance between the dignity of the winners and the suffering of victims at the same time shifting the responsibility for making mistakes during that period on the external force represented by supporters of Stalin regime. But such position is unlikely to have lasting effect. According to Mykola Eple, such instructions of the Eastern European countries remind "the Austrian incident, when the role of the victim during the Second World War allowed to alleviate its own negative actions and its own responsibility for Nazi crimes. As a result, nationalism in Austria is much more common than in Germany" [5]. And even the mourning demonstration in Babyn Yar and recognition of Halacaust at the highest level does not bring Ukraine closer to the general European consensus, mostly because of the unresolved issue of the crimes, committed by the OUN-UIA.

In 2016 Poland contributed to adjusting Ukrainian memory policy ,denying the policy of glorifying Ukrainian nationalists and insisting on their responsibility for genocide of the Polish population located in territory of Galicia and Volhyn during the Second World War. The beginning of broad anti-Ukrainian campaign in Poland started after the premiere of "Volhyn" film directed by Wojciech Samzowski. Several avid statements was made by senior officials. In 2017, a "black list" of Ukrainian scholars and historians who were banned to enter the territory of Poland came into force. Representatives of the Polish radical parties demonstratively began to destroy Ukrainian monuments and in response to such actions Ukraine suspended searching activities and exhumation of the dead Poles. In January 2018, the Sejm of Poland adopted a Law according to which all those who deny, support or promote the criminal acts of OUN-UIA will be prosecuted. Thus, Poland sent a signal to Ukraine that "with Bandera heritage, Ukraine will not accepted to the family of European nations" [10].

Conclusions The institutionalization of historical memory contributes to solving such large-scale socio-political issues as implementation of national project, the formation of political nation, national identity, integration into one or another supra-state institution, etc. The stages of institutionalization are the attraction of attention to the "closed questions" of history by representatives of creative intellectuals, independent studies of historians, journalistic investigations. As a result it became necessary in society to restore justice and truth, the establishment of norms and rules for the publication of historical memory content, including declassification of archival documents, the work of search expeditions in the places of mass graves, finding new places of memory as well as revival of forgotten ones, revision of the pantheon of national heroes, various programs aimed to study oral history, the inclusion of the historical memory content in textbooks of educational institutions; adoption at the legislative level of the relevant norms and imposing sanctions for its non-compliance. Finally the creation of a specialized Institute of National Remembrance. Accurate processing of issues of the past, despite all the contradictions, is considered a to be a key for preventing crimes against humanity from recurrence in the future.

References

institutionalization of historical memory

1. Renan, Ernest Joseph. (2016). What is a nation? Available at: http://zilaxar.com/kultura/chto-takoe-natsiya-1882/.

2. Halbwachs, M. (2007). The Social Frameworks Of Collective Memory [translat.]. New Publishing House, Moscow, 348 p. (rus).

3. Nora, P. (1999).The problem of memory places. In: P. Nora, M. Ozouf, J. de Puimej, M. Wynock. France is a memory [translat.]. Publishing house of S.-Petersburg. University, St. Petersburg: 17-50 (rus).

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7. Kurilla, I. (2014). History and memory in 2004, 2008 and 2014. Otechestvennyye zapiski. № 3.

8. Ruta Vanagayte at the third meeting of the Intellectual Club Svetlana Aleksievich (2017.03.09). Available at: https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=4fRYRBIBuEo.

9. Krastev, Ivan (2016, 03.07). Opening of the panel discussion «Universal values and global interests of civilization». Available at: http://Lciviceducation.ru/story/31256.

10. TSN.ua (2017). The draft law was promulgated by the Polish Nationalist Radical Party URL: «Cookie15» Available at: https:/ /tsn.ua/svit/u-polschi-karatimut-usih-hto-zaperechuye-zlochini-ukrayinskih-nacionalistiv-1096005.html.

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