Transformation the world construction after the Second World War and places in its USA and USSR (1945-1946)

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Transformation the world construction after the Second World War and places in its USA and USSR (1945-1946)

Podriez Yuliya

Ph.D. (History), Associate professor, Sumy State Pedagogical University named after A.S. Makarenko

Abstract

The article is devoted to studing the transformation (changes) in the world after the Second World War, as well as the role and the place in it of two powerful states - the USA and the USSR.

The article is devoted to the study of the question of the universe after the Second World War, as well as the role and the place in it of two powerful states - the USA and the USSR. In the article, the author emphasizes the objective and subjective circumstances that transformed Soviet-American relations since 1945. At the same time, it is emphasized that relations are complicated by the emergence of a new factor - atomic. atomic stat war

Keywords: Soviet-USA relations, Cold War, nuclear weapons, reparations, national security.

Подрєз Юлія, кандидат історичних наук, доцент, Сумський державний педагогічний університет імені А.С. Макаренка.

ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЯ СВІТОБУДОВИ ПІСЛЯ ДРУГОЇ СВІТОВОЇ ВІЙНИ ТА МІСЦЕ В НІЙ США І СРСР(1945 - 1946 рр.)

Анотація. У статті автор наголошує на об'єктивних і суб'єктивних обставинах, які трансформують радянсько-американські відносини, починаючи з 1945 року. Разом з тим, наголошується на тому, що відносини ускладнюються появою нового чинника - атомного.

Розгляд питання радянсько-американських відносин пропонується через призму спроби налагодження взаємодії між США і СРСР в економічній сфері, розвитку атомної зброї, а також технологічного підходу в стратегічному озброєнні. Перехід до політичної і економічної конфронтації між країнами не носив раптового, стрибкоподібного характеру, він був обумовлений глибинними суперечностями між СРСР і США, що випливають з геополітичних інтересів обох держав. Але конфронтація отримала закінчену конфліктну форму з приходом на пост президента Г. Трумена.

Аналізуючи перебіг конфлікту США з Японією, авторка дійшла висновку, що після Хіросіми думка про США, як про далеку країну, нездатну створити пряму загрозу СРСР, є хибною.

За своїми можливостями Радянський Союз і США не були рівні. Головною загрозою національній безпеці США вважалося встановлення гегемонії будь-якої держави в Євразії. У 1945 р. такою державою міг бути тільки Радянський Союз, оскільки його війська займали територію більшої частини Європи і, за оцінками західних фахівців, - за необхідності, могли швидко окупувати її західну частину з виходом до Атлантики.

У сфері економіки переваги США були незаперечні. Американська економіка не тільки не постраждала від війни, але отримала від неї потужний стимул. У політичному спектрі в капіталістичних країнах Європи стався зсув в ліво. Зійшли зі сцени нацистські і праворадикальні партії. Різко зріс вплив комуністів. Потсдамська зустріч, ознаменувавши собою закінчення однієї глобальної війни, стала першим кроком на шляху до іншого, не менш складного конфлікту - "холодної війни".

Ключові слова: радянсько-американські відносини, "холодна війна", ядерна зброя, репарації, національна безпека.

Formulation of the problem. The history of USA-Soviet relations is of considerable interest in world historical science, as the confrontation between the two world powers created a new geopolitical paradigm in the international arena, which gradually developed into a Cold War.

At present, the USA and the Russian Federation have the highest nuclear-missile potential, so relations between the two countries remain key in world politics. The preexisting danger of contradicting the emergence of a nuclear conflict, as it made during the Cold War, should be completely eliminated.

The USA-Soviet relations of 1945 - 1946 represent a complex and multifaceted phenomenon in world political history. The first glimpses of the Cold War in USA-Soviet relations, including in their economic component, were observed in 1944-1945. The transition to political and economic confrontation between the countries was not sudden, abrupt nature, it was due to the depth of the depths and the United States, arising from the geopolitical interests of both countries. But the confrontation came to an end with a conflict form with the arrival of President G. Truman.

State of scientific development of the topic. In contemporary Russian historiography, the problem of Soviet-American relations is represented by such researchers as M. Portniy, V. Starodubov, A. Pizhikov, V. Konyshev, I. Bystrov, N. Egorova, A. Chubaryan, L. Nizhynsky, N. Handbook and more.

The presented galaxy of researchers clearly shows, on the one hand, the accusation of Americans and their Western European allies in exacerbating USA-Soviet relations, linking it to traditional American hegemonism; on the other, the idea of shared responsibility for the USA and the USSR for confrontation began to emerge. At the same time, there are even articles in which the USSR is primarily responsible for the course of events.

Well-known American researchers have dealt with this problem: J. Archer, S. Brown, J. Geddis, W. Kogen, 3. Brzezinski, G. Kissinger, D. Hoffman, etc.

Ukrainian researchers O. Sychem, O. Naboko, O. Kondratenko, P. Tkachuk discuss the system of formation of post-war international relations, the role of the nuclear factor in the foreign policy of the USA-USSR, emphasizes the importance of the lessons of the past for stopping the nuclear arms race.

The purpose is to explore the confrontation between the USA and the USSR in the postwar years and to identify the main directions of establishing hegemony in the world.

Presenting main material. Since 1945, relations within the anti-Hitler coalition have undergone rapid changes. In addition to events of an objective nature - the political dominance of the USSR in Eastern Europe, the end of the war, the Berne incident, the Polish question, the Trieste crisis, problems of supply on land lease, which complicate the already difficult Soviet-American relations - the situation is complicated. Namely, the leaders of the Third Reich are still hoping for the split of the anti-Hitler coalition. The death of T. Roosevelt on April 12 was called Minister J. Goebbels miracle, a turning point in the German fate. He tried to convince the Germans that the "US-Soviet Union" was facing immediate disintegration and the war would end for the Reich triumphantly, but new US President G. Truman reaffirmed the early position of the US leadership. For Stalin, the bright image of the late president was identified with the golden age of Soviet- American relations. In Stalin's reaction to the death of his main ally, there were fears about the future [11, p. 240].

On April 15, in response to G. Hopkins's letter referring to Russia's loss of Russia's "greatest friend in America," Stalin wrote in an unusual for himself: "I absolutely agree with you in assessing the role and importance of T. Roosevelt for the Soviet Union. Personally, I am deeply saddened by the loss of an experienced friend - a great soul man "[7, p. 168].

In an interview with J. Davis, Molotov called his death an "irreparable loss", emphasizing that, for Roosevelt's lives longer, "many world problems would have been resolved" [14, p. 227].

At the insistence of the Soviet government, an act of unconditional surrender of the German armed forces was signed at midnight on May 8 in Berlin by G. Zhukov, a representative of the allies of A. Tedder, and witnesses from the American and French sides.

The second line at the official level was represented by Deputy Secretary of State J. Gru and based on the idea of curbing "Soviet expansion" by creating all sorts of balances, not excluding the possibility of a new war. However, US military experts were negative about the prospect of a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Noting the undesirability of war with the USSR [6, p. 264-265].

USA-Soviet relations were complicated by the emergence of a new, very important factor, nuclear. Already on the eve of the Potsdam Conference, Secretary of State J. Byrnes said that "the American bomb would make Russia more accessible in Europe" [1, p. 224].

On August 8, 1945, a statement was issued to the Japanese ambassador in Moscow by the Soviet government stating that the Soviet Union considered itself in a state of war with it on August 9, due to Japan's refusal to cease hostilities against the United States, Great Britain, and China. At an emergency meeting of the High Council in the leadership of the war, Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki said: "The entry into the Soviet Union this morning puts us completely in a deadlock and makes it impossible to continue the war" [8, p. 263-264].

Throughout the war, the USA leadership sought assistance from the Soviet Union in its conflict with Japan, but the concentration of forces on the Soviet-German front did not provide such an opportunity. However, the Soviet side seemed to be trying to promote its partner. Quite often, American bombing planes made forced landings in Soviet territory. Soviet-Japanese neutrality made it possible to use the Pacific route to transport cargo of the Lend Lease, for which nearly 50% of the cargoes were shipped [15, p. 317].

After Hiroshima, the usual notion of the United States as a distant country unable to create a direct military threat to the Soviet Union was undermined. The acquisition by the Americans of a monopoly on a new superpower violated the view of the USSR, the balance of power.

The atomic bombs dropped, the Soviet Union's entry during the war, the blockade and the air bombardments forced Japan to go on the capitulation, which was signed on September 2, 1945.

The end of World War II should has been the beginning of a general disarmament that would has extend not only to the overthrown aggressors, but also to the victorious countries except the USA, USSR, Britain and possibly China (the idea of four "world gendarmes"). Three (or four) are obliged to act together to suppress any threat of peace anywhere on Earth in the bud. The arms race, according to Roosevelt, would be banned as a phenomenon incompatible with a healthy global economy.

The main proposals of the Soviet leadership concerned the future economic cooperation between the two countries:

- granting USSR loans;

- establishment of mutually beneficial trade under the scheme: raw materials from the USSR in exchange for equipment and industrial goods from the USA [2, p. 48].

The corresponding wishes were made by Stalin in 1943 and met with understanding from President F. Roosevelt. Supporters of such a course (G. Hopkins, E. Stennius, G. Morgenthau, etc.) found themselves among the American politicians and leaders who believed that cooperation between the two countries could be of great benefit to the United States itself. The principle readiness to provide significant loans to pay for industrial equipment and goods needed by the USSR, to write off Soviet debts on land leases, etc., to send the USA technical experts to the Soviet Union to help restore the economy of the Soviet Union is shown. The terms of establishing cooperation in the economic sphere were even agreed [12, p. 32].

Back in 1944, Harriman warned the State Department that too generous USA aid could be perceived by the Soviet leadership as a "sign of weakness." In another document, he explicitly stated that economic assistance is one of our main levers in order to have strong cooperation with the Soviet Union.

The efforts of Harriman and his associates were thwarted at the very beginning of 1945 by the signing of a large-scale loan agreement to the Soviet Union, and a few months, almost immediately after Roosevelt's death, to end supply deliveries on the land lease. Many Soviet offers to buy necessary equipment in the USA were also rejected.

After the war, ideology and propaganda of the Soviet Union claimed that the United States was the least affected by World War II. Economically, they have unprecedentedly strengthened and gained a real opportunity for political expansion through economic means. Under G. Truman, capitalization of financial and economic power was practiced in several directions.

The first of these was to provide European and several Asian countries with great economic assistance for post-war reconstruction: loans, supplies and supplies. In a sense, it was an extension of the land-lease technique in order to consolidate military and political positions. The second was to ensure the economic dependence of the support facilities on the United States, which inevitably led to political and ideological dependence. The purpose was to make direct investments, license agreements, cooperative relations, which aimed to form an economic structure that was unable to function effectively in the event of disconnection with the USA economy. The third was referring to the size of economic assistance or its total absence as a way of "encouraging" foreign countries, depending on their internal and foreign policies. The fourth, one of the most promising areas of economic (and not only economic) assistance, was to send USA technical experts to other countries [12, p. 33].

Another powerful factor driving the United States policy on the Soviet Union in the first post-war decades is the technological advantage in strategic arms. By the mid-1950s, America was far ahead of the USSR in strategic arms, primarily nuclear. The Soviet side had limited nuclear capacity, weak strategic bomber aircraft. The United States, it must be acknowledged, had the technical means to inflict or destroy the Soviet Union. This fact caused a clear aggression of the USSR.

How did the process of confrontation between the USA and the USSR in the postwar years, dubbed the Cold War, really develop? From the Soviet view, it was claimed that it had actually been declared by U. Churchill in his famous speech in Fulton, which he delivered on March 5, 1946. Stalin regarded it as "an installation for war, a call for war with the USSR" [4, p. 217].

However, as noted, the Cold War actually began earlier, in mid-1945, as if the American leadership, represented by President Truman and his associates, had set out to contain the Soviet Union.

After the victorious end of the war with Germany, it was necessary to finally agree on positions concerning the post-war system of Europe. A new Big Three meeting took place in Potsdam. The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, which took place on July 17 - August 2, 1945, was intended to consolidate in its decisions the historic victory gained by the peoples of the United States and the USSR and other allied countries, and to develop a program of just and lasting peace on the continent. The beginning of the Berlin Conference was preceded by extensive preparatory work - correspondence, consultations in capitals, meetings. The venue was not immediately determined until they stopped at the Cecilienhof Palace in Potsdam [11, p. 68].

G. Truman, who became President of the United States after T. Roosevelt's death, stated in his first conversation with J. Stalin that he wanted to establish "the same friendly relations with President Roosevelt".

There were no sharp clashes between the members of the "Big Three" at Potsdam meetings, as all issues were carefully agreed in advance, at the level of experts and foreign ministers. At the beginning of the conference, the American project on the establishment of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States, Britain,

USSR, China and France was considered and approved. Five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The Council was to draw up peace treaties for Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania and Finland, as well as to prepare a peace settlement with Germany. The primary task of the RMZD was to develop peace treaties. The governments of the three countries agreed to study the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary before concluding peace treaties with these countries (diplomatic relations with Italy had already been resumed). Following the conclusion of peace treaties with the recognized democratic governments of these countries, the participating States of the Berlin Conference considered it possible to support their applications for membership in the UN [16, p. 38].

In the course of the Berlin Conference, the goals, which should have been guided by the Control Council, the supreme authority of four states in Germany, were finally agreed. One of the most important achievements was the adoption of political and economic principles, which had to be guided by the treatment of Germany in the initial control period. These principles were based on points aimed at the demilitarization, democratization and denationalization of Germany.

It envisaged the complete disarmament of Germany and the elimination of all German industry that could be used for military production; the destruction of the National Socialist Party and the prevention of Nazi and militarist propaganda; the abolition of all Nazi laws; punishment of war criminals; promoting the activities of antifascist parties and preparing for the final reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and peaceful cooperation with other states [5, p. 78].

Adopted by the Berlin Conference, the economic principles of treating Germany included not only the ban on all military production but also the decentralization of the German economy. The focus should be on the development of a peaceful industry and agriculture.

A protocol was signed concerning policy on Germany. In the "Political principles" section, the three states confirmed that under the control mechanism agreement, the supreme power in Germany would be exercised by the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces of the USA, USSR, UK and France, "each in their own occupation zone, following the instructions of their respective governments, and jointly on matters affecting Germany as a whole, acting as members of the Control Board. " Heads of Government pledged to eradicate German militarism and Nazism, forever preventing their revival [3, p. 459-460].

Discussion of reparations caused great differences at the conference. A compromise was found at the end of the conference. The reparation requests of the USSR were to be secured by the removal not only of the Soviet occupation zone of Germany, but also of the corresponding German investments abroad. In addition, the USSR had to obtain 25% of industrial equipment from the western zones, 15% of them in exchange for the equivalent cost of supplies from the Soviet area, and 10% without payment and compensation [10, p. 467].

The Berlin Conference considered a number of territorial issues related to the end of the war in Europe, including the transfer of the USSR to Kцnigsberg (Kaliningrad) and its surrounding area, which was enshrined in the decisions of the Berlin Conference. In accordance with the proposal of the Soviet delegation, the issue of establishing the western border of Poland along the Oder - Western Neuss River was resolved. Poland included part of East Prussia as well as Danzig (Gdansk). Thus, it was possible to achieve the practical implementation of the decisions of the Crimean (Yalta) Conference in 1945, by which the territory of Poland increased.

In general, the Potsdam Conference was successfully completed across the spectrum of issues. But most importantly - the possibility of successful cooperation of the great powers was demonstrated not only in waging war against a common enemy, but also in organizing the postwar world [17, p. 55].

The Berlin Conference proved that it was possible to find and find mutually acceptable solutions, to reach compromises between the USSR and its Western allies, despite the growing manifestation of differences between them.

In April 1945, the drafting of the final version of the UN Charter was completed in San Francisco. The draft was submitted for approval to a conference that invited 42 countries that declared war on Germany or Japan by March 1, 1945. Invitations were sent on behalf of the USSR, the United States, Britain and China, whose governments (January 1, 1942) signed the Declaration of the United Nations. In the future, the number of participants in the San Francisco Conference increased to 50 states. The conference ended with the signing of the Charter, which came into force in October of the same year, after which the UN began its work [13, p. 62].

Conclusions. The Soviet Union and the US were not equal in their capabilities. The main threat to USA national security was the establishment of hegemony of any state in Eurasia. In 1945, only the Soviet Union could seem such a state, since its troops occupied the territory of much of Europe and, according to Western experts, could, if necessary, quickly occupy the western part of the Atlantic.

However, in 1945, the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, which promoted them to the position of military force and military-technological leader. The Soviet Union was only able to test its own atomic bomb in 1949.

In terms of economics, the US benefits were undeniable. Not only did the USA economy not suffer from the war, but it received a strong stimulus from it. The militarytechnological leap that the United States made in 1945 in its monopoly possession of nuclear weapons strengthened their position as a country capable of establishing world hegemony.

There has been a shift to the left in the political spectrum of the capitalist countries of Europe. Nazi and right-wing parties left the scene. The influence of the Communists increased dramatically. In 1945-1947, the Communists were part of the governments of France, Italy, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Finland.

The Potsdam meeting, marking the end of one global war, was the first step towards another, equally difficult, Cold War conflict.

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