"Periphery", state, and revolution, or Russia's morphology of "backwardness"

Many of these conspirators were sons of Russia's most prestigious hereditary and landowning nobility. Russia's foremost poet, Pushkin, publicly expressed sympathy for their views, without actually belonging to one of the societies. The rebellion broke out prematurely, triggered off by arrests and a crisis of succession that followed Alexander I's death. In December 1825 (hence the nickname Decembrists given to its organizers) troops that were never quite told what the upheaval was all about, were led into the streets of the capital by their officers -- members of the secret societies. The rebellion in Petersburg and in the South was quickly defeated by loyalist troops. Five of its leaders were executed and many more exiled to Siberia. The execution of Ryleev, a promising poet and a civilian, provoked Poland's foremost poet Mickewicz's stinging description of Russia as “a land which murders its prophets”.

The next `first' was the essentially secular and `sociological' debate about the nature of Russia in its relation to the West: the debate between the Westerners (Zapadniki) and Slavophiles. It began in the 1830s, triggered off by the Philosophical Letters of P. Chadayev, a personal friend of many Decembrists, who in the wake of their defeat and under the heavy hand of Nikolai I declared that Russia belonged neither to the Western nor the Eastern civilizations, nor did not it represent a civilization of its own; it was `an intellectual lacuna'. In the furore that followed, the tsar personally ordered Chadayev to be considered mad and had him repeatedly subjected to medical inspection. Abuse flew freely also from less official sources, but a debate was launched, its participants dividing into two major camps. Those who considered Russia backward and called for modernization, understood as Europeanization, came to be referred to as Westerners. Peter the Great was their hero, commencing a process that now required to be completed. As against them, the Slavophiles believed in the uniqueness of Russia's social and spiritual nature and destiny, different from and superior to what Europe had to offer. They subsequently idolized pre-Petrine Russia and considered the German-infested bureaucracy, set up by Peter, to be the main obstacle to the natural harmony between the autocrat and the people that would have prevailed otherwise, with Orthodox Christianity offering its norms. They were deeply counter-revolutionary, and, while advocating freedom of speech and the revival of Zemskii Sobor, objected to constitutionalism and Western parliamentary rule. V. Belinskii was probably the most outspoken and influential of the Westerners while the Slavophiles were well represented by A. Khomyakov and by K. Aksakov [1; 4; 6; 21; 26]. Both groups were critical of Russia's actuality. Despite the conservatism, religiosity and monarchism of the Slavophiles, their writings and journals were subsequently frowned upon and often repressed by the censorship.

Finally, the most important `first' of the new dissent was the creation of revolutionary populism -- Russia's first indigenous socialist ideology and movement. Its main theorists were Hertzen, Chernyshevskii and Lavrov and its most powerful political expression was the People's Will party (Narodnaya volya). The movement was also influenced by the views of Bakunin and Tkachev, but never fully identified with them [6; 24; 38; 42; 46]. It was Hertzen who commenced the particular theoretical position associated with Russian populism. His views evolved from initial Westerner assumptions, through a critical analysis of Western Europe and of the 1848 revolution. From the outset he refused the Slavophile mystical and religious belief in intrinsic Russian peculiarities, but eventually was not prepared either to treat Russia simply as a more backward equivalent of Western Europe. To Hertzen, Russia was not unique or `spiritual', but its social structure and potentials differed from Western Europe in a manner to be taken into consideration in the shaping of its socialist future. The fact that Russia could draw on the West European experience was new. The legal equality and constitutional rights the Russian liberals were beginning to demand had already proven insufficient. Hertzen was akin to the West European socialists and considered one of them in demanding social equality and the full emancipation of the exploited classes which would become the masters of a better world. In the Russian context, that meant the destruction of serfdom and the rise of the peasantry. Chernyshevskii, and later the Land and Liberty movement, were to adopt all those positions but to represent them inside Russia (Hertzen emigrated and set up Russia's first `free press' in exile). These `populists of the interior' were to develop Hertzen's initial analysis further and to add the blaze of martyrdom, of direct action and, eventually, of revolutionary struggle.

There was considerable originality in the way populist theorists and their movement approached the future of Russia. They assumed the possibility and desirability for Russia to bypass the capitalist stage and to proceed directly to a socially just society. This view and preference was rooted in the concept of `uneven development' -- a radical departure from the prevalent evolutionism of the day, first suggested by Chadayev. Not Russian uniqueness or supremacy but rather the global context of Russian history would lead to an alternative path of development. The advance of industrial capitalism in Western Europe was central to it. On the other hand, the fact that the peasant commune, by now dormant in Europe, was still operative in Russia, could and should be put to use in the building of the new just world. To Hertzen, while Western Europe must progress from the political liberties achieved and from the rampant individualism of the capitalist society towards growing communality of the social structure, peasant Russia should keep its communalist structure while advancing towards liberty, to meet at socialism's junction. Put in the Hegelian idiom of the day by Chernyshevskii, the `synthesis' of the future world would therefore resemble the initial `thesis' of pre-capitalist and pre-class communities rather than its capitalist `antithesis'. Tsardom's obstinate conservatism defined the revolutionary nature of the social transformation due to occur.

Without being fully accepted by the Russian populists, the writings of Bakunin had stimulated in their ranks a belief in mass spontaneity, an insurrectionist `mood' and a particular hostility towards state centralization. Later, the writings of Tkachev came to exercise an opposite influence in so far as revolutionary action was concerned, stressing the significance of Jacobin centralism and of resolute minorities in revolutionary confrontation was well as the significance of the time factor: to delay a revolution might mean losing the chance to bypass capitalism in Russia.

The theorists of revolutionary populism considered the stardom Russia's main capitalist force, representing not only a `Mongol-like oppression', but generating, linked with and maintaining capitalism and capitalists. The state and state apparatus were central to the populist social analysis and designation of enemies. As against its power and capitalism-inducing strategies, the populists put their trust in the laboring class, which to Chernyshevskii included `peasants, daily laborers and permanent wage workers' (it was to become peasants, workers and intelligentsia in later populist writings), united by the common enemies. It was the class war (with classes differently defined than in Marx or in Ricardo) that was eventually to transform Russia. Populist demanded not only parliamentary democracy but social equality. Since the nature of the main enemy entailed a repressive political regime and a social regime of inequality, both embedded in the state, it meant a necessarily combined revolutionary struggle for liberty and social justice. The goal was to establish a socialist Russia [38. P. 43--48, 69--71, 206--207; 46].

A point to remember in view of the `brainwash' of the latter generations, the Russian populists of the 1860s and 1880s were socialists in their own eyes as well as those of Western Europe. When resident in Western Europe, they joined as a matter of course the local socialist parties, edited their newspapers, were active in the 1st International. Its Russian section (located in Switzerland and led by Utin) consisted fully of populist йmigrйs, followers of Chernyshevskii. It elected Marx as its representative on the General Council of the International which he accepted with manifest pleasure. The leaders of the People's Will kept contact with French, German Polish and British socialist parties and were in direct relations with Marx in London. Friendship and appreciation between Marx and the People's Will were often mutually expressed the differences of approach were acknowledged and treated by both sides as deriving mostly from the Russian particularities [20; 38; 46]. It was Lavrov who `on behalf of the Russian socialists' offered the eulogy read-out on Marx's grave. As a member of the 1st International, a founding member of the 2nd one, and a participant in the Parisian Commune, he well represented the living link between Marx, the West European socialist movement and the Russian revolutionary populism.

Finally, the Russian populists offered a set of images and views that linked what would be today treated as `social sciences' with a different type of discourse and was described (and badly misnamed) as `subjective sociology' [6; 24]. It was a combination of social, psychological and ethical considerations about the place and duties of the intelligentsia in an oppressive and changing world. The issue of the two meanings of truth (pravda): truth as realism (istina) and truth as justice (spravedlivosf), was part of this debate. So was the place of ascetism as radicalizing simplicity and of revolutionary activism as a way of life. The later terminology of professional revolutionaries and cadres within Leninism stemmed directly from these views. So did the belief in the educating and purifying force of revolutionary experience in the creation of new men and women. Conceptually, those views related the populist creed to an analysis of the role of ideas in history, enhancing their weight and offering a rationalist and libertarian theory of social advance. Most importantly it was a call for action.

By 1873, the views of the theorists and discussion within clandestine circles were transformed into a political movement of growing coherence and numbers. The appeal of the theorists were reacted to by hundreds of young men and women who, in the summer of 1874, left the comfort of their well-endowed families to `go to the people', that is, to go to the villages to propagate the populist cause among the peasantry. They were met with bewilderment by the peasants, denounced, and rapidly rounded up by the police. That was not the end of the matter, however. The radicals drew conclusions from their failure and reformed accordingly. By 1877, a new wave of populist propagandists went into villages. This time, most of them had trained beforehead in skills useful to the peasants: carpentry, metalwork, etc. They came now to settle permanently and in larger groups -- `colonies' -- and were more ready for a long and slow haul. They established also an effective national organization, the Land and Liberty, with a network of clandestine branches and printing presses all through European Russia.

By the end of the 1870s, the populist movement reached its next stage. The results of the work in the villages were still barely to be seen. The authorities were fairly effective in precluding the attempted political re-education of the peasantry. In the populist ranks arrest followed arrest. The majority within the Land and Liberty leadership concluded that the state's oppressive power must be broken first, before the spiritual emancipation and social transformation of plebeian Russia could be proceeded with. In their own words, “Social reform in Russia is revolution. Under our political regime of absolute despotism and denial of the right and of the will of the people, reform can be only achieved by a revolution”. This new insurrectionist strategy was objected to by a minority that wanted to proceed with the movement's earlier village-centred approach (the `dereven'schiki'). In 1879, the two wings parted company. The majority established the People's Will Party, the minority formed the Black Repartition organization, each of them with its own clandestine journal that took its name from the organization it represented.

The People's Will rapidly outpaced its rivals and for a few years came to dominate the Russian political scene. They shifted their `cadres' into major towns, moving rapidly and effectively to organize army officers, workers and students for an insurrection. Immense energy was shown in establishing clandestine networks of new organizations, printing presses, etc. Wage workers rather than peasants were now considered central in the immediate battle but not because of the intrinsic socialist qualities of the proletariat but for tactical reasons, that is, their concentration at the urban centers where the political power lay. In accordance, a particular `workers program' was prepared, `workers circles' set up and the first Russian newspapers specifically aimed at the urban wage workers were printed. An adopted `tactic of terror' against the top dignitaries of the state led to some of the People's Will's most spectacular exploits. It aimed to `shake' the tsar- dom and its leaders, to break their confidence and the totality of their grip. The People's Will hoped that, pursued with sufficient energy, such attacks would make the government forces retreat or waver, and wake the mass of the people from their political slumbers, destroying the belief in the irresistibility of the state. The Executive Committee of the People's Will, both a national leadership and a top organization for terrorist action, adopted as its direct aim the killing of Alexander II.

In the confrontation that followed, the People's Will was eventually defeated. The initial impact of the organization had led to a considerable panic at the top (the establishment of `dictatorship' of General Loris-Melikov, etc.) [50. P. 254--271]. In 1881, the People's Will succeeded in killing Alexander II, but no popular insurrection followed and most of the Executive Committee members were imprisoned and/or executed within a year. The party re-formed, establishing new leadership, which in turn was arrested. Then, the powerful Military Organization of army officers who joined the People's Will, preparing for the possibility of a military uprising, was destroyed by betrayal and arrests. New executions, imprisonments and exile followed. In 1884 came one more major attempt to re-establish the People's Will's national structure by G. Lopatin, a member of the General Council of the 1st International, and Marx's personal friend. It was crushed by a new wave of arrests. For all practical purposes that was the end of the party of People's Will. The last localized attempt to renew and proceed with its action took place in 1887, when a group of students, who adopted the name of Revolutionary Fraction of the People's Will, attempted to kill Tsar Alexander III. It ended, once again, in arrests and the execution of its participants, who included Alexander Ulyanov, Lenin's elder brother [38; 40; 42].

The continuity between the generations of the Russian new dissent was considerable, at times implicit yet ever powerful, enhanced by personal contacts and intimately related to Russian literature. Many of the social theorists of Russia were poets, novelists or literary critics; indeed, the very division between types of writing was never clear. Pugachev, who led his Cossack and peasant rebels when Radischev was a young man, was first described in realistically human terms by Pushkin, who befriended the Decembrists and exchanged with their prisoners in Siberia poetic messages, all of the educated Russians knew by heart. His closest personal friend was Chadayev, the author of the `Philosophical Letters'. It was also Pushkin who initiated the journal Contemporary, which was eventually edited by Chernyshevskii and suppressed with his arrest. The young Hertzen had admired the Decembrists while the young Chernyshevskii has said that he “admired Hertzen more than he admired any other Russian” [42. P. 140] and explicitly set out to follow his tracks (they clashed eventually, but that came long after Chernyshevskii's `formative period'). The name of the Marxist newspaper Iskra was taken directly from the Decembrists' poetic answer to Pushkin, while Lenin took the name for his book devoted to party organization from Chernyshevskii's novel What Is to Be Done, which he admired. A memorial column to the founding fathers of Russian socialism was erected in the first flush of the Bolshevik victory and still stands in the Alexander Park next to the Kremlin. The names, allegedly Dostoevsky (to be judged by the impact of his prose rather than by his political views), selected by Lenin, run from Marx to Fourier and end with Chernyshevskii, Lavrov, Mikhailovskii and Plekhanov. In truth one should have added here literary figures such as Tolstoy, Nekrasov, Chekhov and, of course, Pushkin, whose memorial, nearby in Moscow, reads: “And long my people will remember me for my gift has served the right affections, in this cruel age I glorified liberty and called for loyalty to the defeated”. The third line was initially “Following Radischev I glorified liberty”, but was sacrificed to the gods of censorship. The Russian intelligentsia well knew its history and, through it, knew themselves.

It was the defeat of the People's Will that set the internal political scene of Russia in the two decades beginning from the middle of the 1880s, that is, the period that preceded the 1905--7 revolution. The drama of rejection of the first wave of young populist idealists by the peasants, the gallows, prisons and exile that followed and decimated a whole generation of activists, the immense sacrifice that ended in total defeat and a conservative backlash of the `counter-reforms', were never forgotten by the Russian political opposition. Yet, on the other hand, the knowledge of it caused many latter-day observers to underestimate the long-term achievements of the revolutionary populism of the 1870s and 1880s. They established a model of political action, the crux of which lay in a small and tightly knit organization of revolutionary intelligentsia whose main enemy was the state power and whose long-term strategy was the penetration and channeling of the spontaneous protest of the mass of Russia's under-dogs, workers and peasants, aiming to turn them into a political force. The problem of `Why did it not succeed?' was hotly discussed, but the fundamental social map and the revolutionaries' task was set out already in Chernyshevskii's image of the double division of the people of Russia and of the coming plebeian war. The problem of `cadres' vs. masses and the class analysis of the revolutionary action, as the necessary initial phase of state destruction, were acknowledged and analyzed as central and due to dominate any future considerations. The strength of this approach lay in its coming from and addressing the specific political and social conditions of tsarist Russia and countries with parallel characteristics. That is why it survived in the theory and organizational structures of all of the Russian revolutionary movements that followed.

On the other hand, there was the immediate and powerful experience of the defeat of the People's Will, both conceptual and political. The people of Russia did not rebel at the sign of the tsar's killing. The membership of People's Will was dead, incarcerated or on the run. This destruction left the field of dissent to those who considered the revolutionary action premature or altogether misconceived. They consisted of three major strands. First, after failing to make much impact as a separate branch of populism, the core of the Black Repartition leadership emigrated and rapidly converted to Marxism. They reformed in Switzerland and established there the Emancipation of Labour organization, led by Plekhanov and Axelrod. They came now to accept the necessity of a capitalist stage in Russia's development and of a proletarian revolution as the one possible road to socialism. The failure of People's Will was explained accordingly, that is, as the result of an attack that was premature in class terms and therefore utopian and doomed. The eyes of the Emancipation of Labour group were on Germany, its rapid social and economic transformation during the 1880s and 1890s, as much as the repeated electoral victories of the German Social Democratic Workers Party. By the 1890s Plekhanov came to treat Russian peasantry by a bottle-neck of stagnation, to be disposed of as a necessary condition for the advance of capitalism and democracy, to be followed in due time by the proletarian victory in its struggle for socialism. The movement they initiated was increasingly referred to as the Social Democrats.

Next, groups and individuals who proceeded to adhere to the broad populist tradition but refused its revolutionary implications, and therefore survived, came increasingly to speak on behalf of populism. As the hope for insurrection receded and its proponents were physically out of the scene, a `politics of small deeds' was increasingly being stressed: education, agrarian advance, the welfare needs of the peasants and workers, etc. These views of a non-revolutionary (`legal') populism was finding a social carrier in the professional zemstvos employees. Within the zemstvos such populist members of the intelligentsia often allied with Marxists of similar inclinations and with liberal nobles, with whom they shared the wish to follow the `small deeds', that is to serve the educational, economic and legal advance of the plebeian masses. A third strand of dissent, Russia's liberalism, developed within the-enlightened landed nobility active in the zemstvos but also in the urban `free professions': lawyers, medical doctors, university professors, etc. They were `Westerners' to a man in their wish to have Russia progress towards the West European patterns of political organization, that is, parliamentary rule and constitutional government. To them, political liberty and a democratized (i.e. curtailed in its powers) state administration was the way to secure advance in other fields, that is, activate the Russian economy, stimulate education, enhance personal initiative, etc. They were hostile to, or at least wary of, the revolutionary and antimonarchist йlan of the People's Will, but ready to co-operate with the Left in the pursuit of welfare and educational schemes as well as in some demonstrations of political opposition. With Marxists, especially the `legal' Marxists, they have much in common, including `Westernism', belief in evolution and in the supreme significance of economic progress, and the drive for parliamentary democracy. Their hostility was turning increasingly against the `official Russia', which harassed the elected regional authorities and repressed expressions of the literate public opinion, its journals and associations.

On the government side, the experience of People's Will reflected in the designation of potential enemies and unreliable elements as well as in the methods by which those were to be defeated or controlled. The main enemy was the `terrorist', and as this disappeared the situation seemed essentially safe. Special attention was given to potential `military rebels' among the officers. The main unreliable elements were seen as the rootless people, that is, the intelligentsia and the wage workers, who were to be carefully watched and controlled, with particular attention given to any contacts between the educated and the uneducated. The long-winded theoretical tracts of Marxists or of other scholastic radicals were treated as a marginal nuisance. On the other hand, the mildly constitutionalist reformers and professionals in the local authorities were systematically cautioned, dismissed or exiled.

During the 1890s the gloom of the defeat and executions of members of the People's Will and of the counter-reforms of Alexander III was lifting within the Russian political dissent. The opposition became increasingly active. Contacts were being restored, some of the revolutionary exiles were coming back, new activists were joining the fray. The 1891 famine had proved once more the tsarist state's outrageous crassness and incompetence, as against the relative efficiency of the humanitarian initiative of Russian `society', that is, the zemstvo authorities and the `free professions'. By the mid-1890s clandestine groups were growing faster than was their eradication by the police. Attempts began to establish political parties or equivalent nation-wide organizations in Russia proper (in the Polish, Finnish and Latvian provinces clandestine parties were already active). The framework that shaped these attempts was that of three major ideological streams: Marxist, liberal, and populist, but ethnic divisions and considerations of political strategy added to the complexity of the emerging political structures [36]. The picture at its most general was one of rapid transformation of Russia's political scene -- a rising wave of political dissent and of a parallel self-critical trend between the tsars' nobles and bureaucrats.

In his first book concerned with party organization in those days, Lenin had hotly advocated the need for demarcation before any unification into a political party could take place. The issue was certainly rife within each of the ideological, ethnic and strategy- oriented streams and sub-streams of Russian political dissent. It was through a process of constant attempts at unification, of arguments, demarcations and remarcations, punctuated by arrests and escapes that the map of twentieth-century Russian political parties was being established. At the turn of the century the essential shape of the main political organizations challenging the tsardom could already be seen but program, organizational prescriptions and membership were still very fluid when the revolution of 1905--1907 put the nascent political parties of Russian dissent to their supreme test. It was then that the unexpected characteristics of a political revolution that failed and the high drama of its experience resulted in a conceptual revolution due to play a major role in the transformation of Russia and the world at large. Its essence was the acceptance, often implicit, of Russia's specificity as a developing society and the fact that this moment of truth was put to political use by monarchists radicalized by a revolution, and by revolutionaries, taught new realism by its surprises and its eventual defeat.

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