Pearl industry in the UAE region in 1869-1938: its construction, reproduction, and decline

The segmentation on each boat could also be seen in the fact that all of the ghawasin were in competition. In addition, members of the crew were paid at different rates. Whereas the ghawas was entitled to three shares of the ship's earnings, the sib was entitled to two, the radif and jalas only to one, and the tabbab to none. This made the sib, radif, jalas, tabbab and cook view the ghawas as being privileged, and made the tabbab and cook see all other members of the crew as having advantages over him. These differences too precluded any consolidation of resistance efforts aboard a given ship.

Although political, economic and cultural factors precluded the development of consolidated resistance to exploitation both in the pearl industry at large and among the crew members of pearling dhows other cultural-ideological factors played the dual role both in legitimizing the power relationships between the upper and lower strata of the pearl industry and enabling these power relationships to reproduce themselves, and in constituting a form of individual resistance. These factors were the various myths of the lower strata within the pearl industry. This mythology was a mixture of folklore constructed within the pearling industry itself and of particular interpretation of Islam. The songs chanted by the nahham, for example, tended to glamorize the pearling voyage and to praise the ghawasin and other members of the crew for their skill and strength; the songs had verses about far-away diving places, beautiful pearls, and the skill and strength of the crew [20. P. 28].

Within the lower strata of the pearl industry, there was folklore blaming the sufferings of the ghawasin on supernatural forces such as shayatin (demons) and jan, rather than on the upper strata [10. P. 85--104]. This mythology legitimized the upper strata of the pearl industry in the eyes of the ghawasin, so that they actually believed themselves to be beneficiaries of the controlling strata of that industry rather than exploited by them. It also constructed the shayatin and jan as `others' to whom the blame for these sufferings could safely be affixed since, existent or non-existent, shayatin and jan had no connections to the pearl industry. At the same time, however, these stories about supernatural forces were sometimes constructed to free ghawasin from the brutally strenuous work they were doing. In one example, the ghawas emerged from a dive stiff and, trembling, acted as if possessed by shayatin, and refused to talk until sundown, despite the matawwa's continuous reading of the Qur'an over him. When the ghawas finally spoke, it was with the voice of a woman who identified herself as a shaitanah (female demon) and warned the other crew members not to let him dive again because he had killed her child while fishing. The `shaitanah ' warned that if the ghawas dived again, she would kill him in revenge. However, she also stated that she had no objection to his being made a sib. Obviously, the ghawas had constructed this affair to escape from diving which was exhausting and would kill him.

There also were myths about the chance that an exceptional pearl harvest would make the crew rich. The central figure of one such myth was a poor Bedouin who began as a pearl diver, earned good shares of the revenues during each season, eventually became a nakhodha and then a pearl merchant selling his pearls in Bombay and China [20. P. 33]. In addition, the ghawasin tended to view the vicissitudes of the pearl industry and its revenues and their exploitation as the will of God and entered each pearling season hoping to earn what `God might allow' [7. P. 9]. Finally, just as the ongoing indebtedness of the ghawasin and siyub enabled power relationships within the pearling sector to reproduce, so did the fact that members of pearling crews made it a point to instill a love for this kind of work in their sons. They did this by bringing them on board pearling dhows for training, re-telling miraculous success stories and instilling in their sons the belief that this sort of work was something that only the exceptionally strong and courageous could do.

The decline of the pearl industry

The Gulf pearl industry began its decline in the late 1920s. By the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Japanese had developed their cultured pearl industry into a global export, and this spelled the demise of the Gulf pearl fisheries altogether [22. P. 197]. This overriding factor in the decline of the Gulf pearl industry developed in conjunction with two others -- the onset of the Great Depression, and the decreasing yields from the over fished pearl banks [23. P. 220]. The decline of the pearl industry can be seen both in the decrease in the number of dhows from 1904 to 1946, and in the contrasting aggregate revenue figures for pearl exports from the entire Arabian Gulf for the peak year 1912/1913, versus those for 1946. Figures for pearling dhows in the UAE region show that 1,215 dhows were used in the industry in 1904 [28. P. 2256]. By 1946, this number declined to 250 for the UAE region combined both with Qatar and the pearling ports on the Persian littoral [17. P. 169]. The export value for the Arabian Gulf pearls in 1912/1913 was 2 million GBP. In 1946, that value had plummeted to 62,000 GBP [7. P. 8].

The decline in revenues from the Gulf pearl exports was particularly significant for it engendered the decline of what was left of the UAE larger local merchants' stratum.

As the pearl industry declined under the impact of the global market for Japanese cultured pearls, the tujar and tawawish, all of whom had previously became wealthy as pearl merchants, went bankrupt due to their debts to Banyan financiers. Declining pearl revenues made local merchants unable to send a large number of dhows on pearling expeditions for the lack of money to supply them, and due to the declining sales prospects for the pearls in the world market. The decline in revenues also made local merchants indebted to the Banyan tujar and exporters who purchased pearls from them and credited them.

In response to the increased Banyan complaints of non-repayment by the local merchants, the British Political Resident intervened in the UAE region during the 1920s and 1930s both to force the ruling sheikhs to ensure that local pearl merchants repaid their debts to their Banyan creditors, who were British subjects, and to ensure the safety of the Banyan tujar when tensions arose in this situation, for example, in Dubai in 1930, after an influential Dubai merchant Abdallah bin Yusuf lost 150,000 Rs. when his Banyan creditor forced him to sell his pearls in an unfavorable market to pay his debt. After repaying 80,000 Rs., he was arrested in Bombay, placed on trial, and forbidden to return to Dubai until he paid his Banyan creditors the remaining 31,000 Rs. When the ruler of Dubai threatened to seize all the Banyans if Abdallah bin Yusuf was not released, the British Political Resident dispatched the H.M.S. Lupin to the Dubai harbor to protect the Britain's Banyan subjects. In 1929, another local merchant, Mohammed Bin Bayat, was declared bankrupt because his debt to the Banyan tujar was to 600,000 Rs. Another merchant, Mohammed bin Ahmad bin Dalmuk, was in debt to the merchant Hajji Mohammed Ali Zainal in Bombay because of slow sales of his pearls in Paris. To pay this debt, he was obliged to borrow a sum of 200,000 Rs. from a Banyan merchant Ganshamdeshk at an interest rate of 36 percent [32. P. P. 169].

As for the ghawasin, siyub, rawadif, jalasin and tabbabin, the decline of the pearl industry determined their displacement from the only steady form of employment that remained available to them no matter how harsh it was. Thus, they became a marginalized stratum finding casual employment as porters or in other positions in the Britishcontrolled import trade [23. P. 250--251]. In some cases, this displacement resulted in their leaving the UAE region.

This history of the decline of the pearl industry illustrates the interrelationship under the colonial period of the British colonialism, Banyan merchants, local pearl merchants, and ruling sheikhs. More importantly, it demonstrates how the pearl industry was constructed by the British colonialism through its historical relationship with Banyan merchants. The article describes different strata, revenue distribution and hierarchical construction of the pearl industry to prove that the dependency of the UAE region on the pearl economy continued from 1869 to 1938 and integrated the UAE into the world market with the help of a single commodity. The decline of the pearl industry in the Arabian Gulf, and the global and regional factors for its decline, spelled the demise of the most significant part of the UAE pearl stratum during this period. Subsequently, the British government intervened more directly in the economic affairs of the UAE region, and correspondingly gave the ruling sheikhs regular rent payments through oil concession arrangements. British colonialism also took over UAE region shipping traffic making the city of Dubai entrepots for British goods. The pearl merchants attempted to counteract this trend by the unsuccessful Reform Movement of 1938 in Dubai. This marked the end of the pearl tujar and tawawish, and the rise of the new tujar, who were engaged in the gold trade and the imports and exports of the British goods to the UAE region by the steam ships. The discovery of oil in Abu Dhabi in 1958 and its production set up a new turning point in the UAE region's economy, a new round of integration into the world market economy, and a new structure and process of society's reproduction.

(1) Coastal Oman, Coastal Emirates, Trucial States, Trucial Coast were the names of the UAE region before the establishment of the UAE and during the British domination in the Arabian Gulf.

(2) The Al-Qawasim were an Arab mercantile system coexisting with a tribal confederation called the Beni Yas and living in the area extending from the boundary of Qatar, southward to Dubai, and westward to Liwa, and the eastward to Al-Ain.

(3) Qajar Dynasty came to power in Iran in 1794 and lasted until 1924. The customs were reformed for the Qajar Shah Mozaffar al-Din needed more revenues and cash to go to Europe for cure, and the Belgian customs adviser M. Naus employed by the Shah revised tariffs to produce to provide him with more revenues.

(4) Dhow has no equivalent in Arabic, it is a term used by the Western seamen to denote any of the wide range of local lateen-rigged sailing ships. Arab dhows, such as the larger size boums and baghlah, the mid-sized pearling sambuk and battil were of various shapes and sizes reflecting their diverse uses.

(5) Firstl the nakhodha rarely made profit selling his catch of pearls for he usually sold them to the tawwash at a discount rate to repay the tawwash loan to him. Second, since the nakhodha was constantly in debt due to borrowings from the tawwash to take care of provisions on the ship, it is unlikely that he was entitled to a portion more than a half of total profits from the catch. Third, it is unlikely that the nakhodha was entitled to the same percentage of the revenues for the catch irrespective of whether or not he owned the vessel.

(6) The sheikhs of Coastal Oman signed a mutual extradition treaty among themselves in 1879. This treaty particularly pertained to pearl divers and sailors, who were chronically in debt to their employers. According to the treaty each sheikh was obliged to extradite runaway debtors under the threat of the fine and the obligation to pay the runaway's debts. The British government's representative called the `Native Agent' was to demand the extradition of the runway and to head the arbitrations if facts about a runway's case were in dispute.

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