Anatomy of the Political Transformations during the Period of the Dissolution of the USSR on the Material from Kuhistoni Badakhshon

As a matter of fact, in 1989, conditions to solve the language problem were created. But the situation with the adoption of the law “On GBAO” was much more difficult. Judging by the minutes of the sessions of the Soviet, the first discussions of the law started on 4, September, 1990. Dissatisfaction of people's deputies and representatives of the public with the “spinelessness” of the legislative draft offered can be easily noted Protokol N3 sessijai panchum (davati bistujakumi) Shuroi deputathoi halki vilojati muhtori Kuhistoni Badahshon. L. 14-25.. They were opposed, for example, to the absence of mentioning, let alone defining, of the status of the Pamir languages, and the absence of a chapter on prohibition to change the borders of autonomous region without the consent from the regional government. Deputies also suggested that the number of representatives of GBAO in Supreme Soviet of the TSSR should be increased to 12, and an office for a permanent representative of the region in the TSSR Cabinet should be made. As an option, such representative could be Deputy Head of central government at the same time.

A speech by the member of Executive committee, Sh. Kokulov, was especially radical: for instance, he proposed legislating nonpartisanship of court, prosecution, Executive Committee and staff of trade unions, and also implementing dual subordination of the Executive committee, both to republican ministries and to the regional Soviet of People's deputies.

However, most of the suggestions were much more reasonable and aimed at correcting and clarifying the document. Following the results the discussion, the project was passed in its first reading Karori Soveti deputathoi halkii vilojati avtonomii Badahshoni Kuhii RSS Tochikiston N 38 az 2 sentjabri soli 1990 // GA GBAO. F. 1. Op. 49. D. 3. L. 44..

1991

The beginning of the last year of the existence of the USSR was dramatic for the Pamir region.

In January, the autonomous region suffered yet another earthquake. As we already stated, the situation at the border was rapidly deteriorating; the same was true for the matters of supplies and crime. Hopes to realize the regulations of the Cabinet of the USSR in the conditions of disintegration of the state formation disappeared along with the snow. At the same time, aspirations that connected the bright future of the region with advancement of its political status grew. During the first ten days of April, the Presidium of the Soviet of People's Deputies of GBAO prepared and published a constitutional project “On GBAO” in the local newspaper “Soviet Badakhshan” Konuni chumhurii shuravii socialistii Tochikiston dar borai Vilojati Muhtori Kuhistoni Badahshon (loiha) // Badahshoni Soveti. 1991. 6 apr. P. 1-3; Konuni chumhurii shuravii socialistii Tochikiston dar borai Vilojati Muhtori Kuhistoni Badahshon (loiha) // Badahshoni Soveti. 1991. 9 aprelia. P. 1-3.. The draft, which consisted of seven chapters (95 parts), was to include the region into the late-Soviet political system under the terms that were quite ordinary for the time. For instance, finally the features of the region, which formed the basis for granting autonomous status, were officially recognized: “GBAO is the type of Soviet autonomy that was defined on the basis of common territory, geographical conditions, co-existence of Tajik (Persian), Yazgulyam, Rushan, Bartang, Shughnan, Wakhan, Rhin languages, economic and spiritual singularity, and adjacency to other states”. Referring to the Constitutions of both the USSR and the TSSR, and in view of the historical association, GBAO was considered part of the Tajik SSR. The Tajik language retained its exclusive official status, but the project allowed for use of the Pamir languages in court, which meant their inclusion into the legal environment. There was no direct statement that there were communities other than Tajik in the autonomy, as well as no mentioning of the religious diversity of a significant part of the Pamir Mountains. It is obvious that mentioning Isma'ilism and accepting the right of the Pamiris to self-identification would have brought up the question of the status of Tajik-speaking population of Darvaz and Vanch, and the Kirghiz of Murghab.

The provision for control over the natural resources of the region by its own administration was consequential, and concordant with the spirit of the time. Still, we cannot agree with the understanding offered by M. M. Khudoerov that this was the most important part of the law Hudoerov M. M. Social'no-politicheskie i etnokul'turnye transformacii... P. 54.. Unlike the romantics in the literary circles of Dushanbe, people's deputies were bound to understand that the very geographic position of the region and the state of infrastructure wouldn't allow its entering the world market of crude materials in the near future. Judging by the documents of the work of the Soviet of the region, this provision could rather have, apart from the populist, particular and applicable significance, ensuring the development of the local laws on nature conservation, and tourism control Karori Soveti deputathoi halkii vilojati avtonomii Badahshoni Kuhii RSS Tochikiston N 44 az 4 sentjabri soli 1990 // GA GBAO. F. 1. Op. 49. D. 3. L. 50; Polozhenie ob ohote i vedenii ohotnichego hoziaistva na territorii GBAO // Ibid. L. 51-63; Protokol N 5 sessijai panchum (davati bistujakumi) Shuroi deputathoi halki vilojati muhtori Kuhistoni Badahshon. L. 2 etc..

The law “On GBAO” reformed the representation system of the region at the level of the USSR. Five people's deputies were to be delegated to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. Two people from the region were to represent the autonomy in the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet.

In our opinion, the most important fact was that GBAO was granted the right to leave TSSR and USSR freely, provided that an all-region referendum was held. The day of the creation of GBAO, 2 January, was proposed as a regional holiday.

It is evident from the minutes of the April session of the regional Soviet of People's deputies, that there was no consolidated understanding of the project in the local political circles. A whole range of elected officials tried to make minor amendments to the legislation, probably thinking that its development could be continued. First Secretary of the regional Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan S. Beknazarov during the discussion of the project of law commented that it was of premature nature since constitutional changes at the level of Tajikistan and USSR were bound to come, and it was on the basis of these changes that a legislative act on GBAO should be developed. In contrast, the representative of Rushan, U. M. Aksakolov, insisted that the law project be passed to the Supreme Soviet of the TSSR as soon as possible. The majority of the participants of the session evidently shared his opinion, and the act was passed Protokol N 5 sessijai panchum (davati bistujakumi) Shuroi deputathoi halki vilojati muhtori Kuhistoni Badahshon. L. 22-24..

While the discussion of the prospects of changes in the status was taking place, the local authorities tried to initiate works for reconstruction of the regional infrastructure that suffered from the earthquake in January. According to the ordinance ¹42 of the Cabinet of Ministers of the TSSR of 15, April, 1991, the Executive committee of the Soviet of People's deputies of GBAO ordered to allocate an additional 25, 3 million roubles of capital investments in 1991. It was planned to spend this sum on “financing the reconstruction of damaged industrial and non-industrial objects and construction of new ones in lieu of the destroyed ones” Sovet narodnykh deputatov Gorno-Badahshanskoi avtonomnoi oblasti, Ispolnitel'nyi komitet: Rasporiazhenie N 24-r ot 23 aprelia 1991 g. // GA GBAO. F. 1. Op. 50. D. 5. L. 89..

Part of the reconstruction cost was to be made up for by the local enterprises, “Ta- jikpromstroybank”, “Tajikagroprombank” and “Tajikbankbusiness”, although most of the expenses were to be met by the still existing Centre. The office for industrial and commercial sector and general public services of the Executive committee of GBAO and the Consumers' association of GBAO were ordered to allocate tasks and to conclude delivery agreements for extra goods and materials which were assigned to GBAO by the Ministry of Trade of the USSR in 1991.

It was especially noted that consumer goods and building materials would be available for sale to inhabitants, and shop fixtures and fittings would be used to equip educational, trade and catering objects, and distributed upon approval by the Executive committee of GBAO GA GBAO. F. 1. Op. 50. D. 5.. L. 90.. All in all, according to the data of the Supreme Soviet of the TSSR, during the first half of 1991 the Centre had allocated 46 million roubles for liquidating the consequences of the catastrophe. In fact, though, due to the progressing disintegration of the channels of distribution system, only 12 million were appropriated Saidov A., Safarov A., Azimov H. Zapiska o rabote Soveta narodnykh deputatov Gorno- Badahshanskoi avtonomnoi oblasti, Rushanskogo, Shugnanskogo rajonov po uluchsheniiu sessionnoi dejatel'nosti i povysheniiu aktivnosti deputatov // GA GBAO. F. 1. Op. 48. D. 55. L. 23..

Perhaps, this is why the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR ordered 1.5 thousand tons of meat, 1 thousand tons of butter and 1 thousand tons of sugar to be transferred to the disposal of the Executive Committee of GBAO from the reserve of the Government of the USSR to meet the needs of the population affected by the earthquake Sovet narodnykh deputatov Gorno-Badahshanskoi avtonomnoi oblasti, Ispolnitel'nyi komitet: Rasporiazhenie N 24-r ot 23 aprelia 1991 g. L. 90..

Unfortunately, in the documents that we were able to access there was no detailed description of what the damage suffered by the autonomy from the earthquake was. However, other sources suggest, for instance, that the theatre in Khorugh was destroyed by it Chetvertyi teatral'nyii festival' v Tadzhikistane // Teatr. 1991. Iss. 10. P. 48..

Generally, the archival documents and the press enable to make a conclusion that by the middle of 1991, the socio-economic situation had acquired a range of new recessionary features: cutbacks on cropland acreage (in overpopulated, agrarian Pamirs!), debt crisis, and a decrease in construction by 1/3 Gulhandaev Sh. O chem govoriat itogi polugodiia // Badahshoni Soveti. 1991. 26 iiulia. P. 4.. Another precursor of the social disruption was the increase in unemployment rates (up to 6 200 people capable of working) Zapiska o rabote Sovetov narodnykh deputatov Gorno-Badahshanskoi avtonomnoi oblasti, Rushanskogo, Shugnanskogo raionov po uluchsheniiu sessionnoi dejatel'nosti i povysheniiu aktivnosti deputatov. L. 23.. The region was on the brink of an upsurge of protests.

Despite all the difficulties, it is barely germane to talk about separatist, anti-Soviet or even anti-communist sentiments of most population in GBAO. The all-Soviet referendum on the future of the USSR held in March 1991 clearly demonstrated the attitudes of the people of GBAO towards the existing political situation: out of 78 383 people that took part in the referendum, 77 246 voted for the political continuation of the Soviet Union Baroi Ittihodi navshuda ovoz dodand // Badahshoni Soveti. 1991. 20 marta. P. 1..

Nevertheless, there are no grounds to state that the Badakhshan people didn't have any ambitions to change. First of all, as it was often the case on the post-Soviet Union territory, a swift “resurrection” of the religious constituent of national identity of the Pamirs came about. The most telling of the markers of this process were the first contacts since the 1930s of religious leaders (Pirs) of Shughnan and Darvaz with none other than Aga Khan IV, and a visit of his high-ranking representatives M. Kashevdzhi, A. Radzhput and S. Dzhalol, to GBAO on 27 June -- 6 July 1991. An important consolidating pretext for the Nizaris of the region was raising funds to build a memorial to the legendary preacher Nasir Khusrav Hodzhibekov Je. H. Istoriia aktivizacii religii i religioznyh deiatelei GBAO Respubliki Tadzhikistan v gody Perestroiki (1985-1991 gg.) // Uspehi sovremennoi nauki. 2017. Vol. 4, iss. 2. P. 179-180..

The main events of August and November 1991 that led to the birth of the Autonomous Republic of Badakhshan, took place outside the Pamir Mountains.

Within the framework of institutionalizing of non-governmental organizations in 1991 in the Ministry of Justice, there was registered an organization “La'li Badakhshon” (Lal of Badakhshan). A PhD in Mathematics and a professor of Pedagogical institute from Dushanbe, Atobek Amirbekov, became its leader, with members being students and the youth of Dushanbe. In line with its Statutes, “La'li Badakhshon” intended to actively aid the “development of political thinking, economics, culture and education of the peoples of Badakhshan” Prilozhenie N 7: Ustav organizacii “Lali Badahshon” // Hudoerov M. M. Social'no-politicheskie i etnokul'turnye transformacii na postsovetskom Pamire. Diss. ... kand. ist. nauk. Moscow, 2012. P 244-225.. In practice, the organization appeared to adhere to general democratic ideas, and promoted creation of a Pamir cultural centre in Dushanbe. According to the data collected by M. M. Khudoerov, the basic cells of the organization existed in Kho- rugh and outside GBAO -- in Nurak, Qurghonteppe and Yovon, where Pamir immigrants lived. The total number of the members of the organization amounted to 500 people Hudoerov M. M. Social'no-politicheskie i etnokul'turnye transformacii. P 54., although in the Pamir Mountains themselves the activity of the organization only became visible in the course of the December events.

The 1991 Soviet coup d'etat attempt, or the “August Putsch” and declaration of independence of the republic of Tajikistan followed by the September conflict in Dushanbe, did not affect GBAO, according to the evidence that we acquired. That noted, involvement of the Pamirs into the capital conflicts, sooner or later, had to bring up the question of which of the new political fractions Badakhshan was going to be with.

Most of urbanized intelligentsia apparently believed that fast-track reforms would enable to overcome the socio-political, economic and cultural discriminations that were considered to hinder development of the Soviet Badakhshan. In pursuit of immediate and tangible results, the intelligentsia, most of whom lived outside GBAO, supported “democrats” that laid their hands on the power in a number of republics, and radical supporters of reforms in the whole of Tajikistan ,such as “Rastokhez”, “demo-Islamites”, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan. Paradoxically, at the Soviet and republican levels, the democrats supported the side of protagonists of “national” and religious resurrection of the dominant ethnic group. Success in achieving the above-mentioned goals would have automatically left the Pamirs face to face with the nationalist and Sunni Centre, while being deprived of the habitual possibilities of using the Party to de-escalate the situation and appealing to the all-Soviet actors. Probably, this is the reason why GBAO, at first, distanced itself from all republican conflicts. That situation, however, could not last for long. Old mechanisms of communication with Dushanbe were disappearing. For instance, in October, by the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan the activities of the Communist party were suspended Mozhno priostanovit' deiatel'nost' partii, no ne politicheskuiu zhizn' liudei // Badahshoni Soveti. 1991. 11 noiabria. P. 4.. A. Sobchak and E. Velikhanov, who came from Moscow, supported the “democratic” opposition. At the same time, in the conditions of a permanent crisis, decision-making process on all the issues that were vital for GBAO and were previously made by the Supreme Soviet, were also suspended. In this chaos, the people of the Pamirs needed a new hero, who could listen to their voices, who was highly -- unofficially -- esteemed, and, at the same time, who could assume power. The only candidate for the role was a famous Soviet film director Davlat Khudonazarov.

The cultural luminary from Khorugh was a people's deputy from Shughnan at the top level of the USSR in 1989-1991. In Moscow, he proved to be a supporter of the “democratic opposition”, so when the 5th session of People's Deputies ended at the beginning of September, he came back to his motherland glorified as a reformer and someone who fought party nomenclature. It is no wonder, then, that at presidential elections in Tajikistan, in November 1991 D. Khudonazarov was made a nominee, formally from the “Democratic party of Tajikistan”. Obviously, the Pamiris were, from the beginning, inclined to support their famous and progressive fellow countryman. His popularity was also based on the information, provided by the press and orally, about his personal participation in humanitarian supplies to GBAO, and lobbying in Moscow the continuation of construction of hydroelectric power station “Pamir-1” Karamshoev D. Davlat -- redkaia lichnost' sovremennosti // Badahshoni Soveti. 1991. 20 noiabria. P. 4., connections with B. N Yeltsin, M. S. Gorbachev, English scientists and American congressmen Kaplunov Ju. O Davlate Hudonazarove // Badahshoni Soveti. 1991. 20 noiabria. P. 4; Protokol N 6 sessijai shashumi (davati bistujakumi) Shuroi deputathoi halki vilojati muhtori Kuhistoni Badahshon // GA GBAO. F. 1. Op. 49. D. 5. L. 7-8).. During the first three weeks of November 1991, the main Pamir newspaper “Soviet Badakhshan” published eight articles, which campaigned for D. Khudonazarov in different forms, whereas out of all the other candidates only A. N. Maksumov published his biography and his election agenda in this press title A. N. Maksumov -- kandidat v prezidenty Respubliki Tadzhikistan // Badahshoni Soveti. 1991. 16 noiabria. P. 4.. “Kinovideoobyedineniye” of GBAO held a mini-festival of D. Khudonazarov's films Lutfasanov K. Na ekrane -- filmy kandidata // Badahshoni Soveti. 1991. 22 noiabria. P. 4.. Finally, the famous countryman was the only candidate who visited GBAO during the electoral campaign and held a meeting with electorate in the city stadium of Kho- rugh K vyboram prezidenta respubliki // Badahshoni Soveti. 22 noiabria. P 4.. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that at least 90 % of the electorate of GBAO voted for him on 24, November, 1991.

Nevertheless, the election ended in his failure, since he gathered in the country as a whole 30,07 % votes. In the end, the former First Secretary of the Central committee of the TSSR Communist party, resident of Leninabad R. N. Nabiev became the President Intihobi prezidenti chumhurii Tochikiston // Badahshoni Soveti. 1991. 27 noiabria. P 1.. The disheartening proof of the inability of citizens of GBAO to influence the situation in the whole country led to an eruption.

On 3 December a mass protest began in Khorugh on the main square named after V. I. Lenin. The action was initiated (according to the information from the local press) by the Shughnan youth Kurbonbekov Sh. Girdix,amoi dar majdoni Lenin // Badahshoni Soveti. 1991. 5 dekabria. P. 1.. A number of political demands were voiced at the meeting: an unscheduled convention of the Soviet of People's deputies of GBAO, “transfer from the status of autonomous region to autonomous republic”, introduction of the post of President of the region and re-election of Chairmen of the city administration of Khorugh and the regional Soviet of People's deputies by “nation-wide voting”, recall and re-election of representatives of GBAO in the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, regional and city Soviets. Apart from that, there were also some “enforcement” demands: to publish information about the demands in the press, to “invite” members of the organizing committee of the meeting to the session of the regional Soviet and not to hold the participants of the meeting lia- ble Habib L. Verim, stoim, trebuem // Badahshoni Soveti. 1991. 6 dekabria. P. 4.. In essence, as it was acknowledged by coordinators of the meeting, F. Mirasanov and U. Abdolbekov, the case was sovereignization of Badakhshan within Tajikistan, by analogy with a number of parallel cases on the post-Soviet area Suverenitet v ramkah Tadzhikistana // Badahshoni Soveti. 1991. 10 dekabria. P. 1.. At the same time, as much as we can make of a whole number of lapsus linguae that can be found, for instance, in the speech made at Lenin square for “all the people of GBAO” published on 6 December, the actual political views of the protesters were largely limited to the regional capital and the Shughnan district Obrashhenie mitinguiushhih na ploshhadi im. V. I . Lenina goroda Horoga ko vsem zhiteliam GBAO // Badahshoni Soveti. 1991. 6 dekabria. P 4.. We daresay that this increasing tendency of the Badakhshan sovereignization towards Shughnan later on became one of the reasons for its failure.

People's deputies of GBAO immediately started to negotiate with the protestors, and the conversations ended in creation of a special commission of the regional Soviet on 4 December, which was to deal with the question. However, the activists did not intend to leave the central square of the Pamir capital until all their demands were met: first of all, an immediate holding of the session of the Soviet (given that the next session was scheduled for 20 December). Despite winter, the number of participants grew. They were joined by trade unions and representatives of a number of the regional districts. A. Amir- bekov, the Chairman of “La'li Badakhshan”, came from Dushanbe in order to support the protesters. An interview with the visiting zealot of the Pamirs' freedom and prospects was published under a telling heading “What is “La'li Badakhshan” anyway?” Habib L. Chto za “Lali Badahshon” // Badahshoni Soveti. 1991. 18 dekabria. P 4.. Nevertheless, the 1800 roubles donated by the society became a tangible sign of the support of the events in GBAO by the “democratic” powers in the country. People's deputies had to take a step back.

The unscheduled session of the Soviet of People's deputies of GBAO that took place on 9 December was held, due to its extraordinary nature, with an unusual composition of people present. There were, according to the meeting's minutes, representatives of the organizing committee of the protesters, Atobek Amirbekov -- the leader of La'li Bada- khshon, and deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan -- Sh. Shabdolov, M. Nazarsho- ev, E. I. Turgunov, B. Tashtanov and the Minister of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan M. Na- vdzhuvonov Protokol N 6 sessijai shashumi (davati bistujakumi) Shuroi deputathoi halki vilojati muhtori Kuhistoni Badahshon. L. 1, 15.. Despite the very impressive entry list, the discussion of proclaiming GBAO a republic, as much as we can judge from the documents, did not as such take place. Most of people's deputies of the regional Soviet were, together with a representative of the meeting at Lenin square, F. Khonibekov, unanimous when it came to uneven distribution of resources in favor of Leninabad region and Dushanbe, crisis of transport infrastructure, construction and educational system in the region. They saw the problem in promoting the status of GBAO and receiving full control over the local natural resources. The hopes for concluding agreements for cooperation and creating joint ventures with other post-Soviet republics, China and Afghanistan, shared by the people's deputies, were quite typical, as well as the myths about the “majority of republics that enhanced their economies and overcame the crisis”, and that it was only the lack of the status of republic that hindered the development of the Pamirs Ibid. L. 1-11.. Representatives of GBAO in the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan were criticized for their “half-heartedness”.

Only 2 out of 19 speeches were of a different, non-enthusiastic nature. One of them was a short oration made by the Chairman of the Soviet of Murghab district, S. Abdyrakhmanova, who brought to light the informational isolation of the biggest locality of Badakhshan. She only found out about the demands made by the protestors when she came to Khorugh. The language barrier had almost excluded the Kirghiz population from the regional political process. Apart from that, the Murghab deputy warned about the consequences of cessation of fuel deliveries from Tajikistan when the temperatures were below 40 degrees Celsius in the winter Ibid. L. 11-12..

Sh. D. Shabdolov, Chairman of the Communist party of the Republic of Tajikistan, was no less skeptical. He expressed doubt in expediency of recalling deputies from Dushanbe and confrontation with the central power, and made a justified surmise that “no republic of the Union wants to deal with us without the Republic [of Tajikistan. -- A. D., A. A., V. Sh.]” Ibid. L. 14.. In a private conversation 27 years later Shodi Davlatovich recalled that he warned the creators of the Autonomous republic of Badakhshan that approval of it at the level of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan was unfeasible From the private conversation between the authors of this paper and Sh. D. Shabdolov (6.02.2018)..

Eventually, the Soviet of People's deputies of GBAO arrived at resolution N 99. According to this document, the Mountain Badakhshan Autonomous region was transformed into the Autonomous Republic of Badakhshan as part of Tajikistan. Moreover, the document stipulated that the Supreme Soviet should be asked to approve the resolution made, and address all governmental structures of the Republic of Tajikistan asking to support the resolution. There was also created a commission for development of the newly created constitution of the republic Protokol N 6 sessijai shashumi (davati bistujakumi) Shuroi deputathoi halki vilojati muhtori Kuhistoni Badahshon. L. 16.. After the provisions of the new document were satisfied, the deputies headed by the Chairman of the regional Soviet A. Iskandarov listened to a grateful speech of the representative of protestors, F. Mirasanov, and went to Lenin square, where the celebration of a victory so long anticipated began.. , Habib L. GBAO -- avtonomnaia respublika // Badahshoni Soveti. 1991. 11 dekabria. P. 4.

The events which followed demonstrated that the plans of ethno-political consolidation of Mountain Badakhshan were unrealizable. The region, despite the crisis of supply and utility systems, and disintegration of the all-Union distribution system, had been dependent on the republican Centre since the 1920s. The ethno-confessional Isma'ili factor could not prove to be a sufficient basis for an all-Pamir integrated identity. Dissection of the system of political processes in the Pamir region in 1989-1991 shows the futility of the sovereignization project in the region due to a whole range of reasons. Among them we can point out the absence of solidarity among representatives of the “old” party nomenclature concerning both the law “On GBAO” and the declaration of independence of Badakhshan; economic dependency on the USSR Centre, passiveness of ethnic Pamiri who held positions in central government of Tajikistan. Among external factors, the “hot breath” of Afghanistan and lack of support from the “democratic forces” of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic should be singled out. For example, the visit to Dushanbe of A. A. Sobchak and E. P Velikhov in September 1991 took place only in order to reconcile the “democratic Islamists” with the official powers. Only very few people attached importance to the declaration of Badakhshan independence against the background of the growing civil conflict.

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