Ethnic disintegration and the dissolution of the USSR

Gorbachev had to rely completely on El'tsin. The issue of preserving or not preserving a unified state depended directly on the “cornerstone component” of the union, i.e. Russia. It was clear that the possibility of the New Treaty was slim, but Gorbachev was trying to grasp at any straw in the hope to outplay El'tsin. His hope proved vain.

In November 1991 it became obvious that Russia was going to stall the Treaty as long as possible; it was also clear that El'tsin would not put up with any form of even a token supremacy of Gorbachev -- the Ukraine was but an excuse for El'tsin in pursuing his ultimate goal, which was to remove Gorbachev from the Kremlin. Preserving a unified state was for him a secondary task in comparison with celebrating a conclusive triumph over the Soviet President, which could only be achieved by dismantling the Union and thus leaving Gorbachev without his post. From this perspective, the position of Kravchuk, who did not want to sign the New Treaty either, worked to El'tsin's benefit. The Novo-Ogaryo- vo process had reached stalemate, and the USSR President's close associates started saying that “Gorbachev's efforts to save the Union were fruitless convulsions” Cherniaev A. S. Dnevnikovaia zapis' ot 26 noiabria 1991 g. // Cherniaev A. S. Sovmestnyi iskhod. P. 1027..

The results of the Ukraine's referendum on independence on 1 December 1991, were used by El'tsin and his team to announce that the Novo-Ogaryovo process hit a dead end. In the words of Gorbachev, “the moment with the Ukraine was used by Russia's leaders to their benefit” Gorbachev M. Dai bog, chtob ia oshibsia // Komsomol'skaia pravda. 1991. 13 dekabria.. There was hardly any secret scheme between El'tsin and Kravchuk; it is much more likely that both of them felt it necessary to coordinate their efforts aimed at getting rid of the Centre's patronage. What the Ukraine and Russia did was de facto stand as one when they brought the autumn series of negotiations to a deadlock. The Belovezh Accords signed by the leaders of the three Slavic republics were the bottom line of the history of the USSR.

December 25, 1991 saw the end of the political career of the President of the USSR who announced his resignation. On that day the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and the constituent republics “set off on their own journeys” by starting a new phase in their history. “We ourselves destroyed the Soviet Union, not somebody else. So many right words were said -- but only later. We had to make a decision then. What we decided is now history”, remembered Gorbachev Gorbachev M. Nado izmenit' atmosferu // Ogonek. 2015. No. 4. P. 19.. While Gorbachev has the historical responsibility for the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it must be stressed that the “empire” fell apart, the same way as it did in 1917, in full view of the indifferent people, who, by trademark Russian tradition, “were speechless” having no faith in the old rulers and not having yet lost their faith in the new ones.

Demoralized by the betrayal of the leaders of the Slavic republics, Gorbachev failed to take productive measures to save the Union. Loyal to his credo, he did not go beyond admonishments and carried on his struggle “for preserving a unified state through political -- I want to stress the word, political -- methods”; he blames the Belovezh signatories for the “mindless and opportunistic dissolution of the Union” Mikhail Gorbachev -- Vitaliiu Tret'iakovu: Predlagaemaia Vami rol' «prositelia» mne ne podkhodit // Komsomol'skaia pravda. 2014. 13 marta., but is not ready to take his part of the responsibility.

An immense role in the dissolution of the USSR was played by a whole array of factors: the public being tired of the Communist project; the massive shortages of consumer goods, which made people hate the government; the growing opposition within the Communist party to Gorbachev's reforms; the hesitation of the General Secretary who tried to rely in turn either on the right or on the left wing; the drastic fall in the living standards. However, the crucial role was played by “the parade of sovereignties” and the Centre being too late in its attempts to address the national question.

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