Polish Way: The Light Cossack Cavalry in the Era of Military Revolution

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Polish Way: The Light Cossack Cavalry in the Era of Military Revolution

A. Boldyrew

Dr. hab., Associate Professor, Uniwersytet Lodzki, Lodz, Poland

K. Lopatecki

Dr hab., Associate Professor, University of Bialystok, Bialystok, Poland

The aim of the article is to show the way of adaptation of the military potential of the Crown to the Tatar threat, which first emerged in 1468. In connection with the particular geopolitical situation we present the dissimilarity of military reforms from those in Western Europe. In order to prevent Tatar raids, a standing frontier army (obrona potoczna or Permanent Defense) was formed. In the 1520s, an innovative strategy was developed which involved creating two defense lines with a very deep reconnaissance, 500 kilometers east of Lviv, already on the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The consequence of applying the new model of defense was a new type of armed forces developed approximately two decades later, the cossack cavalry. The article presents a phenomenon of the creation a unified, in terms of weaponry, light cavalry, the process of which took place in the 1540s and 50s. Earlier the troops had consisted of soldiers differently equipped and armored and using various horses. Out of this chaos there emerged more unified units, which was the result of experiences of south-east borderline defense. The article emphasizes it was neither commanders-in-chief nor political and governmental factors that played a key role in the tactical innovation was mid-level commanders (starosts, rotmistrzes). It was their experiments with different types of arms that brought about a revolution in the rearmament and uniformity of the cavalry. The paper indicates that the main originator of the transformations was the starost of Bar and Trembowla Bernard Pretwicz. A clear influence of political decisions and strategic concepts on the final transformations in the warfare tactics should be noted.

Keywords: military revolution, modernization processes, strategic innovations of the 16th c., tactical innovations of the 16th c., old-Polish military, cossack cavalry, military camps.

Польский путь: легкая казацкая конница в период военной революции

А. Болдырев

Dr. hab., доц., Лодзинский университет, Польша, Лодзь

К. Лопатецки

Dr. hab., доц., Университет Белостока, Польша, Белосток

Цель статьи -- показать адаптацию военного потенциала Польской Короны к угрозе, возникшей с 1468 г., со стороны татар. Геополитическая ситуация вынуждала применять здесь военные реформы, отличные от западноевропейских. Чтобы предотвратить татарские набеги, в 1492 г. были созданы постоянные пограничные войска (так называемая поточная оборона). В 1520-х гг. удалось выработать новую стратегию, которая заключалась в создании двух линий обороны с проведением очень глубокой военной разведки в 500 км к востоку от Львова (уже на землях Великого Княжества Литовского). Следствием использования новой модели обороны стали преобразования в отрядах конницы. Примерно через два десятилетия была создана единая с точки зрения вооружения легкая конница, называемая казацкой. Этот процесс происходил в 15401550-х гг. Казацкие всадники были вооружены по татарскому образцу (с некоторым влиянием литовских и московских войск): у них были панцирные кольчуги, луки с сагайдаками, рогатины и сабли. Они передвигались очень быстро, без остановки лагерем, благодаря чему могли своевременно узнать и заранее предупредить основную армию о надвигающейся опасности со стороны татар. Ранее отряды состояли из всадников, вооруженных и защищенных самым разным образом и использующих всевозможные виды верховых лошадей. Из этого хаоса со временем возникли подразделения, которые все более становились единообразными по мере увеличения опыта защиты пограничных земель на юго-востоке страны. В статье акцентируется внимание на том, что ключевая роль в тактических инновациях принадлежала командирам среднего звена (старосты, ротмистры), которые совершили революцию в перевооружении и унификации конницы, экспериментируя с разными видами оружия. В качестве главного вдохновителя изменений назван барский и теребовольский староста Бернард Претвич. Отмечено также заметное влияние политических решений и стратегических концепций на окончательные изменения в тактике военных действий.

Ключевые слова: военная революция, модернизационные процессы, стратегические инновации XVI в., тактические инновации XVI в., старопольские военные, казачья конница.

In Western Europe the 15th century was marked by a progressing domination of infantry over cavalry troops. This resulted from technological transformations: the development of firearms, primarily artillery, and transformations in the art of fortification. Wars increasingly involved the necessity of defending or capturing strongholds and towns, while general battles were of decreasing importance. Also, the way of capturing fortifications had changed; the actions were meticulously planned, and their implementation required long siege works. The transformations first took place on the territory of the Apennine Peninsula in the years 1450-1534. Further fundamental changes occurred on the territory of the Netherlands being a theater of uprising in the 1570s. Then the Italian defensive system was transformed by engineers Adriaan Anthoniszoon and Simon Stevin, which resulted in the foundation of the old-Dutch fortification school. polish way cossack military

Geopolitically, the Crown was in a completely different situation than Western Europe. Certainly, it waged classical wars where the key role was played by fortifications and infantry troops. In the first two decades of the 16th century, certain symptoms of military revolution were noted in the form of the so-called gunpowder revolution; however, for different reasons it was restricted to a technological innovation exclusively, which did not entail any changes of larger importance. Still the dominant type of arms was cavalry, and it was cavalry that was treated as the basic armed force of the Polish state. However, taking into account the fact that the main and permanent threat was still Tatars' raids, it was justified.

The Tatars were organized in various political structures, the most powerful of which was the Crimean Khanate: it regularly raided the south-eastern borderlands of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The scale of the phenomenon was enormous. The old research of Antoni Walawender indicate that major incursions were held on average every 1.62 years, whereas Jerzy Ochmanski's more recent research demonstrates its much higher intensity, on the level 1.27. However, in reality, these rates say little since they refer to big raids noted in the sources. The number of lesser incursions is basically not considered, and specific studies based on town registers enable us to give a considerably higher number of destructive attacks. It is also important to add small Tatar expeditions of 10-300 people (so-called “besh-besh”).

The objective of the article is to show the way of adapting the military potential of the Crown to those circumstances, directly unknown in Western Europe. Strategy innovation was originated then, and as a result of its application a new type of armed forces was established: the cossack cavalry. We present the phenomenon of forming light cavalry, uniform in terms of weaponry the process of which took place in the 1540s and 1550s. Earlier the troops had consisted of soldiers differently equipped and armored, and using various horses. Out of this chaos there emerged more unified units, which was a result of experiences of south-east borderline defense. It should be emphasized it was neither commanders-in-chief nor political and governmental factors that played a key role in the tactical innovation was mid-level commanders (starosts, rotmistrzes). It was their experiments with different types of arms that brought about a revolution in the rearmament and uniformity of the cavalry. We indicate that the main originator of the transformations was the starost of Bar and Trembowla Bernard Pretwicz (c. 1500-1563). We also perceive an influence of the theoretical assumptions in political decisions and strategic concepts on the practical transformations in the warfare tactics. In previous papers, the Cossack cavalry remained in the shadow of the heavy cavalry, the Polish winged Hussars, reformed in the days of Stefan Batory. Only one monograph dedicated to the Cossack cavalry was published -- the one written by Bartosz Glubisz who discussed its history in the period of 1549-1696. The cavalry itself, however (from the mid-17th century called “pancerna” or armored) survived until 1776. Of key importance are the findings of Marek Plewczynski who recognizes the period 1545-1549 as the beginning of the so-called Cossack reform. In this researcher's view, then they created the troops which were characterized by high mobility and speed of action. They were basically armed with a bow, a saber, a rohatyna or a short spear, and also a mail armor. The extensive context of mutual effect of the states and societies (primarily the Crimean Khanate and the Grand Duchy of Moscow) located on the Black Sea basin was presented by Brian L. Davies, whose observations were adopted in this paper.

The formation of the units of light cavalry enabled to successfully counteract the existent defensive problems, which consequently allowed for rebuilding the economic infrastructure of the South-Eastern lands of the Crown and the Ruthenian borderlands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania incorporated into the Crown in 1569. We attempt to look at the phenomenon of strategic and tactical changes through the paradigm of the military revolution. Solutions adopted in the state of the Jagiellons, different from those in the states of Western Europe, seemingly regressive (resignation from firearms and return to the bow) by no means meant regress or a structural backwardness. On the contrary, we want to prove that the formation of the new type of cavalry, so-called cossacks, led to enormous progress comparable with the transformations occurring in Italy at the turn of the 16th century, or in the Netherlands in the second half of the 16th century.

Our theses are founded on the quantitative analysis based on fiscal-military documentation of the Kingdom of Poland (rejestry popisowe or accounting records, bills for the service). However, in order to provide the results with appropriate interpretation, we utilize normative acts, chronicles, military treaties, iconography, and even cartographic sources. Thanks to this, it is possible to verify whether the legal norms or single phenomena noted in descriptive sources are confirmed in the statistical records of soldiers serving in the units of the Permanent Defense (obrona potoczna).

The characteristics of Tatar troops' actions on the territory of the Commonwealth. The way of conducting wars by the Tatars, especially of the Crimean Khanate, was unique in Europe. The fundamental difference lay in the fact that the Tatars did not take any attempts to conquer new territories; their raids combined two strategies: plunder and terror (destruction). The aim of the raids was to capture the highest number of prisoners as well as cattle and horses, and then to retreat swiftly. Thus, the raids were of economic nature and were connected with the lack of economic self-sufficiency of the Crimean Khanate, in addition to the political weakness of the khan, who was not able to control the aristocracy. Dariusz Kolodziejczyk put forward the estimated scale of destruction, claiming that from 1500 to 1700 the Crimean Tatars had taken into captivity c. two million people from Slavic countries (on average 10 thousand people from Europe a year). Probably the numbers may have been even higher since it is known that over 14 months in the years 1577-1578, the Crimean Khanate had exported abroad 17,502 slaves (or 15,000 a year). A large number of the prisoners also stayed in the Khanate, and this population is estimated to have been four times as big as that of the Tatars. It is approximated that the Tatars led away c. 7,000 people a year from the Polish-Lithuanian state, to which we should add the people who died during a raid and a journey. Certainly, we do not deal with a process of constant intensity, which resulted from different effectiveness of coping with the raids. Particularly devastating were the moments of political turmoil and military weakness, of which the Tatars took advantage perfectly. As early as the beginning of the 16th century, the range of Tatar expeditions reached 1,100 kilometers counting in a straight line from Perekop in all directions: Polish (Czersk), Lithuanian (Vilnius) and Russian (Moscow).

Consequently, from the turn of the 16th century onwards, the south-eastern lands of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were ravaged; there occurred settlement regress and huge depopulation, which threatened the functioning of the states.

The operation thought (maneuver concept) of Tatar troops involved avoiding battles and sieges. The key role was played by good reconnaissance of the area, great speed as well as perfect synchronization of the troops. Having founded a kosz (the main camp), they sent chambuls (units) in different directions in order to captivate people. Surprise was a key factor: in extreme situations the Tatars could cover 20-30 miles a day, which is c. 150-225 kilometers. According to Paul of Aleppo, it was a distance which troops normally covered over five or six days. This pace was possible to reach because, among other things, every Tatar had two to four horses. Andrzej Gliwa studying the phenomenon in detail notes that basically it was an early modern history equivalent of asymmetric war. The Tatars used dispersed forces of light cavalry in irregular mode, spreading terror with the help of non-selective attacks on so-called soft aims: either in the form of burning buildings in rural areas or conducting purposeful public executions.

The Tatars' combat tactics was based nearly exclusively on cavalry. Troops fought in a deep several-line flexible order, with the wings moving forward and the slightly withdrawn center. They were masters of maneuver actions; they tried to circumvent the opponent's wings and enter the rear of the army. They applied regrouping, willingly simulated an attempt to flee, which brought about breaking the order of the Polish troops. Before a direct attack they showered the enemy with arrows. Of course, they engaged in combat as a last resort, having murdered the prisoners.

The first major raid of the Crimean Khanate, the aim of which was capturing prisoners and selling them as slaves, took place in 1468. The Crown military forces was not prepared for this type of operations. The principal armed force at that time was the po- spolite ruszenie (mass mobilization, expeditio generalis), which, despite being numerous, gathered too slowly to stop Tatar expeditions.

Strategy innovation: counteracting Tatar raids. The situation described above was extraordinary. The state with a lower demographic, military and economic potential (the Crimean Khanate) had been attacking a stronger neighbor for over 200 years practically with impunity. This was possible because the Crimean Khanate was a fief of the Ottoman Empire, which in 1484 also took control over other Black Sea ports, such as Kiliya and Ak- kerman, and three years later -- over Moldavia. Thereby, an aggressive policy towards the Tatars was impossible in the face of the threat of the Ottoman retaliation. Furthermore, the Black Sea became an internal Ottoman lake, where they successfully conducted trade of slaves and animals. It is important to underscore that the Khanate became a subject of rivalry between Russia on one side and Poland and Lithuania on the other, due to which it almost always was in a favorable geopolitical situation.

Many defensive concepts were developed against Tatar attacks, two of which were of key importance. One involved paying gifts to the Crimean khan, which were supposed to make him cease attacking or organize raids against hostile third states. The other involved creating professional troops stationing in the south-eastern borderlands of the state at the end of the 15th century. That army was paid to from the Royal Treasury and was called obrona potoczna (in old Polish mobile defense). Of course, the troops could not be based on a west-European model of combat. Thus, cavalry was recruited, which, however, raised new problems. First, because of the disastrous state of the Royal Treasury, there were a small number of soldiers (c. 1000-3000), and those who were paid were recruited? for six or nine months a year only. In the remaining time, the troops were dissolved, or the number of men was considerably reduced. Moreover, the organization of cavalry based on medieval knights or medium and heavy-armed soldiers made the operation more difficult. It important to add to this the lack of good reconnaissance, which hindered preventive actions.

Thus, it was indispensable to adapt the methods and instruments of combat to the specificity of the enemy troops and the character of the war theater, which is strategic and tactical innovation. Collected experience, mainly of defeats, led to huge transformations in planning defensive operations at the beginning of the 16th century. As early as 1502 the Ordynacja obrony Rusi (Ordinance of the Defense of Ruthenia), which proposed involving peasants into military service. The reform failed but the document is indicative of forming defense against the Tatars. The field guard was separated under the command of Andrzej Michowski, who stationed in Vinnytsia, Podolia, and the zastawa wotynska (Wolhynia Defence) was deployed in Wlodzimierz and Tuck. Michowski was to recognize the threat, establish the direction of the attack and the strength of the enemy, and then informed about it Field Hetman Stanislaw Chodecki, who was to stay in Lviv. The mobilization was to be conducted at the Wolhynia-Ruthenia borderline. The main camp was founded near Lviv. The general assumption -- advanced field guard, coordination of Pol- ish-Lithuanian operations and the withdrawn main forces, which could concentrate local pospolite ruszenie and volunteers -- was correct. However, there was one fundamental drawback of this assumption: too immobile defense lines in contrast to the Tatars' daily mobility (150-255 kilometers; see: Fig. 1).

The second stage of transformations occurred in the 1520s. This was connected with another major attack and the defeat of the Polish-Lithuanian troops in the battle of Sokal (2 August 1519). The campaign revealed several problems. The Tatars for a long time had been looting the Crown lands reaching even the Belz and Lublin provinces; they also ravaged the Ruthenian province. This allowed the pospolite ruszenie to gather. It managed to block the enemy's way by the Bug River in the settlement Sokal. Instead of defending the eastern bank, the Polish troops crossed the river to the Tatar (western) side. The Tatars showered the Poles with arrows, and the field conditions (cinders, torn terrain) made it impossible for the heavy cavalry to take advantage of its potential. In the final phase of the battle, flanking by the Tatars was a decisive factor in the defeat of the Polish-Lithuanian troops.

The king's entourage prepared an ordinance of defending borderlands in Lviv which was announced in Torun on 28 April 1520. The Crown troops were set in two defense lines with advanced pickets of the guard. The main forces (840 of cavalry) were located on the line Olesko-Zaliztsi under the command of Crown Field Hetman Marcin Kamie- niecki, who was in charge of the maintenance of the fortified camp and the artillery. The other line was situated in Podolia, at the line of Kamyanets Podilskiy and Khmilnyk. It was commanded by Jan Tworowski (600 men and 100 of infantry in Kamyanets Podilskiy). Reconnaissance at the borderline was part of the task of the so-called front guard under the command of Mikolaj Trzebinski (400 cavalry). Additional assistance was to be secured by the Wolhynia defense (zastawa wolynska).

The ordinance was far bolder in its assumptions than its predecessors. The main camp was to be 64-97 kilometers east of Lviv, whereas the second line was deployed from the Dniester River to the Boh River at the distance of 225-283 kilometers from Lviv (see: Fig. 1). The general conception was correct: long-range reconnaissance and arrangement of troops in the order of two lines allowed for fast recognition of the direction of the attack and ably complement the professional army with the pospolite ruszenie. Of key importance was the front guard and its possibilities of detecting the enemy, and then fast informing the main forces of the approach of the enemy. The guards, however, were placed as far as the settled territories in the Crown, whereas they should have been advanced deeply into the so-called Wild Fields (into the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania). As a result, this solution was not always effective, the example of which was a defense from the Tatar-Ottoman invasion of 1524. The enemy troops reached as far as the San River near Radymno. Grand Hetman Mikolaj Firlej protected Lviv; thereby the main forces did not join the active defense, and small victorious skirmishes did not change the negative assessment of the defensive possibilities of the Polish Crown.

The third stage of the strategic changes was connected with Jan Tarnowski's assuming the office of the Grand Crown Hetman in 1527. Immediately afterwards he toured along the whole borderline and all frontier, south-eastern castles. The plan formed at that time was explained by the main defender of the south-eastern borderlands of the Polish state, Bernard Pretwicz, called terror Tartarorum, in 1550. Hetman Tarnowski assessed the giant scale of the havoc, which spread as far as Lviv, Przemysl and Lublin. It was also a result of too “close keeping guard”, and consequently the lack of early reconnaissance. The Hetman decided to move the guard 150-200 kilometers translocating the reconnaissance from the Crown lands to the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. A huge role was given to the new Field Guardian (from 1531 on), Mikolaj Sieniawski. The registers of the troops of 1529 already show much deeper reconnaissance, and first and foremost attentive control of the Tatar routes. This was implemented by, for example, keeping Crown troops on the territory of Lithuania, advancing them even over 320 kilometers from Kamyanets Podilskiy and 507 kilometers from Lviv (I measure the distances to Zvenyhorodka). There were five advanced outposts: in Bratslav, Khmilnyk, Kitsman, Kopystyryn and along the Sluch River, which had from 23 to 47 soldiers (see: Fig. 1). Certainly, the troops patrolled permanently the area entrusted to their protection, which is testified by fiscal-military sources. Altogether, at the turn of 1529 and 1530 (the soldiers were recruited at the beginning of November 1529) 191 of cavalry served, 117 of whom were hussars (61,26 %), whereas 70 could be classified as light cavalry (36,65 %) .

Fig. 1. Strategy of defense from Tatar raids in the early 16th c.: 0 -- dislocation of the forces in light of the Ordinance of 1502; X -- battlefield of Sokal (1519); ) -- defense lines in light of the Ordin- nance 1520; O -- units of the front guard as located in 1529.

Prepared by the author on a part of the map Magni Ducatus Lithuaniae (the end of the 16th c.). Drawn by T. Makowski, engraved by H. Gerrits (Amsterdam, 1635) [Biblioteka Narodowa, sygn. ZZK 1580]. URL: https://polona.pl/item/magni-dvcatvs-lithvaniae-caeterarvmqve-regionvm-illi-adiacen- tivm-exacta-descriptio,MzcwNjk2Njk/0/#info55

It is important to underscore that at the same time a similar concept of defense was proposed by the outstanding Polish cartographer, Bernard Wapowski. The map of Southern Sarmatia, printed in Cracow twice in 1526 and 1528, has the troubled areas of the south-eastern borderland highlighted (Fig. 2). It contains images of Tatar riders symbolizing chambuls invading the lands of the Crown and Lithuania. A settlement desert (slaving zone) is represented as well as ruins of destroyed towns and castles. The key in the iconographic strata is a military camp, fortified and equipped with artillery, in Po- dolia (understood as Bratslav and Kiev lands) between the Dnieper River and the Boh River (Southern Bug). This representation is appended with the information about the successes of Polish troops under the kings of Poland: Boleslaw the Brave (992-1025) and Boleslaw the Generous (1058-1079); the expeditions of Grand Duke Vytautas of Lithuania (1401-1430) who protected the frontiers from “The Scythians” founding a military camp on the bank of the Dnieper River. Thus, Bernard Wapowski proposed a joint (Pol- ish-Lithuanian) defense from Tatar raids which was to be possibly far advanced into the borderlands between the Boh River and the Dnieper River. This concept was fully implemented after the incorporation of Volhynia, the Kiev Land and the Bratslav Land into the Crown, which took place in 1569. At that time, the main military camps were deeply moved south-eastwards. Already in the same year, the camp was located in Trembovla (134 kilometers from Lviv) and nine years later was moved to Vinnytsia (328 kilometers from Lviv). The town's cossacks began to be used more extensively; they were to protect crossings on the Boh River (from Bratslav) and the Dnieper River (from Cherkassy). The Crown Field Hetman recruited even 300 cossacks for permanent military service. All those steps again increased the shield against the Tatars.

The new strategic solutions soon brought about excellent effects. The Tatars ceased organizing big raids on the Crown lands, which were easyly recognized at an early phase of the attack. The way the aggressors managed to cope with the new type of defense was attacking in small groups of maximum 300 men, but even they were chased and destroyed, often on the lands of the Crimean Khanate. Consequently, by c. 1550 the south-eastern lands of the Crown were resettled. Deserted areas around Lublin, Przemysl, Lviv disappeared, and the settlement network moved as far as the very borderline with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Moldavia. There appeared new castles and fortified towns, which considerably increased the defensive potential of the borderland.

Fig. 2. Part of the map of Southern Sarmatia of Bernard Wapowski of 1528.

The copy owned by the authors (the original destroyed in 1944). Reprint of the preserved part of the map: [Alexandrowicz, 2012, p. 280]

The evidence of the difference between the defensive system of Poland and Lithuania is the data collected by Marek Plewczynski. He calculated that in the period 1520-1547 the rate of successful defense from the raids reached 80 % in the Crown and merely 20 % in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. At that time, 37 major expeditions occurred (one expedition fell on 9 months; every 0,75 years); the Tatars met no reaction in only 20 % of cases (jointly 7 times, in the Crown itself -- twice).

Development of light cavalry in the Crown. The strategy involving recognizing the direction of the march and then catching up and destroying the Tatar units required fast actions. The troops had to cover huge distances. From the surroundings of Bar, Bratslav, Cherkassy and Kaniv the chasing units reached the Black Sea coast, i. e. Ochakov or Ak- kerman (Bilhorod). Characteristically, they were no incidental expeditions. For example, in the 1540s, Bernard Pretwicz in front of of his soldiers made such a chase every year, and in 1539 he pursued Tatars towards Crimea twice. In the spring, he set off for the Bratslav land and reached Berymboy, which is a Dniester liman, and in the fall, after desolating the surroundings of Vinnytsia, he started pursuing the Tatars most probably from Bar. He caught one of the groups in the surroundings of so-called Chapchaklay (the outlet of the river of that name to the Boh River, just by its liman). The distances of the expedition and return (in a straight line) were c. 720 and 800 kilometers. This means that over a year during the chase the soldiers had covered more than one and a half thousand kilometers. It is also important to remember that their march took place in very unfavorable circumstances: in the wilderness, in areas devoid of settlements, often at night.

Another aspect of the issue is the question of self-sufficiency. The pursuit of the Tatars made it impossible to bring a camp with the unit. Therefore, the soldier had to have all indispensable camp utensiles with him on the horse. Taking a stock of food for such a long time with the use of sacks fastened to the saddle was also impossible. The horses had to graze in the steppe, while the soldiers used all opportunities to hunt or to take animals from sheperds' herds and flocks.

Over the first decades of the 16th century, the Crown cavalry was divided into a few formations. The basic striking force was heavily armed lancers, who were gradually replaced by the winged hussars (discussed later). This is obvious because soldiers on heavy horses, armed in elements of plate armors and additionally equipped with, for examples, lances and burdened with any kind of moving camp would simply be inefficient in the clash with the Tatars. The specificity of the south-eastern theater of war required light, fast and flexible in action, and, what is the most important, self-sufficient units and soldiers. Lance cavalry and then winged hussars (armed with elastic head and torso protection, and using asymmetric shields of Hungarian or Turkish origins and a light lance) were complemented with mounted shooters. The latter category was heterogeneous, usually the mounted shooters were equipped with the so-called shooter armors and most probably open helmets, and used various types of offensive weapons. At the beginning of the 16th century they, used crossbows, which was not a good solution either taking into consideration the character of the battlefield. Thus, efforts were taken to re-arm them wirh long hand firearms, which was only partly successful. The discussed phenomenon is well illustrated by the example of the Moldavian campaign (summer-fall) in 1531.

On the basis of the information about 4,422 soldiers serving in 1531 in 24 units (rotas), we can assert that no unit of cavalry was uniformly armed. All the rotas were a combination of heavy cavalry (lancers), medium cavalry (hussars) and light cavalry (mounted shooters). Nearly everywhere the hussars dominated (56,2%), the number of whom fluctuated from 33.3 to 68.5 %. Another group were the lancers (27,5 %), who made up 15-45,8 %. The least numerous were the lancers (16,3 %), whose share fits the range 9,9-21 %. It is worth noting that the differences were not considerable, and the general characteristic of the unit may be assessed thanks to the number of particular soldiers, hence, the aspect of light cavalry dominated in the rotas of Jan Tarnowski, Jan Mielecki, Jerzy Rokitnicki and, possibly, Jan Zaborowski. Heavily armed rotas can be isolated after summing up the hussars and the lancers; then we can recognize as such the units of Jan Pi- lecki, Jan Herburt, Stanislaw T^czynski and Mikolaj Orlowski. In general, however, we do not observe any spectacular personnel policy of particular commanders. Such a structure is the evidence of still medieval specificity where the armament depended on the individual inclination of possibilites. It is also a remnant of the financial system in use until 1527, in which lancers, as graves armaturae, received 10 florens a quarter (every three months) and the others -- 6 florens each.

The only exception in this context is the reconnaissance unit (guard) of Mikolaj Sie- niawski, of merely 30 men. 28 soldiers in it are uniformly armed; they are hussars. This is a sign of future changes. The selection of the hussars in the guard unit shows that it was they who were used for reconnaissance purposes, making up the most versatile cavalry formation. This is confirmed by the show of the soldiers stationing in 1529 at the borderline, half of whom were hussars. In this context, iconography is significant (e. g. images of riders on Bernard Wapowski's map of 1526, see: Fig. 2). It represents the soldiers of obrona potoczna setting off for the Lithuanian side in order to recognize and defeat the enemy. They were presented as hussars, with hats typical of that formation.

Simultaneously, the process of replacing lancers with hussars was in progress, which brought about additional elements of their protective armament, and, consequently, changes in the character of the formation towards heavy cavalry. Only the introduction to service of the so-called cossack cavalry was a clear step towards a tactical innovation. This cavalry was necessary for reconnaissance and pursuit actions. It emerged in the mid- 16th century becoming an established formation of light cavalry. In the early 1570s, it is a kind of fully formed cavalry with its own tradition. Its most precise description was given by Jan Andrzej Krasinski (1550-1612), who prepared it for the needs of the coronation of Henry de Valois (1574) king of Poland and Lithuania. He characterized them for people without expertise in the reality concerning the Commonwealth. He distinguishes three types of cavalry: heavy lancers, medium armed hussars and light cossacks. The description demonstrates certain qualities of the formation:

A. It consisted of borderland people, used to camp hardships.

B. They were armed very similarly to the Tatars; they had bows, quivers, sabers and spears (in Polish called rohatyna, i.e. spear with big spearhead).

C. Those units moved extremely fast, which they owed to fast horses, and primarily the lack of camp.

D. They preferred the Tatar tactics involving raining the enemy with arrows.

E. They did not have a moving camp, and they carried all their provisions in saddlebags on the horses; they acquired food in the field, usually hunting.

The cossack cavalry became one of the distinctive characteristics of the old-Polish military. On another map of the Commonwealth, prepared in 1569 and printed in Venice a year later, instead of hussars protecting the borderlands, like in Wapowski's map (see: Fig. 2), cossack riders are depicted (Fig. 3). The collation of the two maps (1526 and 1569) shows the process of complicated transformations which occurred in the Crown. They began with the innovative strategy of fighting the Tatars, and were completed with the tactic innovation, and the introduction of a new type of armed forces into the army.

Fig. 3. Part of Andrzej Pograbka's map “Partis Sarmatiae Europeae” (Venice, 1570) [Deutsch Polonische Stiftung Kulturpflege und Denkmalschutz (Gorlitz). Kolekcja dra Tomas- za Niewodniczanskiego, Zamek Krolewski w Warszawie (depozyt), TN 2369]

The agents of creating the cossack cavalry. Interestingly, the commanders-in-chief (hetmans), often excellent strategists and commanders, did not notice the necessity of creating special units of light cavalry. For a long time, they did not even see a need for any uniformly armed rotas. An example is the figure of Grand Crown Hetman Jan Tarnowski, who even in 1528 promoted a mixed composition of the units in the instruction addressed to the treasurer and rotmistrzes, where he tried to preserve the old lancers. He demanded that they should comprise 20 % of the rota (partly it was an effective action). In cavalry, on the other hand, he planned to equip c. 25 % of soldiers with firearms (matchlocks). The pursuit of modernity, however, emtailed verification in the battlefield. The experience in fighting Tatars (e. g. the lost battle of Sokal in 1519) led to spontaneous abandoning of firearms and crossbows in favor of Asian type bows. On the vast steppes of south-eastern Europe, where of key importance were speed, ambushes and skirmishes, the bow was a better offensive weapon.

We believe that the agents of the transformation (or the people who were the driving force of the dynamic changes in the armament) were mid-rank commanders, especially starosts and rotmistrzes. Such persons had real opportunities for acting and implementing a certain modernization plan and were aware of the aim they wanted to achieve. Paradoxically, what turned out helpful was the medieval tradition in accordance with which there were different categories of soldiers in one unit. Therefore, commanders observed on an ongoing basis not only the cooperation of soldiers using various sets of arms, but also their usefulness in combats with a particular enemy. They could compare their observations with practice of other units, which had a slightly different structure of armament.

We should consider Ostafi Daszkiewicz (Kaniv, Krychaw and Cherkassy starost) to have been a pioneer of the changes under scrutiny, and simultaneously the first agent who knew how to use the experiences of fights against the Grand Duchy of Moscow, and who, on the basis thereof, transformed the Lithuanian light cavalry into the formation modeled on Moscow-Tatar pattern. In the 17th century historical memory, it was he who was deemed the founder of the light cossack cavalry. Soon, it turned out that the formation was not only useful in combatting Tatars, but also made a valuable component in the war waged against an enemy applying the West-European strategy and tactics. It was successfully used in the fall fights of 1520, during the war between Poland and the Teutonic Knights. One of its participants was Przeclaw Lancokoronski, who organized an expedition to Akkerman in 1516 together with Daszkiewicz. The evidence of its usefulness is the fact that a special group of 12 light riders (Tatars) were located in the former capital of the Teutonic Order, Malbork, where they dealt with reconnaissance service.

The successes of the soldiers of light cavalry, not very numerous being estimated at a few hundreds, must have resonated throughout Central Europe since in November 1527 Jan Zapolya planned to recruit 1000-2000 cossacks of Daszkiewicz.

From the Polish perspective, the Bar starost, Bernard Pretwicz (c. 1500-1563) was of key importance. This polonized German from Silesia started his service at the court of Sigmund I the Old, and from 1527 onwards, he served as a towarzysz in Mikolaj Sie- niawski's rota. This unit dealt with reconnaissance, and Sieniawski himself became the Crown Field Guard as early as 1531. Four years later, Pretwicz became a rotmistrz of cavalry in “obrona potoczna” (Permanent Defense), where he served incessantly as a commander of a rota until 1560. He made his name with defensive and offensive actions: he regularly and successfully fought Tatar chambuls; in his pursuits he many times reached the Crimea, Ochakiv and Akkerman. Moreover, in the memorial addressed to the king and the public opinion, prepared in 1550, he clearly emphasized the purpose of military transformations. He underscored the necessity for early recognition of raids, for marching without a moving camp, for speed as the highest combat value. Even when he was still alive, he was considered an outstanding zagonczyk (commander of borderland mobile units) and expert on borderland. Among those who wanted to recruit him to their service were Elector Henry the Pious of Saxony (1540), Duke Albert Hohenzollern of Prussia (1546, 1554-1556), King Ferdinand I Habsburg of Germany (1552) and others. Not only did rulers of other countries try to attract Pretwicz himself but they primarily noticed the military potential of the reformed cavalry. In 1556, Pretwicz was to recruit 400 hussars and 400 cossacks for Ducal Prussia, which shows the high combat value of the already formed light cavalry. Also, after his death (1563), he was assessed as the best expert of anti-Tatar actions.

Thus, we can recognize that many years of practice and observations of the usefulness of various military formations in fighting the Tatars gave Pretwicz an opportunity to organize a military unit which was best adopted to the conditions of the specific battlefield. We are able to follow this fascinating way of modeling the unit through military registers (rejestry popisowe). Fig. 4 demonstrates the personal composition of Pretwicz's rota in the years 1535-1557 (no data for 1536 and 1554-1556) including types of troops serving there. If we have more data from one year, we note them all. Initially (the late 1530s) among his soldiers he had many hussars who outnumbered the other categories of troops. This is an obvious transposition of models adopted by Sieniawski. The hussars achieved their dominating position in 1539, and then their share, despite a few seasonal fluctuations, has a clear falling tendency (see: Figs 4 and 5). The landmarks are the years 1542-1543, when the light cavalry gains the dominating position. At that time Pretwicz participated in three raids on Ochakiv Castle, and he himself had already been the Bar starost since 1540. At the same time, there also occured the uniformity of the armament of the light cavalry, and since 1542 the cossacks had basically been the only type of this formation. Eventually, in the years 1549-1550 the unit may be considered uniformly cossack (the rates are 85,5 and 91 %).

Fig. 4. Number of soldiers in the rota of Bernarda Pretwicz in the years 15351557, by types of armament.

Prepared by the authors on the basis of: [Archiwum... No. 26, k. 13-14v.; No. 28, k. 31v.-37; No. 35, k. 138-1411; No. 39, k. 18-24v.; No. 40, k. 30-34v.; No. 41, k. 20-22; No. 42, k. 225-227v.; No. 44, k. 20v.-28v.; No. 48, k. 27-31; No. 49, k. 38-46v.; No. 50, k. 19-24; No. 51, k. 11-18v.; No. 52, k. 42-45v.; No. 54, k. 18-27; No. 55, k. 18-27; No. 56, k. 13-21; No. 57, k. 20-27; No. 59, k. LXXVIIv.-LXXXIIIv.; No. 58, k. LXXXII- LXXXVIII; No. 60, k. 35v.-39; No. 61, k. 18-21v]

Fig. 5. Percentage of cossacks in Bernard Pretwicz's rota in the years 1535-1557, with the trend-line.

Prepared by the authors on the basis of: [Archiwum. No. 26, k. 13-14v.; No. 28, k. 31v.-37; No. 35, k. 138-141; No. 39, k. 18-24v.; No. 40, k. 30-34v.; No. 41, k. 20-22; No. 42, k. 225-227v.; No. 44, k. 20v.-28v.; No. 48, k. 27-31; No. 49, k. 38-46v.; No. 50, k. 19-24; No. 51, k. 11-18v.; No. 52, k. 42-45v.; No. 54, k. 18-27; No. 55, k. 18-27; No. 56, k. 13-21; No. 57, k. 20-27; No. 59, k. LXXVIIv.-LXXXIIIv.; No. 58, k. LXXXII- LXXXVIII; No. 60, k. 35v.-39; No. 61, k. 18-21v]

The specificity of Pretwicz's unit in comparison with the other rotas of obrona potoczna (Permanent Defense) was also perceived by the enemies, who noted him commanding the cossacks.

Pretwicz's awareness of personal and armament policies resulted from the fact that he was not dependent on soldiers available on the market. Exercising the office of starost, and primarily organizing plundering expeditions on Tatar and Ottoman lands, he was able to keep a big supernumerary unit. We know that in 1542, being the starost of Bar, he kept 150 soldiers at the castle, of which merely 30 were maintained by the starost office, whereas the others were paid by himself.

In 1544, the cossack cavalry already maked up 80 % of the personal composition, which is connected with the reduction of the unit from 150 to 82 people. Pretwicz kept nearly cossacks only. However, the subsequent fall (1545) is connected with a 2,3-time increase in the unit composition (up to 2020). In absolute numbers there were even more cossacks. Thus, the changes are related to recruiting extra solders, the dominating number of whom had hussar armaments. The subsequent years, until the mid-16th century, show a systematic re-armament of the unit. Both figures (see: Figs 4 and 5) demonstrate a clear change in the trend in 1551; in the spring and the summer of 1552; and a complete break in the fall of 1552 and in the year 1553. The mysterious transformations had very spectacular reasons noted in the sources, and they are broadly commented on in the literature of the subject. In 1550, the Ottoman ruler Suleiman demanded that Pretwicz, who still applied the tactics of chasing the Tatars beyond the borders of the state and increasingly and intensively raided deeply in the Ottoman and Tatar lands in order to loot them, should be punished. The conclusion of the peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire (which eventually happened in Constantinople on August 1, 1553) depended to a considerable degree on the solution of the problem of the starost of Bar. In 1551 and at the beginning of 1552, Pretwicz had to restrain himself from radical actions against the Ottoman Empire, and on July 2, 1552, he was deprived of the office of starost, and granted the office of starost of Tr- embowla district located in the interior of the country. Pretwicz's successor in borderland Bar became Jan Herburt of Fulsztyn. Also, among his troops cossacks were numerously represented, which shows the adaptation of the concept of the unit.

The change of the place of residence and stationing of the unit meant that it ceased to play a role of reconnaissance of the Tatars. Tembowla was located far deeper westwards, at the borderline with Moldavia. Thus, Pretwicz re-organized the unit abandoning the quality of high mobility in favor of increasing combat values. This is confirmed by the analysis of his rota's members. Besides the natural process of recruiting new soldiers, most of cossack poczets were re-armed in the fall of 1552. This example shows clearly that the armament structure of the unit was not incidental and dependent on the soldiers' will, but it was a conscious policy of the rotmistrz. The year 1557, when the unit was comprised of 97 % of cossacks, also shows what possibilities for quick and spectacular changes Pretwicz had. Probably, thus, as early as 1554 the unit was reformed into light cavalry.

The exceptionality of Pretwicz's actions can be better understood if we collate the parallel transformations in other units within the Permanent Defense (obrona potoczna). Generally, the point of departure of all units was similar. The rotas of the 1530s were a mixture of three types of riders, usually with the dominating position of the hussars, which was also visible in Pretwicz's troops (see: Fig. 4). In order to illustrate it, we have prepared the personal composition of the hetman rota of Mikolaj Sieniawski of 1538-- 1557. The rota of the Crown Field Hetman is transformed towards heavy cavalry. In 1538 it is still of the nature of light cavalry, then the hussars begin to dominate, but until 1547 the composition was very diverse. We can talk about a uniformed hussar unit only in 1548 (86 %) and then, consistently, from 1550 onwards. In the years 1552-1557 it reaches 90 %. It is a phenomenon characteristic of most of the remaining rotas in the analogous period, and the transformations usually concern hussars. This additionally confirms the innovative nature of the actions of Pretwicz, who did not pursue a popular trend but organized the unites under his command in his own way, which can be recognized as tactical innovation. Moreover, Pretwicz's unit was a school of new commanders. As many as nine towarzyszes became rotmistrzes in later years; only two rotmistrzes had a better result: Hetman Mikolaj Sieniawski (23) and Pretwicz's successor as starost of Bar, Jan Herburt (11). It was an effect of, among other things, giving the inferiors a considerable independence (and, perhaps, good financial conditions resulting from plundering) and, at least in the years 1541, 1543-1544, 1548 -- isolation from the rota groups of a few dozen men commanded by towarzyszes, which alone conducted reconnaissance, pursued and destroyed the enemy troops.

Conclusion. To understand the initial period of the rapid transformations in the early modern military of the Crown in the context of the military revolution occurring in Western Europe, it is important to look at the geopolitical circumstances. Here the key factor was incessant and intense Tatar raids, which applied unconventional strategy and tactics. First and foremost, the aim of nearly yearly raids was not the conquest of lands but plundering, primarily capturing people, who were subsequently sold as slaves. In the 16th-17th century, the Crimean Khanate itself acquired in this way two million prisoners. Consequently, from the first attack in 1468 on, in the south-eastern borderlands a settlement desert expanded, while the kingdom was helpless in the face of a new threat.

We have attempted to explain the transformations in progress from ad hoc actions to systematic ones, which resulted in changes in the strategy of defensive operations, and then entailed transformations in the tactics of conducting warfare. It took almost a quarter of a century from the emergence of the perpetual and systematically increasing threat till the landmark political decision. Among many ideas of coping with the situation, the one which was chosen was creating a permanent army protecting the borderlands (1492). This solution was certainly better than the pospolite ruszenie (Mass Mobilization), but it did not effectively secure the borderlands. First strategic plans emerged after 10 subsequent years but the problem was properly diagnosed in 1520, and the plan was perfected in the years 1527-1529. Furthermore, the application of appropriate tactical solution was a domain of mid-rank commanders who in the course of the conducted war operations developed effective tactical solutions: creating the light cavalry (cossacks) and standardization in terms of armament and the troops' way of combat (c. 1550). Each of those stages required more or less one generation, which was approximately: 24,28 and 22 years.