The Gold Factor and Soviet Gold Industry during the Stalin Epoch

Soviet gold was mostly sold to the United States between 1941 and 1948; no official supplies from the Soviet Union were recorded in 1949-1952 yet there are unverified reports of U. S. security services on the possible selling of Soviet gold on the black market in 1949 to a total sum of $149 million dollars. After Joseph Stalin died, the substantial foreign trade deficit of 1953-1954 was compensated with gold, and the selling of large quantities of Soviet gold began in the West in October 1953. Between October 1953 and April 1954, the Soviet Union supplied the UK, the Netherlands, France, and Switzerland with about 311 tonnes of gold worth of $250 million to $350 million Soviet Gold production, reserves, and exports through 1954. CIA Report. P. 58.. Besides, the Soviet Union used gold for settlements with Finland (1954) and Iran (1955), and granted gold loans to countries of Eastern Europe (1947-1948).

Therefore, about 2,000 tonnes of Russian gold were exported between 1920 and 1954. The largest gold exports were seen in 1920-1922 and the initial period of industrialization; big quantities of gold were also sold in 1937 and 1953-1954. These are official amounts of gold exports, which do not include illegal export and unofficial sales, which definitely took place but could not be assessed due to the lack of information. The government used gold to support the world communist movement and intelligence operations conducted in foreign countries. On the whole, Soviet gold exports could be 10-15 % higher in that period.

R.G. Pikhoya published information about the Soviet gold reserve and exports in the 1960s-1980s; according to her, the Soviet gold reserve stood at 577.1 tonnes by 196 5 Pikhoia R.G. Moskva. Kreml'.Vlast'. Sorok let posle voiny. 1945-1985. Moscow, 2007. P. 608., which means the gold reserves had shrunk by more than 77 % since the death of J.V. Stalin. It is known that 1,339.6 tonnes of gold were exported in 1963-1965 alone, and at least 707,5 tonnes of gold were sold to buy food Ibid. P. 608.. The government imported grain, wool, butter, meat, and certain types of commodities.

Gold backing of the ruble and forex parity. A decree of the RSFSR All-Russian Central Executive Committee dated October 11, 1922, expressed the Soviet currency's parity in gold and set the ruble exchange rate to the dollar and other foreign currencies on the basis of their gold backing. The monetary reform of 1922-1924 set the gold backing of the ruble at the amount which was in effect before WWI, 0.774234 grams of gold. The exchange rates of foreign currencies, which had no backing established by law, depended on their exchange rates to the pound, the dollar, and the franc established in London, New York, and Paris. Back then, the exchange rate was 1 rubles and 94.5 kopecks to the dollar. A ban on the exportation of Soviet money and government bonds denominated in the Soviet currency was imposed, and the chervonets (gold coins) quotation at foreign exchanges stopped in 1926; the importation of foreign currencies in the Soviet Union was banned in 1928.

The dollar was devaluated and its golden backing was cut by 49 % in 1933-1934; the exchange rate fell to 1 ruble 14 kopecks to the dollar. The Soviet Union conducted foreign trade transactions settlements only in a foreign currency. The actual exchange rate of the ruble drifted far away from the gold backing, and on November 14, 1935, the Soviet currency's parity for settlements was based on French francs. Starting from July 19, 1937, settlements were based on U. S. dollars at the exchange rate of 5 rubles and 30 kopecks to the dollar. Given the gold backing of the dollar, 0.888671 grams, and the exchange rate of 5 rubles and 30 kopecks to the dollar, the ruble theoretically had a gold backing of 0,167674 grams of gold. The exchange rate stayed in effect until March 1, 1950, when the Soviet ruble acquired a gold backing of 0.222168 grams of pure gold. Considering the gold backing of the ruble, a new exchange rate of 4 rubles to the dollar was established.

After the 1950 reform, the Soviet administration kept underlining the gold backing of the ruble, but it was propaganda having no effect on economic realities. During that period, the Soviet Union did not publish information about the amount of money in circulation as that would have required the simultaneous publishing of the amount of gold backing of Soviet money. The 1922 emission law required that banknotes of the Soviet State Bank be backed with gold and stable foreign currency at 25 %. Applicably to banknotes in circulation as of January 1, 1958, which totalled 51.1 billion rubles, the country needed gold reserves equivalent to 12.7 billion rubles or 2,842 tonnes of gold Balansy Gosudarstvennogo banka SSSR (1922-1990 gg.) P. 93..

The foreign exchange rate should reflect the purchasing power of a currency to one degree or another. The currency parity is based on market value of the currency in gold. History shows that official currency exchange rates might stay fixed for a long time and differ much from the actual gold backing and purchasing power. In the Soviet Union, there were both official and actual parities; the latter was closely related to the changing purchasing power of the ruble and the price of gold in the country, the actual gold backing of the ruble. As a result, foreigners were allowed to buy goods inside the USSR at an exchange rate much smaller than the official one (Torgsin); special rates were established (for embassies and consulates) In 1941-1947, there was a preferential exchange rate of 12 rubles to the dollar for foreign diplomatic missions buying rubles; the rate was fixed at 8 rubles to the dollar in December 1947., and losses of exporters were reimbursed.

Subsidies compensating for the losses actually adjusted the currency parity and cut off excessive import profits. In case of Dalstroy and Glavzoloto, the real parity led to low purchase prices, which meant that ruble prices exceeded the official price of gold. Gold was officially sold at 5 rubles and 91 kopecks per gram, while the purchase price and the cost price of a gram of gold in 1945 was: 19 rubles and 76 kopecks and 23 rubles 41 kopecks in Glavzoloto; 6 rubles and 90 kopecks and 14 rubles and 40 kopecks in Dalstroy, and 10 rubles and 81 kopecks and 22 rubles and 39 kopecks in the case of prospectors Information by Prof. V.P. Popov, Zapiska A I. Mikoiana I.V. Stalinu “O kurse rublia v inostrannoi valiute” № 533/AM ot 18 dekabria 1946 g. // APRF. F. 3. Op. 39. D. 100. L. 48-60..

According to Soviet experts, the real cost of the U.S. dollar reached 20 rubles in 1946, and the exchange rate could exceed 20 rubles from with regard to gold production cost. In the opinion of A.I. Mikoyan, such an exchange rate would have made the selling of goods on the foreign market “normally profitable”. The number was mentioned in A.I. Mikoyans note to J.V. Stalin in December 1946; it was the first proposal made in the post-war period that the country should stop fixing the ruble exchange rate on any foreign currency but again base it on gold Popov V.P Stalinizm v chelovecheskom izmerenii: raboty raznykh let. Moscow, 2016. P. 178.. The issue was topical for the Soviet administration because of the development of the international monetary system deriving from the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 and the Soviet Union's refusal to participate in the activity of the International Monetary Fund.

World gold price. Gold exports were insignificant in the post-war period between 1945 and 1953 because J. V. Stalin believed that the world gold prices might go up. Given the secretiveness of the Soviet Union and the absence of precise information about gold production and reserves accumulated by the late 1940s -- early 1950s, the West was considering possible use of gold by the USSR as an economic weapon to lower gold prices on the global market In 1937, the Soviet Union sold $200 million worth of gold on the global market within several months. See: Soviet Gold production, reserves, and exports through 1954. P. 10.. However, the Soviet administration was measuring the purchasing power of gold with goods, which could be procured on global markets, and was interested in the high price of gold in the world; the price of $35 per ounce established by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in the first half of the 1940s was deemed insufficient.

There was a free black market of gold outside the Soviet Union; there were practically no illegal transactions in the United States but in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Asia gold transactions were conducted on open markets using local currencies and U. S. dollars. The price was regularly slightly higher than the price set by the U. S. Department of the Treasury but there were also spikes in certain periods. An average gold price on European markets reached $38-39; the highest peaks of gold prices were seen in 1949, when gold cost up to $55 per ounce because of the re-evaluation of many currencies. Similarly, after the start of the Korean War, $44 per ounce in January 1951 Miroslav A. Kriz. The price of gold. Essays in international finance. Princeton, New Jersey. № 15. 1952. P. 3.. The Soviet Union was used approximately the same range of gold prices, $42-52, in calculations of the commission, which was preparing a report in 1949 on the necessity to stop fixing the ruble exchange rate on the dollar and to shift to the gold backing; the average global gold price was set at $45 per ounce Zapiska I.V. Stalinu ot 26 marta 1949 g. ot A. Mikoiana, A. Kosygina, A. Zvereva, M. Men'shikova, V. Popova, N. Chechulina, I. Zlobina, F. Bystrova, G. Kosiachenko, V. Starovskogo // APRF. F. 3. Op. 39. D. 100. L. 80.. Therefore, the price established by the U. S. Department of the Treasury since the early 1940s was the minimum price on the world gold market.

Domestic consumption. Some of the gold was used on the domestic market, by industries and jewelry factories; the amounts were inconsiderable and ranged between 3 and 7 % in various years. The share of gold used by industries was increasing year upon year. The government was also selling small-sized bars of gold on the domestic market. Prices on gold items purchased by the government from the population ranged between 51 rubles and 63 rubles per gram of pure gold in 1946, while state prices on gold items sold to the population ranged from 142 rubles to 170 rubles per gram Zapiska A.I. Mikoiana I.V. Stalinu “O kurse rublia v inostrannoi valiute”... L. 48-60.. Domestic market prices were several times higher than the state production costs. Besides, the Soviet Union had a gold black market, which flourished in the years of war and the post-war period.

Conclusions

The article analyzes publications and archives pertaining to gold production in the context of the development of the Soviet gold industry in the 1920s -- early 1950s, and demonstrates the role of gold as a factor of the Soviet state policy.

Following a rise in Russia's gold output in the early 20^th century, gold production declined during WWI in 1914-1917; during the Civil War of 1918-1922, the state gold monopoly and nationalization of industries led to a plummet of gold production, and most gold mining enterprises stopped their activity. The period of 1923-1930 was characterised by the provision of exclusive benefits to gold industry enterprises, and private capital (including foreign) was allowed to operate while the government still had a monopoly on products.

After the gold output stabilized, the management was centralized, and the gold industry developed in 1931-1945 because of the existence of ordinary and extraordinary sectors, two major gold mining organizations of the USSR, Glavzoloto and Dalstroy. After Glavzoloto was transformed into the Soviet Interior Ministry's Glavspetstsvetmet in 1946-1953, the entire gold industry of the country was functioning under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Interior Ministry on the basis of labor mobilization of convicts. In March 1953, industrial units of Glavspetstsvetmet and Dalstroy were reassigned from the Soviet Interior Ministry to the Soviet Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, and prison camps were passed under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Justice Ministry, but Dalstroy kept using convict labor until the late 1950s. In the 1930s-1950s, there were private prospectors alongside state-run gold mines; the attempts at reforming the institution of prospectors in various years were caused by the desire to increase the share of state-run gold production and reduce gold mining costs.

According to the Giprozoloto institute, Russia and the Soviet Union produced 2,382.8 tonnes of gold in 1901-1940, including 805.4 tonnes in 1901-1917 Indicators cited by the Giprozoloto institute for 1901-1917 are based on information of gold smelting laboratories; this is not the amount of chemically pure gold, but the volume of placer gold smelted by laboratories. According to my estimates, documentary verified industrial production of chemically pure gold amounted to 682.5 tonnes in 1901-1917. See in detail: Grebenyuk P.S. Obemy rossiiskoi zolotodobychi v 1901-1917 gg.: istochnikovedcheskii aspekt // Vestnik arkhivista. 2018. № 3. P. 679-691., 48.4 tonnes in 1918-1922, 281.4 tonnes in 1923-1930, and 1,247.6 tonnes in 1931-1940. As mentioned before, the information about Soviet gold production given by the collection of materials in Giprozoloto included the produce of relevant organizations, people's commissariats, Dalstroy in the 1930s, and, possibly, other sources of gold. There is information that the country industrially produced 29.5 tonnes of chemically pure gold in 1918-1922, about 200 tonnes in 1923-1930, 1049 tonnes in 1931-1940, and about 1200 tonnes in 1941-1950. Between 1931 and 1950 most of the gold was supplied by two organizations, Glavzoloto/Glavspetstsvetmet and Dalstroy. They yielded a total of 2,029.4 tonnes of gold, including 1,116.2 tonnes (about 55 %) mined by Glavzoloto and 913.2 tonnes (about 45 %) mined by Dalstroy. In all, Russia and the Soviet Union industrially produced over 3,100 tonnes of chemically pure gold in the first half of the 20^th century, but total gold supplies to the treasury, including additional sources, could amount to 3,600 tonnes.

The question of economic efficiency of gold production in Russia is closely connected to the role of money in the Soviet system and the ruble exchange rate. Gold production costs of the Soviet Union were high in the 1930s and kept growing in the subsequent periods (the 1940s and 1950s). A key reason for high gold production costs is the remoteness of Soviet deposits from industrial centers, the underdeveloped transport network, and harsh climate. Overheads always constituted a large percentage of costs. Another factor of the post-war period was the depletion of rich placer gold deposits. Since it was using gold as an export commodity, the Soviet Union was monitoring the world gold prices, which made the development of any deposits but large and rich unfeasible in the 1940s -- 1950s. There were some other factors influencing gold production at play in that period, such as the increasing demand for miners and specialists in other actively developing mining areas, especially the production of uranium and non-ferrous metals, as well as ancillary gold.

After the economic shocks of WWI, most countries chose either gold or gold and forex standard. The gold standard became the international standard of the global economy crucial to international trade and transactions conducted on the world monetary and capital markets Mizes L. Chelovecheskaia deiatel'nost': traktat po ekonomicheskoi teorii. Cheliabinsk, 2005. P. 439444.. Gold was the money of international trade, and the turnover of international agreements and revenue and losses of such transactions were calculated on the basis of gold prices. The domestic pricing structure of the Soviet Union was detached from global market prices, and gold was used as a tender in foreign trade. The USSR had to import key commodities, such as food, machines, equipment, and key resources. It was impossible to cut the imports of those commodities below the level essential for the country; besides, they were imported irrespective of the cost. Foreign currency was necessary for imports; it was impossible to get as much foreign currency as necessary with exports, which led to a foreign trade deficit. The exchange rate would have unavoidably grown in a market economy, yet the Soviet Union established the exchange rate with administrative methods.

When options of calculating a new forex parity of the ruble were considered in 1945, a leading Soviet specialist and member of the Expert Bureau of the Soviet Gosbank Board, Z.V. Atlas, stated in a special memo that the solution should derive from purposes of the review of the ruble exchange rate. The following primary functions were mentioned: currency exchange transactions of foreigners, trans-border money transfers, Gosbank export/ import settlements with Soviet organizations, and a comparison of the cost of products in the USSR and abroad Voprosy denezhnogo obrashcheniia (1919-1982 gody) (vedomstvennye materialy) // Po stranitsam arkhivnykh fondov Tsentral'nogo Banka Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Vyp. 15. Moscow, 2014. P. 67-68.. In the Soviet Union all of those functions were adjusted to economic realities of the socialist model so that they could ensure a more or less satisfactory parity of the Soviet ruble.

Z.V. Atlas believed it was possible to achieve a real parity on the basis of the ratio of the ruble-denominated gold price in the Soviet Union to the dollar-denominated gold price in the United States or the ratio of purchasing powers of currencies. An exchange rate based directly on the parity of purchasing powers of the ruble and the dollar would lead to an increase of ruble-denominated prices in the Soviet Union compared to dollar-denominated prices in the United States because of lower labor productivity rates in the Soviet Union. A parity based on the cost of gold required the calculation of an average gold price in the Soviet Union; it was possible to calculate an exchange rate more or less consistent with the purchasing price of the ruble and the dollar on the basis of the gold price in dollars.

Thus, it was advantageous to the country to maintain the existent exchange rate and annually replenish the Soviet budget with billions of rubles with markups from commercial imports; the exports of key commodities (oil, grain, and timber) See: Koleva G.Yu. Neft' v politike sovetskogo gosudarstva // Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta. 2016. № 9(174). P. 43-50; Kondrashin V.V. Zerno v obmen na valiutu i stanki: novye dokumenty rossiiskikh arkhivov ob uchastii zapadnoevropeiskikh stran v sovetskoi industrializatsii // Klio. 2011. № 3. P. 112-115. and gold brought additional foreign currency or necessary goods and made it possible to subsidize exporters in rubles so that they made more goods. This means that the Soviet Union actually had to recognize market exchange rates. The Soviet economic model had no market economy instruments, and the production of precious metals, which broadened the range of offered loans on the global market, was an important resource of the socialist economy. In this connection, the gold potential of the Soviet Union was limited only by gold production vicissitude, the fact which the government could not control and which determined domestic prices of the socialist economy.

According to reports, the Soviet gold industry was “state-planned loss-making industry”. Gold sales prices of the early 1950s reflected the ruble-to-dollar ratio of more than 40-to-1, while the correlation between domestic prices in the Soviet Union and the world had a 20-to-1 ratio. Economic decisions were determined by natural and climate conditions, mentioned by the authors of the Siberian Curse survey Hill F., Gaddy C. The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners Left Russia Out in the Cold. Washington, DC, 2003.. As far as “price of cold” is concerned, we should say that the use of convict labor in gold mining and other industries of northern districts of the USSR was based on the economic estimate and compared to the recruitment of contractors. The factor played a key role in the 1930s -- 1940s. In 1940, the year of the maximum gold output of 80 tonnes, Dalstroy spent a total of 1,732 rubles per inmate, including “the keep and the escort”, which is half of spending on a contractor (4,585 rubles). An average salary of a Dalstroy contractor was 4,203 rubles per year, an average reward of an inmate was 90 % smaller, about 270 rubles. Gold mining activity involved 92,100 people in 1940, including 2,900 contractors and 89,200 convicts. See: Grebeniuk P.S. Dal'stroi i proizvoditel'nost' truda v zolotodobyvaiushchei otrasli SSSR: opyt sravnitel'nogo analiza // Gumanitarnye issledovaniia v Vostochnoi Sibiri i na Dal'nem Vostoke. 2018. № 1(43). P 82-83. -- In 1953, a Dalstroy contractor had an average annual salary of 16,677 rubles, and an inmate was paid 6, 673 rubles. See: Stalinskie stroiki GULAGa. 1930-1953. P 411. The “coldest” area of Dalstroy's activity had the lowest gold production costs and the highest labor productivity in the Soviet Union. The principal factors were convict labor and a high content of placer gold.

While admitting unfavorable conditions of the North, acclaimed Soviet economist S.V. Slavin, who was a deputy chairman of the Soviet Gosplan Council for the North in 1931-1934, said that Dalstroy was saving the Soviet economy a lot of money compared to the development of other gold deposits in the USSR Materialy Soveta po izucheniiu proizvoditel'nykh sil pri Prezidiume AN SSSR po voprosu: “Problemy razvitiia proizvoditel'nykh sil Magadanskoi oblasti” (1959 g.) // GAMO. F. P-21. Op. 5. D. 714. L. 22-23.. This is the inside view of an expert on economic efficiency of the socialist model. The activity of Dalstroy, which supplied nearly half of all industrial gold in 1932-1956, made the average correlation between the dollar and ruble one to 12 from the angle of current gold production costs and the average world gold price, which was far bigger than the indicators achieved by the ordinary gold mining sector (Glavzoloto/Glavspetsmet) and demonstrated a high level of profitability, considering the actual parity of the ruble. While estimating the activity of Dalstroy, one should also bear in mind the rapid fulfillment of tasks, the achievements made in the development of the Extreme Northeast, and heavy investment in collecting scientific information.

The geopolitical factor of remote and border territories played a role in the development of the industry and Dalstroy's activity. J. V. Stalin was well aware of the role the discovery of gold in California played in the development of western regions of the United States, and the Soviet administration realized that the gold mining industry would give a strong impetus to the development of Siberia and the Far East. The Siberian factor in the end played an important role in the process of Soviet modernization of the economy Timoshenko A. I. Sibirskii faktor v formirovanii rossiiskoi industrial'noi tsivilizatsii // Ekonomicheskaia istoriia. 2013. № 4 (23). P. 23-33..

Gold had an absolute value for the Soviet administration and the Soviet economy. Gold has always been in demand on the global markets and came in handy in emergencies (1941) and crises (the first half of the 1930s) as a way to correct the foreign trade deficit, conduct current economic activity, secure international loans, and acquire goods which the Soviet Union was either unable to make or could not afford making.

Given nationalization of foreign trade and forex control, gold was a guarantee of the development of the socialist economic model, while the development of the Soviet gold industry was not defined by direct estimates of possible revenue and losses, but resulted from decisions made by the national government in the late 1920s -- early 1930s; those decisions were rooted in the memory of the economic embargo of the Civil War period, the gold panic, the fear of another devastating plummet and foreign trade deficit (the experience of the Great Depression), and the belief that gold was the foundation of a normal operation of the capitalist economy.

gold mining policy

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