Why, nevertheless, the Soviet government decided to send troops to Afghanistan?

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Why, nevertheless, the Soviet government decided to send troops to Afghanistan?

Igor Samoilov

Afghan War 1979-1989 still raises many questions and is a topic for heated discussions in historical science and political science. Some of the most controversial issues are questions about the reasons for the war's outbreak and Soviet leadership's motives. These questions' final answer has not been formulated, despite the relatively large volume of published sources.

The purpose of this research work - based on available sources and publications, identify the reasons for Soviet troops' entry into Afghanistan.

In April 1978, an event took place in Afghanistan, later called the "April Revolution." The dictator M. Daud overthrew the padishah, the monarchy, and formally established a republican government. Representatives of the leftist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power, maintaining contacts with the USSR. For Soviet representatives, this coup came as a complete surprise. The first news of the coup came through the British Reuters, and only then - a message from the USSR Embassy in Kabul.Kornienko G.M. How the decision was made to bring Soviet troops into Afghanistan and their withdrawal // New and Contemporary History. 1993. No. 3. P. 107. N. Taraki became the head of the government (the Revolutionary Council) and the prime minister, B. Karmal became his deputy, and H. Amin became the minister of foreign affairs. Under the ideology close to the communist that underlay the PDPA program, the Afghan leadership expanded its ties with the USSR. The Soviet Union sent its advisers to the country, where on December 5, 1978, they signed the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation.Merimsky V.A. War in Afghanistan: Notes of a Participant // New and Contemporary History. 1995. No. 3. P. 407-408. However, since its inception

(January 1, 1965), there was no unity in the party. Andrei Gromyko and Hafizullah Amin. Meeting of the two foreign ministers, the USSR and Afghanistan, May 18, 1978.

Fig. 1. Andrei Gromyko and Hafizullah Amin. Meeting of the two foreign ministers, the USSR and Afghanistan, May 18, 1978.https://meduza.io/feature/2019/02/15/stydnye-voprosy-ob-afganskoy-voyne

afghan war historical political

At the end of June 1978, in Afghanistan, repressions began, which weakened the party and created an unstable atmosphere. This situation served as the first impetus for the Afghan leadership's increasing requests to the USSR for military assistance. But the USSR continually refused. Judging by the published documents, the Soviet leaders, although they reasoned in the categories of Marxism-Leninism and class struggle, nevertheless quite soberly assessed the consequences of troops' possible entry. For example, at the meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on March 17, those present agreed on the opinion expressed by the chairman of the Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin: "We need to fight for Afghanistan. After all, we have been living in perfect harmony for 60 years."However, the question of a possible entry of Soviet troops was not approved. A. A. Gromyko voiced the reasons for this: "Our army, which will enter Afghanistan, will be an aggressor. Who will she fight against? Yes, first of all, against the Afghan people. And our army will have to shoot them. Comrade Andropov correctly noted that the situation in Afghanistan was not ripe for revolution. Everything that we have done in recent years in the sense of easing international tension: arms reductions and much more - all this will be thrown back." The head of the KGB, Yu.V. Andropov, summarized the Soviet leaders' approach to the Afghan problem in early 1979: "We need to develop a political decision on Afghanistan and keep in mind that we will most likely be labeled as an aggressor. But despite this, in no case should we lose Afghanistan. " A special commission was created to study Afghanistan's situation, consisting of Yu. V. Andropov, A. A. Gromyko, D. F. Ustinov, B. N. Ponomarev. By the oral order of D.F. Ustinov (USSR Minister of Defense), intense exercises began in the Central Asian Military District. A group of three motorized rifle regiment was advanced to the border of Afghanistan.https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/rus/text_files/Afganistan/March%2017,%201979.pdf

In Afghanistan, the armed opposition intensified, and within the party, the struggle between N. Taraki and H. Amin again intensified. In the USSR, they were worried about the situation, as they relied on N. Taraki. On September 15, 1979, H. Amin carried out a coup and killed N. Taraki. At the same time, H. Amin did not refuse to cooperate with the USSR. H. Amin began to "purge" the state apparatus inside the country, removing his opponents. Some researchers believe that this coup served as one reason to introduce Soviet troops into Afghanistan.https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/rus/text_files/Afganistan/12.31.1979%20Report.pdf

In the Kremlin, in October-November, there were continuous discussions of the Afghan question. Besides, H. Amin continued to send requests to send a small number of Soviet troops to Afghanistan. By the end of November, the Soviet leadership had already decided to prepare for soldiers' entry into Afghanistan. On December 8, Leonid Brezhnev arranged a meeting at his office. Yu.V. Andropov, A. A. Gromyko, M. A. Suslov, and D. F. Ustinov took part. They were decided by the KGB special services' hands to eliminate H. Amin and send a certain number of troops to Afghan territory. On December 10, the USSR Minister of Defense, D.F. Ustinov, informed the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov about this decision. General tried to object, but his arguments were rejected. General Ogarkov sent Directive №312 / 12/00133 to the troops, and the formation of a new combined arms army in the Turkestan military district began. On December 12, 1979, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee made the final decision unanimously to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Yu.V. Andropov, A.A. Gromyko, and D.F. Ustinov made this proposal after receiving a report from a KGB representative from Kabul to assess Afghanistan's situation. The information was drawn up by a secret resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU No. 176/125 "Order to the Alpha group."https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/rus/text_files/Afganistan/1979-12-12%20situation%20in%20afghanistan.pdf

Some researchers argue that Politburo decided on December 8 but formalized it only on December 12.Kornienko G.M. How the decision was made to bring Soviet troops into Afghanistan and their withdrawal // New and Contemporary History. 1993.No.3. P.110.In general, still unclear how was made is the decision to send troops to Afghanistan. The Supreme Soviets of the USSR or any other government apparatus has not adopted any document on this issue.All instructions were given orally; a narrow circle of people knew about the impending entry of troops. Why, nevertheless, the Soviet government decided to send troops to Afghanistan? Officially, after December 27, the goal was formulated unambiguously - to assist in stabilizing the situation and repelling possible aggression from outside. Grossman A.S. Secret documents from special folders: Afghanistan // Questions of history. 1993.No.3. P.13. However, the Afghan side's requests for help were only an excuse and an external facade that hid the real motives. In general, the Soviet leadership decided to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan under several factors that divide into subjective and objective.

Objective reasons mean the development of events in Afghanistan and around it. But the subjective factors of human perception influenced these objective events, and the latter had to change. Subjective factors were no less critical than objective reasons since the Soviet leaders made decisions based not only on personal ideological attitudes but also on the interpretation of information about the events that took place, supplied by the appropriate apparatus of diplomatic and other agents.

Foreign policy events were of no small importance for the development of the situation around Afghanistan. The point is that international relations in the Central Asian region in the period under review had, as it were, several "levels." The Soviet-American confrontation determined them in a global context. At the next "level" were more long-standing interstate "hot spots" (such as the traditional rivalry between Iran and Afghanistan over Herat or the problem of the Pashtuns in Afghan-Pakistani relations), these "hot spots" superimposed on interfaith and interethnic confrontations in the external and in domestic politics.

In April 1979, the Islamic revolution took place in Iran. This revolution meant a weakening of US positions in the region, but it also posed a threat to Soviet influence in Afghanistan. The Soviet leadership quite rightly feared that a possible victory for Muslim radicals in Afghanistan would cause instability in the Soviet republics of Central Asia. The fear of strengthening the USA in the region also played a role in sending troops to Afghanistan. America supported the Afghan fighters for the faith - the mujahideen through Pakistan. Despite the "detente" in international relations, the latest confrontation between the USSR and the United States did not stop. Certain circles in Washington sought to push the USSR to take action against Afghanistan, which could compromise Soviet policy. The position of the United States, which in many respects clarifies the causes and course of events in 1979, was expressed in an interview with the French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur in January 1998 by the former national security adviser to President D. Carter Z. Brzezinski. "According to the official version, the CIA began supporting the mujahideen in 1980," he said. "… But in reality… everything was different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive on the provision of secret assistance to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979.And on the same day, I wrote him a memo, in which I explained that, in my opinion, this assistance would lead to military intervention by the Soviets. " When the reporter asked whether he regretted what had happened, Z. Brzezinski cynically replied: "To regret what? That covert operation was a brilliant idea. She let us lure the Russians into an Afghan trap, and you want me to be sorry? When the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, essentially: "Now we have the opportunity to secure the USSR for its own Vietnam War." In fact, Moscow had to wage an unbearable war for almost ten years, a conflict that led to demoralization and, eventually, the collapse of the Soviet empire."Les rйvйlations d'un ancien conseiller de Carter «Oui, la CIA est entrйe en Afghanistan avant les Russes...» https://ziontruth.blogspot.com/2010/07/what-lurks-behind-obamas-pro-islam-anti.html?m=0http://community.livejournal.com/history_club

"The United States was more interested in bringing in our troops than ourselves," General of the Army V. I. Varennikov noted in an interview with the Internet portal "Afghanistan.Ru" in 2007. "We set ourselves the goal of stabilizing the situation, but they prepared a trap for us ... They launched an information war against the USSR, which turned out to be a heavy burden for us."Varennikov V.I. We were pushed to send troops// http://afghanistan.ru/doc/8049.html.

There was also China's problem, with which the USSR had strained relations, which could influence Afghanistan's situation by its actions. The destabilization of the relationship also occurred in Europe. The FRG and the USA decided on December 12, 1979, to deploy American Pershing medium-range missiles in West Germany, while the USSR did not have such weapons near American border.

On this occasion, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the Soviet diplomat G. M. Kornienko said that Soviet troops to send into Afghanistan because, following the Cold War logic, the weakening of the position of any superpower in one region compensated by its strengthening in another part of the globe. The decisions of the Soviet leaders relied on information about events and personal likes and dislikes. Some researchers believe that one of the motives for troops' introduction was L. Brezhnev's personal grudge against H. Amin for the coup and the murder of N. Taraki, whom the USSR supported. Considering the peculiarities of senile psychology (Leonid Brezhnev turned 73 in December 1979), such an explanation is quite possible, but only in the context of "accompanying" factors. The USSR leadership drew its conclusions based on agents' information and based on the interpretation of specific facts and, of course, personal likes and dislikes. This approach was associated, precisely, with collegial decision-making. The personality of H. Amin did not inspire confidence in the Soviet leaders at all, since he studied in the USA while in power, showed a penchant for dictatorial methods of leadership, was not popular in the country, and strengthen his positions. Therefore, the Soviet residency reports in Afghanistan about the possible ties of H. Amin with the United States fell on the prepared ground. In the context of the above excerpt from Z. Brzezinski's interview, it becomes clear that Moscow's information through various channels (primarily through the KGB channels) about the Afghan leader's desire to reorient himself to the United States was successful disinformation by the American special services. The result of the above reasons was the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, which began on December 25 at 15:00 Moscow. On December 26-27, most of them began to move across the border in the direction of Kabul, Herat, and other cities, without encountering resistance. On the same day, Soviet special forces stormed the Taj Bek Palace, the residence of H. Amin. H. Amin died, B. Karmal was "elected" as the head of the party and the country. The troops were supposed to be used only to protect strategic objects, but since March 1980, the USSR entered a full-scale war that lasted ten years and played the role of one of the catalysts of its collapse.

Thus, the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979 was made by a group of the most influential Soviet leaders under the influence of the events in international relations in general and based on information at their disposal about various sources. This entire complex was under the pressure of the personal worldviews and the Soviet leaders' age-psychological attitude. This decision was due to the Cold War logic. It was geopolitical, aiming to prevent Afghanistan from leaving the zone of Soviet influence and its transition to the area of US influence.

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