Labor mobilizations of the civil employable population as a mechanism of attracting the labor force to the heavy industry enterprises of Donetsk region in 1943–1945

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Labor mobilizations of the civil employable population as a mechanism of attracting the labor force to the heavy industry enterprises of Donetsk region in 1943-1945

Abstract

The article is devoted to the study of the range of problems related to the labor mobilization of the civil employable population to the heavy industry enterprises of the Donetsk region in 1943-1945. The article is devoted to the study of the range of problems related to the labor mobilization of the civil employable population to the heavy industry enterprises of the Donetsk region in 1943-1945. Special attention is paid to the mechanism of a labor mobilization, social conditions, in which mobilized people were after the arrival in Donetsk region and a fight against desertion.

Key words: labor mobilization, reconstruction, Donetsk region, a fight against desertion.

Анотація

labor ideological deserter

Н.Ф. Шипік

Трудові мобілізації цивільного працездатного населення як механізм залучення робочої сили до підприємств важкої промисловості Донецької області у 1943-1945 рр.

Необхідність забезпечення фронтових потреб, а згодом - швидкої відбудови стратегічно важливих підприємств в умовах гострого дефіциту робочих рук стали ідеологічним підґрунтям для широкого використання партійно-державним керівництвом випробуваних в рамках командної економіки мобілізаційних методів залучення робочої сили.

Для покриття дефіциту робочої сили, необхідної для відбудовчих робіт на підприємствах важкої промисловості Донеччини у 1943-1945 рр., партійно-радянське керівництво вдалося до трудової мобілізації міського і сільського населення працездатного віку. В ході її реалізації були використані величезні можливості у розпорядженні людським потенціалом, притаманні тоталітарним системам. Зневажливе ставлення до умов життя і праці мобілізованих робітників суттєво вплинуло на рівень виконання поставлених державних завдань, у бік його зниження. У відповідь на ігнорування елементарних соціальних потреб, з боку мобілізованих на індивідуальному рівні формувалась своєрідна практика виживання, що проявлялась у втечах з виробництва, і яка в часи існування трудової повинності отримала назву трудового дезертирства. Для виявлення дезертирів вважалося за необхідне провести суцільну перевірку за мобілізаційними списками тих, хто повернувся, та направити матеріали до прокуратури. В рамках посилення боротьби з трудовим дезертирством було передбачено обов «язкове ведення слідства по справам, пов «язаним із порушенням трудової дисципліни. Каральні дії з боку силових структур перемежалися з амністією особам, які самовільно залишили підприємства військової промисловості та добровільно повернулися на ці підприємства. Останні мали на меті повернути мобілізованих робітників обличчям до влади. Проте, за жахливих соціально-побутових умов, справа по вирішенню проблеми плинності робітників пробуксовувала. Боротьбу з трудовим дезертирством за допомогою силових структур не можна назвати успішною.

Ключові слова: трудова мобілізація, відбудова, Донецька область, боротьба з дезертирством.

Main part

The need for providing the front-line demands and, subsequently, the rapid reconstruction of strategically important enterprises in the face of acute shortage of manpower became an ideological basis for the widespread use of tested mobilization methods of attracting labor force within the frameworks of command economy by the party and state leadership.

Soviet historiography contains extremely limited information and, at the same time, positive evaluations of labor mobilizations as necessary, justified in view of the strategic factor and the successful actions of the Party-Soviet leadership. The authors emphasized the heroic work of mobilized people in the conditions of the patriotic rise of the Soviet people. An access to archival sources in the post-Soviet era enabled a substantive study of the problem. Modern scholars have drawn the attention to an ambiguous nature of labor mobilization, pointing to the contradictory aspects of the reconstruction of heavy industry in general.

P. Knyshevskiy noted that the labor mobilization of the civil employable population was one of the methods of meeting the needs of military industrial production in the conditions of the barrack economy, along with the mobilization of liable for military service people, involving the demobilized, interned, German prisoners of war, human resources of the GULAG, and etc. He pointed out on the difficulties in its implementation, related to interregional displacement; the repressive nature of the legislative settlement of the problem of desertion of mobilized people. I. Vetrov, M. Loboda, L. Khoynatska, studying the social aspect, noted the presence of forced mobilization, the absence of normal working conditions, simple living conditions, malnutrition and untimely payment of wages, which resulted in a high level of labor turnover. A notable feature of «Postwar Ukraine: Essays on Social History (second half of the 1940s-mid-1950s)» monograph is a consideration of mobilized workers as a subject of history. [1].

Consequently, over the past two decades, scientists have made a significant contribution to the study of methods for mobilizing labor to reconstruction of the enterprises of strategic importance. Further study of the problem requires a detailed consideration of the implementation of labor mobilizations at the level of the regions and sectors of the economy, and accordingly the attraction of a wide range of local sources by the researchers.

In this article an attempt is made to consider the features of the mobilization of the labor force in Donetsk region (earlier Stalin Oblast) in 1943-1945, in particular, such as the mobilization mechanism, the living and labor conditions of mobilized workers, on the basis of the exploration of modern scholars and the involvement of a broad source base, as well as the organization of struggle against labor desertion.

The source of the study consist of decrees of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the USSR, Resolutions of the State Defense Committee (hereinafter SDC), correspondence of the party, Soviet and economic bodies on the progress of the mobilization of the labor force, report of complaints of the youth, mobilized for the building of industrial objects, certificates on the fighting against desertion in industry. The important issues for studying the problem are the materials of the Bureau of Accounting and the division of labor force under the rule of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR.

At the legislative level, the labor mobilization was formalized by the Decree of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the USSR dated February 13, 1942. It extended to the employable urban population - men from 16 to 55 years old and women from 16 to 45 years old who did not work in state institutions and enterprises, as well as rural population. An exception was made for mothers who had children under the age of 4, in the absence of other family members, who were able to provide care for them; pregnant women, starting from the 5th month of pregnancy [1, p. 16]; persons dismissed by the medical commission; the lonely ones whose mobilization was connected with the liquidation of the collective farm and those who had old parents who were in need of nursing care [2, p. 73].

A significant part of the tasks of the labor mobilization of manpower to industrial enterprises of the Stalin region in 1943 relied on local residents. Thus, by the decision of the State Defense Committee «On the mobilization of the employable population for the enterprises of the People's Commissar №4275 and the People's Commissar of coal industry №4433», it was planned to mobilize 83 thousand people in the Stalin region [3]. In 1944 there was a tense situation with local labor resources [4, p. 80]. In a telegram dated December 8, 1943, the Central Committee of the CPU (b) U requested the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR to dismiss the urban and rural population from the Stalin region from further mobilization, since according to the plan to provide the labor force of agriculture, industry, transport, construction, taking into account the number of employable population, the average annual agricultural needs, mobilization tasks for the rebuilding of industry, schools of FT and Military Commissariat, a shortage of manpower was formed. [5, p. 5, 59, 62-65].

In 1944 57.6 thousand mobilized people came to the colliery undertaking of the Stalinugol plant. Mostly there were people from the Ukrainian SSR (98.2%). The largest number was from Vinnytsa (37.4%), Donetsk (16.7%), and Kirovograd (10.1%). A general plan for sending workers to these enterprises was performed only 82.1%, almost entirely at the expense of the rural people mobilized by the Soviet authorities and through the People's Commissariat of Defense.

A mechanism for mobilizing the labor force was created, impulses for the USSR State Defense Committee, which issued numerous resolutions on mobilization, first of all, to strategic importance areas. The Bureau for Accounting and Distribution of Labor Force under the rule of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was preparing arrays for the mobilization of labor force to the enterprises of a certain commissariat and sent them to the fields of recruitment. Region bureaux of accounting and Distribution of a labor force at the regional executive committees, mobilization departments at the rayon executive committees made a monthly report on the availability of non-working employable people in the cities and rural residents of working age, and each ten days - reports on the implementation of mobilization tasks. Party leaders were also responsible for the timely implementation of mobilization tasks. Reports on the implementation of mobilization tasks were heard at the meetings of the Bureau of the regional commissions of the party and regional executive committees [2, p. 73,74]. Sectoral commissars sent their representatives to the places of appeal for departure and accompaniment mobilized to the places of destination. Mobilization was supposed to be accompanied by political and educational work on the importance of rebuilding the national economy and their personal involvement.

As a result of hostilities, the residential sector in Stalin region suffered considerable damage. For the purpose of maximizing the population, an order was adopted to seal the residential space of the public sector and private home ownership In the cities [12; p. 103]. Difficulties in the rehousing of mobilized workers were accompanied by the inability to buy the most necessary things, such as: soap, matches, shoes, clothes, etc. [13; p. 33]. They did not have time to create the necessary conditions for arriving masses. The managers of the companies, reporting on the rehousing of the arrivals, argued that everything was done, «despite the fact that the housing stock of mines are destroyed and do not have equipment and inventory. The hostels are equipped with washbasins, troughs, buckets and furniture, but not in sufficient quantity» [14; p. 325]. Subsequently, it was clarified that «not everywhere the normal living conditions were created for mobilized people «[9; p. 189.]. The head of the coal industry department of the Central Committee of the CP(b) U stated that the difficult living conditions in which the mobilized workers were, is one of the reason of desertion. Due to the lack of baths, laundries, soaps many workers did not bath and change clothes for 1.5 - 2 months at the mines. While visiting the dormitory of mine 4/5 Mykytivka, the head of the department found that the workers slept on the boards without bedding in the same clothes, in which they worked. It was dirty in the dining room on this mine, there were not enough seats. Wages were delayed for 2 - 2,5 months, in addition there were cases of mass shortchanges of workers [15; p. 3.]. Party leadership often managed to administer through publishing the directive guidance, such as «immediately improve the living conditions in all working mines and especially newcomers in order to completely eliminate the fluidity of the labor force in the near future» [16; p. 29.]. A number of managers were excluded from the party, fired from work, because they did not created conditions for the mobilized people.

The food supply was extremely slow. In 1944, it was not always possible to organize dining rooms, and sometimes even with the opening of the dining rooms, mobilized people eating only once a day. It was also allowed to shortchange the workers in determining the cost of food [17; p. 189]. One way to solve the food problem was to send several mobilized workers home for products for themselves and for the rest of the workers.

The problem of food supply for mobilized people was fixed by the organs of the People's Commissariat of the State Security in 1944 and in 1945. Thus, in November 1944, the Deputy of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR sent a special report «On complaints of the youth, mobilized for the construction of industrial objects of the Artemiv district, Stalin region» to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. In October military censorship revealed 15 letters with complaints about living conditions and lack of food. Worker Luzhanets from Chasov-Yar wrote in his letter to Kamyanets-Podilsky region:

«…We were brought here to work, placed in cold dormitories, the work was given heavy. You had to be in the cold for 12 hours. We ate 2 times a day, but one borsch. All our clothes were wore out, the products were over, I do not know whether we'd survive the winter…». Another worker from Chasov-Yar wrote to Zhytomyr region:»… I have been already sick for 3 months, doctors do not let go, they say, work as you can. Now I'm not a good worker, shoeless, undressed, hungry and sick…» [18; p. 1-3].

In the next special message of the People's Commissariat of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR, dated June 23, 1945, it was reported that the complaints of mobilized workers to the coal industry about commodity difficulties were found during the perlustration [19; p. 18-20].

Many mobilized people tried to obtain an official permit to return home, and in case of refusal they escaped. According to coal mines, in 1944, 207.4 thousand people arrived at the Stalin and Voroshilovgrad mines, and for various reasons 128.4 thousand people left, that is 61.9% of the total number of arrivals through mobilization, including - 27% voluntarily [19; p. 23]. Escape from the enterprises of the military or equivalent to it industry was punished in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated December 26, 1941, an imprisonment for a term of 5 to 8 years. The arbitrary abandonment of the enterprise in the conditions of the existence of labor conscription was qualified as labor desertion or desertion from the labor front. [20, p. 55].

The head of the coal industry department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) U. Berezhnyi in a letter to the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) D. Korotchenko noted that the unauthorized withdrawal of Donbass enterprises dated February 10, 1944 has become a great problem. From among 79.2 thousand people who arrived in Donbass, 9.7 thousand or 12.2% people went away without permission. Among the reasons for the desertion, he counted: 1) impunity, because in his opinion the leaders of district and village party organizations completely separated from the struggle; 2) lack of political work in the places of mobilization, and at the enterprises in which they arrive; 3) heavy living conditions for mobilized. In order to eliminate desertion, he proposed to establish close control over the railways by the People's Commissariat of Railways and the railway police, who will make it impossible to leave the deserters from the enterprises, and all the detainees should be returned in custody to work at the enterprises. He also insisted on the necessity to strengthen the responsibility of chairmen of village councils, collective farms, managers, as well as heads of construction organizations and enterprises for covering and hiring those who deserted from enterprises. He recommended to organize, through the police, the search and transfer to the authorized Commissar of coal those, who deserted from the coal industry to return them to Donbass. He advised to conduct demonstrative trials in some areas over the most evil deserters, as well as those who covered them. He emphasized the importance of creating the necessary housing and living conditions for the mobilized workers and their proper production use at the coal enterprises. Finally, he proposed to strengthen political and educational work by affixing readers of newspapers and campaigners to the hostels, and conducting conversations with the leading workers of mines, Komsomol organizations, trade unions and party organizations [15, p. 3, 4].

The highest level of desertion among the immigrants from other regions [21, p. 1], gave grounds for the chiefs of coal enterprises to blame the managers of the regions for the turnover of workers, who have arrived from those regions. According to the head of the trustee of Kirovugol Voroshilovgradugol plant, such leaders «did not attach proper importance to Donbass coal industry, did not conduct mass-explanatory work during the departure.» It was also pointed out that the impunity of deserters when returning home, as well as the placement of work in the place of residence. «Are there many workers who send letters to their families asking them to inform or condemn those who returned home? If not, then we will run away. Their families inform them that there are such people and they were not condemned, so people continue to escape» [14, p. 325]. Commissioner of the coal industry commissariat in January 1944 proposed to pass a law in conformity with which, not only deserters of coal enterprises, but also the heads of collective farm councils and other people would be condemned to forced labor in Donbass mines for concealing the deserters [14, p. 272].

The problem of impunity for deserters was the subject of discussion by the judicial authorities. Thus, in the report of the Head of the Military Tribunal of Voroshilovgrad Region dated May 2, 1944, it was reported that on the mine control of Izvarin 196 people were deserted during the January-February, and no case was filed for consideration. The checking of the impunity of the deserters revealed that most of them did not work due to the lack of shoes, as well as the fact that the some children of these workers were not taken to the nursery. In some cases, it was claimed that mobilized workers are called for a job only for 3 months, and some people even got mobilization sheets for a 3-month period in Chernivtsi region. At the end of the term, people were not allowed to go out, and they went by themselves, believing that they had legitimate grounds for doing so. When such deserters were put on a trial, they rightly stated that they became deserters as a result of deceit of the recruiters [2, p. 30, 31].

To overcome the impunity of labor deserters, on June 29, 1944, the People's Commissars of the USSR adopted the Resolution «On the elimination of deficiencies in the practice of applying the decree of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the USSR dated December 26, 1941». Public Prosecution Office, the People's Commissariat of Justice and the NKVD bodies were accused of giving up the situation with a phenomenon like desertion [22, p. 120]. The resolution was foreseen for mandatory investigation in cases involving violations of labor discipline. It is indicated the mandatory establishment of the desertion fact, the possible location and taking measures for the detention by the police. The investigation was supposed to end in a three-day term and only in a case of its special complexity - up to 10 days. Consideration of the case in absentia was prohibited. Procedural registration was shortened: interrogation of the deserter, if necessary, interrogation of the witness, the choice of precautionary measures, a decree of the investigator, approved by the prosecutor on commitment for trial.

Assuming an increase of the volume of work of the prosecution agencies, a number of industrial areas, such as: Stalin, Voroshilovgrad, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhya increased the staff of investigative bodies. In summer 1944 in the letter of the Prosecutor of the USSR to the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPU, it was indicated that there was an additional minimum of 100 investigators for these regions of Ukraine. [23, p. 12]. It was a question of the need to immediately take measures for the recruitment and transfer of investigators from other regions to the main industrial regions and the allocation of the position of investigator from party organizations [23, p. 13]. Employees of the central office of the Prosecutor Agencies of the Ukrainian SSR were sent to organize work in 10 regions of Ukraine. The representatives of regional public prosecution offices were sent with the same purpose. Their activities covered 22 districts in Stalin region, 12 in Voroshilovgrad region, 13 in Chernihiv one and 9 in Sumy region. Several enterprises organized a direct supervision by the public prosecution office. Only in July and August the prosecutor agencies received 30.265 thousand materials on the deserters of the military industry from 8 regions, and not from all regions. Before issuing the resolution, at the first half of 1944, monthly they received 9,800 materials. [23, p. 1517].

In order to identify the deserters it was considered to carry out a thorough check by the mobilization lists those who came back and to send the materials to the public prosecutor office [23, p. 15, 16]. The Bureau of State Security was also involved in the case. This Bureau carried out the perlustration of correspondence in order to establish the facts of desertion. Thus, in a special constitution of the People's Commissar of the State Security of the USSR «On the Desertion of the mobilized workers for the reconstruction of the industry of the Ukrainian SSR from the Labor Front» dated September 11, 1944 it was reported that from July 1 to August 15, 1944, military censorship was processed postal correspondence from the population of Sumy, Chernihiv, Vinnytsia, Odesa regions. It was detected 153 reports on the desertion [23, p. 24].

An increase of a number of materials submitted to deserters, which were brought to trial has become a result of a hard work of law enforcement agencies. In July 1944, 3.211 thousand people were arrested and put on a trial of the military tribunal [23, p. 17, 18]. A large number of cases were returned for investigation. Thus, in August 1, only 398 cases were returned for the investigation. Thus, only at the first half of August, 398 cases were returned for the investigation. Thus, only at the first half of August, 398 cases were returned for the interrogation. Incorrect mobilization was one of the reason for returning the cases: people under 16 years old, seriously ill were sent to work, parental status of mobilized workers. A large number of cases were suspended because investigation was stopped. There were cases of unjustified conviction. Thus, the Tribunal of Stalin Region condemned the desertion of V.P. Melnyk, born in 1887, who was not to be mobilized by the age, and Bublik M.I., who did not desert, but was sent to another job. [23, p. 35].

The number of cases considered by the court of the military tribunal has also increased. An overview of the work of the military tribunals of the NKVD of the Ukrainian district in the cases of convicts for desertion showed that in the third quarter of 1944, 11.1 thousand cases were received, 7415 were considered, and 3272 were sent for investigation. From the total number of defendants 58.9% were convicted for 5 years, 20% - for 6 years, 11.2% years - 7 years, 6.6% - 8 years, conditionally - 3.3%, less than 5 years - 0.9%. They organized showtrial of the military tribunal over deserters at some enterprises [23, p. 33]. Guided by the principles of the national economic expediency, the leaders sought the opportunities to use the convicts in the interests of the region. Thus, at a meeting of the Bureau of the Voroshilovgrad Committee for the purpose of their labor exploitation, it was decided to send a petition to L. Beriya, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR with a permission to organize a camp of convicted deserters from industrial enterprises [24, p. 13, 16].

One of the consequences of increasing the fight against the desertion was the increase of cases of voluntary return of deserters to production. Thus, by mid-August more than 1 thousand people returned to Stalin region. [23, p. 2].

As for those who returned voluntarily, the Prosecutor of the USSR proposed to mitigate the punishment: to qualify their actions as a long unexcused absence and to condemn to correctional tasks for a term of 6 months in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated June 26, 1940 [23, p. 3]. Under these conditions, on December 30, 1944, a new Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR «On the Amnesty For Persons Who left Military Industry Enterprises without permission and willingly Returned to them again» was adopted. The decree became widely publicized. Its text was printed in newspapers, posted up on a large screens. The enterprises held a meeting to prove its content to the workers, they allocated some agitators [21, p. 1]. Only in the Stalin region, during the month after the adoption of the decree on the amnesty, 1962 people returned to the defense industry enterprises with the help of the public prosecutor's office, the police, the business managers. But at this period of time, 2.719 people deserted. This situation rouse doubts about the effectiveness of the measures [25, p. 3]. During the intensive work, the public prosecutor's office and the court drew their own conclusions on the causes of desertion, such as: an insufficient explanation of the decree, incomplete coverage of hostels, lack of baths (especially in a number of enterprises of the coal industry), clubs and cultural entertainments, delays in salaries, poor organization of catering, clothing, footwear and medical services; the impunity of those who concealed deserters [23, p. 37].

Consequently, in order to cover the shortage of the labor force, which was necessary for rebuilding work at the heavy industry enterprises of the Donetsk region in 1943-1945, the Party and Soviet leadership succeeded in mobilizing methods tested in the command economy during wartime, namely, labor mobilization of urban and rural population of working age. During its implementation, huge opportunities were in use of the human potential inherent in totalitarian systems. The dismissive attitude to the living conditions and work of the mobilized people significantly influenced the level of performance of the state tasks set, in the direction of its decline. In response to the neglect of elementary social needs, on the part of the mobilized people at the individual level, which manifested itself in the escapes from the enterprises, and which during the existence of labor conscription got the name of labor desertion. Punishment by the security forces was alternated with more lenient measures aimed at obverting mobilized workers to the government. However, in the terrible social and living conditions, the issue on the solution of the turnover problem of the workers has faltered. The struggle with labor desertion with the help of security agencies cannot be called successful.

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Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan Ukrainy (dali TsDAHO Ukrainy), f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1185.

8. Кравченко Е.Л. Обеспечение рабочей силой угольных предприятий Донецкой области (1943-1945 гг.) / Е.Л. Кравченко // Новые страны истории Донбасса. - 1995. - Кн. 4. - С. 121 -128

9. ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 1234; TsDAHO Ukrainy, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1234

10. ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 542; TsDAHO Ukrainy, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 542.

11. ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 3405; TsDAHO Ukrainy, f. 1, op.23, spr. 3405.

12. ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 76, спр. 1020; TsDAHO Ukrainy, f. 1, op. 76, spr. 1020.

13. ЦДАГО України, ф. 2, оп. 7, спр. 1144; TsDAHO Ukrainy, f. 2, op. 7, spr. 1144.

14. ЦДАГО України, ф. R.4626, оп. 2, спр. 9; TsDAHO Ukrainy, f. R.4626, op. 2, spr. 9.

15. ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 76, спр. 995; TsDAHO Ukrainy, f. 1, op. 76, spr. 995.

16. Державний архів Донецької області (даді ДАДО), ф. R.4383, оп. 1, спр. 1; Derzhavnyi arkhiv Donetskoi oblasti (dadi DADO), f. R.4383, op. 1, spr. 1.

17. ДАДО, ф. 326, оп. 2, спр. 748; DADO, f. 326, op. 2, spr. 748.

18. ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 76, спр. 903; TsDAHO Ukrainy, f. 1, op. 76, spr. 903.

19. ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 76, спр. 879; TsDAHO Ukrainy, f. 1, op. 76, spr. 879.

20. ДАДО, ф. 326, оп. 2, спр. 161; DADO, f. 326, op. 2, spr. 161.

21. ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 1391; TsDAHO Ukrainy, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1391.

22. ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 2037; TsDAHO Ukrainy, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2037.

23. ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 2035; TsDAHO Ukrainy, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2035.

24. Кнышевский П.Н. Государственный комитет обороны: методы мобилизации трудовых ресурсов // Вопросы истории. - 1994. - №2. - С. 53-65

Knyshevskiy P.N. Gosudarstvennyy komitet oborony: metody mobilizatsii trudovykh resursov // Voprosy istorii. - 1994. - №2. - S. 53-65

25. ДАДО, ф. 326, оп. 2, спр. 933; DADO, f. 326, op. 2, spr. 933.

26. Вєтров І.Г. За лаштунками відбудови важкої індустрії УРСР: примусові мобілізації та дезертирство у вугільній промисловості (1943-1945 рр.) / І.Г. Вєтров // Науковий часопис Національного педагогічного університету імені М.П. Драгоманова. Серія 6, Історичні науки: збірник наукових праць. - 2008. - Вип. 5: До 175-річчя НПУ ім. М.П. Драгоманова. - С. 116-123

Vietrov I.H. Za lashtunkamy vidbudovy vazhkoi industrii URSR: prymusovi mobilizatsii ta dezertyrstvo u vuhilnii promyslovosti (1943-1945 rr.) / I.H. Vietrov // Naukovyi chasopys Natsionalnoho pedahohichnoho universytetu imeni M.P. Drahomanova. Seriia 6, Istorychni nauky: zbirnyk naukovykh prats. - 2008. - Vyp. 5: Do 175 - richchia NPU im. M.P. Drahomanova. - S. 116-123/

27. ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 1244; TsDAHO Ukrainy, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1244.

28. Державний архів Луганської області, ф. P.179, оп. 2, спр. 405; Derzhavnyi arkhiv Luhanskoi oblasti, f. P.179, op. 2, spr. 405.

29. ДАДО, ф. 326, оп. 2, спр. 630; DADO f. 326, op. 2, spr. 630.

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