The deployment of the Czechoslovak independent brigade on the right-bank of Ukraine in 1943-1944

In this situation, Czechoslovak Brigade received an order from the commander of 40th Army to hand over its positions on the north bank of Hirskyy Tikych and concentrate on a new defensive line. The new position was located in the direction of the expected German advance, about 15 km west of Tsybuliv and Ivakhny. The forehead of defence line between Sabarivka (Сабарівка), Balabanivka (Балабанівка) and Frontivka (Фрон- тівка) was turned to the southeast. However, before the brigade could take up this position, it was ordered to move to the area of Stupky (Ступки). Detailed order was issued by the commander of the 51st Rifle Corps. But once again; before this order could be carried out, the brigade was directed to the area of Lukashivka (Лукашівка), about 10 km northeast of the initially intended position. These dynamic changes were caused not only because of changes in subordination of Czechoslovaks but also by the fact that the German strike broke through the Soviet defence, and instead of directly to the west, as expected, it turned north.³⁴

Subsequently, the brigade's destination changed several times, before, on 28 January 1944, it finally took defence on the line of the Yushkivtsi (Юшківці) and Rozhychna (Рожич- на), about five kilometres west of Lukashivka. It became clear that the task would be to prevent the opponent from penetrating north. The situation was, nevertheless, for Czechoslovaks critical, since the position of the I battalion was meantime occupied by Germans and Czechoslovak right flank was without any cover; that is why the I battalion was directed to area of Rozhychna. After all, Soviet troops in strength of five rifle divisions got into encirclement when two attacking

German formation met together in area of Balabanivka. Anyhow, after this achievement, German advancement culminated. So, the brigade held the set line until 31 January 1944, experiencing only small skirmishes until surrounded Soviet troops broke through and joint the core of their forces. Ibidem (27 to 31 January 1944); VUA- VHA, f. Ceskoslovenska vojenska mise v SSSR, box 68, no. 8 -- Report on engagement in January and February 1944.

At this moment, the Czechoslovak Brigade's participation in the Battle of Zhashkiv, also in the Korsun- Shevchenkivskyy campaign, ended. Although in the following days, the brigade changed several positions yet it did not get involved into direct combat. Finally, on 9 February 1944, the brigade was transferred in the second line and again placed under command the 50th Rifle Corps. VUA-VHA, f. 1. ceskoslovenska samostatna brigada, box 1, inv. no. 11 -- War diary of the 1st Czechoslovak Brigade (1 to 9 February 1944).

Assessment

The fighting in area of Zhashkiv were for Czechoslovaks in number of aspects unique. There, for the first time, the Czechoslovak Brigade met with defectors from the German side. This fact is evidence that morale was beginning to decay among the German Armed Forces. For example, on 10 January 1944, deserted Pvt. Josef Jan Goralcik. Before the Second World War he had Czechoslovak citizenship, but after German occupation he was called to the Wehrmacht. His fate, however, was not typical, because into German Armed Forces only selected groups of Czechoslovaks were compelled to enlist; among them people from Teschen Silesia (Tesinsko; Slqsk Cieszynski) or Hlucin Region (Hlucinsko) (see: Marsalek, Z. -- Neminar, J. 2019, especially pp. 104117).

On the other hand, as far as the Czechoslovak Brigade is concerned, the morale of their members was assessed, according to war diaries, as `very good'. However, several incidents indicate that this wasn't quite the case. After all, the brigade was very often moved from one place to another, usually without the possibility of any rest. Losses also gradually increased and the first combat failures also started to appear. One of these incidents, as an example, is the case of Pvt. Jurij Mumriak, a member of the 3rd company of the I infantry battalion. He deserted after his company was endangered by mortar fire. However, he was immediately caught. Although he faced the death penalty for `cowardice before the enemy', his company commander decided to pardon him and reassigned him to his unit. Soon after that, German tanks approached the position of the I battalion. Pvt. J. Mumriak took advantage of the chaos that erupted and ran away a second time. This time, he got caught after four days. Since it was his second failure, he was shot on the spot. This happened on 25 January 1944, at the time of harsh combat. To understand this, it is necessary to once again remind the fact that majority of members of Czechoslovak Brigade did not served voluntarily.

In this view, it is essential to assess all combats of Czechoslovaks. The fighting for Ruda and of Bila Tserkva, as was indicated above, claimed for Czechoslovak total losses of 411 men, i.e. approximately every eighth member of the brigade, i.e. 12.8 per cent (out of 3,204 men); among them there were 66 killed (and 270 wounded and 75 missing in action). Losses on the German side remain unknown and are now virtually impossible to know for sure. The war diary of the Czechoslovak brigade contains references to around 1,050 casualties that were inflicted upon the Germans, but these numbers are most likely exaggerated (Vojenske dejiny Ceskoslovenska. 1988, p. 356). Verifiably, German documents testify that the Czechoslovaks actually caused `significant' losses to the German Armed Forces and that they were caused mainly by artillery. BA-MA, RH RH 21-1/122 -- War diary of the 1st Panzer Army (passim).

The participation of the brigade in the Battle of Zhashkiv then claimed 160 casualties, (including 46 killed in action);5.8 percentinrelativeterms(out of 2,751 men before the engagement). The amount of losses on the German side remains also unknown, but given the operational situation, they are unlikely to reach the relevant number, not even at the tactical level; thou Czechoslovak Brigade claimed 1,000 casualties among opponent (Vojenske dejiny Ceskoslovenska. 1988, p. 362). Altogether, during its engagement in Right-Bank Urkaine, Czechoslovaks lost between 30 December 1943 and 31 January 1944, i.e. within 33 combat days, in total 571 men or 17.8 per cent (out of initial 3,204 men). Together with lost equipment, the combat ability was seriously affected which meant that Czechoslovak were transferred in fact in the rear.

The engagement in Ruda and Bila Tserkva demonstrates the sophistication of Red Army operational planning, which had mastered the most progressive tactical lessons at the time (indirect attack, so called pincer manoeuvre). Above all, it was the intention to deploy an attack with its task to bind the forces of opponent in combination with a outflank strike, which was aimed at the rear of the adversary's retreat routes. However, another encounter near Zhashkiv gives a totally different picture. Repeated frontal strikes towards Ostrozhany -- despite apparent failures and considerable losses -- testifies of the rigidity of the Soviet command and its blind obedience to the issued orders. It is therefore clear that the approach to resolving the situation on the battlefield depended on the position of a particular military headquarters and varied significantly from case to case.

Conclusion

From December 1943 to January 1944 the 1st Czechoslovak Independent Brigade was deployed in the Zhytomyr- Berdychiv offensive and partially in the Korsun-Shevchenkivskyy campaign. In first engagement with offensive, in second one with defensive task. This led to the battles of Ruda, Bila Tserkva and of Zhashkiv. In both campaigns the Czechoslovaks were assigned on a less exposed section and outside the centre of gravity of the Soviet attack. This, together with the fact that the Czechoslovaks represented only a tiny fraction of the Soviet forces -- not even one per cent--means that their share in the Soviet offensive efforts was limited. The brigade also achieved uneven results in the fighting. The battle of Ruda proceeded in principle according to a plan; the attack on Bila Tserkva brought only partial results; and the fighting near Zhashkiv ended without any achievement. The reason was not only caused by the rapid wearing down of the force of the Czechoslovak Brigade, but also errors in coordination with Soviet troops and units and very often inappropriately chosen operational assignments.

This last factor was particularly important, as the brigade had only very limited operational autonomy. The orders they received were often detailed and concerned not only the brigade as a whole, but also its individual components (battalions, companies). This means that the role of the Czechoslovak command was largely restricted to just handing over the order to subordinate units. Paradoxically,its `independent'character also contributed to this. Since it included a tank battalion, the brigade was very often divided into ad hoc combat groups. The purpose of these measures was to enable the Czechoslovak tanks to provide support not only to Czechoslovak but also to other infantry units of the Red Army.

Although the brigade was given several tasks that could not be accomplished, the key objectives for Czechoslovaks of both the Zhytomyr-Berdy- chiv and the Korsun-Shevchenkivskyy offensive, to prevent German troops from endangering the Soviet flank and rear was fulfilled, which led to Soviet victories in both campaigns This also allowed other Soviet troops to focus their efforts entirely on the main offensive. This is the main contribution of the 1st Czechoslovak Independent Brigade during the fighting in RightBank Ukraine.

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czechoslovak armed formations world war

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