Military supplies and the population at the beginning of the Rakoczi war of independence (1703-1704)

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Military supplies and the population at the beginning of the Rakoczi war of independence (1703-1704)

Yurii Chotari

PhD, Associate Professor Department of History and Social Sciences Ferenc Rakoczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian College of Higher Education

The article highlights that in the first two years of Rakoczi's War of Independence, the problems of military supply arose, in the solution of which the Prince was also strongly involved. In his decrees, he ordered the leading officials and war commissioners of the county to ensure the continuous supply of the troops, because the soldiers fighting for the independence of their country could not and should not suffer shortages at the front. Feeding the Kuruc army and supplying the cavalry troops, which were indispensable in the battles of the time, was a burden on the shoulders of the common population during the years of warfare. The efforts of the population for the benefit of the homeland were a great burden for the people, as the imperial and rebel armies sometimes tried to provide food from the same area. In the first years of the War of Independence, the present-day Transcarpathian region ensured the supply of food and forage to the troops besieging the region's fortresses (Mukachevo, Uzhhorod, Satu Mare). As the siege of Satu Mare, for example, lasted nearly a year and a half, the Hungarian state administration, which was gradually being built up in Rakoczi's state, solved this multifaceted task through military commissioners. Without this background work, it would not have been possible to maintain the positions built up and there would have been no chance of occupying the militarily significant fortifications.

It is known that in addition to the Hungarians, there was a significant Ruthenian and Romanian-speaking population in this area, who also contributed to the supply of Rakoczi's troops. Through the decrees of Ferenc Rakoczi II, which can be found in the State Archives of the Transcarpathian Region, he organized the supply of the army, created tax districts, where the procedure for the levies and the payments were clearly established. The «Transcarpathian» counties (Uzh, Ugocha, Bereg, Maramuresh) were under the jurisdiction of the military commissioner Gyorgy Orosz, who did his utmost to provide food and forage for the Kuruc army, which fought with varying success. Finally, the number of soldiers of the Kurucs who were sent to the various battlefields of the War of Independence from the territory of present-day Transcarpathia and the number of soldiers that our region was able to supply in proportion to the number of soldiers will be pointed out. The study explores the details of the cooperation between the military and the population, using archival sources.

Keywords: Kuruc army, Rakoczi's decrees, military supply, counties, castle siege, public tax.

ПОСТАЧАННЯ АРМІЇ ТА НАСЕЛЕННЯ НА ПОЧАТКУ ВИЗВОЛЬНОЇ ВІЙНИ ПІД ПРОВОДОМ ФЕРЕНЦА РАКОЦІ ІІ (1703-1704)

Юрій ЧОТАРІ

кандидат історичних наук, доктор філософії доцент кафедри історії і суспільних дисциплін Закарпатського угорського інституту ім. Ференца Ракоці ІІ

Висвітлено питання, пов язані зі забезпеченням війська під час визвольної війни під проводом Ференца Ракоці ІІ, у вирішенні яких він особисто брав активну участь €к власними розпорядженнями наказав головним чиновникам комітатів і своїм комісарам забезпечити військо харчами. Методологічною основою став комплексний підхід до аналізу архівних джерел, на основі яких висвітлено співпрацю населення та війська під час боїв. Простежено, що харчування військових куруців і забезпечення кавалерії, яка була незамінною в тогочасних боях, протягом багаторічної війни лягло на плечі звичайного населення. Акцентовано, що зусилля населення для блага батьківщини стали для народу важким тягарем, оскільки й імператорські війська, і повстанці часто намагалися забезпечити провіант із тої самої території. З ясовано, що землі сучасної Закарпатської обл. забезпечували в перші роки визвольної війни постачання харчами і кормом загони, які штурмували розташовані у краї замки (Мукачево, Ужгород, Сату-Маре). Встановлено, що оскільки, наприклад, облога Сату-Маре тривала майже півтора року, це складне завдання вирішували через військових комісарів. Констатовано, що без цієї тилової роботи було б неможливо утримувати новостворені військові табори й навіть не було шансу зайняти важливі з військового погляду фортеці.

Висновано, що на цих територіях, окрім угорців, проживала велика кількість русинів і румунів, які також долучилися до забезпечення війська Ракоці. Зазначено, що Ференц Ракоці II керував постачанням армії через укази, які зберігаються у Державному архіві Закарпатської обл., створював податкові округи, для яких чітко було визначено перелік податків і хід їх виконання. Простежено, що «закарпатські» комітати (Ужанський, Угочанський, Березький, Марамороський) перебували під керівництвом військового комісара Дєрдя Ороса, який доклав усіх зусиль, аби забезпечити провіантом воїнів-куруців, що воювали зі змінним успіхом. Також з'ясовано кількість військових куруців, які походили з території сучасної Закарпатської обл. та долучилися до різних фронтів визвольної війни, і те, скількох у пропорційному відношенні солдатів здатен був забезпечити наш край.

Ключові слова: військо куруців, укази Ракоці, постачання армії, комітати, штурм фортеці, податки для населення.

Background to the study and its aims

The War of Independence led by Ferenc Rakoczi II (1703-1711) went down in European history as the longest war aimed at establishing an independent Hungarian state. To achieve this, the prince made considerable efforts to convince the people of the country of the importance of his mission against Habsburg rule. In the territory of present-day Transcarpathia, the example of the unity and cooperation of the Hungarian and Ruthenian peoples was realized. Numerous scientific works have already proved that the liberation struggle in this region began with the unfolding of flags, and ended with the abandonment of Mukachevo Castle or the last parliament in Shalanky (Salank*). The peace treaty itself was nearly signed in the present-day Transcarpathian town of Khust (Huszt), but then actually it was signed in Satu Mare (Szatmar). Typically, the plan for the anti-Habsburg movement itself was formulated in a town that now belongs to Ukraine. The castle of Berezhany (then Poland, now Ternopil region) granted refuge to Ferenc Rakoczi II, who had fled from Vienna, and Miklos Bercsenyi, who had escaped from capture. They were allowed to stay incognito in Berezhany as proteges of the Polish Grand Hetman Adam Sieniewski and his wife Elisabeta. The secret peasant delegations from the Hungarian county of Bereg arrived in this castle with the aim of winning the prince for the cause of the War of Independence.

The strongest fortress in the north-eastern part of Hungary was Satu Mare Castle, the possession of which was of significant strategic importance. Because of its location, the castle controlled the roads leading to Transylvania in the valley of the River Somes (Szamos) and was also close to the economically important mining district of Oas (Avas), to Baia Mare (Nagybanya) and Baia Sprie (Felsobanya). In the first two years of the War of Independence, Rakoczi attempted to take this castle, but his plan was not completed until early January 1705. Until then, he held the castle and the town in a long, sometimes loose siege.

The aim of the present study is to investigate the details of one of the most important economic problems of the Rakoczi War of Independence, the supply of the war in the historical administrative units of the present-day Transcarpathian region, based on archival sources. Based on the evaluation of the documents available in the State Archives of the Transcarpathian Region, it is clear that the contemporary population of present- day Transcarpathia contributed to the military victories of the first years of the War of Independence not only by providing soldiers but also by supplying food to the troops.

Review of the academic literature

military supplies rakoczi war independence

Rakoczi arrived in Ghenci (Gencs) near Carei (Nagykaroly) on 15 August 1703. This is when the siege began. He stayed here continuously until 8 October and mainly organized the encirclement of the castle. He mobilized a large part of his troops, as the castle's defense system gave the Austrian army stationed inside it a considerable advantage. The garrison of the fort was under the command of experienced chief officers - General Friedrich Lowenburg and General Dietrich Glockelsperg. During the siege, the military supply of Rakoczi's army was continuously developed. Initial practice shows that the troops themselves seized the necessary food and fodder from the areas they occupied as a result of their advance, in addition to the supplies they had received. Thus, the population living in the siege zone was at the mercy of soldiers who were often undisciplined and sometimes had difficulty obeying their commanders. In the absence of an adequate state institution, the prince controlled the army and the supply of the army by his own decrees. The looting of the military could not be stopped due to the circumstances. The military, mostly in the absence of pay, considered this to be the only source of income. Based on this, it is natural that in the petitions and county reports written to the prince, complaints against the insurgents were also formulated.

The state of Rakoczi had to deal with the initial difficulties, and the county leadership had to be organized in accordance with the interests of the War of Independence. Agnes R. Varkonyi (1928-2014), a Rakoczi researcher, is correct when she sees the key to successful cooperation in the loyalty of the county officers and the effectiveness of the county's implementation of the decrees. «How efficient was the new state? It largely depended on the counties and the local governments. The county and the city magistrate accepted central decisions or politicized according to their own local interests».

On September 7, Rakoczi issued a military regulation from the Domaneshti (Doma- hida) camp to Captain Pal Nagy of Carei (Nagykaroly), in 21 points, with which he wanted to improve the discipline of the army, warning the military against disturbing the population. He put the obligations of the gun owner and the possible penalties into strictly worded points. He first emphasized the duty to guard, the prohibition of criticizing officers, and the punishment of escapes and espionage. During the campaign in the Trans-Tysa region (July 7 - October 16, 1703), he issued several decrees in which he repeatedly warned the rebellious elements against lawlessness and the misuse of weapons.

Rakoczi dedicated several decrees to the organization of military supplies. On the one hand, the siege of Mukachevo Castle and Uzhhorod Castle had to be supplied with food and fodder for the horses, and on the other hand, the siege around Satu Mare Castle had to be provided with food and soldier replacement by the population. In the archives of Transcarpathia, the documents about the siege of Satu Mare (Szatmar) became regular from September, and from this month onwards new details and connections regarding the siege of the time can be revealed.

Research results

It is clear from Rak6czi's first decree on the siege of Satu Mare (Szatmar) that he continued the siege, did not regroup his regiments but withdrew further away from Satu Mare (Szatmar). The real reason for Rak6czi's departure was probably related to the imperial army's military actions in Transylvania. He stressed that, in order to continue the siege, the counties had to continue the provision of war suppliesand food. It is clear from the accounts of the period that the counties of Bereg, Ugocha, and Maramuresh also made a significant contribution. The catering of the mercenaries coming from Poland to Nameny in Bereg County was also provided by the surrounding counties, according to Rak6czi's orders.

Ferenc Rak6czi II did not have the means to besiege the fortresses in present-day Transcarpathia, he lacked artillery and soldiers trained for the task. He nevertheless ordered a siege around Uzhhorod Castle, Munkachevo Castle, and especially Satu Mare Castle, the results of which were not seen unЋdl much later. Providing the blockaded army with supplies became particularly difficult in winter. The prince kept in constant contact with the coun- Ћdes, and even then he demanded regular informaЋdon on the problems of military supply.

During the War of Independence, Rak6czi issued several decrees concerning the family members of the Kurucs, their rights, and their obligations to carry their burdens. In this respect, he sent several decrees to the surrounding counties. One of these decrees was issued on September 27, according to which those who took up arms and fought with him for the freedom of the country were exempt from all types of taxation and public dues. The others were obliged to serve their landlords in their customary lawful peasant capacity and to help restore the country to its former glory. On August 28, 1703, the Vetish (Vetes) manifesto was published, which determined the taxation and status of the family members who stayed at home. This document protected the interests of the population who took up arms and provided partial tax exemption for wives and children who stayed at home. However, Rak6czi could not completely exempt them from the supply of food to the counties. Those living in one household received only a discount that they could not be charged for transportation. For them, the decision was that they must continue to serve the landlord according to the law. However, the household of a serf soldier, if he had only his wife at home, did not owe service to the landlord under the decree. At this time the prince also exempted the serf soldiers from the payment of tax. The father and elder brother of the soldier under the banner of Rak6czi, as well as the serfs who remained at home, were still obliged to pay the tribute. However, the observance of the new measures encountered a number of obstacles, the solution of which was later dealt with not only by Rakoczi but also by the county notaries. Istvan Ujhelyi, the notary of Ugocha County, made a proposal concerning the taxation of the family members of the soldiers. According to this proposal, the prince should lay down in a decree the forms of taxation for them, because without settling this issue they would not be able to meet the legally imposed taxes. On the left side of the document, we can read the resolutions of the prince's secretary, Janos Papai, in which he explained that Ugocha, like the neighboring counties, could collect food from the soldiers' family members who stayed at home. Rakoczi, in a separate decree dated 30 January 1704, sent to the counties, emphasized that family members who stayed at home were also obliged to provide food. Certainly, because of the weight of the issues raised, at the beginning of the War of Independence, he also ordered the exemption from the taxes of those soldiers who were not yet his supporters.

The nobility did not want to accept the rules that were detrimental to their economic interests. Besides the counties, Rakoczi also sent a decree to Istvan Sennyei to settle the tensions between the people who stayed at home and the landed gentry. Here he warned against excesses and charging the poor. It is characteristic that even then he demanded strict compliance with existing instructions, while at the same time keeping an eye on the suggestions of the county. In any case, he sought to alleviate the tension between the social strata even if he failed to do so in full. Soldiers who were poorly or not paid at all could not be deterred from looting. In warfare based on fighting traditions, loot played an important role, as this was the only way they could feed themselves. In the meantime, food was provided in the form prescribed by regulations. The submissions of Uzh County were urged by Gyorgy Orosz, who demanded that wheat, barley, and meat be delivered to the food warehouse in Ecsed.

Rakoczi left his camp at Satu Mare (Szatmar) on 8 October and set off for Tokaj. He entrusted the siege to General Istvan Sennyey, who held the post until 13 February 1704. At that time he dispersed the regiment of the imperial garrison. The prince ordered him to leave the castle and appointed General Istvan Buday in his place, but on 14 June 1704, his camp was also ambushed by the attackers from the castle.

Rakoczi had active correspondence from his Tokaj camp, in which he covered the further process of the siege. He recalled the decree previously passed by the counties, according to which those who had submitted to regiments and banners were not allowed to leave en masse. Here we are talking about those who had gone into camp at the first call and some of whom were already tired of fighting.

In January 1705, Rakoczi reorganized the War Commissariat, which had already been established on 9 November 1703, in order to manage the army's food, pay and equipment more efficiently. He put Istvan Csaky, the chief commissar, at its head. Csaky was assigned a special commissar in charge of the mercenaries, food, clothing, artillery, and armaments. On 29 January 1705, Rakoczi issued an order from Topolchianky (Kistapolcsany) on the payment of the commissars. These posts were mainly held by the landed gentry, who usually learned the administration as county officials. It took years for the upper nobility to become involved in solving the complex problems of administration and the economy. At the beginning of the War of Independence, economic administrators, provisors, and prefects of estates were appointed to fill these posts at the county level. They were able to continue their work while remaining on the estates, so Rakoczi retained the social structure of the time and did not create any new posts in the counties. However, based on the old administrative system, he increased the number of economic officials in the counties. Thus, he sometimes expanded the powers of military organizers at the expense of county leaders.

At the time of the first siege of Satu Mare (Szatmar), which mobilized considerable forces, the commissar in chief* was already providing the troops with supplies, especially food. Their work consisted of distributing the necessary food and fodder to the counties, in accordance with the military rationing norms of the time. Ferenc Gyulay had already done so on 5 December 1703 for the counties of Szatmar, Central Szolnok, Maramuresh, Ugocha, three districts of Szabolcs, two districts of Inner Szolnok and Chioar (Kovarvidek). That meant 60 pounds of meat per soldier per month, half a cube of flour, 1.5 cubes of fodder per horse. This was the first planned levy that attempted to distribute the burden proportionately. True, in practice, not everything went according to the regulations, because the population living within the 50-kilometer radius of the battlefield willingly or unwillingly still fed the besieging troops. The concentration of the burden in one area can be explained by the poor transport and road conditions of the time and the possible excesses of the military. In parallel with the commissariat in charge of military supplies, Rakoczi, Bercsenyi or the generals in charge of the area also organized the food supply for the soldiers. Due to the workload of the center, the role of two positions in the army food supply organization increased: that of the district commissaries and that of the clothing, artillery, and armament commissaries.

District commissariats played a key role in the management of military supplies, and their wide-ranging economic tasks were usually performed satisfactorily. Their economic activities also included the takeover of castles, the minting of copper coins, the manufacture of gunpowder, the sewing of uniforms, the manufacture of arms, the salt trade, and the organization of the recruitment of soldiers.

Later, the districts of the commissariats changed continuously, and during the War of Independence, the counties of Bereg, Uzh, Ugocha, and Maramuresh were divided into different divisions. On 13 November 1704, Rakoczi regulated the collection of food tax for the whole country in Nove Zamky (Ersekujvar). The counties were divided into tax districts and headed by chief commissars. In this way, he wanted to make it easier to supply the troops during the winter. Then the counties of Uzh, Bereg, Ugocha, Mara- muresh, Szabolcs, Bihar, Szatmar, Central Szolnok, Kraszna, Zarand and the Chioar (Kovarvidek) region were transferred to the district of Gyorgy Orosz. During the eight years of the War of Independence, the commissioners ensured the supply of the army, although their work was marked by many mistakes and shortcomings.

The burden of providing supplies for the war naturally fell on the counties. The collection of the levies imposed on the nobility and serfs was handled by the county officials according to their own interests. Therefore, in order to avoid abuses, Rakoczi ordered the county to send two commissars with the food supply wagons, one of whom would stay in the siege camp, while the other would organize the collection of food and its transport to the camp. Due to the prevailing conditions, this was the only way the prince saw to secure the supply of food. However, he stressed that the quantity of food to be supplied to the troops could in no way be at the expense of the county.

During the first year of the War of Independence, food was supplied continuously, albeit with shortages, especially from the counties close to the besieged Satu Mare Castle. This is confirmed by records showing that food was supplied to the regiments of Albert Kis and Tivadar Belteki from neighboring counties. Albert Kis's regiment came to Satu Mare via Ugocha County, while Belteki's regiment, under the command of General Pal Orosz, marched to the besieged fortress in early December. Sennyei had also informed the relevant counties in advance of the need for supplies, which were accounted for by Istvan Ujlaky, deputy lord-sheriff, at the end of 1705.

In parallel with the rapid military successes, Rakoczi had to establish his own state apparatus in the conquered territories, for the time being without a significant part of the landed gentry. He needed to secure an economically well-functioning hinterland in order to continue the struggle for freedom, which had become a nationwide struggle. As his soldiers advanced, he gradually took possession of the so-called fiscal estates and the abandoned noble estates. This process went smoothly where the prefects of the estates stayed on and helped to manage affairs. The estates of the Perenyi family in Ugocsa County remained homeless until the transfer of the baronial family, as even before the appearance of the regiments of Albert Kis and Janos Majos, the members of the baronial family fled to Khust Castle. The management of these estates, the smooth use of the goods here for the purposes of the army, required the appointment of clerks who also managed the enormous territories. On October 7, 1703, Rakoczi appointed Gyorgy Ramocsahazy* as prefect to manage the treasury areas and property occupied as a result of the Trans-Tysa campaign. Under his authority were the thirtieth tax collectors of the Trans-Tysa region, the officers, and the customs officers. He administered the Rakoczi estates on the same principles. On 3 November 1703, Rakoczi took measures in relation to the thirtieth tax from the Tokaj camp, with which he helped to establish free trade. He collected the thirtieth tax from the merchants according to the old custom and used the proceeds for military purposes. At that time, Balint Ilosvay was the thirtieth tax collector in Vynohradiv, Gyorgy Bornemissza in Mukachevo, and Imre Haraszti in Uzhhorod. In 1704, Rakoczi sent Gyorgy Gerhart, later senator, to review the thirtieth tax.

In addition to the supplies for the siege of the Satu Mare Castle, recruits were also ordered from Ugocha and Bereg to the Mukachevo blockade, as there they had to prepare for a longer siege too. In his decree of 6 November 1703 in Tokaj, Rakoczi ordered Ugocha to place the agreed number of soldiers under the command of Colonel Janos Majos, who was entrusted with the capture of Mukachevo Castle. In the letter, Rakoczi accused the people of Ugocha of stopping the initial enthusiasm and then sent a letter to the county on December 5 with similar content. The inhabitants of Uzh County were regularly instructed by the colonels of the War of Independence to feed the people in Mukachevo Castle, and Pal Balazs imposed grain and transport obligations on Uzh County, among others. On February 16, 1704, the castle defenders were reconciled after they surrendered the Rakoczi Castle in Mukachevo with a free retreat. The county usually complied with the regulations for warfare, as evidenced by the relevant statements.

In order to speed up the food deliveries and get them to their destination, the prince in his decree of 26 December 1703 ordered Ugocha to send Istvan Sennyei to the Trans-Tysa region, first of all, to remedy the grievances of the poor, and secondly to remedy the grievances of the nobility. He ordered Sennyei, with the help of Gyorgy Dolhay, to catch the disorderly thieves and prosecute them or send them to the army. He gave special priority to salt deliveries, the smooth running of which he entrusted to Gyorgy Ramocsahazy. At the end of this year, he issued a special dispatch on the need to take action against deserters from the ranks of the army and return them to their troops. The decree was addressed to the heads of the counties, who were responsible for its implementation.

In addition to food and recruitment, the counties also had to ensure the payment of various extraordinary monetary taxes. One of these was the obligation to keep post horses, for which the county administration allocated 1000 forints. It should be noted that similar collections were used to cover gifts to the prince and the arrears of salaries of the county officers. It is typical that the entire amount had to be raised by the peasantry*. Food delivery has been regulated on several occasions, both to prevent abuse and to impose new obligations on the part of the population staying at home. On 23 January 1704, Istvan Ujhelyi, as the ambassador of the county, addressed a petition to the Prince in order to settle these issues. The solution to the problems was expected directly from Rakoczi. Concerning the noble cavalry and those ordered to besiege Mukachevo Castle, they asked to be returned to the territory of the county, as they could not be supplied with either quarters or food.

Ujhelyi complained about Istvan Sennyei, the commander of the blockade, saying that the wagons carrying food to the Satu Mare (Szatmar) blockade were being held there by the troops. At that time, he reported the loss of 16 wagons, which the county was unable to replace, which had a negative impact on further transport. Rak6czi's reply was that only the specified number of wagons was to be sent and that the commissioner should arrange for the remaining wagons to be recalled. As regards the financial situation of the county, the reply mentions the following case. In the summer of 1703, the county administration borrowed a large sum of money (six thousand German forints) from the Germans in Kosice (Kassa), which it was unable to repay because of the tax burden. The administration, therefore, asked the Prince to intervene to cancel the debt. They also asked the prince to put an end to the despotism of the «blaspheming and debauching» fugitives in the county. In this initial period, the prince could not count on the clear support of the leaders of the counties, but he received useful comments, as it was in this region that the difficulties of discipline, taxation, and food supply first appeared. In the spring of 1704, Rakoczi controlled the supply of the army largely by his own decrees. A local historian, Tivadar Lehoczky (1830-1915) drew the attention to a document from the archives of Ugocha, in which Rakoczi ordered the supply of food to Satu Mare Castle, in order to prevent soldiers from escaping from the entrenchment due to the lack of food.

In the early days of the liberation struggle, the leadership of some counties illegally levied financial taxes on peasant farms, which were not regular, but were a heavy burden in addition to the soldiers' supplies. In this connection, Rakoczi stipulated that the tax should not be collected from peasants in military service until the next time it was imposed.

The events around the siege of Satu Mare (Szatmar) showed the difficulties that Rakoczi and his soldiers had to face. Due to the lack of equipment and initial lack of organization, they were unable to successfully intercept the enemy's attacks that sometimes broke out of the castle, so that they could always return to the castle, even if with losses. On 21 June 1704, the Satu Mare (Szatmar) garrison succeeded in breaking the siege barrier provided by General Istvan Buday. The organization of the Kuruc teams continued nonetheless. In the autumn of 1704, Pal Orosz asked 60 cavalry soldiers to the Presov (Eperjes) camp from Uzh County alone, which he received with some delay. In order to ensure the supply of the besiegers, Rakoczi sent several decrees to the county so that his soldiers would not leave their posts for lack of food.

Istvan Buday, as the military commander in the area, wrote letters in Kallo and Majcichov (Majteny) demanding military supplies, as well as the mobilized inhabitants of the county to join him. He stated that he would hold the county leaders responsible if the siege barrier was abandoned due to a lack of food. This time the food had to be transported to Szamosszeg. On 22 July, the county received a much more extensive order from Rakoczi. Here, the Prince did not only warn the counties around the blockade to deliver the food but also instructed Chief Inspector Gyorgy Orosz and Commissioner Farkas Zoltany to reinforce the blockade's military supplies. He ordered the food and wagons for the workers to be sent to the provisions storehouse in Ecsed. In this document, he again urged the fulfillment of the levies established by Chief Commissioner Gyorgy Orosz, who urged the sending of reapers and collectors to Ecsed.

A month later, Gyorgy Orosz ordered food for General Simon Forgach's army of 6000 people and fodder for the animals from Uzh County. They were stationed in Satu Mare (Szatmar). A portion of the making of uniforms was also imposed on the counties, primarily in accordance with the order of Miklos Bercsenyi of 27 July 1704. The clothing and footwear that had not been sent in by then had to be delivered to Ferenc Lonyai, the military commissioner. Lonyay himself issued a number of orders to the counties to prepare warm clothing for the soldiers for winter. He demanded 1000 shubas (a cloak, reaching to the ankles, made of hairy sheep skin) and 100 woolen overcoats from Uzh County. In September 1704, the siege was further strengthened, at which point Rakoczi instructed the counties to return the released officers and soldiers to their units without delay.

In November, the prince re-fixed the food services also by decree. He created new tax districts by counties, where the charges and the procedure for making contributions were more clearly defined. This time, the counties of Uzh, Ugocha, Bereg, and Mara- muresh also came under the district of Gyorgy Orosz. It was based on these orders that his decrees appeared in the counties, designating specific routes and destinations for the transport of foodstuffs.

Finally, Simon Forgach succeeded in forcing the surrender of Satu Mare Castle in early January 1705. He also warned the county that if the debt was not repaid, the country's interests would suffer greatly. The document concluded with a so-called appendix, which contained a list of debtors and shed light on the identity of the people staying there from the counties. The debt could be settled with the help of the county as the points of the capitulation were fulfilled. After the blockade was lifted, the consignments from Ugocha arrived in the Satu Mare (Szatmar) food store. As far as possible - on the instructions of Rakoczi, Gyorgy Orosz, Sandor Karolyi, and Ferenc Galambos - the county provided workers, carts, and other economic means to Satu Mare Castle, and at the same time to Ecsed Castle to restore it.

Summary and perspectives of further investigation of the topic

In conclusion, comparing the analyzed censuses, we have to agree with the opinion of Professor of History Janos Varadi-Sternberg, who stated the following about the participation of the counties of the Transcarpathian region: «The list of the Kuruc soldiers of the 55 settlements of Ugocha nicely complements the list of the Bereg Kurucs. Based on these, we can now name 1259 Kuruc soldiers from 165 localities of the two counties. There are no such detailed records for the other two counties in our region, but we do have some data. Rakoczi wrote in his memoirs: “The county of Maramuresh increased my army by about four thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry”. As far as Uzh County is concerned, we know that Ukrainian-Ruthenian peasants descended from the Verkhovina in Berezna, who numbered between five and six hundred, besieged Uzhhorod Castle from the autumn of 1703 until March 1704. Based on the above, we can say without exaggeration that in 1703-1704 about 7-8 thousand soldiers from our region (Transcar- pathia) served in Rakoczi's army. This is very significant participation, if we take into account that according to the calculations of the military historian Arpad Marko, the Kuruc army numbered about 30 thousand at the end of 1703...».

Finally, if we compare the proportion of freedom fighters in the «Transcarpathian» counties, we can conclude that the number of inhabitants was not decisive. Even though the population of Bereg was several times larger than that of Ugocha, the participation of Bereg was conspicuously lower than that of Ugocha in the 1706 survey. The number of the cavalry nobility was 72 (27 in Bereg), the number of horses 90 (46 in Bereg), the number of servants 15 (15 in Bereg), and the number of noble infantry 99 (47 in Bereg). Uzh County had 115 cavalry nobles, 152 horses, 24 servants, and 38 noble infantry. If we take into account that these figures reflect only a snapshot, as there may have been significant changes in numbers within weeks or months, the proportions clearly indicate mass participation in some of the north-eastern counties.

The most characteristic feature of Rak6czi's army is the constant change, the personal fluctuation. Not only did the upper military leadership divert each company and regiment from one battlefield to another according to the needs of the time, but the soldiers themselves, individually or in groups, sometimes went home from camp, sometimes returned, and not always to the place they had come from. A careful perusal of the military rosters, in their comments section, will support these findings.

Examining the first two years of the War of Independence, the material of the State Archives of the Transcarpathian Region shows that our region provided a significant amount of military supplies and a sufficient number of soldiers in relation to the population. Achieving this required a great effort on the part of the population on the one hand, and on the part of the leaders of the War of Independence on the other, who were able to achieve these goals by means of requests, or rather decrees. The population of the present-day Transcarpathian region thus made a significant contribution not only to the supply of the forces of the War of Independence but also to the building of Rak6czi,s state, which they managed to maintain for eight years, albeit with shortcomings, and raised hopes throughout Hungary for the independence of the state and the achievement of freedom.

The topic under study can be further researched mainly for the following years, thus combining data for the whole region.

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