Podilia Village in 1944: Social and Economic Situation

In addition to direct forceful methods to help and promote harvest, various forms of party Soviet institutions' work included different campaigns conducted under the relevant slogans of the time. According to the government, they had to bring positive results.

On September 7, 1944, a letter was distributed in the region, signed by Isay, Secretary of the CP(b)U Regional Committee, and Ryabukhin, Commissioner of the People's Commissariat of Procurement in the Vinnytsia region, proposing "to help the front and the Red Army and to improve the situation with the supply of industrial centers by holding in the period from September 8 to October 8, a month of procurement of livestock products and carryng out the following specific tasks." Each district received target figures for meat, milk, eggs and wool, which had to be met as part of the annual mandatory delivery plan. Our attention was drawn to the point which demanded "to organize the mass surrender by collective farms, collective farmers, workers and employees and individuals, of the livestock and poultry in advance at the expense of meat supplies in 1945." [SAV&R, F. P-136. Op. 13. Ref. 5. Arc. 27]. Given the desire of some local leaders to "fulfill and overfulfill", such a requirement for the farmers could mean forced additional meat deliveries to the detriment of their families.

The Vinnytsia region, in addition to all the above mentioned types of food, was also a supplier of vegetables. In particular, the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Vinnytsia Regional Council of Workers' Deputies of September 30, 1944 approved a plan for the receipt and use of vegetables from the 1944 harvest. Among other things, it provided for the supply of the Red Army in the amount of 32,901 tons, for trade and catering - 2920 tons, export to Moscow - 1050 tons.The plan also provided for the processing and preservation of vegetables. Within the next 5 days, it was to be brought to the attention of those who were to carry it out [SAV&R, F. R-5091. Op. 2. Ref. 1. Arc. 81].

Interesting, in our opinion, is the information about the supply of vegetables to Moscow in terms of war. Vinnytsia region was liberated from the German-Romanian occupiers just a few months before. It suffered significant material destruction, huge human losses - this was confirmed by the Stalinist regime, which restored its power. But Moscow immediately returned to the previous, colonial policy (in the 1930's the practice of providing Russian cities with food from Vinnytsia region was carried out even in 1932-1933). Until recently occupied by the Germans and Romanians Vinnytsia region, immediately after the "liberation" began working for the previous occupiers, who did not quite take into account the interests of the people of the region.

Among the forms of "stimulating" the implementation of procurement plans were various prohibitions. In particular, as was often the case in the pre-war years, a lot of prohibitions applied to trade. Thus, on August 2, 1944, the Bershad District Executive Committee adopted a resolution banning trade of grain, flour, oil-producing plants until the full implementation of state supplies [SAV&R, F. R-5073. Op. 2. Ref. 5. Arc. 167a]. Among other things, sale of food gave the peasants the opportunity to get the money needed to pay taxes: labordays, earned in the collective farm, were not paid at all, or the money was not enough. Now the collective farmers were in an even worse situation.

The last discovered document of national importance, dated 1944, concerning the procurement and supply of food by the Vinnytsia region, was the resolution of the Soviet People's Commissar of the USSR № 1653 "On the delivery of bread to Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk regions", which included Vinnytsia region: it was obliged to send to the Sverdlovsk region 10 thousand tons of bread in order to ensure "uninterrupted supply of bread to the population" in January-March 1945 [SAV&R, F. P-136. Op. 13. Ref. 1. Arc. 48].

Characterizing the state of agriculture in Vinnytsia, we should pay attention to another important, in our opinion, aspect that helps to estimate effectiveness of the collective farm management system. As is a well-known fact, not a single important issue, whichever aspect of life it concerned, in the Soviet period could be resolved without the opinion of the communist party. This also applied to the functioning of collective farms. With the liquidation of the private ownership in the village, the collective farmers lived and worked from the beginning of the establishment of the collective farm system in strict correspondence with the party guidelines. An example of such leadership is a letter signed by the secretary of the regional committee Mishchenko that accompanied a copy of the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b), which, in our opinion, deserves publication: "To the secretary of the district committee of the party. The regional committee of the party sends you a copy of the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) of October 4, 1944 "On the unsatisfactory plowing in collective and state farms."

Attaching great importance to the issue of plowing as the best guarantee for timely spring sowing and high yields in 1945, the Party Regional Committee draws your attention to this question and demands to organize plowing and to unconditionally provide accomplishment of the plowing plan in your area, being guided thus by the decision of regional executive committee and the regional committee of the CP(b)U of September 27, 1944 "On the plowing and the plan of deep plowing for sugar beet sowing in the collective farms of the region in 1945" [SAV&R, F. P-136. Op. 13. Ref. 5. Arc. 51].

Thus, plowing the land without a party decision was impossible and even dangerous, because self-government could be regarded as sabotage and punished according to the party and state decisions.

Another example. At the end of 1944, the regional party committee and the regional executive committee prepared a letter addressed to each head of the village council in the Vinnytsia region, reminding them of the need to fulfill their obligations to the state, and the first one was: "Immediately check the state of supply of bread, potatoes, vegetables, meat, milk and other products to the state by the collective farms of your village council. Mobilize the attention of all Soviet and collective farm assets, raise all the resources and opportunities of your village and in the nearest future complete the fulfillment of all obligations of your village to the state" [SAV&R, F. P-136. Op. 13. Ref. 5. Arc. 25]. Then followed the reminder about the end of the gathering of sugar beets and potatoes from the fields and ensuring the supply of raw materials to the country's industry, about the "great obligation to the state coal industry to provide mines with manpower, scaffolding, to provide rail transport and enterprises with firewood." The next task inscribed to increase the number of collective farm herds by removing young animals from contracting and ensuring their proper stay on farms. (Note that this decision very quickly led to a reduction in livestock due to lack of food, poor care, disease, etc., but the state plan to increase the collective farm herd had to be implemented...). And this despite the fact that the appeal stated that "... it is necessary to prepare and insulate [...] the premises, to establish proper care for young animals in order to fully preserve all young animals and help them survive winter in good, well-fed condition." [SAV&R, F. P-136. Op. 13. Ref. 5. Arc. 25].

As for the sowing campaign of 1944-1945, the Communist Party and the Soviet state took care of this as well. They advised to organize a "thorough inspection of the availability of seeds for the entire planned sowing area for each collective farm. The seeds have to be cleaned, exchanged and purchased. Examine all agricultural equipment, organize its repair and manufacture of the new one. Organize proper care for working cattle in winter, so that they survived winter well-fed and in full efficiency" [SAV&R, F. P-136. Op. 13. Ref. 5. Arc. 25]. It seems that without a reminder from the Communist Party, the peasants may not have known that seeds were needed for sowing, and cattle needed to be fed.

It is noteworthy that not a single of such documents had a word about the state's obligations to the peasantry, about the interests of those who kept the army, fed millions of workers in industrial centers and city dwellers, and sent food to Moscow.

The assessment of the agriculture development in Vinnytsia region in 1944 was given by the collective farmers themselves, whose statements show a deep understanding of the situation: "Life in our collective farm has never been like this. Horses are skinny, there is no food for them, except rye straw, half of them have already died. The carts are all broken and there's no one to repair them" (December 1944, Nemyriv district, Sypachky village); ".complete mismanagement/arnachy in the collective farm. Everything is ruined and no one is concerned with putting the collective farm in order. The bread from the collective farm didn't come. The horses were all infected, almost all of them were shot. There are three horses left for the whole collective farm. Calves get sick, several of them have to be slaughtered every day." (January 1945, Kryzhopil district, Kryzhopil village); ". the collective farm distributes horses, and they die because there is nothing to feed them on. Two-three horses die every day. Ten horses were given to our brigade, but no one wants to take them" (January 1945, Voronovytsia district, Volovodivka village); "The situation is so shameful in our collective farm that you can't imagine. Spring is coming, there are no seeds, no traction forces. There were 27 horses, 9 cows in the collective farm, but only 20 horses and 3 cows remained. They die because of the lack of food. Seeds for sowing are collected from collective farmers" (Chechelnytskyi district); "It's already March, sowing is coming soon, and there are no seeds or horses in our collective farm. There were 12 horses in our brigade, and only two remained, the others died. The governers don't do anything. We are all doomed to grief and famine" (Tomashpil district); "Spring is approaching, fields need to be sown, and there are no seeds to sow in the collective farm. Almost half of the village is currently starving, and authorities demand seeds for sowing from them. Almost all the horses are dead, only two pairs remained" (Obodov district); "There are no seeds for sowing in the collective farm, there is no traction force, I do not know what we will do in the spring with such leaders" (Monastyryshchensk district) [SAV&R, F. P-136. Op. 13. Ref. 25. Arc. 23, 26, 27, 63]. Thus, the peasants noted the complete inability of local authorities to establish proper functioning of collective farms. In addition, analyzing the economic situation in the collective farms, the peasants concluded and foresaw the inevitable famine that occurred in some villages in early 1945.

Conclusions. The consequences of German-Soviet war and German-Romanian occupation significantly worsened the social and economic situation in the Vinnytsia district. Significant human casualties and decrease in the population of the region, destruction of the already weak material and technical base of collective farms were the consequences of the management of the new occupants. 1944 was characterized by a significant reduction in livestock, especially cows and horses, which could to some extent replace the technique. The personnel support of collective farms was unsatisfactory.

At the same time, the return of Soviet power and the Stalin order was accompanied by a rapid resumption of procurement policies, which increased significantly.

The lack of material interest in the results of work in the collective farm led to low labor discipline, refusal to work.

In 1944, Vinnytsia region was an important supplier of food to the army, large industrial centers and Moscow. Stalin's government used the inhabitants of the Vinnytsia region as "labor reserves", as evidenced by the mobilization of young people to Donbas mines, the relocation of Podilia peasants to the Crimea. The central government of the Soviet state and the leadership of the bolshevik party were not concerned with a significant reduction in the number of workers in collective farms.

The social and economic situation in the region was characterized and assessed by collective farmers in late 1944 - early 1945. Emphasizing the inability of various levels of government to establish effective collective farms work, the peasants foresaw a new famine. Thus, the foundations of the Holodomor of 1946-1947 were laid in 1944 by the social and economic policy of the Stalin regime.

Gratitude

Sincere gratitude to the staff of State Archives of Vinnytsia and the region for help with the research materials, and to members of the editorial board of the journal - for constructive advice during the preparation of the article for publication.

Financing. The author did not receive financial support for the research and publication of this paper.

References