Regional Integration Projects in Venezuela's Foreign Policy under the Presidency of Nicolas Maduro (2013-2018)

Thus, CELAC was unable to solve the key problems of Latin American integration and overcome the fragmentation of Latin American regionalism. N. Maduro had not managed to implement any significant projects within the organization, and instead of becoming a leader, Venezuela had turned into an outcast who needed constant protection and patronage. At the same time, although the organization went through a crisis during the studied period, it has not completely lost its potential. Attempts to develop a multilateral approach for solving acute regional problems on the basis of CELAC may be evidence of another step towards Latin American integration and the readiness of the countries of the region to intensify their influence on international processes.

The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)

H. Chavez had high expectations for the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), where Venezuela was one of the founders of the regional association. From the beginning, UNASUR was seen as an instrument to keep the Organization of American States (OAS) out of South America. While the Brazilian government had lost its interest in the organization as an instrument of regional power projection, UNASUR became more critical for Venezuela as an instrument of 'regime boosting' and 'soft balancing' against the US Nolte D, Mijares V.M. UNASUR. P. 96..

The first great challenge in creating UNASUR was to provide an institutional design flexible enough to allow states as dissimilar as Brazil and Suriname or rivals, such as Colombia and Venezuela, to converge on a common project. Physical belonging to South America was the central criterion of membership. Regarding the scope of issues covered, UNASUR's institutional design was ambitious and in line with post-hegemonic regionalism, establishing a dozen sectoral councils covering different areas: defense, health, electoral issues, energy, science, technology, and innovation, culture, social development, economy and finance, education, infrastructure and planning, drugs, citizen security, and the coordination of activities against transnational organized crime. The proliferation of sectoral councils sought to incorporate countries with different interests in the regional project. According to V. Mijares and D. Nolte, a single focal entity did not centralize these multiple goals due to the varying importance of member countries Nolte D, Mijares V.M. UNASUR. P. 95..

Within the framework of the dynamic structure of UNASUR, it was supposed to solve issues related to ensuring regional security and defense matters. The inclusion of those issues in the scope of its activities fundamentally distinguished this organization from all the associations that existed before. To consider those issues, the Defense Council (organization of collective defense) was established within the framework of UNASUR, the purpose of which was to consolidate the efforts of the countries of South America to create a South American zone of peace, to form common approaches in matters of regional and international security, to participate in peacekeeping operations, as well as to establish contacts for solving issues of defense and fighting against drug trafficking Гаврилова Н.В. (ред.). Зовнішня політика країн Латинської Америки... С. 27..

After coming to power, N. Maduro immediately used the organization's authority to eliminate possible international condemnation of the dubious democracy of the presidential election. Moreover, an invitation was made for UNASUR to play a supervisory role in the electoral polls by being independent, impartial, and respecting Venezuelan sovereignty. The agreement between Venezuela and UNASUR was signed on March 25th, and it formalized UNASUR's commitment to observing elections in that country. The organization deployed approximately forty-two observers. Despite some violations pointed out by the representatives of Colombia and Brazil, the elections were generally recognized as democratic Borda S. The Union of South American Nations. Series: Mapping Multilateralism in Transition, No 3. New York: International Peace Institute, 2014. 16 p. P. 7-8. URL: http://www.istor.org/stahle/resrep09508..

That was facilitated by the fact that the former Venezuelan Foreign Minister All Rodriguez Araque held the position of Secretary General of the organization since June 11, 2012 (June 11, 2012 - July 31, 2014) and contributed to the convening of an Extraordinary meeting of the UNASUR Council of Foreign Ministers on April 18, 2013, in Lima, Peru. The emergency summit proclaimed its support for the presidential elections in Venezuela and called for the recognition of their results: “The UNASUR countries call on all parties involved in the electoral process to respect the official results of the presidential election published by the National Electoral Council of Venezuela” Aquino M., Velez P. Sudamerica apoya triunfo electoral de Maduro, pero pide dialogo en Venezuela // Reuters. 2013. April 19. URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/latinoamerica-venezuela-unasur-idLTASIE93H05G201 30419.. That was a significant victory for N. Maduro, which was gained with the help of a regional organization.

According to V. Mijares and D. Nolte, it was a fortuitous constellation for the Venezuelan government that former Venezuelan foreign minister Ali Rodriguez held the organization's Secretary General position when Maduro came to power since the regime became questioned after the controversial presidential elections in 2013. Rodriguez never visited the seat of UNASUR in Ecuador, exercising his function from Caracas. He stayed in office until August 2014, slightly over a year longer than initially planned. This was attributed to the lack of consensus between the UNASUR governments regarding a successor and the strategy of the Venezuelan government to avoid at all costs that someone not in accordance with their interests would take the position. His successor, former Colombian President Ernesto Samper, took a benevolent stance regarding the Venezuelan government, shielding it against the critics Nolte D, Mijares V.M. UNASUR. P. 96-97..

Because of that internal tension, the supranational bureaucracy and leadership were not consolidated. A consequence of UNASUR's structural crisis was its inability to reach a consensus on the election of its Secretary General, which had always been one of its problems. On January 31, 2017, former Colombian president Ernesto Samper terminated his function as Secretary General, and when the Argentine government was about to take over UNASUR's presidency pro tempore in April 2017, on the one hand, it proposed an Argentine candidate for the vacant position of General Secretary and, on the other, it suggested a repositioning of UNASUR with a stronger focus on economic cooperation. Both proposals immediately met with Venezuela's (and Bolivia's) resistance Mijares V.M., NolteD. Regionalismo posthegemonico en crisis... P. 110; NolteDetlef, Mijares VictorM. UNASUR... P. 96..

The Venezuelan regime was afraid of electing a disloyal Head of the organization because, for the Venezuelan government, it was important to control the election of the successor of Samper, even risking the paralysis and breakdown of UNASUR. De facto, Venezuela and Bolivia blocked the Argentine candidate Jose Octavio Bordon, supported by seven governments. In the end, UNASUR's fate was sealed by Venezuela's veto. While the Venezuelan government became openly authoritarian, culminating in the 'non- democratic' re-election of N. Maduro in May 2018, the center-right governments in South America saw decreasing benefits in sharing membership with a hostile and trouble-making government in UNASUR. From their perspective, it was, in the end, a logical step to leave the organization Nolte D, Mijares V.M. UNASUR. P. 96..

On April 18, 2018, the foreign ministers of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru announced the suspension of membership in the association due to the lack of concrete results in the organization's activities. The decision was caused by the chaos that arose in the absence of a Secretary General since January 1, 2017 (Bolivia held the interim presidency of the organization), as well as by the rejection by Nicolas Maduro and Evo Morales of the candidacy of the Argentinean Jose Octavio Bordon, despite the support of the majority of members. Since the conflict situation was based on political and ideological cleavages, and the decision was taken by consensus, the situation could have been endless Ponce Vivanco J. Eduardo. El chavismo y la crisis de UNASUR // El Montonero. 2018. 18 de Mayo. URL: https://elmontonero.pe/columnas/el-chavismo-y-la-crisis-cle-unasur..

As a result, in 2018-2019, the organization was withdrawn by Colombia in August 2018, Ecuador in March 2018, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay in April 2019, and Uruguay in March 2020. In March 2019, the Forum for the Progress of South America (Foro para el Progreso de America del Sur, PROSUR) was established at the initiative of Colombia and Chile to strengthen regional ties. The organizers of the new association did not invite N. Maduro, and J. Guaido considered his participation premature Ивановский З.В., Розенталь Д.М. Венесуэла: политическое противостояние. С. 89.. Since most member countries stopped making contributions, the organization's headquarters was closed and the general secretariat was dissolved Comunicado de Prensa N° 18/20: Cancilleria anuncia el retiro del Uruguay de la UNASUR y su regreso al TIAR. 10/03/2020 // Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Sitio oficial de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay. URL: https://www.guh.uy/ministerio-relaciones-exteriores/comunicacion/noticias/1820-cancilleria-anuncia-retiro-del-uruguay-unasur-su-regreso-tiar.. However, the organization officially continues to exist consisting of four states - Bolivia, Venezuela, Guyana, and Suriname.

According to V. Mijares and D. Nolte Nolte D., Mijares V.M. La crisis de Unasur y la deconstruccion de Sudamerica // El Espectador. 2018. 23 de abril. URL: https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/la-crisis-de-unasur-y-la-deconstruccion-desudamerica-articulo-751730., the UNASUR crisis is evidence of the destruction of South America. In addition to the predictable hegemonic lurches of policy, the processes of greater or lesser cohesion in the region related to geopolitical macro trends intensified as a result of government changes in recent years. The organization's weak institutional structure, which served so well to build its initial consensus, ultimately undermined its unity by failing to create a supranational institutional framework capable of transcending temporary government projects. National autonomies had the final say, which exceeded the regional autonomy, since the decisions made by the organization's bodies were not always implemented at the state level.

In addition, the Venezuelan problem, which could not be resolved within the regional organization, was a key catalyst for the dissolution of UNASUR. For many countries, the best option was not to meet with the other governments within UNASUR and not to take decisions on Venezuela. UNASUR was no longer seen as an instrument to strengthen the member states' autonomy within the international system, but as a burden that negatively affected South America's foreign perception. UNASUR had become a regional organization, which for most member countries only produced costs but no benefits. Venezuela, according to V. Mijares and D. Nolte, “became part of the broader power game played on the global stage” Nolte D., Mijares V.M. UNASUR... P. 91-92..

Conclusions

Taking into consideration the theoretical and ideological foundations of Venezuela's foreign policy, the conclusion can be made that the regional vector of foreign policy has remained one of the focal points for President Nicolas Maduro. In this vector, Venezuela actively developed both bilateral partnership relations and practiced multilateral diplomacy within the framework of integration associations.

Thanks to its resources and ideological dominance, the country could rightfully claim regional leadership, as it united the countries of the region on the wave of anti- Americanism, initiated many integration movements, and made most countries in the region dependent on its energy supplies and credits.

'Pockets of resistance' to US expansion in Latin America and regional integration were concentrated in three organizations where Venezuela was one of the founders or key players: ALBA, CELAC, and UNASUR.

The economic and political crisis that hit Venezuela sharply raised the question of the continuity of the 'Bolivarian Project,' which affected the change in the state's priorities, including in the international arena. The decline in the growth of social and economic indicators in the country (especially the reduction of oil and its derivatives prices At the beginning of the Maduro mandate, in 2013, Venezuelan oil production averaged around 2.8 million barrels per day (bpd). In 2018 production is below 1.4 million bpd (Mijares V.M., Rojas S.N. Venezuelan Migration Crisis puts the Region's Democratic Governability at Risk // GIGA Focus Lateinamerika. 2018. No 6. P. 2. URL: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-59911-3).) led to a weakening of the country's 'soft power', and the international position of N. Maduro's government as well. If in the years of prosperity for the Bolivarians, the main focus of foreign policy was on the idea of regional unity and strengthening the position of Caracas in Latin America, then during the crisis, the internal problems became of main priority for the Venezuelan government.

In the regional integration policy of Venezuela during N. Maduro's first term of office, we can distinguish two qualitative periods: 1. 2013-2015, the time of relatively successful implementation of the regional integration course, and, 2. 2016-2018, the decline and actual collapse of the regional vector of Venezuela's foreign policy. It was just the loss of democratic tendencies in Maduro's domestic policy that led to the loss of regional leadership and global stature.

The three integration projects analyzed by the authors began to lose their credibility and effectiveness during 2013-2018, which happened mostly due to the crisis in Venezuela. Overlapping with the complex international situation and changes in political regimes in the partner states, regional integration in Latin America began to collapse. CELAC and UNASUR, on which H. Chavez put high hopes of turning Venezuela into a regional leader, de facto ceased their activities. The only instrument of N. Maduro's regional influence remained ALBA, whose key players were not only close to Venezuela ideologically and politically but also continued to draw dividends in the form of preferential supplies of Venezuelan oil.

At the same time, it is difficult to disagree with political expert Victor M. Mijares, who just in 2015 noted that 'Maduro's doctrine' is a survival from the Chavista political regime under adverse conditions, for it assumes a defensive configuration, instead of an offensive one, it retracts instead of being assertive, submitting itself to its real possibilities in a post-charismatic and falling oil incomes phase Mijares V.M. Crude juggling: Venezuela petro-strategy between U.S. and China // Boletin del ISIAE. 2015. Vol. 60. P. 34-39.. And N. Maduro's foreign policy defeats in the regional vector only confirm the stated point of view.

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