Peace building initiatives in ukraine and competence of the un general assembly: aspects of influence and importance for ensuring world order

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Peace building initiatives in ukraine and competence of the un general assembly: aspects of influence and importance for ensuring world order

Klish Andriy Bohdanovych PhD hab. (History), Professor of the Department of History of Ukraine, Archeology and Special Branches of Historical Science, Ternopil Volodymyr Hnatiuk National Pedagogical University, Ternopil,

Abstract

The article examines the problems of peacekeeping activities in Ukraine, in particular its legitimacy and the possibility of intervention by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the lack of effectiveness of the Security Council. The article analyzes the requests of the Ukrainian authorities to the UN related to the conduct of peacekeepers in the territory of the conflict, investigates the legitimacy of these requests, taking into account the norms of international law, and determines the degree of their compliance with the principles of the UN. Particular attention is paid to determining the extent to which these peacekeeping initiatives have broad national and international community support, and highlights the problems associated with the inability of the Security Council to address the situation.

In particular, aspects related to the blocking of decisions due to the veto of some permanent members of the Council are considered. The impact of these shortcomings on effective decision-making and the development of the situation in Ukraine is considered. The role of Russia in blocking international initiatives to resolve the conflict is analyzed in detail.

The article also draws attention to how the UN General Assembly can assume responsibility in case the situation is not resolved by the Security Council. Historical examples where the General Assembly played a key role in resolving such conflicts are analyzed, and its potential as the main body of the UN in such circumstances is highlighted. Additionally, the article includes a retrospective look at the role of the UN in peacekeeping operations, taking into account examples of previous interventions and their impact on regional stability.

Emphasis is placed on the General Assembly's ability to help resolve international conflicts and ensure peace and stability in the absence of the Security Council. The possibilities of expanding the powers and competences of the UN

General Assembly to ensure more effective settlement of international conflicts and preservation of peace in the region are analyzed. The general purpose of the article is to reveal the possibilities and justify the need to involve the UN General Assembly to solve the problems of peacekeeping in Ukraine and in other regions of the world where there are similar challenges and limitations.

The general conclusion of the article is to emphasize the need to reform the international response mechanism to international conflicts. The article proposes the expansion of the powers of the UN General Assembly and the activation of the international community to solve the urgent problems of peacekeeping in Ukraine and in other countries that are in similar difficult situations.

Keywords: United Nations, Security Council, General Assembly, peacekeeping activity, peacekeeping mission, conflict, international security.

Кліш Андрій Богданович доктор історичних наук, професор кафедри історії України, археології та спеціальних галузей історичних наук, Тернопільський національний педагогічний університет імені Володимира Гнатюка, м. Тернопіль united nations security council

МИРОТВОРЧІ ІНІЦІАТИВИ В УКРАЇНІ ТА КОМПЕТЕНЦІЯ ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОЇ АСАМБЛЕЇ ООН: АСПЕКТИ ВПЛИВУ ТА ВАЖЛИВІСТЬ ДЛЯ ЗАБЕЗПЕЧЕННЯ СВІТОВОГО ПОРЯДКУ

Анотація. Стаття розглядає проблематику миротворчої діяльності в Україні, зокрема її легітимність та можливості втручання Генеральної Асамблеї Організації Об'єднаних Націй у відсутність ефективності Ради безпеки. Стаття аналізує запити української влади до ООН, пов'язані з веденням миротворців на території конфлікту, досліджується легітимність цих запитів, враховуючи норми міжнародного права, та визначається ступінь їх відповідності принципам ООН. Особлива увага приділяється визначенню того, наскільки ці миротворчі ініціативи мають широку підтримку національної та міжнародної спільноти, а також висвітлює проблеми, пов'язані з недієздатністю Ради безпеки у вирішенні ситуації.

Зокрема, розглядаються аспекти, що стосуються блокування рішень через вето деяких постійних членів Ради. Розглядається вплив цих недоліків на прийняття ефективних рішень та розвиток ситуації в Україні. Докладно аналізується роль Росії у блокуванні міжнародних ініціатив щодо урегулювання конфлікту.

Стаття також звертає увагу на те, як Генеральна Асамблея ООН може взяти на себе відповідальність у разі неврегульованості ситуації Радою безпеки. Здійснюється аналіз історичних прикладів, де Генеральна Асамблея грала ключову роль у розв'язанні подібних конфліктів, і висвітлюється її потенціал в ролі головного органу ООН у таких обставинах. Додатково, стаття включає ретроспективний погляд на роль ООН у миротворчих операціях, враховуючи приклади попередніх інтервенцій та їх вплив на регіональну стабільність.

Здійснюється акцент на можливостях Генеральної Асамблеї допомагати в розв'язанні міжнародних конфліктів та забезпечувати мир і стабільність в умовах недієздатності Ради безпеки. Аналізуються можливості розширення повноважень та компетенцій Генеральної Асамблеї ООН для забезпечення більш ефективного врегулювання міжнародних конфліктів та збереження миру в регіоні. Загальною метою статті є розкриття можливостей та обґрунтування необхідності залучення Генеральної Асамблеї ООН для вирішення проблем миротворчості в Україні та в інших регіонах світу, де існують аналогічні виклики та обмеження.

Загальний висновок статті полягає в акцентуванні на необхідності реформування міжнародного механізму реагування на міжнародні конфлікти. Стаття пропонує розширення повноважень Генеральної Асамблеї ООН та активізацію міжнародної спільноти для вирішення нагальних проблем миротворчості в Україні та в інших країнах, які знаходяться у подібних складних ситуаціях.

Ключові слова:Організація Об'єднаних Націй, Рада Безпеки,

Генеральна Асамблея, миротворча діяльність, миротворча місія, конфлікт, міжнародна безпека.

Problem Formulation

Since 2014, the conflict in Ukraine has engendered legal complexities that delve into the heart of international law and its theoretical framework. Of particular concern among legal scholars is the matter of secession, the right to self-determination, and the imperative of respecting states' territorial integrity. This article aims to discern the political and legal ramifications of the secession of Ukrainian territories and potential breaches of international law. A relatively unexplored dimension of the conflict is the prospect of attaining a legal resolution to the dispute, aimed at quelling violence and adjudicating the discord under the auspices of the United Nations. This objective could be pursued through the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces.

Research Analysis

Several key aspects have emerged in historiography concerning peacekeeping activities, particularly in Ukraine. Foremost, scholars underscore the imperative to legitimize the necessity of peacekeeping operations, while also examining the competence and function of the UN General Assembly in resolving international conflicts. Attention is frequently directed towards the historical backdrop against which peacekeeping initiatives in Ukraine unfolded, notably the events of the early 1990s when Ukraine gained independence, and subsequent periods characterized by peacekeeping missions.

In exploring the competence of the UN General Assembly, historiography consistently emphasizes its pivotal role in making decisions geared towards the preservation and restoration of peace. Analysts delve into various resolutions and decisions pertinent to specific situations in Ukraine, contextualizing them within broader international politics and the framework of law and order.

Overall, historiography on this subject reflects diverse approaches and perspectives on the challenges of peacekeeping in Ukraine and the influence of the UN General Assembly's actions. It serves as a valuable resource for further research and analysis, particularly in navigating contemporary events and complexities in international relations.

The purpose of this article is to systematically analyze the key aspects of peacekeeping activities in Ukraine, with a particular focus on their legitimization at the international level. It aims to assess the necessity of peacekeeping measures within the Ukrainian context while examining the role and competence of the UN General Assembly in conflict regulation and the maintenance of international peace.

The study endeavors to make a significant contribution to understanding effective conflict resolution mechanisms and peace support in Ukraine, contextualized within the framework of international law and the UN's role in this process.

The idea of conducting a peacekeeping operation in Ukraine has been under discussion since 2014. Notably, on January 4, 2016, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN officially called for a UN peacekeeping mission in Donbas [12]. Earlier, on April 14, 2014, and February 18, 2015, two additional requests were submitted for the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in Ukraine [13]. The first request, made by Turchynov, aimed to seek UN peacekeepers' assistance in combating terrorists, while the second, advocated by Poroshenko, supported the introduction of peacekeepers for stabilization purposes.

Both requests explored the possibility of involving the European Union as a mediator and regional provider of UN-mandated peacekeeping operations. However, European authorities declined direct participation, instead deferring the matter to the UN Security Council [1].

Considering the request from Ukrainian authorities, two critical questions emerge regarding the potential deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in eastern Ukraine.

Firstly, there's the issue of the legality of the request. Conducting a UN peacekeeping operation during a conflict necessitates specific conditions to be met, as outlined in the Principles of Peacekeeping. Failure to meet these conditions renders the request ineligible [2].

Secondly, there's the question of whether the UN General Assembly possesses the authority to decide on this matter. Conventionally, the UN Security Council holds a monopoly over peacekeeping. However, when faced with a deadlock due to opposition from one or more permanent members of the Council, there arises an urgent need to explore alternative and effective solutions. Hence, the relevance of this question lies in understanding the extent to which the General Assembly could potentially authorize a peacekeeping operation.

This article deviates from the traditional approach to the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations, which relies solely on the authorization of the Security Council. Instead, it substantiates the possibility of conducting a UN peacekeeping operation under the auspices of the UN General Assembly. The article aims to provide a fresh perspective on the role of the General Assembly in peacekeeping, with a specific emphasis on its relevance to the conflict in Ukraine.

In the international legal system, the United Nations utilizes various measures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, including conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding [8, p. 17-18]. According to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (2008), peacekeeping operations must adhere to three main principles: the consent of the parties involved, impartiality, and the non-use of force, except in cases of self-defense and protection of the mandate [8, p. 31].

Of particular concern for this analysis are the necessity to obtain consent from all parties to the conflict and the issue of the UN mission's impartiality. Given the complexity of the conflict, determining the legitimacy of a UN operation is crucial for ensuring its effectiveness and mitigating potential objections.

Considering the factual, legal, and legitimate conditions required for a peacekeeping mission, it can be argued that the conflict in Ukraine, along with the Ukrainian government's request, meets these criteria, thus allowing the UN to consider the request as legitimate and deploy peacekeeping forces in the conflict territory.

The deployment of peacekeeping forces in a territory necessitates the fulfillment of specific conditions, which are grounded in the fundamental principles underlying peacekeeping operations: impartiality, non-use of force, and obtaining consent from the host state.

When evaluating the Ukrainian government's request for peacekeeping activities, particular attention is directed towards the consent provided for the UN operation and the impartiality of the mission. From a legal standpoint, consent serves as a cornerstone of peacekeeping, safeguarding against violations of state sovereignty. It constitutes a necessary condition for establishing international obligations and providing the legal basis for a peacekeeping operation.

Lack of consent not only undermines the mission's credibility with the international and local communities but also risks transforming deployed UN forces into active participants in the conflict, thus compromising their role as peacekeepers. Without consent, the UN would contravene Article 2(7) of the UN Charter and the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention [8, p. 9]. Failure to agree will adversely affect the mission, and it will lose credibility with the international and local communities. In addition, without consent, deployed UN forces risk becoming a party to the conflict, losing their role as peacekeepers.

The consent of the receiving state must be analyzed considering two crucial aspects: external and internal.

Externally, consent must be freely expressed and should not be subject to any form of external influence. External influence may manifest when a country's government faces illegal pressure or threats from another country or foreign entities. If the government of a country is coerced into agreeing to the presence of peacekeeping forces on its territory due to economic, political, or legal pressures, the intervention of peacekeeping forces by the UN cannot be permitted.

The domestic aspect of host state consent necessitates that the intervention is endorsed by a legitimate authority within the state. This element is multifaceted and revolves around the legitimacy of the entity requesting UN intervention.

Firstly, defining who qualifies as a legitimate entity capable of legitimately requesting UN intervention presents a challenge. According to scholarly literature, a government is considered legitimate if it exercises effective control over territory and population as a result of a democratic process, within a society that upholds the rule of law and adheres to principles of international law [9, p. 211].

Secondly, complications arise in cases of internal conflict where the state is divided. In such scenarios, relying on the consent of parties within the country becomes precarious, as actors may emerge or vanish rapidly and their interests may fluctuate unpredictably.

Thirdly, another challenge arises when the government theoretically possesses the authority to give consent, but faces practical obstacles due to opposition from competing actors within the state. Despite this, the government may still be deemed legitimate if it maintains some degree of control over the country's territory [6].

Ultimately, a peacekeeping operation must not only be legally justified but also deemed legitimate. The key question revolves around the legitimacy of both the request for a peacekeeping operation and the operation itself, particularly in situations where there is no unanimous agreement among the warring factions.

Past UN operations have demonstrated that even if the mission's legitimacy is confirmed, challenges may arise regarding its acceptance by all parties involved. Such instances have often resulted in less effective operations and strained relations between UN forces and participants. For example, during the Suez crisis, Egypt initially consented to a UN mission but later withdrew its consent, leading to complications for the deployed UN forces and the international community's efforts to resolve the conflict. Similarly, in the Congo, the withdrawal of consent for a UN operation raised significant uncertainty about the mission's continuity.

Despite these experiences, current UN policy does not mandate the mandatory consent of all parties for deploying peacekeeping forces; instead, it emphasizes the impartiality of the operation. Given the multifaceted nature of modern conflicts, seeking unanimous agreement from all parties is often unfeasible. Therefore, UN operations typically require consent from major parties involved in the conflict.

It's important to note the distinction between strategic consent from primary parties, which is essential, and tactical consent from other parties, which may not be necessary. While obtaining the consent of all parties was historically considered crucial for the legitimacy of a peacekeeping operation, contemporary practices do not deem it mandatory.

To ascertain the feasibility of a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, it is essential to evaluate the conflict against the primary criteria for approving such a mission. A critical consideration is whether the conflict is categorized as intrastate or interstate. In internal conflicts, peacekeeping missions would typically operate within the internal jurisdiction of states, necessitating the consent of the host state.

Regarding Ukraine, despite Russia's evident interests in the conflict, many scholars classify it as an internal conflict. Following the onset of the war, the Security Council convened a meeting to address the situation in Ukraine at the request of the Ukrainian representative to the UN. Subsequently, a series of meetings ensued between 2014 and early 2015, culminating in the adoption of two resolutions: one addressing the downing of civilian flight MH17 and another in support of the Minsk peace agreements signed in February 2015.

In early 2014, the General Assembly adopted a resolution urging an end to the conflict and the preservation of Ukraine's territorial integrity [5]. However, the international community's focus primarily rested on addressing violations of international law rather than devising a specific plan for pacifying the region.

The global response to the conflict has been characterized by division, with some nations staunchly supporting Ukraine's position while others adopt a more cautious approach, cognizant of Russia's direct involvement in the conflict.

In considering the external and internal aspects of the Ukrainian agreement, it is crucial to underscore that the expressed consent is free from any external influence and reflects the state's genuine desire to maintain control over its national territory and mitigate the escalation of conflict. Indeed, the Ukrainian government has consistently sought a peacekeeping mission at various stages of the conflict, independent of pressure from the international community or external forces.

Regarding the consent of parties other than the host state to a peacekeeping mission--in the context of internal conflict, some scholars argue for the necessity of obtaining consent from all involved parties. Such consensus would bolster the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN operation, facilitating its actions. However, as previously emphasized, this condition is not obligatory but rather a factor that can enhance the peace process and contribute to the feasibility of the operation.

In the case of Ukraine, given the intense confrontation between parties and the failure of ceasefire attempts, securing agreement from all parties was improbable. Consequently, the consent of the Government of Ukraine sufficed, as it represents the state officially.

In conclusion, based on the aforementioned considerations, it is evident that the request made by the Ukrainian government was legally sound.

Given the legitimacy of the request for a UN peacekeeping operation, it becomes imperative to ascertain which body holds the authority to deploy peacekeepers. UN peacekeeping operations typically receive authorization from the Security Council under Chapters VI or VII of the UN Charter. Article 24 of the Charter stipulates that the Security Council bears the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, thus granting it a pivotal role in peacekeeping endeavors. The Security Council can authorize peacekeeping operations by resolution following the consent of the host state.

However, challenges arise when the Security Council encounters a deadlock that obstructs decision-making. In such instances, one potential recourse is to involve the UN General Assembly, which possesses the authority to authorize peacekeeping operations. This approach ensures that the objectives of the UN are upheld despite the obstacles faced by the Security Council.

When examining the competence of the UN General Assembly in peacekeeping, it is crucial to consider the interplay between the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as the distribution of their powers in this realm. While the UN Charter does not provide a normative definition of peacekeeping activities nor directly regulate them, peacekeeping operations are conventionally regarded as integral to the UN's efforts to resolve conflicts and mitigate hostilities."

The Security Council and the General Assembly possess distinct functions and powers concerning international peace and security. Article 24(1) of the Charter designates the Security Council with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, entrusting it with powers delineated in Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the Charter. As such, the Security Council serves as the principal organ tasked with ensuring peace and security worldwide [8. p. 21].

The Security Council is empowered to implement various measures, including peacekeeping operations. While interventions authorized by the Security Council may involve the use of force, peacekeeping missions specifically prohibit the use of force except in cases of self-defense.

Conversely, the General Assembly assumes a different role in peacekeeping efforts. It has the authority to make recommendations and draw attention to situations that pose a threat to international peace and security. While the General Assembly lacks the power to enforce its recommendations, its influence lies in its ability to shape discourse and mobilize global attention towards pressing issues [8, p. 14]..

At first glance, it may appear that the Security Council and the General Assembly have distinctly different roles and functions in the realm of international peace and security, with the Security Council positioned at the apex of a hierarchical structure. This interpretation has garnered considerable support over the years. However, viewing the UN as a rigid pyramid system lacks persuasive argumentation.

This hierarchical interpretation can be challenged on several grounds. Firstly, while the Security Council bears primary responsibility for international peace and security, this responsibility is not exclusive. In the Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses, the International Court of Justice emphasized that the General Assembly also possesses the capacity for action in this domain. The Security Council assumes a unique role when authorizing UN operations involving the use of force or coercive measures. However, peacekeeping operations, authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, fall within the purview of both bodies [7, p. 60].

Thus, the Security Council does not enjoy exclusive authority in this area. While it holds primacy in matters of peace and security, this does not automatically exclude the involvement of other bodies. Under certain circumstances, responsibility for international peace and security can be delegated to the General Assembly, which can play a crucial role in authorizing peacekeeping operations. Rethinking the powers of the Security Council concerning peacekeeping missions allows for a more effective UN, avoiding unnecessary hierarchical dominance of one body over another.

Secondly, there is potential to broaden the powers of the General Assembly to include its participation in decision-making regarding the deployment of peacekeeping forces. In its general capacity, the General Assembly lacks binding authority and typically operates within the framework of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, issuing recommendations rather than mandates. Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter stipulate that the General Assembly's powers are non-binding and advisory in nature. Furthermore, the General Assembly is prohibited from making recommendations on matters currently under consideration by the Security Council [8, p. p. 15].

However, the General Assembly has been granted authority to initiate and facilitate the establishment of peacekeeping operations when deemed necessary for considerations of peace and security. In its Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses, the International Court of Justice underscored a reinterpretation of the General Assembly's role, affirming that the powers conferred upon it by the Charter are not merely directive but imply a capacity to organize peacekeeping operations at the request or with the consent of concerned states [7, p. 61].

Thirdly, one more step in recognizing the role of the General Assembly in maintaining peace can be made taking into account Article 14 of the UN Charter. This norm states that the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful settlement of any situation that results in a violation of the provisions of the Charter [8, p. 16]. Thus, the General Assembly can play an important role in the deployment of peacekeeping forces to avoid an escalation of a situation that could threaten the peace.

The situation surrounding the conflict in Ukraine underscores a deadlock in the Security Council's deliberations, primarily due to the direct interests of one of its permanent members. The veto power granted to these members has emerged as a significant impediment to the Council's effectiveness, prompting calls for reform. In recent years, the Security Council has struggled to overcome internal opposition from certain permanent members, resulting in de facto stagnation within the body and the broader UN system.

Given these limitations, it becomes imperative to explore alternative avenues within the international legal framework to address conflicts similar to that in Ukraine. While the Security Council bears the primary responsibility for international peace and security, its inability to act in instances where the interests of one of its permanent members are involved necessitates consideration of other methods by the United Nations.

This shift does not imply the abdication of the Security Council's functions but rather acknowledges the General Assembly's parallel competence in conflict resolution when the Security Council is unable to act due to the entanglement of the conflict with the interests of a permanent member.

A significant advancement in bolstering the General Assembly's competence in maintaining peace occurred in 1950 with the adoption of Resolution "Uniting for Peace" [4]. This resolution marked a pivotal moment when the Security Council faced deadlock due to the Soviet Union's refusal to cooperate in authorizing the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in the Republic of Korea. Faced with this impasse, the General Assembly took unprecedented action.

For the first time, the General Assembly exercised its authority to adopt resolutions aimed at supporting and promoting international peace and security, independent of Security Council decisions. This demonstrated that the absence of Security Council consensus did not diminish the General Assembly's role nor negate the imperative to address threats to the international community's security.

In situations where the Security Council fails to reach agreement among its members, it falls short of fulfilling its primary responsibility. As a result, the General Assembly assumes a pivotal role in filling this void. It can recommend collective measures that encompass not only peaceful means but also the use of force [4].

The General Assembly follows a specific procedure, which includes convening an extraordinary special session within twenty-four hours of a request from the Security Council or by a majority of UN member states. This precise procedural framework, endorsed by a qualified majority, ensures the legitimacy of the General Assembly's actions.

Despite the groundbreaking innovations introduced by Resolution 377 into the UN system concerning international peace and security, this decision has sparked serious controversy and continues to be the subject of ongoing debate. While fundamentally serving as a safety valve to overcome difficulties, Resolution 377's implications remain a topic of scrutiny and discussion.

An intriguing aspect of this analysis lies in examining historical precedents where the General Assembly opted to recommend collective action, including peacekeeping operations. Notably, the General Assembly dispatched a peacekeeping force to the Congo, a case with striking parallels to the situation in Ukraine. In the Congo, a dramatic clash between the Soviet Union and Western countries fueled disagreements between UN forces and the Congolese government. With the Security Council stymied by a Soviet veto, the matter was referred to the General Assembly, which invoked its powers under Resolution 377 to break the deadlock.

Similarly, during the crisis in the Republic of Korea, the General Assembly took decisive action by deploying UN forces, bypassing the Security Council. Subsequent to this episode, the General Assembly refrained from direct interventions involving the use of force, opting instead for a series of recommendations.

Under the new understanding of peacekeeping authorization, it becomes apparent that the General Assembly possessed the competence to deploy UN forces in Ukraine. This assertion hinges on two crucial points. Firstly, the Security Council's inability to fulfill its mandate concerning the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine due to obstruction by Russian interests in the conflict. This obstruction effectively halted the Security Council from executing its primary role in maintaining international peace and security, leading to a broader stagnation within the UN system resulting from the veto of one of its members.

Secondly, the conditions specified in Resolution "Uniting for Peace" were met. Similar to the situation in Korea in 1950, where the Security Council was unable to act, rendering the international community's response ineffective, the same predicament arose in Ukraine. Consequently, the prerequisites for General Assembly intervention in Ukraine were fulfilled, as the conflict demonstrated the existence of dangerous international tension and the absence of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council, as mandated by Resolution 377 [4]. Thus, the responsibility for taking measures and deciding on the possible deployment of peacekeeping forces in Ukraine falls to another UN body, namely the General Assembly.

In conclusion, despite efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution, the conflict in Ukraine has escalated into a full-scale war, casting doubt on the credibility of the UN. Consequently, considering the circumstances outlined above, authorization for the intervention of UN peacekeeping forces in Ukraine could be granted by the UN General Assembly, aligning with the approach outlined in Resolution 377.

Efforts to quell the flames of conflict have faltered, and the UN has proven unable (or unwilling) to effectively intervene, particularly when the Security Council deliberated on preserving Ukraine's territorial integrity. The vested interests of Russia, among other permanent members, have stymied any decisive action by the Council regarding the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Ukraine. The Security Council's impasse has exacerbated instability in the region, exposing the weaknesses of the UN system in upholding peace.

Addressing this predicament requires innovative solutions. The involvement of the General Assembly and a reinterpretation of its powers in peacekeeping activities could offer an alternative approach. While the UN Charter outlines general principles and rules governing its operations, these can be flexibly interpreted and applied to ensure the UN achieves its objectives despite impediments faced by its organs. Resolution 377 exemplifies member states' readiness to adopt a flexible approach to interpreting the provisions of the UN Charter. Thus, in instances where the Security Council is deadlocked, peacekeeping missions could be authorized even without its approval, with the General Assembly stepping in to intervene.

Moreover, it is imperative to consider the legal implications of granting the General Assembly the power to directly intervene and authorize peacekeeping missions. This development represents a significant advancement in international law, not only for the specific situation in Ukraine but also for future conflicts where the Security Council is paralyzed and unable to act within its existing authority to deploy peacekeeping forces.

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Література:

1.EU won't send armed force to Ukraine despite clashes. URL: https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-32478933

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11.Порошенко виступив за введення миротворців. URL: https://lb.ua/society/2015/ 02/18/296048_poroshenko_vistupil_vvedenie.html

12.Постійний представник України при ООН вручив офіційні повноваження. URL: https://mfa.gov.ua/news/43648-permanent-representative-of-ukraine-to-the-un-presented-his-credentials

13.Турчинов просить миротворців ООН допомогти боротися з терористами. URL: https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/04/14/7022389/

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