EU gas policy transformation in the context of EU-Russia relations

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EU gas policy transformation in the context of EU-Russia relations

Introduction

gas policy european

The topic of this dissertation is: «EU gas policy transformation in the context of EU-Russia relations».

The research actuality of this work consists on the recent transformation of the EU gas policy after the two Ukrainian gas crises of 2006 and 2009. After this, diversification, liberalisation and securitization became the main priorities and goals of the EU gas policy. The EU is trying to find new alternatives to Russian gas in order to reduce its dependence and liberalise the gas market by its own rules and interests through instruments such as the Third Energy Package.

The object of this research is the ЕU, while the subject is the transformation of the EU gas policy in the context of relation with Russia.

The research question of this work is: to what degree is the transformation of the EU gas policy triggered by Russia?

The hypothesis is the follow: the transformation of EU gas policy in the recent past years was triggered mostly by Russia. In the medium term the EU strategy will be focused on the search of new alternative routes to Russia for gas import and attempts in order to liberalize the gas market. These attempts will be used as a method of pressure on Russia in the matters of gas prices. Furthermore, Germany's position is strengthening in the EU and in gas relations with Russia, leading to the division between MSs within the EU. The absence of integrity of EU gas policy in relation with the different interests of MSs shows the weakness of the EU gas policy.

The goal of this work is to study the transformation of the EU gas policy in the recent years and to identify the role of Russia and EU-Russia relations in this transformation.

The research objectives are:

- Analyse applicability and relevance of the Theories of Realism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Securitization to the study of the EU gas policy, and examine this policy through the prism of these theories;

- Analyse EU gas policy integration and different directions of MSs in shaping EU gas policy by practical case studies;

- Examine the transformation of the EU gas policy after the two Ukrainian gas crises taking into account Russia as a triggering factor;

- Give some possible scenarios for the future of EU gas policy in the context of relations with Russia.

EU gas policy transformation in the context of EU-Russia relations is a very complex and comprehensive topic. In order to best analyse this subject as a whole, it is fundamental to take into account different factors and aspects that compose it. In fact, this topic is characterized by different players at different levels such as the EU as a whole, EU institutions, EU Member States, energy companies, consumers, suppliers, transit countries and so on. Moreover, gas market is a very unique phenomenon due to its regional peculiarity and depends on political pressure and geopolitical developments more than other energy markets. It is evident that there is the necessity to take into account interests, economic interdependence factor, political and geopolitical context. For these reasons, it would be impossible to use only one theory to make a full analysis. This is why in this work are used three different theories: Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Realism and Securitization. Each theory is able to describe one component of this complex and multifactorial topic.

The methods used are: analysis, deduction, induction, synthesis, forecasting, case study and event analysis.

The research novelty of this work consists of the analysis of the transformation of EU gas policy and Russia as a context factor that has triggered this change. Moreover, the author wants to analyse the integrity of EU gas policy taking into account different case studies in order to outline the different standpoints and interests of MSs using some case studies. Multi-theoretical approach is also a novelty factor. The author tries to give some possible scenarios for the future of EU gas policy in the context of relation with Russia.

The sources used for this work are official documents (European Commission-Energy; Internal Energy market-European Parliament; Energy Outlook; Roadmap: EU-Russia energy cooperation until 2050; Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy; European Energy Security Strategy and others); official websites of energy companies and pipelines projects; official speeches; annual and official reports; the works of the main thinkers and authors of Realism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Theory of Securitization. Moreover, there were used works and articles of specialists on the EU gas policy and EU-Russia gas relations like A. Winkworth, A. Arenare, M. Waloszyk, N. Esakova, D. Rechenberger, N. Herweg and some Russian authors like T. Romanova, A. Konopljanik and T. Bordachev. By using these Russian authors for the present work research and analysis, it was given a wider picture to the topic and a better analysis of EU-Russia gas relations. In particularly, thanks to the contribution of T. Romanova, were introduced in the paper some considerations about the reaction of Russia after the Third Energy Package was approved and its position and principles about the gas market. A. Konopljanik gave a great contribution in order to analyse the working of EU-Russia gas relations and the rules that regulate it, in particular the question on prices and the risk zone linked with gas contracts. The contribution of T. Bordachev in this work is about the theoretical part. This author helped to better understand the three theories used in this work: Realism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Securitization and the relations with them and the topic of this work.

1. Theoretical part

1.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism: EU integration in the field of gas

Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) is considered part of the literature on European integration, although it cannot be considered really as a theory but more as an approach that wants to prove that even if the EU is a unique institution, it does not require a sui generis theory. In this context, LI wants to put itself in contrast with the Neo-functionalism theory and the concept of «spillover», according to which the European economic integration would be self-sustaining. LI considers that «neo-functionalism is today widely regarded as having offered an unsatisfactory account of European integration because it mispredicts both the trajectory and the process of EU evolution.»

Liberal intergovernmentalism was formulated by Andrew Moravcsik in his work The Choice for Europe (1998). Moravcsik developed the version of liberal intergovemmentalism to explain the `grand bargains' of EU's evolution. Indeed, he investigated the evolution of the EU from 1955 to 1992 (from Messina to Maastricht). The basic claim of LI is that the EU «can be analysed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination». LI wants to explain the crucial moments of the European integration and analyse why states, which are rational actors, decide to renounce to a part of their sovereignty and give it to institutions.

LI is based on two assumptions:

1. States are actors

This means that the EU, like other international institutions, can be studied by treating states as actors in an anarchy context. National interests are the result of the interaction between the State and the society. They arise through national societal groups which compete for political influence, making coming up new policy alternatives that could be recognized by governments. This is a dynamic process: states' objectives are not fixed and completely shaped, they vary from state to state and they change during the time.

States first define a set of interests, then decide to cooperate among themselves in order to realize those interests through intergovernmental negotiation. «Metaphorically, these two stages shape demand and supply functions for international co-operation. A domestic preference formation process identifies the potential benefits of policy co-ordination perceived by national governments (demand), while a process of interstate strategic interaction defines the possible political responses of the EC political system to pressures from those governments (supply). The interaction of demand and supply, of preference and strategic opportunities, shapes the foreign policy behavior of states.»

2. States are rational

The agreement to cooperate can be seen as a strategic rational state choice. Indeed, the costs and benefits of economic interdependence are the primary determinants of national preferences. This means that states enter by their own choice into the EU by making accords between states (translation of governments) because they can get some benefits and improve their interests. Institutes help and facilitate this process of accords. States decide to set up an intergovernmental cooperation because they think it is possible for them to put the emphasis on certain national preferences and securing them through the compliance from the other governments.

So, at first states define their priorities and interests, then negotiate and reach agreements with other actors and finally establish an international institution. It follows that EU integration is characterized by rational choices made by states following their interests. So, the primary source of integration lies in the interests of the states. It is important to underline that LI refers the most to the economic interests.

Therefore, Liberal intergovernmentalism integrates within a single framework two types of general international relations theory often seen as contradictory: a liberal theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate strategic integration, bargaining and institutional creation.

It is important to say that according to the theory of national preference, state's interests are the result of the interaction between private individuals, voluntary associations and groups in the civil society. Interests and influence of these groups vary for several reasons. The interaction between groups delaine preferences and then it is up to national administration to start negotiations and put them in the political agenda.

As far as the theory of interstate strategic integration is concerned, states prefer to cooperate in the fields that can possibly increase their control over domestic policy, giving them possibility to achieve goals that otherwise would not be possible. This is the case, when coordination eliminates negative international policy externalities, that is when one nation is able to influence the policy goals of another. So, the prospective and possibility to improve these negative externalities is a big incentive for coordination. On the opposite side, when externalities are positive or insignificant, there is little room for cooperation.

It is important to underline that the distribution of benefits is not always fair because even where agreements are mutually beneficial, governments often have different preferences concerning the distribution of the benefits and this can lead to conflict between them. The more each state is stable in term of interests, the most is easy to cooperate with other states. This is because of societal pressure on national governments, which determines the goals and flexibility in negotiation.

As it was underlined by some scholars, LI has some limitations. First of all, it cannot explain all facts of the European integration. For example, LI is good to explain the EU common agriculture policy, because it is the sphere were national interests are so strong, there are certain and intense preferences and clear positive benefits for the MSs. By another side, LI is not good to be applied to enlargement because costs and real benefits are more imprecise to calculate, especially about Eastern enlargement. Second of all, LI does not explain the everyday decision-making in the EU. Third of all, LI does not consider sociological or historical factors but as it was said mostly economic interests.

LI is able to explain the reasons why member states decided to adopt a unified approach and policy in the field of energy (included gas) from the very beginning of EU integration and why member states want now to improve the project for a common EU energy policy (included gas).

According to LI, MSs are interested to cooperate between themselves and loose part of their sovereignty in the energy field by giving it to EU institutions because in this way they can follow and reach their interests in this sphere.

Indeed, energy has always been at the centre of European integration since the beginning. Coal and atomic energy were the starting point for the first European treaties: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty in 1951, which was mainstreamed into EU policy in 2002, and the Euratom Treaty on atomic energy with the Rome Treaties in 1957 and which is still in force today.

Moreover, LI is able to explain why in 1973, when happened the first oil shock, the European Community arrived to the conclusion that the integration reached in the field of energy was not enough and decided to integrate more in this field and have a stronger multilateral cooperation in exchange to a loss of autonomy by MSs in the energy field. The EC declared the willing to develop a common energy policy and introduce it in the single market. So MSs agreed that they could get more benefits by creating a common energy market.

MSs recognized energy as fundamental for their economic development and this is why in 1989 the Commission set a task to liberalize electricity and gas markets.

With the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and with the program Trans-European Networks, the EU could improve transnational energy infrastructure. It needs to be said that this step is very significant in the field of cohesion and cooperation between MSs and once again can be explained by LI.

As far as EU common energy market is concerned, the Third energy package, adopted in 2009 (2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC) is fundamental and represents the willing of MSs to integrate more in the energy field and create a freer common market based on competition. The Third energy package was aimed to set common rules on transmission, distribution and supply of energy sources and set the possibility for consumers to access to information about companies which are providing energy so they can choose freely the provider.

As it has been said, in accordance with LI, states are rational actors and decide to cooperate in order to better achieve their interests. They believe that if they cooperate together they will be able to secure their national preferences, otherwise it would be not possible or it will be less effective. This means that states are by their own choice into the EU and decide to integrate more and more in the energy field. In order to facilitate the process of cooperation and accord they decide to establish institutions, which help and facilitate this process.

The pick of development of EU energy policy coincides with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, when the EU gained full power to develop the EU energy policy, introducing the energy chapter in the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU). In fact, before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the EU took advantages of different treaty dispositions, such as the article 95 of the Treaty of the European Community (TEC) regarding the single market, articles 154 - 156 of TEC about trans-European networks, articles 81-88 of the TEC for competition, which were not supposed to recognize any power to the EC on the energy sphere.

In this context, article 194 of the Lisbon Treaty is significant:?«In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to:

- ensure the functioning of the energy market; ?

- ensure security of energy supply in the Union; ?

- promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the ?development of new and renewable forms of energy; ?

- promote the interconnection of energy networks.» ?

Also, the second statement of this article is fundamental, since it affirms that «Such measures shall not affect a Member State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply, without prejudice to Article 192 (2) (c)». This means that member states were completely free to decide their national energy policy, mainly on the production of energy.

Nowadays the EU still needs to implement a common energy policy, both in external and internal dimension in order to be really efficient and to have an opportunity to become independent from external energy suppliers, or at least try to reduce the dependency.

These are the main future goals of EU for the energy field:

«- securing Europe's energy supply; ?

- ensuring that energy prices do not make Europe less competitive; ?

- protecting the environment and in particular combating climate change; ?

- improving energy grids.» ?

It is evident that these goals correspond with the interests of each MSs and these is why they want to go ahead and establish the EU Energy Union.

In order to achieve it, the EU has set two long term strategies mainly based on climate change objectives: «Energy 2020, a Strategy for Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy» and «Energy Roadmap 2050».

According to LI, a common EU energy policy is yet to be created because of the national preferences of member states.

1.2 The Theory of Realism and the concept of «Security dilemma' as an instrument to explain the integrity of EU gas policy and EU-Russia gas relations

Realism is a classical theory in the framework of International Relations. Realists consider states as the principal actors in the international arena. States act in accordance with their own national interests and struggle for power in a context of anarchy.

The highest and main interests of each state are sovereignty, independence and survival. And so, security is primarily. States act because of power and self-interest but not all realists, however, deny the presence of ethics in international relations. Since each state is concerned only about its own interests, there is always a room for potential conflict among states. If there is no balance between states (peace), war will be inevitable. Realists consider the state as the reflection of the human nature. Indeed, humans for their nature are aggressive, selfish and struggle for power. In this context, cooperation has only a time limit and exists only until interests coincide.

Realism has a long theoretical tradition and circumscribes a variety of approaches. Its founding fathers are Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. However, the thinkers that can better help to explain some aspects of EU gas policy transformation in the context of EU-Russian relations are E.H. Carr (1892-1982) and Hans Morgenthau (1904-1979), who contributed to the development of the so called `Twentieth Century Classical Realism'. Moreover, there is a realist concept, that can also explain some aspects of EU gas policy transformation in the context of EU-Russian relations, that is the `security dilemma'. For this reason, it will be analysed in this part after the `Twentieth Century Classical Realism'.

Twentieth-century realism was born in response to the idealist approach which started to be popular after the First World War. Peace was considered by the idealists a necessity in order to prevent another world conflict. In their opinion, building peace was possible only by creating a system of international law regulated by international organizations. The League of Nations (1920) and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) represent the tangible results of interwar idealism. For idealists, war did not originate because of egoistic human nature, but because society is imperfect. Their positions were criticized by Reinhold Niebuhr and by E.H. Carr. The fact that the League of Nations failed to prevent the Second World War produced a strong realist reaction and realists criticized idealists and their inability to build international institutions, such as the League of Nations, strong enough to prevent the Second World War.

Classical realists, which gave a great contribution to the realism theory, were John H. Herz, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Raymond Aron.

In his main work, The Twenty Years' Crisis (1939), E.H. Carr criticised idealists, describing their position as «utopianism.» He believes in reason and progress. He declares that «morality can only be relative, not universal», and states that the doctrine of the harmony of interests is invoked by privileged groups «to justify and maintain their dominant position». Carr states that policies are the products of circumstances and interests. His main idea is that interests always coincide with what is regarded as moral principles because principles cannot be universal but are only based on interests. While the idealists consider some values, such as justice and peace, as universal for everybody, Carr argues that is not like this. In fact, he thinks that there a nether universal values nor universal interests. Those who speak about universal interests in reality are acting in their own interests.

Carr also analysed the idealist concept of the harmony of interests, based on the fact that humans can cooperate between themselves when they have some common interests. Carr criticised this point and introduced its concept of conflict of interests. According to this idea, order is based on power and not on morality. It follows that morality is the product of power. Like Hobbes, Carr considers morality as a construction by power. In fact, dominant nations or groups impose their view as international morality over less powerful nations. What idealists consider as universal values such as peace, justice and so on, are considered by Carr as status quo notions. «Just as the ruling class in a community prays for domestic peace, which guarantees its own security and predominance, … so international peace becomes a special vested interest of predominant powers».

Hans Morgenthau also contributed to the develop of realism with his work Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1948). Morgenthau introduced six principles:

1. «Political realism believes that politics is governed by objective laws with roots in human nature.

2. The main signpost of political realism is the concept of interest defined in terms of power which infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible.

3. Realism assumes that interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid but not with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. Power is the control of man over man.

4. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action. Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.

5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. It is the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from moral excess and political folly.

6. The political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere; he asks «How does this policy affect the power of the nation?» Political realism is based on a pluralistic conception of human nature. A man who was nothing but «political man» would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. But, in order to develop an autonomous theory of political behaviour, «political man» must be abstracted from other aspects of human nature.»

The main difference between Morgenthau and Carr is that the former recognizes the similarity between the state and the human nature. Moreover, in the Morgenthau's analysis the central national interest is considered to be power. Despite the importance of the concept of power to him, he never analysed it with the care and sophistication it deserved, however.

Twentieth-century realism can explain two main aspects of EU gas policy transformation in the context of EU-Russian relations, that is the absence of integrity in the field of gas due to a conflict of interests between MSs and EU gas policy towards Russia.

As it has been already said, energy is vital for each state but gas represents probably the most sensitive. Indeed, gas is the energy sector that can easily be conceived as a monopoly with few firms which control grids. This is why companies and member states do not want to lose completely their control over it. Indeed, from the beginning there was a reluctance from MSs to adopt proposals in the field of gas. In 1989 the DG XVII (responsible for energy) presented a set of proposal regarding the internal energy market, concerning transparency of electricity and gas prices, less restrictive rules on transit for gas and electricity and plans for the supervision of large investments in the energy sector. Electricity proposals were adopted very easily, with very little resistance from the member states, but with gas proposals there have been more problems.

MSs have different national interest about the gas issue. First of all, it is possible to divide the member states in two categories: importers and exporters of energy. It is possible to say that the former ones are more willing to support a common energy policy, while some of the exporters support the implementation of a single market in the energy sphere in order to sell its gas to the other EU MSs at better conditions.

Today the EU has a competence both in energy and trade, however the decision-making process and the development of a European policy in these areas differs in many respects. Indeed, while trade is an exclusive and well established competence of the EU, energy received a formal inclusion among the competencies shared by the EU and Member States only with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. As a consequence, national governments still have strong competences in energy matters and remain in charge of providing security to their citizens and firms. According with the Lisbon Treaty, EU countries are free to develop whatever energy sources they wish. They must, however, take account of EU renewable energy objectives.

Moreover, decisions on energy policy are taken within the community using the «ordinary legislative procedure». It consists in «the joint adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of a legislative act, regulation, directive or decision - on a proposal from the Commission». This procedure applies to energy policy except the legislation about nuclear power and energy taxation, which are decided by the Council of Ministers. Although the cooperation and energy related objectives in the EU have widened a lot, each member state is still responsible for its energy policy. This of course evidence the willing of each MSs to keep its superiority over the energy field.

The practical example of conflict of interests between MSs in the gas field is represented by the different pipelines projects between the EU and Russia. Here is where the different interests of MSs are undeniable clear and tend to clash with each other. The example of this is represented by Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 and its concurrent projects like South Stream and Turkish Stream. In fact, in this situation it was evident the fact that each Member State supported a different project in order to protect its own interest.

Another point of the realism theory, namely the absence of universal moral standards and values, is interesting in order to explain the behaviour of the EU in the gas field. Indeed, the EU wants to spread the idea of a free and liberalised gas market where citizens can enjoy the concurrence having lower prices and more choice. Moreover, the EU wants to export these ideas and values to third countries like Russia. It is evident that this discourse is against Russia's interests, where there is still a monopoly in the gas sector represented by Gazprom. The EU reefers to universal interests and values but in reality, it is acting in its own interest according with realism. Indeed, the EU relies heavily on gas imports from Russia and it is in its interest to create an open, transparent and stable international energy market.

As it has been said, there is another realist concept that can help to analyse and understand some aspects of the EU gas policy transformation in the context of EU-Russian relations, that is the security dilemma. This concept, is able to explain the EU-Russia gas relations and transformations. The concept was introduced by Herz (1950) in his book Political Realism and Political Idealism and Butterfield (1951) and it describes the obstacles that two countries face in achieving peace and cooperation. Security dilemma can happen because of fear between states which leads to a lack of trust. Indeed, according to realism, states do not want to cooperate with each other's because of their aggressive and selfish nature concentrated on security and power in an anarchical international system.

Another important contribution to the security dilemma debate is a paper by Kydd (1997) in which he analyses the problems of trust that are at the heart of the security dilemma.

Collins in his writing «The Security Dilemma» described the concept: «The Security Dilemma is the notion that in a context of uncertainty and bounded rationality perceived external threats (real or imagined) generate feelings of insecurity in those states that believe themselves to be the targets of such threats, thereby leading those states to adopt measures to increase their power and capability to counteract those threats (alliance creation, arms build-ups, and so on)».

The security dilemma has two levels: the dilemma of interpretation, that is the interpretation of the intentions of other states, and the dilemma of response. There is a competition between states in order to accumulate more power and feel more secure. However, after a certain point the competing states accumulate more power and begin to threaten other states. This threat makes other states to respond in turn and try to reinforce their own positions and security. Those triggered reactions generate the security dilemma. So, it is clear that mutual dependence might lead to a security dilemma.

The security dilemma can help to explain the EU gas policy transformation in the context of EU-Russian relations. Indeed, the interdependence between the EU and Russia in the gas field has led to a security dilemma. EU needs Russian gas in order to sustain its economy and Russia needs to sale its gas to the EU for the same reason. The EU-Russian interdependence in the gas field is a serious matter. Indeed, the 43% of gas that the EU imports comes from Russia. Even if the EU is trying to find new alternatives, the EU will continue to need Russian gas for the foreseeable future since gas depends from a regional market and from infrastructures already existing.

On the other hand, Russia does not have any credible alternative to the EU market for its gas. In 2015, Gazprom exports to Europe (including Turkey and the Energy Community countries) reached nearly 160 bcm, an increase of 8% compared with 2014. This quantity is beginning to reach the volume of sales in Russia itself, where Gazprom delivered 205 bcm. Russia's attempts to diversify its markets have produced limited results. Moreover, Gazprom has its own growing competitors inside Russia, particularly Rosneft and Novatek and Russia's gas sector continues to change, with an increasing number of companies looking for new markets. The repeated gas pipeline building proposals by Russia and Gazprom (South Stream; Turkish Stream; Poseidon; Nord Stream 2) have to be seen as giving clear signals and further evidence that maintaining the ownership of gas to the EU is really vital for Russia. The current capacity of all gas pipelines towards the European Union stands at nearly 250 bcm, which is already 90 bcm more than the current demand from Europe and the last two projects (Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream) would add an additional 118 bcm in transit capacity. It would increase the overall capacity to nearly 370 bcm, a capacity that will never be fully used.

This interdependence between EU and Russia do not lead to cooperation because sides consider that future interdependence would be asymmetrical and they would become more dependent than the other side, that means more vulnerable and weak. This is why EU and Russia has implemented policies to reduce the respective dependence and try to diversify away from each other. The EU wants to institutionalize EU-Russia energy relations and export its normative values in order to liberalise the EU-Russia gas market, while Russia opposes and refuses to adopt the EU norms and align its legislation with them using Gazprom as a foreign policy tool.

The security dilemma can be illustrated concretely through pipelines projects that both Russia and the EU promote. Russia promotes Nord Stream 2 in order to strengthen its energy security by consolidating a strong bilateral energy relation with Germany and ensure itself as the main gas supplier to the EU trough diversification of supply routes. In particular, the project avoids instable third country and for this reason represents a great concurrent to the Ukraine pipeline and to other projects such as South Stream and Turkish Stream. Russia by doing this does not want necessarily to undermine or threaten the EU but simply diversify pipelines to the EU in order to ensure its gas supply to the EU. This fact is interpreted by the EU, and in particular by Member States that are highly dependent from Russian gas, as a threat and by consequence they ask the EU to take measures in order to reduce EU gas dependence from Russia or at list try to control it. The Third Energy Package and the clauses about reciprocity and unbundling are a good example of EU measures in this context. Moreover, the EU supports alternative pipelines named before and Russia's internal energy liberalization. As for Russia, also the EU does not behave necessarily against Russia but to strengthen its own security. Russia, in its turn, interprets these measures as a threat to itself.

1.3 The theory of securitization in the framework of EU gas policy

The theory of securitization is essential to analyse EU gas policy transformation in the context of EU-Russian relations. In order to understand how this theory can help to analyse this topic, it is important to define what security means and what energy security is.

The term `Security' is a very important concept within International Relations studies which created a serious debate around it. First of all, it is important to answer the question of `what is security?'. There are two approaches to the English notion of `security.' In the first approach, the word security comes from Latin `securus safe', that is the quality to be free from danger physically. In the second approach, security comes from the Latin word `se-curus', that is a peaceful condition without any risks or threats. There is also a third meaning, which defines security as an absence of military conflict. According to Buzan, there are `moral, ideological and normative' features of security, which makes it difficult to reach a universal definition of the term security. As a consequence, it is evident that there is not a universal definition of security, but it can be summed up that security deals with issues above politics because a high degree of urgency and attention is needed.

Initially, the concept of security has been linked with the military sector and so to states and not to individuals. As explained by Smith, «Security is what states make it.» For traditionalists, security can only be considered in military terms, and they do not see a broadening of the concept acceptable or anyway possible. From their perspective, «security policy consists of the use of armed forces - the military and the police - to free the state and its citizens from threats.» This is why, the concept of security has always been related with the state and threats directed to its sovereignty.

During the Cold War, security was very important in the study of international politics. As a consequence, broad literature and discussions have emerged on this topic in that time. Indeed, traditional understanding of security has become inadequate.

Another important aspect was the declaration of the United Nations Security Council on January 31, 1992, that threats to international peace and security could come from «non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields.» In addition, the Human Development Report of 1993 declared that: «the concept of security must change from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people's security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security.»

In that context, different approaches have emerged, one of this is the theory of securitization by the Copenhagen School. This theory has contributed to one of the most interesting developments in the contemporary study of security.

In the early 1990s, a group of scholars (Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde and others) came together under the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, trying to develop a framework for the study of security from the constructivist perspective. They published a book in 1998 called `Security: A new framework for analysis', which was constructed around two important concepts on security: Barry Buzan's notion of sectoral analysis of security, and Ole Waever's concept of `securitization'. They considered security as a wider concept not linked only with war.

The contribution that the Copenhagen School wanted to give is defined as follows: «Based on a clear idea of the nature of security, securitization studies aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results and, not least, under what conditions (what explains when securitization is successful).» In other words, «When a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is'normal politics', we have a case of securitization.»

The Copenhagen School does not concentrate on what `security' means, but on what `security' does. This is why they developed a new concept, named `the theory of securitization'. Through the theory of securitization is possible to analyse the process through which a threat is classified. This process can be applied to all areas, not only military. The theory is able to analyse how a special issue can be brought to the security level and how can be securitized. The most important contribution of the Copenhagen School is to have analysed who securitizes (securitizing actor), what the referent objects are, and with what results and under which conditions.

The Copenhagen school considers security as a speech act. In fact, it is not important if threats are real or not, but the main point are the ways in which an issue can be presented as a threat to society. It follows that all kind of issues can become threats. This leads the Copenhagen school to define securitization as a speech act that has to fulfil three rhetorical criteria:

1. an object which is threatened;

2. extraordinary countermeasures need to be taken in order to overwhelm the threat;

3. convince an audience that extraordinary countermeasures are justified.

So, security is a kind of «speech act», by which a security issue is perceived as important and urgent and this legitimizes the use of special measures outside of the usual political process to deal with it. In fact, securitization is considered «the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.»

It is important to specify the difference between politicization and securitization. Politicization is the process through which, when the threats are realized, they are simply made part of the political agenda and public policy. At the opposite, when special measures are required in order to face the threats, there is a process of securitization. This happens when the threat is perceived urgent and has highest priority.

The theory of securitization can be also applied in the energy field. Indeed, energy has always been an essential dimension for the survival of the states. Without energy, the actual world and states could just not work in the way we know. States could not protect themselves through an army, assure their level of wealth and economic development. As highlighted by Roberts: «we live today in a world completely dominated by energy.» Energy is the only element able to influence so much global politics and economics in our current international system. This is why sufficient energy resources translate into economic and political strength in the international arena. Therefore, their absence causes an existential threat for the survival in terms of economy, transport, technology and military needs.

The energy market is influenced by various aspects: limited sources of supply, high energy demand among global actors (China and the US), energy dependency of the states (the EU), increasing energy prices, instability of energy-producing regions (the Middle East), and using energy as a political tool against the consumer countries. For these reasons energy, has increasingly gained the status of major concern at the global level, gradually viewed as a threat to security and to the state sovereignty.

As far as the EU is concerned, the EU is depended from other countries of the world in the energy field. The EU is the second economy in the world and consumes 1/5 of the world energy produced in the world, without counting the small percent of its energy reserve. At the moment, the EU needs to import more than half of the needed energy. The EU is the third largest consumer of energy at the global level, after China and the US. In 2013 Europe consumed 1 666 million of tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe), approximately 13% of the world total. In the same year, China consumed 2 852 Mtoe (22%), while the US consumed 2 266 Mtoe (18%). In order to understand the EU gas policy, it is important to keep in mind this enormous gap between gas production and consuming.

Natural gas is the only fossil fuel whose consumption is expected to increase in the medium term, due to its comparatively lower level of GHG emissions and the increasing dependence on imported natural gas will be the most challenging issue. Gas trade is essentially regional because it depends on gas export infrastructures (i.e. pipelines). The EU imports natural gas from Russia (43%), Norway (33%), Algeria (11%), Qatar (7%) and others (6%). The lack of a truly global market and the enduring relevance of import pipelines requires a strong political involvement to secure trade relations at the regional level.

Taking into account these factors, it is understandable why for the EU energy and particularly gas represents a security matter. Without energy, the EU cannot keep its top economic position in the world and assure the necessary economic growth for the future. As highlighted by Barroso: «Energy is not an issue in itself; it has impact on other sectors: If I am asked today what is the most important issue for global security and development, the issue with the highest potential for solutions but also for serious problems if we do not act in the right way, it is energy and climate change. Energy today is not only considered as a major challenge from an economic point of view but precisely for its implications for environment and climate. Because of increased competition for scarce resources, it poses serious concerns for global security… It is the great challenge of our generation.»

In general, it is believed that the issue of energy security started with the 1973 Oil Crisis. In 1974 the Commission formulated the notion of `energy security'.

Following this energy crisis, the link between energy and security has been progressively explored, and the concept of energy security entered the political agenda of international actors in the 21st century. Energy has started to be understood as an existential threat to the actors' survival, and is no longer only apprehended in economic terms, with a political dimension also present. As a consequence, global actors have started to securitize the issue of energy.

By consequence, energy became a top priority in the domain of the Security Studies and has been conceptualized as a security matter by the Copenhagen School. Energy has been securitized by the actors and has been taken out of the `agenda of normal politics' and it is increasingly perceived in terms of existential threats, in order to prevent any danger posed to the survival of the actor.

With the broadened security approach of the Copenhagen School, energy securitization can be defined as a security type realized in different sectors (political, military, economic, societal and environmental), at different levels (international, regional, national and individual) and through different actors' (states, companies, non-governmental organizations, lobbies, international institutions, individuals, etc.) ability to maintain a secure and sustainable demand/supply of energy at affordable prices. Energy should be recognized as a topic linked to all other security sectors: military security, economic security and environmental security.

On the other hand, in comparison with energy security, the issue of energy securitization is an entirely different concept. In order to describe the process of energy securitization, it is essential to consider the period of energy supply, which is divided into three main elements: `production', `transportation' and `consumption.' Therefore, the supply of energy and demand for energy products creates a situation of dependency among `producers', `consumers', and `transit countries.' It is important to underline that energy security does not get involved only the energy consumers (import) but also the energy suppliers/producers (export) and transit countries.

In this work framework, the EU is the energy consumer, Russia is the energy supplier and transit countries are mainly Ukraine and other EU countries, most of them post-soviet.

First, the energy consumers' priorities are the security of supply, the ability to access the needed energy resources and to keep the prices less expensive. Second, the energy suppliers relate to security of demand and usually use their energy resources as a weapon for their own political interest and a way to politically influence other states. Finally, there is the side of transit countries, according to which the security of supply routes is very important in contributing greatly to their economies.

The process of energy securitization is connected to the political behaviours of states towards the unbalanced energy markets, which can be considered as an existential threat to the referent object regarding the energy policies of the producer, consumer or transit countries. The mutual dependency between energy-importing countries originates the anxiety of energy dependency and energy demand gradually initiates the process of securitization. So, in order to assure energy security to all these parts, it is required a perfect harmonization and the absence of political tensions between the actors.

The theory of securitization is able to explain how the EU reacted after the two-energy crisis between Ukraine and Russia of 2006 and 2009. Indeed, after this period, the EU started to securitize energy and there was a radical change in the energy philosophy and relations between the EU and Russia. The EU started to act in order to ensure security of supply, diversification and liberalisation of the gas market. The tangible answer of the EU could be considered the Third Energy Package (2009), which is valid also for third countries and so also for Russia. The externalisation of the EU's internal energy market is a form of securitization.

So, in this framework, it is possible to say that the two Ukrainian-Russian energy crises represented the moment when the EU realized the threat, that is gas dependency from Russia and instable transit country such as Ukraine (depending too much from geopolitical factors and Russian influence), and started to take special measures outside of the usual political process to deal with it.

It is important to underline that not only the Ukrainian-Russian energy crisis played a role in the process of EU energy securitization but also other factors. Indeed, another reason for energy securitization is linked with the rates of world energy demand. Statistics show that the world faces major problems in producing sufficient energy to meet future demand, with current global trends in energy supply and consumption blatantly unsustainable, according to the IEA. It is projected that energy demand will increase by 50% by 2030 and a great majority of that increase (70%) will occur in developing countries (Asia and the Middle East). For this reason, the EU started to move in the direction of renewable energy resources with the programs `Energy 2020' and `Energy 2030'.