Geopolitical factor in Ukrainian-Belarusian relations

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Geopolitical factor in Ukrainian-Belarusian relations

Leontev I.O.

Currently Ukraine is in a dangerous situation. With its territory annexed by Russia, Russian troops and Russian- sponsored separatists waging a hybrid war in the East of the country and the international order itself being destroyed there is a clear need for improvement of Ukrainian security and strategic policies [1; 2]. It is complicated by Ukrainian geographic position which has often been noted as severely disadvantegous due to the lack of any proper natural borders to the West or East. This fact combined with the sea shore to the South and marshes and forests to the North influenced the idea of using the North-South axis to be the main security frame in Ukrainian geopolitics [3, p. 85-88]. However, using such an axis for security policy is only viable if Belarus, Ukrainian Northern neighbor, is not hostile to Ukraine itself.

Belarus is an extremely closed country governed by A. Lukashenka's authoritarian regime. Its landscape makes it extremely hard to traverse and control by military means but achieving a control alows any actor to use it an excellent shield against the expansion of any adversary which doubles as a foothold for actor's own power projection. Current Belarus is also infamous for its lack of any strong national identity which was exacerbated by A. Lukashenka's desire to use people nostalgic for a Soviet past as his main supporters. As a result, for all intents and purposes Belarus still remains a Soviet republic, some 25 years after the Soviet Union collapsed.

The most telling example of Belarusian identity crisis is the situation regarding Belarusian language. Officially Belarus is a bilingual country with two state languages having equal legal use but this superficial bilingualism is the exact result of a false choice between dominating and subjugated cultures which people such as I. Dzyba strongly warned of. The lack of any support for Belarusian language and culture led to Russian language and culture dominating the cultural landscape of a country with overwhelming superiority [4]. In 2012 only 23% of Belarusians used Belarusian language every day and only 18% of schoolchildren studied in Belarusian [5].

Another concern for the country is its economic model, we consider it to be a variation of colonialism. While it does not depend on the export of commodities per se, mineral products comprised 35% of its total export in 2014, with refined petroleum reaching 29% of its total export [6]. Mineral products reached 32% of 2014's Belarusian import, with crude petroleum and petroleum gas comprising 21% and 9, 1% of the total import respectively [6]. Most of said commodities were imported from Russia; Russia in general comprises a disproportionate amount of Belarusian volume of trade, amounting to 48, 4% in 2015 [7]. Belarusian natural gas pipelines are owned by Gazprom [8]. There were attempts at merging key Belarusian strategic enterprises such as Belaruskali, one of the world's largest potassium fertilizer producers, and MAZ, with Russian companies or outright buyouts by Russians which, however, fell through [9; 10]. Thus, Belarusian dependency on Russian economy is evident.

Belarus is also a member and an active participant of various Russian-led integration projects such as CIS, Eurasian Union and CSTO. Belarus and Russia also form a Union State which aims at establishing a uniform Russian - Belarusian space in all spheres of life, although this project is generally considered dormant with the exception of minimal control on Russian - Belarusian border [11]. Belarus also hosts two Russian military facilities: Hantsavichy Radar Station and 43rd Communications Center of the Russian Navy [12]. There were plans of establishing a Russian air force base in Baranavichy, however currently the plans seem to have fallen through as well [13].

To sum it up, Belarus has severe dependence on Russia; we think Belarus can even be considered a Russian protectorate. Due to crucial Belarusian strategic position this situation is concerning not only for Belarus itself but also for Ukraine and the whole region of Eastern Europe in general. Russian war against Ukraine led to Russia getting considerably weaker. Losing Ukraine from its essentially colonial sphere of influence, Western-imposed economic sanction and the inherent internal conflict of Russian centralization hindering development yet decentralization potentially starting disintegration processes as well as Russia itself being vulnerable to its very own hybrid warfare and international order dismantlement modus operandi all contribute to the fact that Russia cannot uphold the current status quo in the region and it is only going to become weaker in the strategic perspective.

Weakening Russia is a double-edged sword for Belarus. While there is no doubt that economic decline of Russia hits Belarus as well, it also brings some opportunities to lessen foreign influence on the country to the foreground since Russia is going to be more and more concerned about its internal situation in the strategic perspective. Some evidence of Belarus preparing for possible changes in the status quo regarding the country has surfaced already. Belarusian military doctrine has recently been updated and elaborated in comparison to its old 2002 doctrine, and the threats listed in the text, including but not limited to applying military force by circumventing the current international law, provoking internal instability, using sabotage and terror tactics in addition to conventional military means, establishment of informational warfare units, states and non-governmental entities training illegal armed groups while having no clear direction of possible threats often look exactly like contemporary specifically Russian tactics [14]. Recent Belarusian large-scale military exercise took place in the Eastern part of the country, and official press release cited illegal armed groups as the opposing force together with anti-sabotage and counter-insurgency tactics being utilized [15; 16].

However, as Belarusian economy has not been properly reformed since Soviet times, the reestablishment of the international order will drastically change Belarusian foreign positioning, and since Belarusian strategic position is of utmost importance to several actors in Eastern Europe, we consider preservation of previous Belarusian both internal and foreign status quo to be impossible. Therefore we consider at least three possible directions the country can reestablish itself in, each of them having their own geopolitical implications. First one is «Western Russia», East - West geopolitically. Russian discourse often happily uses old Russian imperial concepts. After the crackdown on anything national in mid-19 century there were attempts at presenting different parts of Russian Empire as absolutely Russian in nature; Ukraine and Belarus were respectively named Southern Russia and Western Russia. Russians don't generally understand the national differences between Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, at best claiming the only difference between the nations is akin to regional differences within Russia itself, thus using the old concept of «tri-unity» has always been a favorite of theirs; though it sometimes had different elements on the surface level, such as the idea of «Soviet nation». Since Belarus is a severely Russified country which is heavily dependent on Russia, and it currently has Soviet imprints dominating its cultural sphere, the «Western Russian» identity might seem like the one with the biggest prospects for development. However, it has several factors working against it.

The Soviet time capsule which Belarus essentially is was not established because Belarusians themselves think they're Russian. In fact, the staggering lack of perception when it comes national differences can only be applied to Russians due to the character of Russia itself, more akin to Byzantian or Ottoman administrative figures than even to Western political nation, let alone Eastern European countries established from the ground up, often literally due to the peasant character of many peoples. The current weak national sentiment should not be confused with complete non-existance of a nation. We consider the reason for strength of Soviet influence the fact that Belarus had nothing to roll back to after the collapse of USSR since it did not have any experience with independence, for instance Ukrainian People's Republic. There were attempts at establishing Belarusian People's Republics but it had never held any kind of control over the territory.

Moreover, Russia as a state is diving deeper and deeper into archaism. As a result it cannot offer any desirable concepts of development or modernization projects. Russian propaganda always emphasizes the common past as if it was a thing to strive for in and of itself. It may seem logical to Russians who are generally extremely conservative if not outright reactionary but the lack of any ideas for the future is what has the biggest potential to put other nations off.

Nonetheless, the passivity of the majority of Belarusian population and comparatively strong influence of pro- Russian circles together with the lack of proper border security make Belarus especially vulnerable for Russian hybrid warfare tactics. However, passivity of the people does not equal pro-Russian sentiment. Nothing consolidates a nation as well as direct aggression against it and centralization of Belarus together with its harsh landscape make it not as simple of an opponent for Russia as it may seem, and direct aggression against Belarus would have destroyed any kinds of common integration projects almost overnight if it were to happen. Aforementioned military changes in Belarus also show that Belarusian state knows about the problem and attempts to solve it.

To sum it up, we consider Russian factor to currently be the most dangerous for Ukraine due to unparalleled amounts of Russian influence over the country which are impossible to mitigate quickly. However, there is a possibility of it losing importance in the strategic perspective. Russians established their strategy by utilizing the false premise that passivity and lack of national development in Belarus mean Belarus is inherently pro-Russian. While there is no doubt that some strong pro-Russian circles exist within the country, they are certainly a minority as all radicals are. Russian orientation to the past also makes Russia a less desirable example for cooperation as it cannot offer any modernization options. It is, however complicated by strong economic and political ties with Russia yet it is evident that Belarus is starting to make some steps in protecting its sovereignty. Belarus dependent on Russia also poses immediate threat to Ukraine, therefore the most desirable Ukrainian course of action is destroying the remains of the status quo.

Second one is «PLC», short for «Polish - Lithuanian Commonwealth». Geopolitically it uses East - West axis. It is naturally strongly supported by Poland, mostly through the means of various civil society programs and Belarusian democratic opposition [17]. Officially Polish support is aimed at further democratization of the country through the local level, yet after further inspection it becomes clear that Poland has more plans for Belarus than simple democratization. It is worth noting that many Belarusian historians, especially the nationalist ones, do not differenciate between Grand Duchy of Lithuania and later Polish - Lithuanian Commonwealth as, in their point of view, Lithuania still had a large degree of autonomy after the Lublin Union. Polish perception of the Commonwealth generally undermines Lithuanian factor within the country, therefore it might seem like it severely clashes with Belarusian point of view.

However, that is not the case. Polish relationship with Lithuania is notoriously poor [18]. Some 80 years ago Vilnius was under Polish rule which Poland gained after proxy war and establishment of a pupper state called Central Lithuania, not unlike various Soviet exercises with declaring ostensibly independent Soviet republics in various regions of Russian Empire; and also not unlike current Russian practices in Ukrainian East. After regaining independence from Soviet Union the main concern of Lithuania was not Russian minority which was typically the norm among the vast majority of other former Soviet republics but a Polish one. Polish tendency to undermine Lithuanian influence and their perceived territorial claims led to a concept which found a degree of approval within Belarusian nationalist circles: Belarusians are considered true Lithuanians while actual Lithuanians are considered Samogitians who have taken the name and history from Belarusians. While bold, such concept is not completely baseless since Belarusian self-naming has often been «Lithuanians» or «Litvins», and even Ukraine has a small subgroup of such «Litvins» living in the Northern region of the country [19, p. 126-127].

Polish Belarusian strategy has strong historic basis and it is quote thoroughly developed. It also clashes with natural Ukrainian need of security from the North: while contemporary relations with Poland are satisfactory, Polish control over Belarus puts Ukraine, and also Lithuania, under an immediate threat from Polish expansion. It does have some weak points, however. The natural problem of Polish strategy is the weakness of Belarusian democratic opposition. It had problems even with delegating a united opposition candidate for the whole period of A. Lukashenka's rule [20]. His authoritarian model has its unique features: the basis of his power is not and overwhelming support for him but rather the lack of any alternatives. He governs not because he is strong but because the opposition is weak. The democratic opposition can of course become stronger over time but as we can see on Ukrainian case, even in much more favorable conditions it took more than twenty years for an authoritarian element to finally become undesirable among the people. The democratic opposition will not be powerful enough for Poland to properly utilize its investments immediately after regime change if it were to happen, therefore there is still time for Ukrainian reassessment of its Belarusian policy.

Another potential weakness of the Polish plans is Polish national sentiment itself. Polish historical concepts of relations with the other former Commonwealth partners show lack of respect for their independence. The line between R. Dmowski's national democracy or J. Pilsudski's federalism is quite thin. We think Poles are prone to undermining Belarusian achievements as well as their very right for independence which makes it another reason Ukrainian strategy can be a better alternative for Belarus.

Poland uses Belarusian democratic circles in order to further its own goals within the region. This could be a cause for concern for Ukraine as possible Polish control over Belarus can result in Ukrainian optimal security strategy being jeopardized. Polish plans have to be taken into account when developing Ukrainian own strategy towards Belarus.

Third one is «GDL», North - South, and a possible Ukrainian alternative for the regional structure. Grand Duchy of Lithuania is an example of a less advanced culture conquering the more advanced one. Such events were not uncommon throughout history, that has also happened with Bulgarians conquering Slavic tribes and Mongols conquering China. However, the end result was more of a symbiosis of Lithuanian centralization and Ruthenian culture which proved to be quite beneficial for the development of the country. The religious majority was Eastern Orthodox and Chancery Slavonic language, also known as Ruthenian, Old Ukrainian or Old Belarusian, was the main legal one.

Since Belarusian nationalists consider Grand Duchy of Lithuania to be an old Belarusian state, they tend to undermine Lithuanian contribution to it, thus playing into Polish narrative as mentioned above. However, the legacy of Grand Duchy of Lithuania before the Union of Lublin can be considered a better format of regional cooperation by the other two actors, Ukraine and Lithuania. Unlike Polish - Lithuanian Commonwealth, Grand Duchy of Lithuania did not oppress Ruthenian - Ukrainian culture and there is no denying that the ruling Gediminid dynasty was Lithuanian in origin. Also unlike Polish - Lithuanian Commonwealth which operated approximately on East - West axis, Grand Duchy of Lithuania was clearly a North - South axis country, repeating the structure of Kievan Rus to a considerable degree and using the main Ukrainian geopolitical orientation.

The other advantage of the «GDL» model is establishment of a security shield against possible Russian expansion Westward and Polish expansion Eastward. We think that outside control over Belarus was the factor that contributed to the imposing of East - West division on Ukraine perhaps the most. Ukrainian geopolitical thought considers such division to be a foreign one, and it is hard not to agree with it when looking at situation regarding Belarus. Security threats in Ukrainian North and Ukrainian West/East together with no control over the Southern border of the time made the country too vulnerable from all directions, and as such foreign actors used it as their advantage when subjugating Ukraine.

To be effective, however, this model needs some elaboration. Lithuania has to be persuaded to make some concession regarding its common past with Belarus which will be complicated as such concessions will also weaken its position with Poland. Polish Belarusian strategy is currently very well-developed which will make confronting it complicated. Also there is a need for Ukraine to define the main social base to support this strategic concept within Belarus itself.

The weakness of Belarusian democratic circles and the impossibility of preserving the status quo mean Ukraine has to find new communication strategy for securing its interests in Belarus. Interestingly enough, the lack of any coherent Belarusian strategy in the previous years can actually become a positive factor now as the lack of involvement in democratic opposition and the lack of any compromising ties to the regime make Ukraine a perfect middle ground for better cooperation with Belarus as a whole.

We think Ukrainian experience with regime change and state building may be invaluable for establishing its strategic policy. With the majority of the population being as passive as it was, national democratic circles lacked support to engage in state building by themselves. Since there were no parallel societal structures to develop a different kind of elites, the core of independent Ukrainian elites remained the same as it used to be during the Soviet period. They did not go anywhere and they remained the main decision makers for a long period of time. The passive silent majority of Belarus is the social base for the projection of Ukrainian interests, the foothold has to be gained among their minds first and foremost.

Ukrainian state building experience in general might actually show a good case of potential cooperation when extrapolated to Belarus, especially if we remember L. Kuchma's government model. His strategy was situational alliance with national democratic circles in order to achieve the ultimate goal of establishing an independent state apparatus. Of course, the actual state system created was heavily flawed but it was an independent state that actually worked nonetheless. The same could be said about the infamous multi-vector policy. While it is true that the lack of any determined movement to any supposed direction made Ukraine have no reliable allies and no clear goals, it also allowed an independent state to slowly move away from its close ties with Russia without provoking a crisis in densely-populated industrial regions of the East [21]. L. Kuchma's state system can be a decent example for the development of independent Belarusian statehood as Belarus has no firm social base to hold onto with the exception of the passive silent majority, the former Soviet elites.

National factor also has to be absolutely taken into account when developing a proper strategy for Belarus, and the simple fact of understanding the Belarusian mentality can be the decisive point in various actors' success. Russians do not understand the national differences at all, let alone between the nations they often call «the same people», therefore Russians have already put themselves into serious disadvantage. Polish national policy is more advanced and intricate but typical Polish zeal towards their own past which is often utilized by Polish nationalists together with arrogance regarding the other nations in the Commonwealth are the factors that could potentially jeopardize its Belarusian strategy as there is a thin line between Intermarium, federalism and «the same people» as far as Polish extremist circles are concerned.

These flaws of the other actors make Ukrainian approach regarding national factor to have much better potential, especially when taking into account traditional Ukrainian respect for the foreigners who respect Ukrainian traditions in return. However, Belarusians are very suspicious of any outsiders, therefore as Y Lypa soundly noted, Ukrainian policy towards Belarus has to be open, predictable and consistent first and foremost, although we do not share his aims at establishing a union state of Belarus and Ukraine [22, p. 18-19].

The border situation also has to be addressed. Ukrainian and Belarusian cross-border regions have some problems with determination of where Belarus ends and Ukraine begins due to the mutual intelligibility of various Belarusian and Ukrainian dialects, as well as ethnic similarities between the nations. Also as researchers note, some Belarusian regions have Ukrainian population [19, p. 128]. This may lead to a potential conflict between the countries, some might even go as far as to remember that P. Skoropadskyi's government exercised control over some regions of Southern Belarus. We consider such scenario to be extremely dangerous for the development of relations between the two states and detrimental to the essential needs of Ukrainian security. The best cause of events would be establishing a borderline along the current internationally recognized borders without any territorial claims, official or otherwise. The natural Ukrainian route for expansion is Southeast, there is no need to engage in more territorial disputes in the secondary directions, let alone with the country good relations with which are crucial for the whole security of Ukraine.

The bigger concern is the situation between Poland and Ukraine. Polish idea of regional development very clearly repeats the approximate framework of the Commonwealth, including proposed Baltic - Black Sea cooperation initiative also known as Intermarium. Such an idea, while lucrative on the surface level, is severely detrimental for the development of Ukraine because of differences between the European North centered around Baltic Sea which Poland naturally gravitates to and European South centered around Mediterranean and Black Sea which Ukraine naturally gravitates to. This integration project has the same flaw of putting politics before economics many concepts of power projection have. Another concern is the possible strengthened Polish influence putting both Lithuania and Ukraine at a threat of Polish expansion. Ukrainian ideal positioning of Belarus is protection from the North, Polish ideal positioning of Belarus is a foothold for further expansion. Such obvious conflict of interests cannot be ignored in the strategic perspective.

Belarus as a country is vital for Ukrainian security. It is the key to Ukraine as a whole and while neutral Belarus can be acceptable for the country's development, the complete security can only be achieved in an alliance with it, preferably utilizing the North - South axis which is more natural for Ukraine. Current Belarus is essentially a Russian protectorate but the situation is changing rapidly. We think there are the models of potential Belarusian reevaluation: Russian, Polish and Ukrainian-Lithuanian one.

Neither Russian nor Polish influence over Belarus should be allowed to be spread and while Russia is the utmost threat for the regional security, Poland might have several clashes with Ukraine in the future. It has strong basis for expanding its operations but the weakness of it is the weakness of the social group it bet on as well as possible resistance from several directions and general Polish imperialist tendencies. Currently Belarus is at the crossroads and Ukraine does have something to offer it.

Ukrainian strategy has to be aimed at Belarusian silent majority, Lithuania has to be persuaded to improve its relations with Belarus and Ukrainian policy regarding the country has to be as open, consistent and predictable as possible.

geopolitical ukrainian security belarusian

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