Specific Features of Chinese Economic Expansion in Central America and the Caribbean

Solving all previous problems, the company had to work hard adopting to local legal system which has a lot of differences with the one Chinese company used to. But all in all, Sinohydro managed to finish the project successfully turning all the problems into opportunities.

Chucas project was the first one for Sinohydro in Costa Rica. Management of the company was very worried about it going smoothly and an image that the company created in the region. "The Costa Ricans know little about China and its companies, and that's why a good first impression is so important," said Fu Xing, a Sinohydro manager working on the plant Sinohydro: Social responsibility good for business//China Daily, 2012. He also mentioned that Sinohydro workers once lobbied local authorities to build a clean-water well for local residents and met with the local Red Cross to solicit medical care for locals. Ambulances brought to transport the sick or injured to clinics and hospitals were also later donated to the Red Cross after the project was finished. He said:" These small gestures that cost relatively little can play a big role in elevating a company's standing in the community". Sinohydro: Social responsibility good for business//China Daily, 2012

It is important to mention the way this project was discussed in the press. When one looks the sources about Chucas project in western press, he would find less information about Chinese company building the project. Almost all of the sources would praise Italian Enel and congratulate it with success which is strange because it was Chinese who built this project. On the contrary in Chinese sources mention of Enel is minimal. This was the first time for us to meet such a tremendous difference between sources. It is hard to understand why journalists could not just tell the truth especially bearing in mind that it contains nothing special. Chinese press always has predispositions for exaggeration the achievements of the Chinese nation in the sake of honoring. But why did western-speaking press try to hide some facts?

During our research we found that the way the technical information was given is one more characteristics important to mention. Comparing information about all other Chinese infrastructural projects, the information about Chucas project is absolutely transparent. One may easily find the full description of the project with all the diagrams, schemes and detailed explanation. All the possible problems and their resolutions are enumerated beforehand. Emission factors and their reduction counted up very precisely. All of it made an impression that project is extremely reliable and built to last. Well-thought out and wise- it faced little opposition from the public.

But why this project was so important for Costa Rica? The answer to this question may lie in country's adherence to ecologically clean power generation. According to Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) 88% of all electricity comes from clean sources. Arias L. Construction of Central America's biggest hydroelectric dam is nearly finished in Costa Rica// Tico Times,2014 which is a considerable number comparing with the other countries. In order to provide stable energy supply, authorities are trying to attract more and more investors for building new electric generation projects. Partially they succeed in this task because apart Chucas there are some other projects like El Diquнs Hydroelectric Project etc. Authorities are the one to be praised for country's development and at the same time they are the one to be blamed for the prolongation of some aspects. The amount of bureaucratic red-tap frightens a lot of investors and not all of them are ready to go through it. Also it is known that Costa Rican government not always makes successful deals with foreign companies. For example, selling the Chucas project to Enel, it deprived itself from ownership rights. Thus it buys the energy and only then sells to the citizens who made the final price bigger. Our question is why authorities need the services of mediator? One may guess that they were afraid not to find the company-contractor themselves - there was a possibility to lose the project at all. But even taking into consideration this fact, we still think that they paid too much for avoiding this risk.

Chucas represents a success story and shows that transparency over the project and consent of people and government mean a lot. But unfortunately not all of the projects built up by Chinese companies in the region could be same cloudless. The projects of Sinohydro in Honduras Patuca III and Aqua Zarca were much more a trouble story. First common Sino-Honduran project Patuca III was supposed to produce 104 MW of energy and met country's growing demand. It was supposed to operate in 2017 but up till now Chinese company fulfilled only first phase of the project instead of 3 according to the schedule. Despite the fact that there were no Sinohydro's fault in the delays, the project still influenced badly on its image in the country.

The plans of damming Central America's second longest river Patuca appeared in distant 1990s. But then a lot of factors like hurricane Mitch, lack of funding and numerous uncertainties prevented it to be implemented. In 2006 Taiwanese firm Sinotec Engineering agreed to build the project but financial crises repulsed them from it forever. After Taiwanese withdrawal, the owner of the project Empresa Nacional de Electrica (ENEE) conducted several surveys on ecological and social impacts of the project and in 2008 obtained two-year permission to implement the project. In 2011 after the coup new Honduran government sighed a contract with Sinohydro on building the electricity generating complex on Patuca River including building of 3 dams Patuca II, Patuca IIA and Patuca III. After Sinohydro had almost finished the first phase, the construction stopped for 2 years due to lack of funding. This happened because the main investor Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) conducted the new study which stated that the real capacity of the river is lower than it was expected and environmental and social consequences would be higher than mentioned earlier. As a result IDB withdrew its money from the project. For two years ENEE and Honduran government were looking for the new investor and in 2015 they signed an agreement with Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for US$297 million loan. The deal signified a unique case for China cooperating with the country which recognizes Taiwan. We believe that this loan was approved by Chinese authorities because they did not want to lose the chance of attracting possible ally. In 2015 the construction continued and the project is being built up till now; the date when the project will be finished is unknown.

Patuca III is another example of the controversial infrastructural project and there are several reasons for it. First of all, project has a big ecological side and caused a huge polemic inside the country. Patuca project is located in ecologically sensitive area and is a home for a lot of unique species. The basin of Patuca River is called “Mesoamerican Biological Corridor”. Building dams there supposed flooding of some part of rainforest near the river. Animals living there would have to change their habitat. The river itself would change its flow which affects the fish population. Among other negative consequences would be change in the bio-chemical makeup, reduction in water quality and potential tectonic impacts. Honduras: Patuca River and Communities under threat// International Rivers.-Bercley,2016 P.3 Downstream from the dam, the river's volume, flow, and temperature would change, altering the habitats of shellfish, reptiles, amphibians, plants, and bird species. Upstream, the reservoirs would submerge rainforest vegetation, soils, and organic matter, which would emit greenhouse gases as they rot. Reservoirs in the tropics produce high amounts of methane and carbon dioxide, accelerating global warming. Eidt J. Honduras: Patuca River Dams Threaten Indigenous Survival // Wild Utopia, 2011 Palm Plantations will be the only one from Flora and Fauna to benefit from the dams.

Another big problem which followed the project from the beginning is the necessity to resettle local residents. The banks of the river are settled by indigenous communities of Miskito, Garifuna and Pech. Their way of live is the same their processors had hundreds of years ago and thus river plays crucial role in their live. Most of them up till now refused to change the place of living. Besides them the project affected 400 other families. According to official information from the government all families whose houses were affected had a compensation. But the reality disproves these words. Thousands of people are living in the street across the manager's office of the state energy company. They have still received no answer. Hondurans Protest Over Lands Lost in Hydroelectric Project // Telesur, 2015 Environmental journalist Jack Edit in his article devoted to helping indigenous population in Honduras describing the people's attitude to the project said: “to them always the dollars … to us always the pain.” Eidt J. Honduras: Patuca River Dams Threaten Indigenous Survival//Wild Utopia, 2011

Picture 5. Location of the dam Patuca III The Patuca River and its location in the country of Honduras in Central America // Research Gate,

Besides the problems mentioned above, the project is being criticized for lack of transparency and ignoring opinion of local people. One may ask if there are so many problems all over the project why Honduran government could not just simply cancel it? Authorities have their reason to insist on this project. For the last couple of years the dependence of Honduras on oil raised year after year. Its manufacturing sector is growing and thus each time demand more and more. In order to cut this strong addiction to oil authorities decided to make a stake on renewable energy which is a very good move in a long-term perspective. But authorities made several mistakes which later on had a negative impact on the whole situation. First of all, they took a loan while they did not pay for another dam - El Cajon. Secondly, they did not bother to make a referendum and ask usual people about their opinion. Thus they have all those numerous protests with no end to see. Usual people are not thinking about what is better for manufacture they care about their houses and their lives. And thirdly, the government did not look carefully through alternatives. They approved the land for the project regardless ecological and social damage. As the result, they lost an investor in 2013 and barely found the new one. Among locals the Patuca III and its possible future twins will always be something that ruined someone's life. We think people would never agree to accept this project and will fight against it till the end.

Another Honduran project which turned out to be a disaster is Aqua Zarca - hydroelectric project on Gualcarque River in Northwest Honduras. The idea of this project was the same: to reduce dependency on fossil fuels and enlarge electricity production from renewable sources. Honduran company Desarollos Energeticos (DESA) became the main owner due to its good ties with politicians. DESA found three main investors namely Dutch Bank FMO, FinnFund and Central American Bank of economic integration. The main constructor by analogy with Patuca project became Sinohydro. Till 2013 everything went well and estimations were only positive. Aqua Zarca was supposed to bring a lot of benefits to the area: create a more stable supply of the energy, promote employment and create new working places, train local people and develop education. According to the plan the dam should generate 21.3 MW. It occupies 35 hectares which were bought from Honduran government and local people.

But despite all the benefits locals did not appreciate this project much. As it was the case with Patuca, the project partially touched local indigenous population Lenka tribes for whom river is the main source of life. Environmental activists also could not leave the project unnoticed.

Picture 6. Agua Zarca Project Location Agua Zarca Map//World Politics News

They hinted on possible flooding and killing hundreds of species in the area. At first such accusations were peaceful and were left unattended by the government but later on opposition from local people made the project suspended and nicknamed “violent”. The protests around the building of the dam were very harsh. The situation worsened after the unknown gunmen shot dead one of the activists' leader. A year after his death one more activist was killed in her home. These two murders put a period on participation of European investors in the project. But they were not the first to leave the project. In 2013 Sinohydro cancelled the contract without much consideration and explanations. One may guess that Chinese did not want to be engaged in project which demand so many efforts and could do small output in the end. That time investors quickly replaced it by Costa Rican company COPRECA. From 2013-2015 authorities tried to settle the dispute around the project with locals but it was unsuccessful. In May 2016 the rest of the “father-founders” withdrew from the project. Among the reasons which made them abandon the project they cited the results of the study conducted right before the cancellation. Turned out that river could not provide the flow and capacity estimated earlier. Besides, European companies accused Honduran government in ignoring the opinion of locals, bribery and lack of transparency. Thus now DESA are looking for new partners but one could predict that after all the scandals it will be a hard task to do.

Thinking about Aqua Zarca one may ask was the project dead from the beginning? This question is extremely relevant in this situation. Analyzing all the materials about this project we would guess that it is rather yes than no. From the beginning Honduran government simply ignore opinion of locals. All they care about was not the benefits for people but benefits for itself. If everything was like they claimed it to be, people would never made so many noise and protest. There is no smoke without the fire. Contract killing of activists was an apogee. Investors could not stand any longer such a harsh resistance. The result - project is postponed, it is already planned to be relocated and it is waiting for someone who will become its sponsor.

Judging by all this projects we see that authorities of Central American countries prefer to ignore the opinion of local people. Bribery, lack of transparency, negligence, rush, lack of qualified environmental impact studies- it is all there, all around Chinese infrastructural projects in the region under discussion. But who is to be blamed for such situation? Is it Chinese companies or local authorities? We suppose that both actors are responsible for that. The first one does not scorn to disturb environmentally sensitive areas in the sake of development. The second wants to implement project by any means regardless protests, lack of money or obvious problems.

In all this projects we see one common characteristic and it is Chinese patience. Simply imagine what it feels like when you bring thousands of workers, millions of machines, you construct new roads and create new facilities. And then you have to stop your works because locals who did not know much about what is going to be built there start protests. Local governments are responsible for such situation. When one calling for help abroad, he must be sure that country and people are ready for this. From six Chinese projects analyzed in this chapter only 3 were built. The rest fall the victim of negligence. Locals shout: Go away Chinese, you will ruin our nature! But if the company is already there it means somebody called it earlier. Why Chinese companies should think about local ecology and rare fish. It is you who live there should worry about and Chinese are here for business. Central American and Caribbean countries are shouting about lack of investors and the wish to become more developed. At the same time people are trying to stop almost every big infrastructural project that supposed to be built there. They all must decide they are either want to save their traditional way of life or they want to catch up with developing countries. If they want to be traditionally oriented they should not call for investors and for Chinese companies in particular because this or that way they will do some changes in local life. People must understand that if they want to make their life better they will need to pay some price for this. Of course it is not always the case that when you develop your infrastructure and manufacture the ecological situation worsen but the balance is very hard to obtain. If we look at all great superpowers of the past and present they all sacrifice ecology in this or that sense for the sake of prosperity. Of course we did not support such state of things but we are trying to be objective and this is what things are going on for real.

The second problem of the region - lack of legitimacy, what usual people think does not correspond with what authorities have in their mind. They don't trust their politicians and there are a lot of reasons for it. Indigenous people don't care much about their country's depend on oil, they don't understand that good infrastructure require electricity, they are thinking about their houses and families and want to live their life the way their ancestry used to do. This is hard task for authorities to deal with such a category of the people but what authorities of countries under discussion are doing - namely ignoring them, is totally not an option. One may suggest that building a kind of reservation zones for preserving traditional way of life might be a good choice. Of course indigenous people probably would not agree on that either but it is probably the only way to found a compromise between the wish to catch up with the best and preserve traditions and customs.

Now in half of the cases we have studied the following situation occurs: Chinese companies came, started construction works, spent their money and effort and then have to stop and leave because of these or that reasons. In one case it was environment, in other case indigenous people or wrong calculations. But are Chinese companies guilty for their withdrawal from the projects? To answer this question one should think over who is the author of the project. In most cases Chinese companies are only the constructor, not the owner and not the one who propose the place for the projects. Were there the Chinese who decided to choose exactly the Goat Island territory on Jamaica to build facilities there - no, it was Jamaican government. Were there the Chinese who choose the land of indigenous Lenka tribe to build a dam there - no, it was Honduran DESA. Were there the Chinese who insisted on enlarging Patuca project - no, it was authorities. Thus the only case when Chinese could be guilty for postponing the project is Nicaraguan Canal but here again it was the president of the country Daniel Ortega who announced the idea of building new canal inside the country.

But China is not an angel too. If the Chinese companies cared about the environment they could refuse to become the constructor, but so far they never did so. Their chairmen claims that they are altruistic and want to promote harmonious development in the world but one could find a lot of hidden motives there. Chinese are doing a lot of good to the countries of the third world but it is always a favor for the favor. In the first chapter we mentioned some projects given by China for its supporters. And if they did not demand something from the receiver so far, it means that time will come later. Those six case studies showed us that Chinese have to bear a lot in this region. They face a huge bunch of problem but still did not give up and this means that this region plays an important role for them because otherwise they will give everything up and relocate this money to Africa where everybody is happy with the things as they are.



Conclusion

Chinese economic expansion in Central America and the Caribbean turned out to be a very interesting and controversial topic to discuss. Unlike other topics analyzing Chinese foreign policy it represents a tangle of different problems. On the surface lies the problem of strengthening Chinese influence abroad and ambitions of being superpower and spreading its will on others. But inside we found a rather big portion of contradictions like Chinese investments and wish to become a sponsor and immaturity of local markets, the wish to become more developed and at the same time unavailability to come to compromise.

During our research we studied every country in the region mentioned above in detail and came to the conclusion that so far with all the attempts had been made those countries only could be the receiver of Chinese help and have little and some of them nothing to give in exchange. In the early stages of conducting the research there were some assumptions that Chinese came to the region due to pure economic reasons, the same they pursued in Latin America. Among them we can mention mineral resources, agricultural production and new mass market for selling Chinese goods. But later those assumptions took second place and first one occupied Taiwan with its last allies in the region.

Analyzing the struggle between the PRC and the ROC it became clear for us that first of all China promotes its expansion there in order to deprive Taiwan of its last allies. Thus political reasons come first and economic one comes second mainly as bonus and as means of establishing firm presence in the region.

We have chosen the topic “Chinese economic expansion” because by means of economic tools like investments and loans, Great China is beating a path towards Taiwanese submission. And features of this economic expansion are indeed special because no other country excluding Taiwan could balance between permitted and unpermitted so gracefully. Take even Honduras for example. In the official website of Chinese Foreign Ministry you will never find a word dedicated to this country as it never existed. Honduras recognizes Taiwan and thus officially ignored but this did not prevent state-owned Sinohydro from participating in projects there. The same goes to other countries like Nicaragua or Belize. Commenting such state of affairs we suggest that China is ready to open a door to the region to become its new best friend even if this door is closed and there is only an eyehole there.

The first step of making friends with Central America is to made as much countries as possible recognize Beijing. Then they must show how good and friendly they are - build facilities, energy power generations, roads, schools and everything these nation scars. Then Chinese businessman could move in and establish their business. Also China would buy products that produced there starting from banana and finishing with dental surgery instruments. This trade would not be that much important for it but would be essential for Central America and Caribbean states which pretty much produce the same. Local people would buy cheap Chinese goods which would perfectly match not stable economic and political conditions.

Thus conquering this region China could kill several birds with one stone: press the enemy Taiwan, realize the ambitions of a superpower, move forward United States, find a new market area and create new working places.

Answering the questions raised in the very beginning we may conclude that real Chinese interests in the region are hidden behind the wish to help developing countries. The real one includes gaining new allies, resisting Taiwan and opening new markets for trade. The wish to become a super power and finally beat Taiwan is pushing China further and further into the region. Despite the fact that reasons of this situation are mainly political, the final goal is carried out through economic means - loans, grants, programs, presents and participating in main infrastructural projects. These economic means at the same time are features of Chinese-Taiwanese check-book diplomacy which mainly consists of bribing as many countries as possible. So far, both sides has achieved parity but recent tendencies show us it could not last long.

Participation of Chinese companies in infrastructural projects in Central America and the Caribbean is mutually beneficial. Chinese can employ their working force, can enjoy special attitude and sometimes can use the land near the project as they want (Jamaica). The other side, in its turn, has an opportunity to have modern up-to-date equipment and facilities which would be impossible to obtain without external help. Most of the projects presuppose a win-win formula but this does not mean that they are free from pitfalls. There is no guarantee on quality of the works and terms of operation but so far there were no complains in this field. Infrastructural projects can create a good base for future development in these countries because investors would like stable energy supply, good roads, high-capacity ports. But a lot of factors will depend on how countries would behave themselves and deal with the help they got. If authorities pocket all the profit it would pull the nation down but not up. The approach “let's copy what others did” could worsen the situation either. Central American and Caribbean countries may take some Asian states as a good example of the developmental model but they must take into consideration that conditions between them are totally different and thus the outcome could be the opposite.

To sum up all the ideas we mention in our work we may say that Chinese actions in Central America and Caribbean are not a coincidence or just business. It is well thought-out strategic policy and if everything goes on according to the plan, once and for all, Taiwan would be 23^rd province. China would be free from one of its main headaches.



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