However, when compared to China, Indonesia builds infrastructure largely because of the needs in an area or region that does not have proper road facilities. It is different with China which builds infrastructure not because it suits the needs of a region or region, but rather that infrastructure is built for connectivity and distribution between regions so that the economy develops and grows. In the period 1980-1990, infrastructure in China was very sad and the main cause of the bottleneck (bottle neck) in the economy there, where growth was only 3.9% in 1990. Then, China began to boost infrastructure development from 1992 to 2013, such as highways, trains, airports, and ports and others, which then made China's economic growth accelerate. According in Journal “Questioning Modernity in Indonesia and Malaysia”, also contains the same meaning for Indonesian and Chinese culture that on average has the same background or social status.this is motivated by the culture of modernization. The establishment of the National Mosque is an icon of examples of traditional positions where locality, culture of citizenship, meet with Islamic message about religious pluralism Wendy Mee, J. S. (2012). Questioning Modernity in Indonesia and Malaysia. Insight Turkey, 269..

Indonesian government has determined that it will only open B-to-B scheme options in BRI projects and refuse the use of government to government (G-to-G) schemes. For the record, government is responsible for Chinese investment in the BRI context, caused by the time, processes and procedures that take a long time to work on projects with the G to G scheme Bhaskara, I. L. (2019, May 2). Ekspansi Proyek OBOR Cina, Indonesia Diminta Waspadai Jebakan Utang. Retrieved from https://tirto.id/ekspansi-proyek-obor-cina-indonesia-diminta-waspadai-jebakan-utang-dnpo .

Chinese multinationals are described by being enormous, by having entered the worldwide economy generally as of late and practically every one of them are state-or territorial possessed endeavors. Most huge Chinese organizations are possessed by focal or neighborhood government and this applies similarly to organizations with speculations abroad.

These multinationals mirror the exercises of their mother organizations in China as for innovative abilities and quality gauges. China's industrialization is generally described by being low-wage, low-tech, low-efficiency fabricating at the low finish of worldwide flexibly chain from one viewpoint, and high venture, high asset utilization and contamination, high abuse, and high level of outside capital/exchange reliance on the other. As opposed to multinationals from other creating nations, which work in a set number of remote nations, Chinese multinationals work in countless nations around the world, like some South Korean huge firms. Tarmidi, L.T (2013). Chinese foreign direct investment in Indonesia: trends, drivers, and impacts, Int J. Technological Learning, Innovation, and Development, Vol.6, Nos. 1 /2, pp.136-160

On the other hand, Jokowi's government cooperation with the Chinese government brought huge excesses, including the construction of reclamation which was considered disturbing the environment so that it became part of the feud in the DKI Jakarta Regional Election in 2017. Currently, the Lippo Group's arrogance in the Meikarta mega-project with an investment of IDR 278 Trillion is mostly from China. The plan is to build 300 towers and an industrial city covering 500 hectares. Unfortunately, they have not yet received permission and have been reprimanded by the Bekasi Regency Government and West Java Provincial Government, but continue to build, advertise, and sell. That said, the product has been purchased 100,000 customers. It was announced that on August 17, 2017 they will launch even without permission. This is a form of Chinese arrogance because of the loosening of Jokowi's government towards China.

With the Indo-China scheme, foreign organizations (social organizations) may also be established in Indonesia. We still remember, the establishment of the FBI (Forum Bhayangkara Indonesia) in military uniform as a Chinese mass organization that functions to protect Chinese workers in Indonesia. After the reclamation of the north coast of Jakarta, apparently the north coast of Indonesia became the target of Chinese territory expansion for business reasons. The information, there are 20 hectares of land in the village of Mukti Pangandaran, KEK investment (Special Economic Zones) in cooperation with PT. Jababeka (KEK specialist) on Morotai Island which is famous for its virgin forests, reclamation ports in Bojonegoro Banten, the coast of Banten, Lombok and Flores (East Nusa Tenggara). That said, the new BUMN Act also has an article to answer BUMN assets no longer requiring DPR permission.

Cases of labor strikes and JICT (Jakarta International Container Terminal) workers as a subsidiary of PT. Pelindo II also smells racist because Chinese workers and professional workers, the salary far exceeds the salaries of Indonesian workers. Keep in mind, the JICT workers strike is also due to employee refusal to extend the contract management of Hutchison Port owned by tycoon Li Ka-shing which is very protected by RJ Lino, former Managing Director of PT. Pelindo II at the time, and Rini Soemarno (Minister of BUMN). Li Ka-shing is one of the richest people in Asia, who is also Chairman of China's Overseas who will get a contract extension until 2039. Pressure from shareholders and investors, as well as Jokowi's ambition to build infrastructure which in the 2017 State Budget reaches IDR 387 trillion, but in the State Budget 2018 rose to IDR 409 trillion. Chinese investment with all its excesses indicates not just ordinary business but can be said to be an invasion because it really disturbs the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.

This certainly degrades Jokowi's popularity in public opinion, despite releasing macroeconomics in the state budget but in reality, the debt burden in 2017 is IDR 390 trillion and in 2018 it is IDR 430 trillion. Not to mention if the amount of revenue in the APBN projections is not reached, of course the deficit of IDR 308 trillion in the 2018 State Budget will increase. The big question is, where does the Government get the source of funds to cover debts that are due in 2017 and 2018? We know that fiscal space is very tight, and taxes have never reached the target. We know that since 2006, Indonesia's tax targets have never been reached. While the tax target continues to be raised, at a time when the real sector is sluggish, and people's purchasing power is weakening⁵.

President Jokowi understands the differences in the character of Chinese and Japanese investors. Japanese investors, companies, and experts have long been famous for being stingy in transferring knowledge to local workers. They even tend to undermine the abilities of Indonesians. However, in terms of investment, Japan's relations with Indonesia are already very close. Japan has established economic cooperation and been involved in development assistance in Indonesia since the 1950s.On the other hand, China must work harder in order to gain the trust of Indonesia⁴. Moreover, the country has not been included in the list of the top five foreign investors for Indonesia. In other words, there is still a long way to go for China if it wants to shift Japan, Singapore and South Korea, which have become Indonesia's ideal investors.

In the last few years the project, despite the budget savings policy, Japanese assistance continues to focus on technical cooperation in the field of roads, aviation, port, maritime (including preparations to form a new Yen Loan project). Technically, the capacity of the Government of Indonesia and Companies in Indonesia are increasing, but projects that require new technology such as subway development require ongoing collaboration, including transfer technology from Japan, where the collaboration is a plus for Japanese ODA.

The result is by strengthening networks throughout Indonesia, Japan is contributing to strengthening connectivity domestically, developing Indonesian industry as part of international trade and production networks, for example the results are as follows:

· Strengthening ferry and trans-Sumatra transportation (of which 60% of 2,500 km of roads were built by Japan). Through the construction of a ferry transportation that connects Java and Sumatra, it can shorten the time that was previously 5 hours, now is less than 2 hours.

· Strengthening the capacity of transportation of main trains in Java.

· Development and expansion of 5 airports (Bali, Balikpapan, Surabaya, Padang, Palembang), and construction of security facilities in 33 airports.

· Development of 8 of 28 national gateway ports, 12 non-commercial ports in eastern Indonesia, and 10 ferry ports throughout Indonesia (Japan International Corporate Agency, 2018) Japan International Corporate Agency. (2018). Pembangunan Indonesia dan Kerjasama Jepang: Membangun Masa Depan Berdasarkan Kepercayaan. Japan International Corporate Agency Journal, 9..

This is very much in accordance with the journal "The basis of Indonesia's marine policy as a maritime country to explain the benefits of transfer of tech from Japan to Indonesia: The importance of an integrated economy" which says that During the Reformation Era (since 1998), the Indonesian government has sought to develop a global-oriented economy in conjunction with technological progress by building a competitive advantage based on comparative advantage as a maritime nation that also possesses a land-based economy with potential variation by region. This indicates that Indonesia's economy rests on the development and integration of various sectors, both land and sea. By prioritizing the development of maritime infrastructure and connectivity through the construction of ocean tolls, deep seaports, logistics, shipping industry, and maritime tourism, this paradigm guarantees that maritime development will eventually help increase efficiency and effectiveness in developing economic activities in the land areas Yety Rochwulaningsih,,. S. (2019). Marine policy basis of Indonesia as a maritime state: The importance of integrated economy. Marine Policy 108, 3-5..

Indonesia is the largest recipient of ODA (government-level development assistance) from Japan (based on the net payment realization in 2005 of US $ 1.22 billion, which is + 17% of all ODA provided by Japan). The government will ask Japan to transfer technology more to Indonesia in leading sectors, such as the automotive sector (Kedutaan Besar Jepang di Indonesia, 2007). Moreover, technology transfer is included in the Midec scheme as a prerequisite for the signing of the IJ-EPA seven years ago which included a reduction and exemption of import duties (BM) by around 90% on tariff posts.The economic development policies that lead to unifying the potential of the marine and land sectors are evident in the application of the concept of Blue Economy. Kementrian Perindustrian. (2014, December 10). Menperin: Jepang Harus Transfer Teknoogi. Retrieved from https://kemenperin.go.id/: https://kemenperin.go.id/artikel/10625/Menperin:-Jepang-Harus-Transfer-Teknologi

The application of this model looks very dichotomous in a sector that was only associated with the sea. It ignores the fact that the land sector is also strengthening its maritime potential. To date, this concept was limited to the discourse, not based on legality, with an accompanying budget. This model is not able to develop potential commodities from various sectors. It has not yet been implemented. In contrast, the formulation of the Blue Economy model is not the main topic of discussion in Indonesian economic history. Thus far, this economic model is implemented only in fisheries.

From the form of cooperation in the field of infrastructure carried out by Indonesia to China and Japan, in terms of the efficiency of cooperation with Japan it is more profitable. This is due to Japan having the latest technological advancements and being one of the best countries in Asia in terms of technological development, with this progress, Japan easily builds all infrastructures in accordance with the needs in a region.

However, this is not advantageous in terms of human resources because in the construction of the infrastructure, most of it is not done by human workers but machines, while AIIB and BRI conducted by China and Indonesia still use human labor. Therefore, Indonesia itself needs to develop human resources in order to have a good ability in terms of infrastructure development in the long term in the future.

3.2 Infrastructure investment in Indonesia: the practical perspective

In this section, the author would like to elucidate its analysis concerning the infrastructure investment from China and Japan in Indonesia. As the largest economy in the South East Asia with the total population of 268 million, Indonesia has rapid economic development and enabled impressive gains in reducing property and human growth especially in the urban area. With high rate of migration to cities as the place for better living, government needs to maintain and provide a good urban infrastructure access for the people. Government has tried to push the infrastructure sector by collaborating with local and foreign investor with many policies and regulations. Based on Global Economic Report 2015-2016, Indonesia was standing on the ranks 64^th from 142 countries regarding the infrastructure. Indonesia Investments (23 June 2017). Infrastruktur di Indonesia. Retrieved from https://www.indonesia-investments.com/id/bisnis/risiko/infrastruktur/item381

Overall, the infrastructure budget in Indonesia is keep increasing. In the first year of Jokowi presidency, the spending for the infrastructure was raised from US$ 11.7 billion into US$ 15.5 Billion in 2015. The government infrastructure spending plan has total amount of IDR 2,216trn or 2.9% of GDP nominal on annual basis. In the 2016, government revised the budget and rose it up to 9%. The foreign direct investment (FDI) also increased by 9.6% in 2015 while the domestic investment was going down by 4% on that year. President Jokowi keeps developing many initiatives to gain the infrastructure budget until 2025. PwC Indonesia. ( 2016) Indonesian Infrastructure Stable foundations for growth. PwC Annual Infrastructure Report, 3-4

In terms of regulation, the government also made some revision regarding the policy because some of the infrastructure projects was running slowly due to the obstacles in the investment implementation. Overall, the weak coordination between stakeholders often resulted in some delay in decision making process. On the preparation stage, the limitation of funds allocation and the weak quality of project preparation also causing problems. Further, there are also some problems regarding the availability of land that causing the procrastination to reach financial close.

One test confronting all financial specialists considering the Indonesian infrastructure, is the administrative structure which can be questionable. Verifiably, the wellsprings of this vulnerability have included political change, centralization/decentralization of different layers of power, and covering and conflicting guidelines. In later years be that as it may, Indonesia has attempted to improve the administrative conviction in the framework segment. In particular, the administration refined the PPP governs in 2015 to widen the extent of the plan and presented accessibility installments as a type of venture return. The issuance of financial improvement bundles likewise mirrors the administration's craving to limit administrative vulnerability. Soraya, N. Key Challenges facing Indonesia's infrastructure market in 2017. Norton Rose Fullbright. Retrieved from https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/054c6c6e/key-challenges-facing-indonesias-infrastructure-market-in-2017 (accessed 11 05 2020)

To overcome these obstacles, government has taken corrective steps in terms of regulation, fiscal, and institution. Since 2014, government has formed a committee for the acceleration of priority infrastructure provision to lead the coordination of infrastructure priority acceleration and push the escalation of project setup quality. Further, government created 8 economy policy packages to reorganize Indonesian regulations which hampering. economic growth. These 8 policies are about the deregulation of 165 rules and laws, bureaucracy of land acquisition permit, investment permits, cut duration for taking care of tax allowance and tax holiday, deregulation of labor and salary systems which including incentives, and tax reduction. Pusat komunikasi Publik. Pemerintah keluarkan paket kebijakan infrastruktur Kementrian Pekerjaan Umum dan Perumahan Rakyat. Retrieved from https://www.pu.go.id/berita/view/3435/pemerintah-keluarkan-paket-kebijakan-infrastruktur (accessed 27 04 2020)

Land securing can present huge issues in the undertaking advancement process and can at last forestall ventures achieving monetary close on time. There are three basic difficulties confronting land obtaining in Indonesia:

- Long exchanges with nearby networks, particularly where there are bunches of land proprietors. The procedure can take considerably more if the plots don't yet have a land testament and standard land has first to be changed over.

- Land debates, where one gathering professes to be the legitimate proprietor when settlement hosts been reached with different gatherings introducing documentation or witnesses affirming their possession.

- The enormous measure of assets required for land acquisition.

Different laws and guidelines have been given to quicken the land procurement process, eminently the 2012 Land Acquisition Law. There are additionally now actualizing guidelines intended to disavow land rights where it is in the open enthusiasm to do as such, to restrict the length of each procedural stage and for the most part, to defend the interests of land proprietors. This improved procedure prompts the appropriate inquiry of how these guidelines are being actualized. For without appropriate usage, land securing issues will keep on deferring execution of foundation ventures. Hermawan, J. Doing Business in Indonesia. 2013. Hogan Lovells. Pp. 43-65

To achieve the funding needs, the administration built up two significant budgetary foundations - PT Indonesia Infrastructure Finance (IIF) and PT Penjamin Infrastruktur Indonesia (Indonesian Infrastructure Guarantee Fund or IIGF). IIF is an auxiliary of PT Sarana Multi Infrastruktur (SMI) that has been organized as a private non-bank budgetary establishment to give obligation account and value cooperation. IIGF works through an assurance system to upgrade financing through the open private organization (PPP) instrument. The PPP conspire urges private area investment to help beat financing difficulties. To supplement this, the administration has been looking for financing options, most as of late the administration's non-spending venture financing.

Regarding the bankability, Studies have discovered that the issue with framework financing in Asia and particularly in Indonesia isn't really a deficiency of subsidizing however an absence of accessibility of practical and bankable ventures. Bankability and financing issues are firmly related, and the difficulties in private segment subsidizing are normally determined by bankability issues. It is regularly hard for the backers to present to loan specialists venture gets that are bankable. This is on the grounds that the structures of the activities and the delicate documentation, are not constantly natural to global loan specialists. Tasks may likewise battle to show a dependable wellspring of income. For foundation extends specifically, the undertaking proprietors ordinarily search for either no response or constrained plan of action financing. The danger of default will be higher when the wellspring of the income is untrustworthy. Hazard distribution among the gatherings can likewise prompt bankability concerns. The general guideline is that dangers ought to be allotted to the gathering best ready to oversee them. For instance, the danger of the legislature dropping or changing the terms of venture understandings, or of an adjustment in law which antagonistically impacts the task, is best overseen by the administration.

The last challenges that have to be faced by the Indonesia in order to help pledging faster infrastructure development and more investment opportunities to create jobs and growth concerning the socio-economic sectors are; Suroyo, G, Widianto, S. (20 October 2019). Factbox: Key challenges for Indonesia's Widodo in second term. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-politics-president-challeng/factbox-key-challenges-for-indonesias-widodo-in-second-term-idUSKBN1WZ09F

- Economic Slowdown, Indonesia has battled to lift financial development above 5% lately regardless of a blast in foundation building and endeavors to cut formality hampering investment Indonesia has pulled in interest in mineral purifying, yet has neglected to win as a significant part of the assembling venture whenever contrasted and a few adversaries. Jokowi has vowed to improve the venture atmosphere further by loosening up severe work rules, opening up more regions to remote financial specialists and accelerating exchange agreements. But a lot is on the line given 2019 monetary development is required to slow without precedent for a long time in the midst of dangers of worldwide downturn.

- Corruption, Widodo has affirmed parliament's bill to put the Corruption Eradication Commission under the watch of another board of trustees and check its opportunity to wiretap suspects. Recently, more than 40 financial experts marked an open letter encouraging Widodo to deny the law, contending debasement harms productivity and hampers speculation.

- Education, In a nation where about a large portion of the populace is under 30, understudies reliably rank close to the base of global understudy studies. The president has apportioned cash for abilities preparing for the jobless and extended a program to pay for advanced education for poor people.

- Conservatism and Radicalism, Indonesia has the world's greatest Muslim populace and is regularly observed for instance of how majority rules system and Islam can coincide, yet rising conservatism has fanned more prominent intolerance in a nation with huge strict and ethnic minorities. Simultaneously, Indonesia is thinking about a resurgence in Islamist militancy after a progression of self-destruction bombings in the city of Surabaya a year ago and the ongoing cutting of the nation's main security serve by a presumed activist.

- Environment, Indonesia as of late endured its most exceedingly terrible timberland fires since 2015 and as the world's greatest palm oil maker has been battling an arrangement by the European Union to eliminate utilizing the oil as a vehicle fuel because of connections to deforestation. Jokowi declared plans to move the capital from the swarmed, flood-inclined city of Jakarta on Java island to the forested island of Borneo, activating inquiries over how the arrangement would be financed and its natural effect.

Since won the second election as Indonesian Presiden, Joko widodo did not make any significance changes regarding his administrations for infrastructure investment. Throughout the Jokowi government, in addition to the rapid infrastructure projects being built in Indonesia, there were also many negative sides to the foreign investment. Relocation of many foreign investors from Indonesia to other Southeast Asian countries, especially Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand, is one of an economic challenge that will be faced in the President Joko Widodo'sadministration. The Investments that coming out of Indonesia has resulted in increased unemployment and decreased household consumption.

In the 2014 election campaign, Jokowi ambitiously targeted Indonesia's growth of 7%. But in the last five years, economic growth only grew an average of five percent, even touching 4.79% in 2015. Moreover, World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) cut Indonesia's growth projection to only 5% in 2019, from the previous amount of 5.2% and 5.1% in 2018, according to each institution. We could see the growth of Indonesian economic to the following diagram;

Table 8

Indonesian economic growth 2015-2019

Source: World Bank and IMF estimation 2019

Beside the obsession with infrastructure development, as is referenced over, the development and authenticity of the Jokowi government progressively depends on the utilization of one normalized "estimation" of the local framework. It seemed like, the nation is less worried about inquiries of dissemination and possession.

Initially, the natural "empowering" character of framework is challenged. Framework should fill in as the establishment that empowers another thing to occur. In this sense, it ought to realize upgrades to help business forms, which in the long run offer ascent to profitability. However, the profitability itself apparently is an open-finished term that has been barely characterized by the administration.

Despite infrastructure being on the fast track, the World Bank's 2019 Ease of Doing Business positioning shows that Indonesia is seriously lingering behind in giving a steady business condition, even comparative with its ASEAN peers. World Bank group. (2019). Doing Bussiness 2019 Training for Reform. A World Bank Group Flashing Report. p.141 Foundation improvement is an essential but not adequate. Profitability ought not be likened essentially with a call to fill in foundation holes. To redesign the economy and have influence on the worth chain, broad endeavors ought to incorporate expanding the proficiency of existing offices and climbing the item cycle with both productivity and neighborhood inputs. The update requires human capital turn of events and an endogenous total learning process. The system of development must be connected and upheld by unique complementarities among upstream and downstream firms. This could have been encouraged by foundation, yet additionally a perplexing blend between sound market guidelines and steady organizations and political establishments.

Increasingly risky, Jokowi's organization receives a tricky answer for take care of the abrogating basic issues. The state has obviously gotten fixated on "advanced development" and "unicorns," which are currently observed as "supernatural" methods for taking care of Indonesia's hidden auxiliary issues. In any case, indeed, these unicorns profit by the "inadequacy" of foundation and institutional shortcomings, as opposed to tending profoundly issues. Accordingly, the problematic critical thinking procedures that the legislature is focusing on might just turn into a faзade, overlooking the nation's key issues.

What the legislature has neglected is that, similarly as modern improvement has been ruined by basic issues, so too are new companies and advanced innovations. Indonesian financial development still vigorously depends on non-IT capital, with a 79 percent commitment. Asian Productivity Organization. (2018). APO Productivity data Book 2018. Tokyo. Kelo University Press Inc. pp. 152-156 The commitment from work represents only 17 percent of development and only 1 percent originates from Total Factor Productivity (TFP) - the estimation of innovative limit and institutional quality. This is a very compelling evidence that Indonesia still beset with development constraints - ailing in physical foundation, yet additionally such social framework as quality work, IT capital, and innovation, just as delicate infrastructure like institution and regulation.

Another issue is that, despite the fact that the infrastructure improvement is required in Indonesia, there are significant worries about the administration's method for doing it. In spite of the fact that the administration additionally keep duplicating risk. Furthermore, the restricted alternative of financing plans brings high budgetary weight. These issues are additionally combined with reckless arrangement and a surged course of events, which lead to bad infrastructure quality. Infrastructure supporters in Indonesia have frequently referred to China of as an example of how an infrastructure-first approach, although state-led, can lead to economic growth. Wijaya,T, Nursamsu, S. (09 January 2020). The Trouble With Indonesia's Infrastructure Obsession

The state's narrative of economic development oversimplifies complex structural problems. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/the-trouble-with-indonesias-infrastructure-obsession/

Moreover, the massive investment also leads to massive loan for Indonesia. The administration of President Joko Widodo plans to spend more than $400 billion structure air terminals, power plants and other framework in the following five years. That is much more than the Indonesian record of $350 billion that Jokowi directed in his first term. The inquiry is the means by which to fund such eager plans. Indonesia has twin exchange and spending shortages, and the administration has been mindful so as to keep the last inside 3% of GDP, a worldwide standard for financial reasonability. Ren, S. (22 05 2019). Indonesia's debt binge takes a leaf from China. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/indonesia-is-turning-chinese/2019/05/20/b3f38d40-7b5b-11e9-b1f3-b233fe5811ef_story.html

In recent time, International rating agency Standard & Poor's (S&P) Global Rating has raised worries over the compounding accounting reports of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that take part in the nation's enormous infrastructure projects. In 2011, SOE could take care of the entirety of its obligation with only one year of pretax benefit. However, starting at 2017, the ability to pay the pretax had swelled into 4.5 years. Aisyah, R. (14 03 2018). S&P warns of SOEs' poor financial reports. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/03/14/sp-warns-of-soes-poor-financial-records.html

PT Waskita Karya, one of the biggest contractor in Indonesia has the most presentation to government agreements, and its obligation trouble has detonated under Jokowi's administration, Another example is PT Jasa Marga, Indonesia's biggest tollway administrator, is a genuine model. The organization needs an extra 35.1 trillion rupiah ($2.4 billion) of funding to twofold its street arrange in two years. That is identical to 5.5 long stretches of working benefit, putting Jasa Marga in danger of penetrating obligation agreements. Ren, S. (21 05 2019). Indonesia is Turning Chinese. Bloomberg Opinion. Retrieved from https://www.bloombergquint.com/global-economics/indonesia-s-infrastructure-debt-binge-follows-china-model

SOE manufacturers have been offering obligation to remote financial specialists and getting advances from China. For instance, PT Wijaya Karya brought about $400 million up in January 2018 selling Komodo bonds, designated protections sold in the market, and acquired 80 trillion rupiah in credits from China Development Bank. Kontan.co.id. (24 January 2018). Tawarkan kupon 7,7%, Komodo Bond Wijaya Karya laris. Retrieved from https://investasi.kontan.co.id/news/tawarkan-kupon-77-komodo-bond-wijaya-karya-laris Subsequently, most financing has originated from Indonesia's legislature controlled banks - simply like in China. Bank advances to non-money related SOEs expanded to 8% of the framework's aggregate, from just 3% every decade back. In total, Indonesia foreign debt has reach US$ 407,5 Billion in February 2020. It consists of US$ 204.2 in private sector and in the government debt, it is around US$ 203.3 billion. Bank of Indonesia believe that the Indonesia's foreign debt is still under control and safe. Ketut,D. ( 22 April 2020). Foreign debt is within safe limit: Bank Indonesia. Retrieved from https://en.antaranews.com/news/146540/foreign-debt-is-within-safe-limit-bank-indonesia

Further, Indonesia currently is still offering more infrastructure projects to foreign investors. Recently, the Indonesian ministry of public works and public housing four toll roads worth Rp112.96 trillion or US$ 8.06 billion with a total length of 424.27 kilometers (km). The four projects are: Maruff, A.(21 Noveber 2019). Indonesia Offers Four Toll Road Projects Worth US$8B. The insider stories. Retrieved from https://theinsiderstories.com/indonesia-offers-four-toll-road-projects-worth-us8b/

1. Solo-Yogyakarta toll road with total length of 93.14 Km and estimated cost of Rp. 28.85 trillion.

2. Yogyakarta- Bawen toll road with total length of 76.36 Km and estimated cost of Rp. 17.38 trillion.

3. Tasikmalaya - Cilacap Gedebage toll road with total length of 206.65 Km and estimated cost of Rp. 57.594 trillion and

4. Makassar-Maros-Takalar toll road with total length of 48,12 Km and estimated cost of 9.41 trillion.

In the previous time, Indonesia's Toll Road Regulatory Agency already has offered seventh cost street ventures with a speculation estimation of Rp151.13 trillion to be sold until December 2019. The undertakings have a length of 575 km. Other the six cost toll road projects are likewise fit to be sold with a complete speculation of Rp135.60 trillion. The six projects are Semanan - Balaraja toll road, Kamal - Teluk Naga - Rajeg toll road, Patimban Port with total access along 37.70 km, Gedebage - Tasikmalaya - Cilacap toll road, Solo - Yogyakarta - Kulon Progo toll road, and Yogyakarta - Bowen toll road.

The legislature is persistently attempting to understand a successful and proficient national transportation framework to improve the portability of products and ventures. With an end goal to help the national coordinations framework, the Government executes an approach of exchange mix on cost streets. From 2015 to June 2019, the administration has finished the projects with total length of 985 km.

Jokowi is all correct to incline toward foundation to arrive at the 7% GDP development target he set when he first was getting to work in 2014 because honestly the nation needs better urban connections and vitality supplies and such projects promise long-term economic benefits. Indonesia still urgently needs hard foundation to lessen disparity among its almost 270 million individuals. Over the most recent two decades, both China and Japan spent constantly on quicker railroads and greater air terminals. Jokowi should remain on target. The current monetary shortfall is well beneath the lawful furthest reaches of 3% of GDP every year. It's acceptable that he's looking to redesign Indonesia's work laws and update its negative speculation list to pull in outside direct infrastructure. FDI in the assembling segment hit records during Jokowi's first term, yet will remain constrained if the streets and ports stay obstructed. Importantly, he ought to be careful about how Indonesia will pay for it.

Conclusion

The study was aimed to have better understanding the comparation of infrastructure investment between Indonesia, China, and Japan under the government of President Joko Widodo. Since he win the election in 2014, Indonesia's seventh president, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) is really focus and determined in the infrastructure development sector. The study has uses liberalism perspective as methodological basis on an important bilateral relation, which describing on how Jokowi using in terms of reaching and approaching Indonesia's national interests.

Well development infrastructure in a state is reflecting the progress and stability of a prosperous state with a purpose to prosper the entire community. In every development lies the involvement and help from another state which could provide aids in financial investments or loans. Indonesia has done good cooperation with other states such as China and Japan in approaching foreign investment to build infrastructure projects in Indonesia

Under his precidency, Indonesia plans to support the foundation improvement. Jokowi organizes quickening foundation improvement to associate the peripheries to development focus, and advancing the availability between islands in the archipelago. Arguably, his improvement methodology has barely center around building infrastructure and contributing foundation speculation to address disparity, lessen poverty, and advance development.

When estimating how President Jokowi molded the bearing of the nation's remote foundation speculation which keeps an eye available system where the quality and reasonable standard will be picked by the legislature. With these standards, Jokowi's organization through the Ministry of Public Housing (PUPR) keeps on teaming up with different gatherings identified with framework improvement.

In the process of running his plans and policies, Jokowi really successes in developing infrastructure in Indonesia. It is proven by many infrastructure projects plan since he won the election in 2014. Currently, these following infrastructure projects have been built during the five years of the Jokowi-JK administration (2014-2019):

· 980 Km Toll road

· 3,793 Km National road

· 2,778 Border Roads

· 330 Hanging Bridge Units

· 7 Cross Country Posts

· 18 Sea Routes

· 15 New Airport

· MRT (Mass Rapid Transit) and LRT (Light Rail Transit)

· 79 Sports Infrastructure

· 65 dams

These massive amounts of projects mostly could be implemented by the help of foreign investor. In this case, China and Japan are countries with biggest investment on infrastructure projects in Indonesia. In his first year, Jokowi immediately rise the portion of infrastructure budget into 14,64 % from the state budget. In the previous period, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono only allocated 9,84 % of the state budget for infrastructure. The spending for the infrastructure was raised from US$ 11.7 billion into US$ 15.5 Billion in 2015. The government infrastructure spending plan has total amount of IDR 2,216trn or 2.9% of GDP nominal on annual basis. In the 2016, government revised the budget and rose it up to 9%. The foreign direct investment (FDI) also increased by 9.6% in 2015 while the domestic investment was going down by 4% on that year. Referring to data of Center for Indonesia Taxation Analysis (CITA), in 2018, the budget portion was increased into18,46 %. President Jokowi keeps developing many initiatives to gain the infrastructure budget until 2025.

In the comparation of China and Japan investment in Indonesia, each country brings difference benefits and threats to Indonesia.

Also, the loan from the China and Japan has many differences. China's investment is generally described by being low-wage, low-tech, low-efficiency fabricating at the low finish of worldwide flexibly chain from one viewpoint, and high venture, high asset utilization and contamination, high abuse, and high level of outside capital reliance on the other. Also, it brings some problems in land reclamation and labor strikes because Chine tends to use Chinese workers rather than local workers. However, China's loan are more adjustable because some of the implementations using the “share benefit” method which more beneficial for Indonesia that has problem regarding the ease bankability.

However, Japan is already Indonesia's old partner way further before China. It means that China has to always keeping Indonesia's trust to shift Japan in the case of investment. Japanese investors, companies, and experts have long been famous for being stingy in transferring knowledge to local workers. They even tend to undermine the abilities of Indonesians. From the type of participation in the field of foundation completed by Indonesia to China and Japan, as far as the proficiency of collaboration with Japan it is increasingly beneficial. This is because of Japan having the most recent mechanical headways and being probably the best nation in Asia as far as innovative turn of events, with this advancement, Japan effectively assembles all frameworks as per the requirements in a locale.

We could take conclusion that the progress in infrastructure is really massive compared with the previous years. Even, President Jokowi got a title as “Father of Infrastructure” in Indonesia. However, in implementing his actions he found several obstacles regarding some aspects. First, in terms of regulation, Indonesia still has weak policy and rules of the regulation which make the infrastructure investment meet some delay because of the unclear instruction and regulation. Of course, it brings more problems in terms of efficiency. Second, land securing also present huge issues in the undertaking advancement process and can at last forestall ventures achieving monetary close on time. Third, regarding in achieve the funding needs, the issue with framework financing in Asia and particularly in Indonesia isn't really a deficiency of subsidizing an absence of accessibility of practical and bankable ventures. Bankability and financing issues are firmly related, and the difficulties in private segment subsidizing are normally determined by bankability. And the fourth, the challenges that have to be faced by Indonesia in order to help pledging faster infrastructure development and more investment opportunities are concerning socio-economic aspects such as economic slowdown, corruption, education, environment, conservatism and radicalism.

In addition, the huge investment additionally prompts gigantic debts for Indonesia. The administration of President Jokowi plans to spend more than $400 billion structure air terminals, power plants and other system in the next five years.

Indonesia still urgently needs hard foundation to lessen disparity among its almost 270 million individuals. Over the most recent two decades, both China and Japan spent constantly on quicker railroads and greater air terminals. Jokowi should remain on target. The current monetary shortfall is well beneath the lawful furthest reaches of 3% of GDP every year. It's acceptable that he's looking to redesign Indonesia's work laws and update its negative speculation list to pull in outside direct infrastructure. FDI in the assembling segment hit records during Jokowi's first term, yet will remain constrained if the streets and ports stay obstructed. Importantly, he ought to be careful about how Indonesia will pay for it.

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