Conflictogenity of international migration: specificities of its formation and use

Размещено на http://www.allbest.ru/

CONFLICTOGENITY OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: SPECIFICITIES OF ITS FORMATION AND USE КОНФЛІКТОГЕННІСТЬ МІЖНАРОДНОЇ МІГРАЦІЇ: ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ФОРМУВАННЯ І ВИКОРИСТАННЯ

conflictogenity international migration

Semenkova M.,

Lecturer, National Defence University of Ukraine

named after Ivan Cherniakhovskii (Kyiv, Ukraine)

Семенкова М.,

викладач, Національний університет оборони

України імені Івана Черняховського (Київ, Україна),

The new approaches to the achieving of foreign policy goals stipulate the use of non-military means to destabilize the targeted country. The international migration is designated as one of these means due to its ability to acquire conflictogenity. One of the ways of acquiring conflictogenity is the horizontal inequality transformation. This transformation is resulted from the migrants, whose peculiarities are different from the peculiarities of locals, getting into the new socioeconomic conditions. It causes the resentment among migrants or locals and the increasing of the conflict potential. It is stated that the conflict potential of international migration can be used by the foreign policy actor to destabilize the host country.

Keywords: international migration, conflictogenity, horizontal inequality.

Нові підходи до досягнення зовнішньополітичних цілей передбачають використання невійськових засобів для дестабілізації цільової країни. Одним з таких засобів в статті визначено міжнародну міграцію, в тому числі у зв'язку з її здатністю набувати конфліктогенних властивостей. Як один із шляхів набуття конфліктогенності наведено трансформацію горизонтальної нерівності. Визначено, що ця трансформація відбувається внаслідок потрапляння мігрантів, які мають особливості, відмінні від особливостей місцевих жителів, в нові соціоекономічні умови. Наслідком цього стає зростання незадоволення серед мігрантів або місцевих жителів і нарощення конфліктного потенціалу суспільства. Зазначено, що конфліктний потенціал міжнародної міграції може бути використаний зовнішньополітичним актором з метою дестабілізації країни перебування мігрантів зсередини.

Ключові слова: міжнародна міграція, конфліктогенність, горизонтальна нерівність (стаття друкується мовою оригіналу)

The changing security environment across the globe reflects the subsequent integrative nature of military and non-military technologies of achieving the political goals including the aggressive ones. Among the wide spectrum of non-military means that can be used by the foreign policy actors there are some that are not considered to be the conflictogenous ones prima facie. Meanwhile they are able to acquire the conflictogenous properties both on their own or due to the external impact. As one of such means, the migration processes can be subsequently used as the factor of destabilization of the certain country or region, for instance in the context of the hybrid conflict.

However, the importance of the migration processes for the security environment relatively recently has been realized by the scholars. Migration used to be treated as the internal affair of the country and the security itself was considered in rather narrow context. But eventually the «soft» security risks such as migration as well as criminal activity, environmental problems, drug trafficking and so on, began to be considered as the research subject. The increasing topicality of the migration and security nexus is demonstrated by the growing number of studies but they mostly cover the issues linked with the violent conflict impact on migration [4; 8; 11; 17; 23]. At the same time shift towards the non-military means of achieving the foreign policy goals and the development of the concepts of «asymmetric fighting», «network-centric warfare», «strategic paralysis», «parallel wars», «directed wars», «hybrid wars», «cognitive warfare”, global presence, proxy wars, smart defense, and more is not only actively studied now but was even foreseen [15; 18; 19]. The role of international migration processes in the context of the new approaches to achieving foreign policy goals needs to be studied in-depth in order to prevent their use as a destructive policy means.

In view of the above-mentioned, the objective of the article is to find out the specificities of formation and use the conflict potential of the international migration processes. In order to achieve this objective we need to meet the following tasks:

- to determine the mechanisms of the international migration conflictogenity formation and to specify the possible external impact;

- to examine the possibility of use the international migration conflictogenity as a destructive policy means by the foreign policy actors.

For the international migration processes to be used as a means of destructive actions they need to have the conflict potential. In order to provide the theoretical model of the migration process transformation into the conflictogenous one we are going to use the horizontal inequality concept and the theory of relative deprivation. The horizontal inequality or the inequality between groups that are differentiated in various ways such as race, ethnicity or religion, was stated by Stewart as the factor that provokes the some kinds of violent conflict [21]. Some scholars assert that the different inequalities between the ethnic groups not only deepen the resentment but also strengthen the cohesion between the members of the relatively deprived group [5; 13; 16; 21]. It goes along with the relative deprivation theory that states it is not the absolute lack of recourses for the person or group that causes the resentment and frustration but the amount of recourses comparing to other people or groups respectively or with the expectations [12; 14; 22]. G. Ostby studied the cases of the 33 countries, based on aggregated indicators of economic, social and political inequalities between two largest ethnic groups she provided the robust evidence that the social dimension of horizontal inequalities is positively related to civil conflict [13].

We presume migrants and locals as two groups of people that are differentiated by their permanent residence. To this kind of differentiation the other kinds as the ethnic or religious ones can be added. Moreover we assume that not only the horizontal inequality itself but its dynamics can increase conflictogenity because either the deterioration or the improvement of the migrants' status in relation to locals can cause the discontent [20]. The inequality transforms due to the migrants' getting into the new social-economic conditions in the host country. The factors that determine the transformation of the socio-economic level are the different personal characteristics of migrants and locals and the specific socio-economic conditions in the host country that contributes or hampers the situation of groups of people. The transformation can go two ways: the socio-economic situation of migrants relatively to locals improves or gets worse.

As for the personal characteristics that differ, the average migrant is usually younger, healthier, more educated and more active. For example by January, 1, 2018 the average age of the people born in Europe was 44 years, when of those born abroad was 36 years. Besides the average age of migrants that currently come is even less, for example the average age of 2,4 million migrants came in 2017 was 28,3 years [10]. 56% immigrants working in the innovative spheres in Silicon Valley in USA have the Degree of Bachelor and above comparing to 21% of locals, in New York - 44 % and 30%, in Seattle - 37% and 19% respectively [2].

Despite the fact that it is difficult to quantify the level of proactivity and health it is reasonable to assume that these two indicators correspond with the age and the educational level, besides it is usually the active people with relatively good health who decide to migrate in case it is not the forced migration. At the same time the assumption about the high proactivity of migrants can be supported by the fact that in 2016 in USA more that the half of startups valued at over 1 billion dollars were founded by immigrants. In 71% of these companies immigrants held key senior positions. Besides, it was empirically proved that the immigrant entrepreneurs are more likely to survive for 3 years compared to their closest native peers [7]. These factors create the initial preferences for migrants that are strengthened by the necessity for migrants to work harder to succeed.

At the same time the socioeconomic policy can contribute or otherwise worsen the migrants' economic and social status comparing to locals' one. The host country can create the favorable conditions in the sphere of employment, business, social benefits, cultural integration or can restrict the socioeconomic, political and cultural opportunities for migrants. The limited socioeconomic opportunities can eliminate the fact of the better initial preferences of migrants. Whether the socioeconomic situation of migrants becomes better or worse it is going to cause the resentment among the group that will get into the relatively worse situation as the change in the level of inequality causes dissatisfaction with one group or another and accordingly an increase of the protest and conflict potential.

As for the change in the level of inequality within the migrant community, which also occurs due to their living in new circumstances other than those in their homeland, such as the need for other specialists, language proficiency level, etc., for example migrants who represented the middle class at home can face the legislative restrictions for their activities or realize they do not have specific knowledge, skills or attributes to succeed in their field. But the low-qualified migrants in case there is the demand in the host country can improve their economic level. Such transformation of inequality can also cause the psychological discomfort and, accordingly, can lead to the increasing of conflictogenity level. If certain migrant community and locals also belong to different ethnic or religious groups their resentment can be enhanced by the cultural component of and the level of conflictogenity increases.

Given that, we can present the above-mentioned as the following model: migration - transformation of inequality - resentment - increased conflictogenity.

Figure 1. The formation of the international migration conflictogenity

At each of these stages the things can go spontaneously resulting from the objective circumstances. Taking into consideration the migration processes ability to be the self-regulated ones, their possibility to transform into the destructive conflictogenous process is limited, that means the migration does not necessary lead to the high conflictogenity level and, accordingly, does not threaten the stability of the country or region. For instance the considerate socioeconomic policy of the host country can prevent the horizontal inequality reach the excessively high level. But even the high level of inequality does not necessary cause the considerable frustration or resentment as people think the higher socioeconomic level of the certain group is deserved or fair. At the same time this resentment can be latent or suppressed but nevertheless not entail the high conflictogenity level.

But in case there is the foreign policy actor that is interested in the destabilization of the certain country or region and that considers the migration as the means of destructive action the conflictogenity level of migration can be artificially increased. The interested foreign policy actor can influence the quantity of migrants and their characteristics, the country or region they choose, the behavior of migrants and locals in the host country, the migration policy of the host or home countries in order to form the conflict potential and use it to achieve the foreign policy goals, first of all the aggressive ones. It becomes possible first of all due to the modern communicative technologies and the newest methods of social engineering [1; 3].

Besides, the contradictions between migrants and local community or between migrants do not always arise on the basis of actually existing socioeconomic inequality. Due to the modern manipulative technologies they are sometimes formed through the interpretations of contradictions in peoples' consciousness. Even when people are able to coexist peacefully, or the conflict can be latent, these contradictions can be artificially created by the external actor that has its political or military interests, for example in the context of the hybrid conflict. The external actor can artificially shape tensions, often creating a distorted perception of the current state of affairs for example when the income of the representatives of the certain groups is exaggerated or their achievements are presented as undeserved. Moreover due to such technologies some groups can be accused in the deterioration of the economic situation of the others.

The quite important aspect is that actors while using information technologies and the technologies of influence on the mass consciousness to direct migration can hide their real interests behind the commendable goals or hide their involvement at all, because it is possible to use them in the hidden way.

The level of conflictogenity depends not only on the level of horizontal inequality and the dynamics of its transformation between migrants and locals and between the migrants as well as on the other factors linked with the international migration. The factors that are considered to be the most important ones are the “youth bulge” and the urbanization. As it was already mentioned the average age of migrants is usually less than of locals. Natural and artificial concentration of the great number of young people in certain place is able to act as a precondition for the conflict potential formation or even as a source of conflict. It is relatively easier to mobilize the young people unemployed or with the limited opportunities, they are more per- septive to the radical ideas but do not have the obligations to their families or the career restrictions. It was proved by the successful harnessing of youth during the revolutions in Tunis, Libya, Egypt, during the riot in Paris in 1968 [3].

The resettlement of people to the large cities means the subsequent enlargement of megapolices. At the same time if the level of urbanization is higher than the economic growth, the risk of the political instability increases. According to the research of the political crisis in South American countries, that took place from 1955 to 1995 the other things equal the political crises is twice more probable to happen if the urbanization level is higher than average and the income per capita is less than average [9, p. 58]. Besides, the conflict that occurred in the highly-urbanized area has its peculiarities that make them more difficult to be solved [6, p. 16].

The sustainable development of the country depends on the stability of all the spheres of its functioning, but to our mind the political, socio-economic and cultural sphere can be affected by the negative consequences of migration in the most significant way. So these spheres are the most likely to be destabilized by the external actor that is interested in the weakening of the whole country or region. As it was already mentioned in the political sphere the actor can use the conflictogenity as a precondition for the political destabilization of the state in the wide context or to use the increased due to the migration proportion of the certain cultural group in the population of the country with the simultaneous horizontal inequality transformation creating the prerequisites for separatist ambitions in a specific region of the country.

The social benefits and other expenditures of the host country directed for migrants, or the diversion of resources from the economy because of the arrival of the significant number of migrants for the relatively short period of time can also contribute to the increasing of the conflictogenity level. Besides there can be a kind of inequality as a result of the increasing of the regional disparities of the country because of settling the migrants in mostly economically attractive regions. The emergence and exacerbation of cultural contradictions due to the arrival of migrants - the representatives of another religious or ethnic group is one more result of the horizontal inequality in the cultural sphere. It is reasonable to assume that the simultaneous inequalities between migrants and locals or between different groups of migrants can not only mutually exacerbate each other, but doing together can reinforce the destabilization.

Therefore, if the countries use the positive consequences of migration in order to solve their domestic problems so in the same way its negative consequences can be used by the external actors to create or to exacerbate the domestic problems of the target country. Taking into account the mentioned tasks as for the destabilization of the country using the migration-related conflictogenity it is reasonable for the political actors to resort to it for example in the hybrid war context. Given that, the destructive properties of migration can manifest themselves both in the case of their spontaneous formation and development and in the case of partial or full impact on them from the external actors. Accordingly, such possibility must be taken into account while analyzing the current political and security situation and the international and bilateral relations of the country as well as while predicting the possible course of events.

In order to evaluate the current level of the horizontal inequality in the certain country or region and, respectively, the level of conflictogenity we should not only analyze the indicators connected with current migration but to analyze the indicators that characterize the dynamics of the horizontal inequality level, such as the relation of the proportion of migrants to the proportion of the local population; average age of migrants / average age of locals; average level of education of migrants / average level of education of the locals; level of migrants' employment / level of locals' employment; average level of migrants' income / average level of locals' income; status of migrants / locals in the hierarchical structure of enterprises and organizations; the access of migrants to the state system of social benefits.

All the above-mentioned indicators are the quantitative ones. But there are some that need to be theoretically and empirically investigated. Among them we can list the history of bilateral relations between the host country and the country of origin, the international relations in the region, the immigration history in the host country, the opportunities of migrants to be politically represented in the state authorities, etc. Besides we have to find out if there are the special measures that influence the escalation of conflictogenity based on the horizontal inequality level, for example the informational campaigns, in the mass media including those from the side of external actors.

Because the consequences of the migration are remote in time and are influenced by different factors, including the unpredictable ones, we have to analyze continually the course of migration processes taking into consideration the variable external factors. In this case we will be able to identify the emergence of the destructive conflictogenous properties of migration and to determine if they are used by the actors in achieving their foreign policy goals.

Except doing that, we have to determine the thresholds of above-mentioned quantitative indicators and the description of the qualitative indicators that reflect the situation when the horizontal inequality is high enough to develop the migration conflictogenity. It should be done in order to prevent the conflictogen- ity level that threatens the security of the state. These thresholds and descriptions for conducting differential assessment of the horizontal inequality and conflicto- genity level as well as the preventing measures constitute the subject for the further research.

Список використаних джерел

1. Губанов Д. А., Новиков Д. А., Чхартишвили А. Г. 2010. Социальные сети: модели информационного влияния, управления и противоборства.

2. Potchemu кремниевая долина не выживет без иммигрантов https://ubr.ua/ukraine-and-world/technology/ pochemu-kremnievaia-dolina-ne-vyjivet-bez-immigrant- ov-469427

3. Сундиев И. Ю., Смирнов А. А. 2016. Теория и технологии социальной деструкции (на примєрє «цветных революций»).

4. Adamson F., 2006. Crossing borders: International Migration and National Security. International Security, 31 (1), pp. 165 - 199.

5. Bredel R., 2003. Horizontal Inequalities, Relative Deprivation and the Explanation of Organized Group Conflicts

6. Brennan E., 1999. Population, Urbanization, Environment, and Security: A Summary of the Issues, Washington.

7. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics. Collaborative Economics. http://www.star- tupwiki.ru/courses/19281/lectures/306191

8. Dancygier R., 2010. Immigration and Conflict in Europe. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

9. Esty D., Goldstone J., Gurr T., Harff B., Levy M., Dabelko G., Surko P., Unger A., 1999. State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings Issue 5, Washington.

10. Eurostat (migr-imm2ctz) https://ec.europa.eu/eu- rostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/ data/main-tables

11. Faist T., 2005. The Migration-Security Nexus. Working Papers - Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development;

12. Fearon J. D., Laitin D. D. 2003. `Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', American Political Science Review, 97(1), pp. 75-90.

13. 0stby G., 2004. Horizontal Inequalities and Civil Conflict, Oslo.

14. Gurr T., 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

15. Hoffman F. 2007. Conflict in the 21st century: The rise of hybrid wars. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

16. Horowitz D., 2000. Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 2nd edn. Los Angeles.

17. Huysmans J., 1994. “The Migrant as a Security Problem,” in Migration and European Integration: the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion, ed. R. Miles and D. Thrandhardt, London: Pinter.

18. Lind W., Nightengale K., Schmitt J., Sutton J., Wilson G. (1989), The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, Marine Corps Gazette 73 No. 10, pp. 22-26.

19. Messner E., 1971. Vsemirnaja mjatezhevojna.

20. Pacek P., Danyk Y, Semenkova M. 2019. “Patterns of the migration during the hybrid warfare and its con- flictogenity”, Torun International Studies, 12: 61-73.

21. Stewart F., 2002. `Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development', Working Paper Number 81, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford

22. Walker I., Smith H., 2002. Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

23. Weiner M., 1995. International Migration and Security. Boulder, CO: Westview.

References

1. Gubanov D. A., Novikov D. A., Tchkhartishvili A. 2010. Sotsialnyie seti: modeli informatsionnogo vliianiia, upravleniia i protivoborstva.

2. Potchemu kremniievaia dolina ne vyzhivet bez immigrantov https://ubr.ua/ukraine-and-world/technology/ pochemu-kremnievaia-dolina-ne-vyjivet-bez-immigrant- ov-469427

3. Sundiiev I. Y., Smirnov A. A 2016. Teoriia I tekh- nologii sotsialnoj destruktsii (na primere “tsvetnykh revo- lutsij”).

4. Adamson F., 2006. Crossing borders: International Migration and National Security. International Security, 31 (1), pp. 165 - 199.

5. Bredel R., 2003. Horizontal Inequalities, Relative Deprivation and the Explanation of Organized Group Conflicts

6. Brennan E., 1999. Population, Urbanization, Environment, and Security: A Summary of the Issues, Washington.

7. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics. Collaborative Economics, http://www.star- tupwiki.ru/courses/19281/lectures/306191

8. Dancygier R 2010. Immigration and Conflict in Europe. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

9. Esty D., Goldstone J., Gurr T., Harff B., Levy M., Dabelko G., Surko P., Unger A., 1999. State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings Issue 5, Washington.

10. Eurostat (migr-imm2ctz) https://ec.europa.eu/eu- rostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/ data/main-tables

11. Faist T., 2005. The Migration-Security Nexus. Working Papers - Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development;

12. Fearon J. D., Laitin D. D. 2003. `Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', American Political Science Review, 97(1), pp. 75-90.

13. 0stby G., 2004. Horizontal Inequalities and Civil Conflict, Oslo.

14. Gurr T., 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

15. Hoffman F. 2007. Conflict in the 21st century: The rise of hybrid wars. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

16. Horowitz D., 2000. Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Los Angeles.

17. Huysmans J., 1994. “The Migrant as a Security Problem,” in Migration and European Integration: the Dy-

18. namics of Inclusion and Exclusion, ed. R. Miles and D.

Thrandhardt, London: Pinter.

19. Lind W., Nightengale K., Schmitt J., Sutton J., Wilson G. (1989), The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, Marine Corps Gazette 73 No. 10, pp. 22-26.

20. Messner E., 1971. Vsemirnaja mjatezhevojna.

21. Pacek P., Danyk Y, Semenkova M. 2019. “Patterns of the migration during the hybrid warfare and its con- flictogenity”, Torun International Studies, 12: 61-73.

22. Stewart F., 2002. `Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development', Working Paper Number 81, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford

23. Walker I., Smith H., 2002. Relative Deprivation:

Specification, Development, and Integration. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

24. Weiner M., 1995. International Migration and Security. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Размещено на Allbest.ru