Foreign Policy of Japan in the XXI Century: A Policy of Order or a Policy of Justice?

The Role of Primary Institutions in The Foreign Policy of Japan

Nationalism

Japanese politics is dominated by center-right parties, such as the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Therefore, it is strongly influenced by nationalism (Ogura, 2019). Nationalists in Japan often claim to defend traditional values. Nationalism, however, I neither a product of tradition, nor a product of Japan. In fact, it is a product of modernity. Breuilly (2014) defines nationalism as `the idea that membership of the nation provides the overriding focus of political identity and loyalty, which in turn demands national self-determination'. It appeared in Europe and became a significant ideological force by 1750 (Breuilly, 2014). It gradually but successfully replaced the primary institution of dynasticism in Europe. As Breuilly (2014) notes, already during the Napoleonic Wars, European-nation states on both sides invoked nationalist arguments to mobilize their populations for total war. Japan, however, had only limited access to European ideas at that time. From 1603 to 1868 Japan was ruled by Tokugawa shoguns (or military rulers) who conducted a policy of sakoku (enchained country). Under this policy, Japanese contacts with the West were restricted to a small Dutch trading post in Dejima. Tokugawa shogunate regarded Western ideas as dangerous and severely censored them. This changed after Japan had been forcefully opened to Western trade by the American fleet headed by Commodore Perry. Under the threat of Perry's gunboats, the Japanese signed the Convention of Kanagawa (1854), which was the first in the series of Japan's unequal treaties with Western powers. The inability of the shogunate to prevent the infiltration of Western ideas caused popular resentment and sparked Meiji Restoration (1868), which abolished the shogunate and returned power to the emperor. Notwithstanding, the new imperial government understood that to avoid the bitter fate of being colonized, Japan must emulate Western societal organization. According to Benesch (2014, p. 76 - 103), Japan invoked nationalism to mobilize internal resources and the principle of datsua nyuo (leave Asia and enter Europe) to conduct rapid modernization within a very short period of time. Japan was the most successful East Asian state in the race for modernity, which, as Suzuki (2014) notes, led some Japanese to view Asia as `uncivilized other'. Western powers, however, were reluctant to quickly accept Japan into Western international society. For instance, according to Clark (2007), Japanese suggestion to include Racial Equality Proposal to the Covenant of The League of Nations was blocked by Great Britain. Thus, rapid economic development and racism of West-led international society created an ideal environment for Japanese nationalism and militarism to flourish. By the end of the 1920-s, the military seized full control over fragile democracy in Japan. At that time, nationalism was widely supported not only by elites but also by the ordinary people who blamed the old system in the economic hardship of the Great Depression. This, alongside systemic factors such as great power rivalry with the US, led to the disastrous participation of Japan in WW2 which ended with the complete defeat of Japanese forces, a tremendous number of civilian victims, and devastation of the economy. From 1945 to 1952 Japan was occupied by the Allies who strictly suppressed the remnants of Japanese nationalism. Moreover, after the defeat in WW2 nationalism and militarism lost their legitimacy in Japan. Japanese war-crimes were disclosed, and Japanese people blamed war-time ideology for inflicting enormous suffering on Japan and the World. As Benesch (2014) rightly notes, war-time ideology suffered `ideological bankruptcy'. Japan adopted a pacifist Constitution. The famous Article 9 of the Constitution renounced war as a sovereign right of a state. Pacifism and antimilitarism found broad support in Japanese society and after several decades became deeply entrenched social norms (Berger, 1998). 

Nationalism, however, was never completely wiped out from the political landscape of Japan. The Cold War between the US-led Western bloc and the USSR-led Eastern bloc became especially visible in East Asia. In 1949 Communists won the Civil War in China, and in 1950 the Korean War (1950-1953) started. The focus of the US shifted from the suppression of Japanese nationalism to fighting communism. American occupation forces were sent to fight in Korea, leaving Japan almost completely unprotected from external invasion. Therefore, under the auspices of occupation forces, the National Police Reserve was formed in 1950, and in 1954 the Japan Self-Defense Forces (the JSDF) were established. Far-right nationalist organizations got the chance to resume their activity using the fight against communism as an excuse. For instance, in 1952, the Great Japan Patriotic Party was established. It propagated (and continues to do so today) extreme nationalism, revision of Article 9, and strong support for the Japan-US alliance. Extreme nationalism was very marginal and hardly capable of altering Japan's foreign policy course. Notwithstanding, nationalism does not necessarily mean extremism. Japan's mainstream politics was center-right almost from the start, as it best suited American interests. The Liberal Democratic Party ruled Japan for 38 years (1955-1993) consecutively. Despite brief periods of interruptions from power, its overwhelming dominance continues today. This party always contained influential factions that were in favor of the revision of Article 9. Many of the LDP prime ministers visited the Yasukuni shrine, notorious for enshrining the souls of some of the war-time leaders of Japan, convicted by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal in 1946. Still, nationalism was out of fashion in Japan in the XX century. Japanese society was preoccupied with economic growth, and internationally Japan was willing to clean its image from WW2 legacy. Therefore, in 1965 Japan restored diplomatic relations with South Korea and paid compensations to the victims of Japanese aggression. In 1972 Japan established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, recognizing Taiwan as a Chinese territory and embarking on a program of official financial assistance to Chinese economic development. 

The improvement of relations with China and South Korea, however, proved to be short-lived. Nationalist tensions combined with unresolved territorial disputes continued to fuel tensions between the countries. As He (2009, pp, 12-46) rightly notes, systemic factors were important but not enough to explain deteriorating relations between Japan and China since the 1990s. He carefully explores how two countries failed to resolve the issue of historical memory. During the rule of Mao Zedong, Japanese aggression was placed into a broader context of aggression of global imperialism against China. After Mao's death, however, Chinese textbooks started to emphasize Japanese aggression rather than global imperialism as a reason for Chinese suffering during the Sino-Japanese wars. It reflected the public opinion, which still carried the memory of Japanese atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre (1937). What is more striking, as He (2009, pp. 234-289) notes, the younger generation appeared to be much more hostile towards Japan than the older generation. Unlike Mao's propaganda, contemporary Chinese criticism of Japan seems to reflect genuine opinions not only of Chinese people but also of Chinese ruling elites who are responsible for foreign policy. According to this view, Japan has neither enough apologized for its war crimes nor has fully realized its guilt and responsibility. It is reflected in Japanese history textbooks that downplay Japanese atrocities, for instance, referring to the Nanjing Massacre as the Nanjing Incident. It means that if Japan becomes strong enough, it is likely to repeat its aggressive behavior and pose a fundamental security threat to China and East Asia, Chinese experts warn (He, 2009). In real policy terms, it is reflected in a continuous increase in Japanese military capability beyond self-defense needs and Japanese activity on Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands that are claimed by China but controlled by Japan. It causes a lot of frustration and irritation in Japan. Japan claims that Chinese history textbooks are also far from ideal. In fact, the Japanese military budget has been significantly lower than that of China both in real terms and as a share of JDP since 2006. Moreover, Japanese military expenditure has been more or less stagnant for over 30 years, while Chinese expenditure skyrocketed from 55$ billion in 2006 to 249$ billion in 2018 (World Bank, 2020a). Japanese politicians bitterly note that China started to claim Senkaku only when oil reserves were discovered near the islands. Both Japanese politicians and Japanese public opinion prefer that China leaves the `historical issue' behind and moves to a constructive partnership with Japan. 

This is not to say that Japan-China relations are in a hopeless condition. When a political will is present, contentious issues can be solved. For instance, the issue of Japanese Official Development Aid (ODA) to China caused numerous controversies between the countries in the past. Japan used the suspensions and reductions in ODA to pressure China during bilateral crises, such as Tiananmen Square protests or worsening of relationship in 2001. Chinese officials always reacted with outrage, insisting that ODA is a moral duty of Japan because of the devastation Japan brought to China during WW2. Japan, in return, urged China to be more appreciative and highlighted the role of ODA in Chinese economic growth. However, after Japan finally announced that ODA to China would be canceled in 2018, the Chinese reaction was quite different. Chinese state-run newspaper the Global Times issued an article that praised Japan for its contribution to Chinese economic development and called upon joint assistance to developing countries on equal terms (Global Times, 2018). In part, this may be because China's economy surpassed Japan's economy in terms of nominal GDP already in 2010. Aid to a bigger economy form a smaller one seemed nonsensical to both sides. Given the deep symbolic meaning of ODA to China, this may also mean China's assertiveness of its great power and leadership status. Although the very fact of a smooth end of such a controversial program is encouraging, this seems to be an exception rather than a new rule. 

Relations with South Korea provide even more evidence of the significance of nationalism and the unresolved issue of historical memory. Japan-China relations are complicated by structural factors, such as the balance of power, security dilemma, and the Japan-US alliance. It is hardly the case with South Korea. As Park (2015) notes, both countries share similar democratic political systems, respect for the rule of law, and human rights that suggests broad cooperation as the most natural outcome. Moreover, Japan and South Korea are close American allies and share the mutual interest in the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and maintenance of liberal world order. In the XXI century, however, Japan-South Korea relations were at best cold and were continually deteriorating. Until recently, this did not touch economic cooperation, but it all changed with the outbreak of the Japan-South Korea trade war in 2019. Historical memory and nationalism by far remain the only plausible explanation of Japanese-South Korean animosity. The issues of `comfort women' and forced labor in Korea during the Japanese occupation (1910 - 1945) of Korea remain especially salient. According to the Korean view, `comfort women' were Korean female residents who were forcibly taken to the system of brothels that served the needs of the Japanese army. Broad public discussion and activism over the issue of `comfort women' started in the 1990s. Japanese right-wing politicians fiercely denied that any force had ever been applied to `comfort women', pointing to the lack of evidence. Notwithstanding, the Japanese Government officially acknowledged the problem and apologized via the Kono Statement (1993) and Murayama Statement (1995) and offered compensations via the Asian Women's Fund. These measures, however, were unpopular both among the victims many of whom rejected Japanese money and in South Korea generally. It is because Asian Women's Fund raised money through private donations, while the victims wanted official compensation from the Government of Japan (Park, 2015). After a long period of tensions and mutual accusations, such compensation was finally offered. In 2015 Japan and South Korea signed an `irreversible' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015) agreement, according to which Japan made official apologies and donated 1 billion yen to support the former `comfort women'. In exchange, the South Korean side agreed to stop its criticism of Japan related to the issue and remove the statue of the `comfort woman' in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul. The agreement proved to be short-lived, however. From the very start, it was unpopular in Korea. Now the reason was that the agreement lacked the acknowledgment of legal responsibility from the Japanese side. Moreover, ordinary Koreans were highly dissatisfied with the demand to remove the statue and united around this symbol of Korean war-time suffering. The agreement was further delegitimized with the impeachment of the South Korean president Park Geun-hye due to the corruption scandal in 2017. To an outrage of the Japanese Government the agreement was reviewed (Washington Post, 2018) The new president of South Korea Moon Jae-in called for deeper Japanese apologies. At the same time, the Supreme Court of South Korea ruled that the victims of forced labor during the Japanese occupation of Korea can demand compensation from Japanese companies. This chain of events fueled nationalist sentiments in Japan. As a result, Japan put restrictions on exports of chemicals, critical for the South Korean semiconductor industry (Reuters, 2019). Both countries excluded each other from the `white list' of preferential trade partners and started a full-scale economic war (Business Insider, 2019). The populations of Japan and South Korea generally approved such aggressive behavior. For instance, the civil society of South Korea engaged in a massive campaign Boycott Japan which led to significant reductions in revenue of Japanese companies in South Korea (South China Morning Post, 2019). Although the focus on trade war somewhat diminished after the outbreak of the novel coronavirus in 2020, it illustrates that nationalism is not a mere rhetorical tool or a supplement to structural factors. In Japan, nationalism becomes more and more rooted in the minds of ordinary people and politicians. This nationalism is not even close to the extremist version of pre-WW2 years. Similar versions of nationalism exist elsewhere in East Asia, making nationalism one of the dominant primary institutions in the region.

Great Power Management

The fundamental proposition of the English School is that international relations cannot be understood separately from the social context in which they take place. The strength and the nature of social bonds between nation-states, however, vary significantly and can improve or deteriorate over time (Bull, 1977, pp. 22-51). In East Asia, there exist the opposite dynamics for strengthening and weakening of regional international society. On the one hand, East Asian international society is being consolidated by the attempts of the ASEAN states to broaden economic cooperation and even construct regional identity. On the other hand, the rise of China and the decreasing influence of the US stimulate the construction of power-blocs and impede inter-state trust that is necessary for the proper functioning of primary institutions such as the great power management. Great power management as a distinctive institution of international society emerged after the treaty of Westphalia (1648) but, according to Buzan (2014, p.103), matured after the Treaty of Vienna (1815). The Vienna Concert of great powers in Europe is a classic example of great power management that means that great powers join their efforts to promote and maintain international order. The order helps to sustain international hierarchy and privileged status of great powers concerned (Bull, 1977, pp. 51-74). Great power management was also visible during the Cold War when the US and the Soviet Union used various means to avoid direct clash and sustain the bipolar system that was regarded as stable. Great power management thus is a profoundly social process. It reflects the hierarchical nature of international society and presupposes the existence of at least partly shared world-view and recognition of each other as great powers by the states concerned. As Goh (2014) notes, the English School has not much to say about how great power management functions on the regional level. East Asia presents an interesting case here, because besides centuries of interaction the two major powers of the region, China and Japan, have not developed a system of practices that resembles anything close to European-style great power management. According to Goh (2014), after the Japanese rulers ceased to recognize Chinese supremacy in the XVII century, China just ignored them as unworthy barbarians. After all, China never exercised real sovereignty over Japan. In the middle of the XIX century, Japan gradually became more powerful than China. It now regarded China as its sphere of influence, not a great power, and attempted to participate in great power management with Western powers instead. After the WW2 East Asia saw the emergence of unique security architecture: the external great power became the cornerstone of local great power management. The Japan-US alliance significantly restrained the possibility of the Japan-China conflict. On the one hand, American military presence allowed Japan to keep its military capability low. On the other hand, it made it non-sensical for China to attack first due to the preponderance of American power. From the 1970s, the US and China gradually developed their practices of great power management such as the One China Policy and joint attempts to promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The role of Japan in great power management in the XX century's East Asia was very limited. This was a conscious policy. Although it lasted for several decades, it was not enough to eradicate the historical memory about being a great power among the Japanese. 

After the end of the Cold War, the fears of abandonment (Green, 2001, p. 146) among the Japanese elites intensified. American foreign policy became increasingly unpredictable and defined by domestic populism. Combined with the rise of China, the fears of abandonment made the Japanese elites increasingly dissatisfied with the pacifist Constitution. Article 9, however, was widely supported by the Japanese civil society as a symbol of antimilitarism (Berger, 1998). Therefore, unable to amend Article 9, the LDP launched a gradual process of constitutional reinterpretation. The Japan Self-Defense Forces (the JSDF) were allowed to participate in peace-keeping missions (1992) and were sent to Iraq in 2003. Eventually, the JSDF were permitted to exercise collective self-defense in certain circumstances (2015). The JSDF acquired contemporary weaponry, making them almost wholly resemble conventional armed-forces (Mulloy, 2011). The process of `normalization' of Japan is accompanied by the strengthening of the Japan-US alliance amid contradictions on the US bases on Okinawa that face strong local opposition (Hughes, 2014). The US fully backed Japan on the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands issue and sent 20.000 personnel to help Japan remedy the consequences of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 (Hughes, 2014). The Japanese elites understood that it would be extremely difficult to resist the growing Chinese influence without the US. An unpredictable ally is better than no allies at all. 

These developments were not left unnoticed by China that dramatically increased its military spending and intensified its activity near the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. As Goh (2014) concludes, the two powers shifted from pluralist-style coexistence to realist-style struggle for power. There are good reasons to think that Chinese behavior is primarily motivated by the US, rather than Japan. From a purely strategic perspective, Japan still presents little threat to China. Japan is a declining power with a stagnating economy, an aging population, and scarce natural resources. Secondary institutions, such as ASEAN+3, ASEAN Reginal Forum, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, seemingly provide an opportunity for China and Japan to socialize and develop the rules of great power management. However, these all these secondary institutions are deeply influenced by peculiar Asian primary institution: conflict-avoidance and non-intervention. This may have helped ASEAN states to find common ground for cooperation, but it prevents China and Japan from raising critical issues, such as territorial disputes. Instead, the regional secondary institutions have become yet another battleground where China and Japan fight for including the members they prefer or promoting their agenda. If one side prevails, another quickly loses enthusiasm for the institution (Goh, 2014). Moreover, as it has been outlined in the previous section, nationalism plays a significant role in Chinese perception of Japan as a threat and Japan is not at all ready to acknowledge itself as a middle power. As Rozman (2015) puts it, Japan aspires to conduct a value-driven foreign policy based on the so-called universal values of liberalism. This, however, becomes increasingly difficult if regional international society deteriorates. 

Democracy

Like nationalism, democracy is another primary institution that replaced dynasticism as a source of state legitimacy. According to Buzan (2014, p. 160), democracy was less successful than nationalism in this respect. Many supposed that mass adoption of democracy after the collapse of the USSR will mark the 'end of history', meaning total dominance of Western political values. (Fukuyama, 1992). It never happened. At the same time, democracy did not fail either. After all, most of the contemporary states, even brutal dictatorships, prefer to call themselves democracies. Such claims have little value, however, if a state is not recognized as a democracy by West-led international society. Democracy has become a new 'standard of civilization' or one of the criteria by which states are accepted into the exclusive club of the US, Western Europe, and their closest partners. Japan is definitely a member of this club. It scored 96 out of 100 points (the freer is the state the higher is the score) in the influential Freedom House ranking of sates by the level of freedom. Freedom House experts name the rights of minorities, gender discrimination, and untransparent government-business relations as minor impediments to Japanese freedom. (Freedom House, 2020). 

The Freedom House experts, however, only briefly mention that Japanese politics is characterized by the overwhelming dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) for decades. They do not see it as a problem. At the same time, competition is a critical element of democracy. (Dahl, 1989) It is unclear whether LDP faces real competition during the elections. LDP's success is impressive: since its establishment in 1955, it lost control over the government for only two brief periods in 1993-1994 and 2009-2012. In fact, the length of its rule over Japan is comparable to the length of the Communist Party rule over the Soviet Union! Does this suggest that maybe the Japanese understand democracy differently than the Westerners do? Samuel Huntington (1993) even calls Japan a separate civilization with a unique mindset. This may imply that what is expected of Western-style democracies may not apply to Japan. A more careful analysis, though, reveals that LDP's dominance is rooted in the institutional structure of Japanese democracy. As Scheiner (2006, pp. 31-64) justly notes, the cause of Japan's one-party dominant system is not the strong LDP, but a surprisingly weak opposition. He names a high level of clientelism is the chief reason for the weakness of the Japanese opposition. In fact, clientelism is not at all unique to Japan. Scheiner defines clientelism as 'the exchange of benefits (by the government, parties, and/or politicians) for voter or organization support'. What is more, it a widespread phenomenon visible in Austrian, Brazilian, Italian, and other democracies. There is even no evidence that clientelism is actually bad for democracy. In reality, Japanese politicians must be attentive to the needs of their local supporters if they want to maintain their clientelist networks. However, when combined with parliamentarism, single-member district plurality electoral system, and high level of financial centralization, clientelism significantly impedes party competition (Scheiner, 2006). The ruling party is able not only to reward its clients but also to make credible threats of punishment by withdrawing funds from the defecting constituencies. What is more, in such a system opposition is unable to recruit enough professional candidates, especially in rural areas. Despite all these advantages, the LDP still managed to lose twice. Moreover, the LDP saw a frequent turnout of prime-ministers, nobody of whom developed anything close to the cult of personality. Arguably, the most popular leader of Japan in the recent period was Junichiro Koizumi who stepped down after only five years in office (2001-2006). The LDP itself consists of influential factions that often disagree on important policy measures. Therefore, it is safe to argue that Japanese foreign policy is a democratic foreign policy.

A minority of IR scholars, mostly structural realists, believe that the type of domestic political regime has a negligible influence on foreign policy (Waltz, 1979). The majority of IR, scholars, however, think otherwise. Liberals, constructivists, and neorealists acknowledge that domestic political institutions can shape states' behavior. This line of thinking implies that democracies and dictatorships behave differently in similar situations. But what policies are specific to democracies? The most popular answer is that democracies do not go to war with each other or democratic peace theory (Doyle, 1986). Despite robust empirical evidence, liberal theorists struggle to explain the causal mechanism behind democratic peace. As Rosato (2003) argues, nothing suggests that democracies are peace-loving or have more respect for each other. Also, Rosato (2003) insists that democratic leaders are 'not especially accountable to peace-loving publics.' According to Rosato (2003), the chief reason for democratic peace is American hegemony. Most of the democracies that might theoretically fight each other are American allies, as it is the case with South Korea and Japan. Such materialist logic contains a grain of truth. One must not disregard, however, the role of democracy and human rights as primary institutions. The common belief in democracy and human rights which is genuinely shared by many democratic ruling elites provides a basis for the socialization of states via formal (e.g. the OECD) and informal (e.g. the G7) channels. Whether properly backed by casual mechanism or not, democratic peace theory and the belief in the supremacy of democracy over all other regimes have become an integral part of the thinking of many democratic leaders around the world. Japanese political elites were also subjected to the influence of this thinking. 

As Rozman (2015) puts it, Japanese foreign policy in the twenty-first century is defined by the kokusaishugi or internationalist realism, as Rozman (2015) calls it. The word realism here is the addition of Rozman himself meant to contrast kokusaishugi with heiwashugi or idealist pacifism. The term kokusaishugi is directly translated as internationalism and is remarkably close to state-centric solidarism of the English School. It implies the promotion of democratic values and international trade while taking into account the balance of power and cultural differences. Thus, kokusaishugi is a manifestation of the democratic foreign policy of Japan. 

In the XXI century, different Japanese government practiced kokusaishugi with varying degrees of success. In the early 2000s its approach by the memory Japanese foreign policy' failure' in the Gulf War in 1991. Fearing entrapment and constrained by the pacifist constitution, the Japanese government decided to provide financial instead of material support. However, the Japanese contribution of 13 billion$ remained mostly unnoticed or was even condemned as 'checkbook diplomacy'. The pacifist constitution became perceived as obsolete. The gradual process of constitutional reinterpretation started to allow more active Japanese participation in maintaining the liberal world order (Ogura, 2019). In an attempt to restore its image as a reliable American ally and defender of democratic values, Japan took more active participation in the US-led Iraq war (2003-2011), providing supplies and deploying military engineers (Reuters, 2015). Generally speaking, Japan consistently strengthened its participation in the Japan-US alliance even despite the interruption of the LDP from power. Although the DPJ was perceived as less pro-American and even promised to remove the American military base from Okinawa, these perceptions and promises never realized. The DPJ made modest attempts to improve relations with China and took limited steppes to acknowledge Japanese responsibility for WW2 crimes, for which it was immediately accused of the 'diplomacy of defeat'. (Rozman, 2015). According to Delamotte (2012), in all other respects, the DPJ followed the foreign policy of LDP, including the strengthening of the Japan-US alliance and easing the ban on arms exports. Japanese internationalism and democratic foreign policy, however, is not restricted by the Japan-US alliance. Some analysts, for instance, Lemahieu & Bley, (2019), even suggest that after the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential elections Japan has become the 'leader of the liberal order in Asia'. Japan deserved such title because it organized the conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement even after the US withdrawal (in the form of CPTPP also known as TPP-11) and became a dominant investor and provider of economic aid in strategic South East Asian countries, such as Myanmar and Thailand. (Lemahieu 

& Bley, 2019). Indeed, Japan has always been mostly successful in projecting its economic power. It is because the Japanese skillfully mastered and utilized another solidarist primary institution, namely, the market.

The Market

The idea that the market must be autonomous from the state was popularized by Smith (1776). However, it became widely practiced only in the middle of the XIX century with the industrialization and the accelerated colonial expansion of the British and other European empires. Previously, economic activity was dominated by mercantilism and was seen as an extension of the sovereign right of a state. The market as a primary institution saw a major setback in the aftermath of the WW1. In the After the WW2, the US made significant attempts build a new architecture based on market institutions, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. The market, however, was largely opposed by the Soviet bloc and the non-aligned movement and became a truly global primary institution only after the end of the Cold War. The understanding of the market and capitalist practices varies throughout the globe. Being a late industrializer, Japan had a chance to learn on Western mistakes and developed its own understanding of the market and capitalism. It is reflected, for instance, in the clash in the 1990s between Japan and the World Bank about the desirability of the complete opening of the economy at the early stages of development (Solis, 2014). The state has historically played a more prominent role as a facilitator of development in Japan than in the West. Japanese model was later embraced by many Asian states, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and others, leading to the emergence of the primary institution of the developmental state across Asia (Beeson & Breslin, 2014). The developmental state means that the elites perceive regime prosperity and even regime survival as directly dependent on the success as a market economy. Although Japan is associated with the quagmire of stagnation rather than economic development at least since the collapse of the asset price bubble in 1992, Japanese post-WW2 economic miracle is impossible to deny. According to the World Bank (2020b), Japan's nominal GDP was roughly 3/4 of American's GDP in 1995 (5.4 trillion$ vs 7.6 trillion$). It was Japan, not China, that was considered a major threat to Western economic dominance. 

Japan post-war economic success is rooted in a set of policies, commonly referred to as the Yoshida doctrine (Edstrцm, 2004). The origins of this doctrine are disputed. Some argue that it was an invention of a post-war prime-minister Shigeru Yoshida, others claim that it could not have been adopted without American consent. (Sugita, 2016). Now there is an overwhelming consensus that even if the Americans approved the doctrine, their influence on Japanese economic policy and state practices was shallow even during the Allied occupation period (Beeson and Breslin, 2014). As Sugita (2016) explains, the Yoshida doctrine dictates that Japan must entrust its defense to the US, maintain very low military spending and use the conserved resources to accelerate economic development. These measures, combined with protection for strategic industries, such as automobile industry, allowed Japan to establish production networks all over Asia. Developing Asian nations, such as Malaysia, Thailand and Myanmar, agreed on Japanese terms of investment because such investment was often accompanied by generous Official Development Assistance (ODA). In the 1990s, Japan was the largest provider of ODA in the world (Solis, 2014). Despite this fact, Japan was often accused of using ODA to promote its business interests with little care for actual improvement of conditions in the recipient countries. Therefore, in 1992 the first ODA charter was adopted. It was very solidarist in spirit and clarified that ODA is meant to promote democratization and human rights (Solis & Urata, 2007). Yoshida has been practiced almost without any interruptions until the middle of 2000s. For instance, as late as in 2004, Edstrцm (2004) writes that there is no evidence that the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity somehow altered the course of the foreign economic policy of Japan. With the continuing stagnation of the Japanese economy and the rise of China, changes became more visible. Japan lost faith in the paralyzed World Trade Organization and reoriented to the conclusion of bilateral trade agreements (Solis & Urata, 2007). Especially significant were the recent the European Union-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (2019) and TPP-11 that were concluded. These agreements become especially significant, given the US-China trade war. While the US aims to defeat China in an open economic clash, Japan tries to become a bastion of liberalism (Lemahieu & Bley, 2019). At the same time, despite all liberal commitments, Japan is increasingly using ODA to compete with China for access to developing markets (Solis & Urata, 2007). However, according to kokusaishugi vision, it is hardly a contradiction because it regards economic diplomacy as an effective tool of great power management and maintaining the balance of power. In fact, the Yoshida doctrine has become not only a set of policies but also heavily influenced the mindset of Japanese political elites, making them firmly believe in the power of economic diplomacy. These beliefs, however, are often not shared and misinterpreted by influential international actors. 

Russia represents a vivid example of the failure of the Japanese economic diplomacy. Japan has a long-standing territorial dispute with Russia over the South Kuril Islands (or Northern Territories as they are known in Japan) that include such islands as Iturup/Etorofu (3.139 km2), Kunashir/Kunashiri (1490 km2), Shikotan (225 km2) and Habomai Islands (100 km2). The dispute stems from the ambiguous formulations of the Treaty of San-Francisco (1951) and Japan - Soviet Union Joint Declaration (1956). Both sides developed sophisticated historical, legal and geographic arguments towards the issue that are not to be retold here due to the lack of space. In any case, the essence of the arguments is of secondary importance. More significant is the combination of strategic factors and Japanese and Russian perceptions of each other. This combination was unfavorable for decades, and the negotiations stagnated. This created an abnormal situation when two major Asian and global players with great potential for cooperation had no formal peace treaty. In an attempt to exploit what was perceived as a friendship with the Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe decided to revitalize the negotiations. He temporary dropped the demands for the biggest islands Iturup and Kunashir and agreed to work within the framework of the Joint Declaration (1956) that acknowledged the possibility of transferring Shikotan and Habomai to Japan in exchange for the peace treaty. Moreover, in 2016 he proposed the so-called Eight-point Plan. to promote economic cooperation and cultural exchange with Russia (Goryacheva, 2018). The real goal of this Plan, however, was to alter the Russian public and elite opinion in favor of Japan and achieve the conclusion of the peace treaty and transfer of Shikotan and Habomai to Japan. This vision might seem too naпve given the obsession of Russia with its sovereignty and extreme hostility of Russian public to transferring territories to Japan. Notwithstanding, not so long ago or, to be more precise, in 2005, Russia transferred 337 km2 of its land on the Amur river to China thus officially ending the Chinese-Russian territorial dispute. This territory is even slightly larger than the landmass of Shikotan and Habomai combined. There was no friendly attitude to China among the Russian public at that time. The Russian public opinion was equally hostile to transferring any territory to foreigners. But no one asked. This partially explains the Japanese hopes of ending the territorial dispute with Russia in a similar fashion but also reveals the first part of the false logic behind the Eight-point Plan. One of the Plan's goals was to promote the Japanese-Russian cultural exchange and improve the image of Japan among the ordinary Russians. But the role of public opinion in Russian foreign policy decision-making is negligible. Those countries that are positively reported by the Russian state-controlled media are regarded as `friendly' by the vast majority of the ordinary people. Secondly, the Plan aspired to support the Russian middle and small business. This reflects the genuine Japanese beliefs in the importance of the middle and small business for economic development. The Russian government also often talks about the support of the middle and the small business but in reality, gives it a very low priority. Instead, Russia prefers to support large corporations that are regarded of strategic importance and Russian elites firmly believe that the economy will benefit most from the so-called megaprojects such as the Crimean Bridge or The Moscow-Saint Petersburg Motorway. Nevertheless, the Plan also includes quite attractive points for Russia such as the support of industries in the Russian Far East and especially cooperation in the development of Russia's energy sector (Goryacheva, 2018). This cooperation is indeed perceived as beneficial and desirable by the Russian elites (Ria Novosti, 2018) but is economically unprofitable for Japan. Moreover, such altruistic behavior during the economic stagnation causes frustration within the Japanese public opinion (Tokusheva, 2019). This policy of Japan reveals the most important part of the false logic of the Eight-point Plan: the belief in the power of economic diplomacy regardless of the circumstances. Economic diplomacy may have helped Japan to achieve its goals in Myanmar and Thailand, but Russia is not Myanmar. It is true that Russia is not at all wealthy, and its economy is in a poor state with no visible signs for significant progress. Notwithstanding, as Tsygankov (2016, pp. 233-261) puts it, the great power identity is central to the world-view of the Russian elites. The growth of the Russian economy may be important, but if it compromises Russian great power status, Russian elites are ready to sacrifice it. The improvement of the bilateral relations with China was essential from the Russian perspective to counterbalance the unilateralism and military assertiveness of the United States that became clearly visible since the start of the Iraq War (2003-2011). In the case of Japan, there is nothing that stimulates the Russian elites to make even the slightest concession. The Japanese promises of tremendous benefits from the potential increase in economic cooperation after the conclusion of the peace treaty also seem dubious. To illustrate the point, Russia has no territorial or political disputes with South Korea and even has a visa-free regime with this country. Still, there is no heavy inflow of South Korean investment into the Russian economy. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (2020), South Korea occupied exactly the same share in the Russian imports and exports as Japan (3.2% and 3.5% respectively). Considering that the Japanese economy is larger than the South Korean economy, after the conclusion of the peace treaty, these figures may rise for two-three percentages for Japan. This is certainly not enough for Russia to make any territorial concessions to an American ally. 

Order or Justice?

After the analysis of the influence of the impact of the four primary institutions on the foreign policy of Japan, it is now possible to answer whether the foreign policy of Japan is a policy of order or a policy of justice. Did Japan the rise of nationalism in Japan enhance its sovereignty? Did Japan try to ensure that the US, China, and Russia coexist peacefully with each other and with Japan? Or did tried to promote democracy and the market? First of all, it must be said that both tendencies are visible to some extent. Order and justice are not connected in the same way as, for instance, taxation and government spending. In some circumstances, states can promote justice without compromising order. The dichotomy becomes visible when one version of justice collides with another. For instance, when Japan stated that its Official Developmental Assistance would promote democracy and human rights (Solis & Urata, 2007), it was an act of asserting solidarist justice. This policy did not compromise order, however, because there were few objections from recipients of ODA. Order is, certainly, one of the major concerns of Japan. The strengthening of the JSDF despite strong moral objections from antimilitarists at home reflects the desire of Japan to maintain the balance of power with China and Russia. Although officially ODA is meant to promote human rights and democracy, Japan respects the cultural differences of its Asian neighbors and has ODA programs in countries that have are not yet fully democratic by Western standards. Japan observes the principle of non-intervention when working within the ASEAN+3 format.

Despite the importance of order for Japan, the foreign policy of Japan is a policy of justice, although Japanese justice is sometimes at odds with the solidarist understanding of justice. This is an unorthodox answer that contradicts conventional accounts of Japanese foreign policy, such as `reluctant realism' of Green (2001). However, it logically stems from the foreign policy of Japan. First of all, it was demonstrated that Japan strongly, sometimes irrationally, believes in the power of economic diplomacy. The Japanese government assumes that economic development is a universal value that is embraced by all countries equally. The Eight-point Plan reflects the liberal understanding of economic development, such as the promotion of the middle and small business. It also significantly overestimates the power of civil society in Russia. More generally, such beliefs make Japan inject considerable sums of money in what Japan considers as just, for instance, the return of Shikotan and Habomai. Alternatively, the Japanese government could support the claims rhetorically to appease the domestic public but not waste precious resources into a hopeless initiative. Instead, Japan takes real action to achieve what it considers just, even if it contradicts the current balance of power. The same logic is applied to Japan's reluctance to fully recognize its responsibility for the WW2 events. Sincere German-style apologies would make much sense in terms of promoting order in the region. They could bring Japan closer to South Korea and temporarily appease China. Instead, Japan is more committed to defending its version of truth than improving the relations with its neighbors. No matter who is right in this dispute over historical memory, it demonstrates that Japan prioritizes justice over order. One may argue that this nationalist behavior of Japan is meant to enhance Japanese sovereignty. But Japan can easily compromise on its sovereignty when it deems necessary. It is proved by the continuing dependence of Japan on the US in the sphere of national defense and the failure of the Japanese government to relocate the American base from Okinawa amid decades-long local protests. In fact, Japanese nationalism has taken odd forms, when many nationalists, for instance, the Great Japan Patriotic Party, actively support the Japan-US alliance. The previous analysis demonstrates how Japan tries to promote its own version of justice at the expense of order. The Japanese version of justice, however, is logically connected to Japan's embracement of the solidarist version of justice. Instead of giving out apologies, Japan prefers to leave history behind and move to a bright future together with its Asian neighbors. And not only Asian. Japan invests little into constructing exclusively Asian international society. For instance, as Goh (2014) puts it, while China insisted on exclusively East Asian membership in the East Asia Summit, Japan lobbied the inclusion of Australia, India and New Zealand. Such actions perfectly fit the dominant logic behind the Japanese foreign policy - kokusaishugi (Rozman, 2015). Even though Rozman calls it internationalist realism, the closest match to kokusaishugi in Western IR thought is state-centric solidarism.

Conclusion

The English School was created study to international societies, but it has evolved sufficiently to study the foreign policy of individual states. States agree upon informal social practices or primary institutions to enhance collectively shared interests. It was demonstrated how four primary institutions: nationalism, great power management, democracy, and the market, influence the foreign policy of Japan. Despite decades of economic stagnation, Japan remains a crucial player in East Asian and global politics. Its foreign policy shapes and is shaped by international society. Japan finds itself in a hostile regional environment. It is also situated in the epicenter of the US-China rivalry. It is not surprising that Japan puts a lot of effort into maintaining regional and global order via strengthening its alliance with the US, modernizing its Self-Defense Forces. Nevertheless, the foreign policy of Japan is a policy of justice. The Japanese political elites are confident that the liberal economic order is beneficial for everyone and sincerely invest in the development of the Russian small business in a hope to solve the territorial issue. They put historical justice above good relationships with South Korea. They prioritize the global identity over East Asian identity. It is the contemporary reality of the foreign policy of Japan. Nothing suggests, however, that it will remain a policy of justice in the future. Liberalism is undergoing significant crisis and the pandemic of COVID-19 may become the start of its complete collapse. On the other hand, liberalism survived much tougher times, such as two World Wars and the Great depression. Maybe Japan will overcome its economic stagnation and promote its vision of justice around the world with double effectiveness. After all, the global cultural influence of Japan, especially on the young generation, is impressive. The future is unknown to us. Predicting the future is an extremely unrewarding activity, that is why the English School never tries it.