The European defence policy and transatlantic cooperation in times of Obama and Trump administrations

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THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE POLICY AND TRANSATLANTICCOOPERATION IN TIMES OF OBAMA AND TRUMP ADMINISTRATIONS

Marharyta Lymar

Viktoria Ahieieva

Маргарита Лимар, кандидат політичних наук

Вікторія Агєєва, кандидат філологічних наук

Чорноморський національний університет імені Петра Могили, Миколаїв, Україна

ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКА ОБОРОННА ПОЛІТИКА І ТРАНСАТЛАНТИЧНЕ
СПІВРОБІТНИЦТВО ЗА АДМІНІСТРАЦІЙ Б. ОБАМИ ТА Д. ТРАМПА

Анотація. Метою статті є аналіз розвитку загальної європейської політики безпеки та оборони за адміністрацій Барака Обами та Дональда Трампа. Серед основних завдань автори визначають такі: розглянути передумови та принципи формування спільної європейської політики безпеки та оборони (СПБО); вивчити тенденції щодо її еволюції у постбіполярний період; дослідити СПБО ЄС як частину трансатлантичної системи епохи Б. Обами; визначити трансформації СПБО європейських держав за час адміністрації Д. Трампа.

У ході дослідження зазначається важливість європейської оборонної політики, яка постає у вигляді двох концептів: як об'єднана сила - складова НАТО, і як унікальна ініціатива, що вибудовується паралельно трансатлантичному співробітництву. Разом із тим, зазначається, що євроатлантичне військово-оборонне співробітництво ніколи не припинялося, незважаючи на тимчасові періоди послаблення.

У статті зазначається, що Європа значно посилила свої позиції наприкінці епохи біполярності, продемонструвавши намір створити власну систему безпеки та оборони. Визначено, що упродовж 2010-2016 рр. Сполучені Штати не мали вагомого впливу на оборонну інтеграцію європейської спільноти. На думку західноєвропейських дослідників, оборонні ініціативи європейських країн стали причиною занепокоєння як президента Б. Обами, так і Д. Трампа. Однак за адміністрації Б. Обами європейські уряди не змогли реалізувати свої наміри (незважаючи на бажання створити власну армію) через відсутність взаєморозуміння та небажання нести додаткові витрати на реалізацію СПБО. Проте, така можливість оновилася під час президентства Д. Трампа.

Зазначається, що фундамент нового етапу європейської оборонної інтеграції був закладений ще у 2016 році, а з 2017 року європейські країни реалізували ініціативи щодо створення Європейського оборонного фонду (ЄОФ) та започаткування Постійного структурованого співробітництва -ПЕСКО (англ. PermanentStructuredCooperation - PESCO).

У статті також йдеться про те, що у 2017-2018 роках спостерігалось збільшення участі національних контингентів у діяльності НАТО. Окрім того, європейська спільнота розглядає власну потенційну оборонну систему як «автономну», а не як абсолютно незалежну від перевірених військово-оборонних структур. Зроблено висновок щодо важливості трансатлантичних відносин і можливого поглиблення трансатлантичного співробітництва з огляду на сучасні виклики безпеці та стабільності у світі.

Ключові слова: Європа, США, НАТО, СПБО, Обама, Трамп, оборонна політика.

security european defence transatlantic system

The recent decades are characterized by dialectical relationship in the international area between the U.S. foreign policy and the common policy of the European countries, especially, between members of the European Union. This interdependence could be observed in such key areas as economics, security and defense policy. The lack of clear agreements in the last sphere creates numerous obstacles on the way to successful resolutions towards the local and regional conflicts. For this reason, the latent distrust between power centers is growing. The European-U.S. defense policy includes common Euro-Atlantic initiatives as well as separate approaches of the United States and the European community. It overcomes the complex evolutionary path as it dialectically depends on the state and international factors and is influenced by variability of the contemporary international political environment. The security and defense system of Europe has been established under the impact of the United States. However, the European defense policy is able to develop independently and to gravitate rather to the America's partnership, than to its protection. This trend dates back to the Obama era and is observed under the Trump administration. Moreover, there is a deepening of cooperation, which will be discussed in the study.

Analysisof the Latest Research and Publications. The issues of the European defense policy and transatlantic partnership are reflected in the works of the European, American, and Ukrainian experts in international relations. Among the works of European political researches, dedicated to the exploration of the relationships between the European Union and the United States in the XX -XXI centuries, including the security and defense issues, the studies and political notes of the following experts should be distinguished: Assistant Professor of International Relations and European Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies A. Pannier; Professor of political science and Head of the Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark O. Schmitt; Director of the European Program and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment E. Brattberg; a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe T. Valasek; Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy L. Coffey; a senior policy analyst in European Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom D. Kochis. The Ukrainian international field on European integration studies is enriched by the scientific works of

A. Khudolii, D. Lakishyk, M. Myronova, D. Panchenko, M. Ratnikov and others. However, the specificity of this article demands to focus on the conclusions and studies of Western European experts. We review also the documentary base of European security and defense cooperation, NATO reports, and documents that reflect the U.S. foreign policy course, including the 2017 National Security Strategy.

NoveltyofResearch. The article complements the researches of Ukrainian scientists, focusing on complex analysis on the European defense policy and itsinterconnection with the U.S. activity. The core attention is paid to the discussed issue in times of Obama and Trump administrations.

PurposeandTasks. With regard to the above-mentioned, the article is aimed at disclosing the specifics of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), taking into account American influence during the last two administrations headed by Barack Obama and Donald Trump. The primary tasks could be defined as the followings: to review the preconditions and principles for the formation of European CSDP; to consider tendencies to its developing in the post-bipolar times; to examine the EU CSDP as a part of the Obama-era transatlantic system; to explore the trends and changes in the CSDP of Europe in correlation with NATO policy under the Trump administration.

BodyofResearch. In the second half of the ХХ century, as well as the new era, NATO has remained the only significant force that determines a character of a coherent defense policy of the United States and the European countries, despite the fact that Europe has never refused the idea of creating its own armed forces, which could ensure its «independence» from the Atlantic partner. Moreover, the development of a common defense policy has been a priority of the European leaders. The dynamic preparation for the construction of the united Europe political «pillar» began immediately after the signing of the Treaty that established the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. It facilitated the signing the European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty in Paris on 27 May, 1952. The Treaty included first six member-states: Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, Italy and France. At that time the EDC played the role of the military group composed of 40 divisions: 14 French, 12 German, 11 Italian and 3 from the Benelux countries [1, c. 53]. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the EDC Treaty was not ratified by the National Assembly in France in 1954. Thus, the European integration continued fruitful development following the economic vector. However, an embodiment of the common security and defense idea was postponed until better occasion, which occurred after the extinction of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Shortly before the collapse of the USSR, the Single European Act (1986) recorded general wishes for cooperation in European security and defense field.

Since the previous century, Germany has been an opponent of France in matters of European and world politics. However, in the early 1990s, both countries set out to turn Europe into an economically strong actor, and to create the Franco-German axis contributed to the strengthening and enlargement of the EU.

The need to resume integration processes in the field of security and defense was justified by geopolitical restructuring in the international arena. International

threats have become both «hard» and «soft», exerting a consolidating effect on European states in order to prevent acts of terrorism, to defend energy security of Western European countries, to resolve the ethno-territorial and religious conflicts, etc.

Tendencies to consolidate European military defense sparked discussions about «undermining» NATO's credible and time-tested defense system, reorganizing of the EU from a civilian structure to a new organization that would be uncertain in its role, and forming a «European army» to compete with NATO. However, enthusiasts stressed the opposite effect on transatlantic cooperation. They considered that the European security and defense policy (ESDP) are aimed at creating Eurocorps or multinational structures and national units that would not rival with NATO. The final provisions on building a joint military defense capability were set out at the 2007 Lisbon Summit, when Germany and France defended their common positions and facilitated the ratification of the final agreement that entered into force in December 2009.

In the early 2010s, the leading EU countries paid close attention to promoting initiatives such as the European Security Strategy and the European Defense Agency, which were purposed at ensuring multilevel and multilateral cooperation and independence of Europe in the implementation of the foreign policy actions. In-depth cooperation has led to creation of, first of all, Eurocorps based on the Franco-German Brigade as an analogue of the international military formations; second of all, the Defense and Security Council; and, third of all, the position of EU High Representative to the Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP (initiated by the Lisbon Summit). Thanks to France and Germany, two key areas (two initiatives) of the EU international projects were formed within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy - the German-supported Eastern European Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. The French government was active in pursuing its own European policy, while Germany maintained close relations with the United States, demonstrating a position on coordinating EU security action with NATO. At the same time, both countries made a significant contribution to the development of the CSDP.

Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that there were obstacles to intensifying European influence. Actually, in the period of Obama administration, Germany, Great Britain and Eastern European countries preferred bilateral relations, particularly, with the United States. Such a policy weakened credibility to the EU, called into question the effectiveness of its collective influence and readiness of countries to deepen integration for common goals. In addition, some European governments maintained an outdated conscription system, while the problems of strategic transport aviation and rearmament remained unresolved. For a long time, Europeans were unwilling to bear sufficient financial costs in favor of military modernization.

Since the 2009, the tendency for reducing the joint defense spending began in 2009, and continued till 2016. Regular reports published by the NATO press service evidenced that Europe was not ready to provide its joint security system even contributing the trusted transatlantic cooperation model. Since the early 2000s, there had been a general steady decline in the armed forces of Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Turkey and France, which participated in NATO activities (Table 1) [7; 8; 13].

Table 1 (contingents in thousands of people)

Considering the above-mentioned, as well as formal calls for increasing defense spending, evidenced the threatening nature of the described situation for NATO in the times of Obama administration [6]. The official data on the national contingents in NATO was renewed (and partly corrected) in March and November of 2019, when it became apparent that the participation of the national armed forces of the European countries in the Alliance activities increased [7].

The analyzed data demonstrated the fact that the U.S. influence on the European countries' policy was weakened in the years of Obama administration. The core reasons for the restarting of the European CSDP restoration were the following: the economic well-being that allowed the European countries to relay on their own, considering their armed forces, which could concentrate the influential potential in the future; NATO's inability to meet the national interests of the European countries; the gradual deepening of the interdependence in Western Europe and the structuring cooperation in the region. In that regard, Great Britain, Germany, and France were considered as the key European countries in terms of the economic power, as well as

the political and military strengths. All of them were members of the EU, and keep membership in NATO and the United Nations today. It should be noted that the Franco-German acute moments were dismissed and the Franco-British defense cooperation was institutionalized. Despite the lack of institutionalization in the German-British relations, there were every reasons to believe that the future agreements could strengthen the bilateral relations between countries and create a sound basis for the further deeper cooperation [17]. According to statistics, in 2014, the defense expenditures in the EU states corresponded to 1,44% of total GDP and € 396 per person; despite the budgetary cuts, at the beginning of the 2010s, the United Kingdom remained the EU biggest defense spender with a budget of € 45,8 billion in 2014, as well as France (€ 43,1 billion) and Germany (€ 32,4 billion) [9, p.62].

A good reason to reconsider the common defense policy was also connected with decompression of the European security environment after the Cold War that helped switching attention from the global issues to the new regional security threats that had rapidly spread inside the European region due to the instability in the postcommunist space [3, c. 100-101]. The Cologne, Helsinki and Nice Summits that resulted in the new solutions approving, the joint programs promoting and the rapid reaction forces forming, reduced reliance on NATO as the sole guarantor of the regional and geopolitical security. However, the events that shook Europe, especially, by the hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine, have confirmed the fact that Europe is not ready to confront own unpredictable regional conflicts, and the armed forces are inferior in significance to the economic leverage. In fact, research on NATO's impact on the formation of the European CSDP has also demonstrated the inability of European nations to go completely beyond the transatlantic partnership [2]. Moreover, some destabilization of the European Union was caused by the process of Great Britain's withdrawal from its structures («Brexit»), which ended in early 2020. Numerous issues related to the settlement of trade relations and the conclusion of new bilateral agreements were frozen for uncertain time due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The previously mentioned figures on strengthening the participation of national contingents in NATO activities in 2017 and 2018 also support the fact that Europe is not ready to create an autonomous defense system. However, it is significant to note that in the times of Trump presidency, the desire of European states for security consolidation, regardless of participation in NATO, has an impetus.

Since 2017, European countries have taken new steps in the highlighted direction. New initiatives, such as the European Defense Fund (EDF) [11] and the revival of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) [18], that bring together a

large group of the EU countries are laid at the heart of the negotiation process. PESCO is currently one of the EU initiatives, which essentially intercepts President Clinton's call for the United States in the far 1998: «... working with our allies and friends whenever possible, alone when absolutely necessary» [5, p. 323], and focused on strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU. National sovereignty remains intact, but the initiative provides an opportunity for member states to synchronize their actions with NATO and the UN in the context of security and defense policy. Obviously, this once again confirms our thesis on the appropriateness of further transatlantic cooperation, given the fact that the obvious slogan that sounded for the United States in the 1990s became a slogan for Europe only 20 years later.

Primary, the reconsidering the CSDP in the second half of 2010s took place due to the expansion of the EU defense ambitions impacted by such factors as the growing instability in Eastern and Southern Europe; uncertainty about Great Britain's membership in the EU after the 2016 referendum; questioning on the U.S. leadership and Europe's further commitment to the NATO under President Trump; increasing demand for deeper European integration and strengthening the defense industry [4].

European experts stress that Europe's persistent progress towards the strategic goal has caused significant concern for President Trump. According to them, only a stronger and more pragmatic transatlantic dialogue could allow to overcome mutual uncertainties and misunderstandings about European defense schemes. It should be noted that the basis for the resumption of negotiations during the Trump administration was laid in 2016. In that regard, a significant event was the publication by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini of the document «Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe -- A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy» in June 2016 [15, p. 14]. Emphasis has been placed on exploring the interests of EU citizens, which include such priorities as job security, guarantees of equality, safety and a healthy environment for increasing overall well-being. A core point is that Europe's welfare is seen only in relation to the increase in international prosperity that must be ensured by the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by all countries.

The new document presented renewed security and defense priorities replacing the outdated European Security Strategy of 2003. Moreover, in November 2016, the European Commission launched a «European Defense Action Plan: Towards a European Defence Fund», which proposed to create the above-mentioned EDF for supporting the joint development of defense technologies and equipment by financial investments, as well as to strengthen the common market for defense purposes [10].

Later, at the NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016, NATO and EU leaders approved a joint declaration, - supplemented by another declaration in 2018 and seventy-four points on the agenda, - confirming NATO's greater commitment to strengthening the EU's defense role. However, note that the primary document was signed under the Obama administration, which was quite friendly to the EU initiatives. Since 2016, the EU has made several significant policy developments on security cooperation. It included the creation of military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) in the EU military personnel in June 2017, as well as the intensification of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2017. A further impetus was given in December 2017 to the launch of the European Defense Industrial Development Program (EDIDP) as a precursor to the EDF, providing co-financing of € 500 million for the joint industrial development of defense equipment in 2019-2020 [12].

Given the above, it is clear that by the end of Obama-era and during the Trump presidency, European countries have both deepened European cooperation toward a more autonomous defense system and demonstrated attempts to strengthen relations with NATO without daring to completely reconstruct the regional defense space. However, such initiatives are quite coldly received by the United States in the person of President Trump. It may seem surprising given the analysis of the U.S. position in previous years, when Former US Secretary of Defense R. Gates in his 2011 speech has expressed deep concern about the future transformation of NATO into a two-tier alliance with some members bearing the brunt of commitments and others, who simply enjoy the benefits of membership and hold on to the «soft» means of settling issues [14]. In fact, PESCO initiative and the EDF 'sactivities are Europe's «long- awaited» response to the U.S. call to «burden-sharing», given that the EDF provides a financial incentive for European nations to work together. Moreover, the European Commission is ready to fund these efforts with € 13 billion over the long-term program for 2021-2027. PESCO is implemented with the political support of 25 European governments, which aim to implement 34 projects covering all areas of defense cooperation - from maritime to land [19].

The reason for the resumption of cooperation between European countries in creating a common defense system may be caused by the fact that President Trump and some officials in his administration questioned the principles of transatlantic security and economic architecture after World War II [20]. President Trump's criticism of NATO, the EU and policy of the key European countries has given reasons for considerable concern in Europe. Generally, the Trump administration has reaffirmed its commitment to NATO and the continuation of transatlantic cooperation, despite a wide range of regional and global issues that cause political

variances between the EU and the United States. However, the classical rhetoric about close transatlantic ties and priority trade is preserved.

In 2017, the U.S.-European economy, which generated $ 5 trillion a year from foreign affiliate sales, employed more than 9 million workers on both sides of the Atlantic. Thus, transatlantic cooperation is still seen as a driving force in the liberalization of world trade. In addition, the U.S. participation in Europe also helps to limit Russian, Chinese, and other possible «malignancies» [20]. For this reason, despite President Trump's concerns, cooperation continues both within NATO and outside the Alliance, and the United States cannot fail to recognize Europe's right to its own defense initiatives that can guarantee exactly what the National Security Strategy of the Trump administration emphasizes: «The United States is safer when Europe is prosperous and stable, and can help defend our shared interests and ideals» [16, p. 48]. If the United States wants to have a credible European partner, it must accept the fact that NATO cannot remain the only satisfactory format for achieving common goals. However, 2020 could mark a new milestone in transatlantic relations in the context of overcoming international goals and challenges, including the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Conclusion. Finally, it should be emphasized an importance of the European defense policy, which has been created in two ways: as a united force within NATO, and as a unique initiative in parallel to the transatlantic cooperation (mostly, after the destruction of the bipolar system). However, the Euro-Atlantic defense ties never end up, despite the periodic abatements.

The importance of developing European defense policy as an integral part of a unified security system alongside NATO is justified. In cooperating with the United States within NATO, Western European countries have never given up their own security policies, as evidenced by establishing of various European institutions, deepening of the Franco-German defense cooperation, launching of the ESDP, reducing of national military participation in the North Atlantic Alliance and, etc. Calls for the resumption of cooperation within NATO under Obama 'spresidency have not had the desired effect, indicating a weakening of the U.S. influence on the defense integration of the European community. However, the regional challenges demonstrated the inability of the EU states to withstand the crisis on their own. Therefore, despite the renewal of cooperation to create an independent or «autonomous» defense system in the times of President Tramp, European governments work closely with NATO, as evidenced by the growth of national contingents' participation in the Alliance for 2017-2018, and are committed to further developing of the transatlantic cooperation, which is equally beneficial to the United States.

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