Transformation of German-American relations in the 21st century

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The Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies and International Security

Transformation of German-American relations in the 21st century

Boykov S.S.,

Intern of the Institute of Contemporary International Studies (ICIS) of

Abstract

Germany is gradually evolving from a satellite to a rival for the USA. Germany is no longer going to be a faithful ally of the USA, as it used to be during the Cold War. The Iraq war 2003 started by the US-led coalition, existing political and economic differences, articulated by US President-elect Donald Trump, as well as some value differences have made Germany to put under question traditional transatlantic relations. Hence, a reorientation of German foreign policy in a more national direction will be more visible, Germany will focus more on Europe and at the same time it will try to deal with Mr. Trump's Administration to preserve the existing level of economic, political and military cooperation with the United States.

Key words: Germany, the USA, transatlantic relations, German-American relations, Schroder, Bush, Merkel, Obama, Trump

Main part

german foreign policy cooperation

Formulation of the problem. The USA and Germany are considered to be very important political allies and economic partners, as both countries are member states of NATO and are closely economically interconnected. Besides, these states belong to the same Western civilization and therefore share the similar values. For these reasons Germany and the USA often speak with one voice when it comes to problems and crises management concerning world policy and world economy.

However, since the early 2000s the relations between Germany and the USA have been changing. The war in Iraq (2003) launched a transformation mechanism of the US-German relations which led to tensions and contradictions in the foreign policies of the two countries. After American President Donald Trump took up office in 2017 the differences between Germany and the USA only increased. At the same time the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 contributed to differentiation of Europe, and Germany became the leading government in the EU. The transformation of German-American relations as well as economic and political strengthening of Germany within the EU have changed Germany's view on the USA. What is the future of the transatlantic relations?

Analysis of recent research and publications. The literature concerning German-American relations and German leadership in the world is vast and includes various aspects.

Deputy Berlin Bureau Chief of Spiegel Christiane Hoffmann is convinced that since America's retreat from its role as a shaper of global politics began before Trump it won't end with his departure. In her opinion, German politics is still focused on the illusion of being a moral power, and if Germany wants to be a leader in the West, then it also needs to have a realistic view of the world [17]. Contributing opinion writer for The International New York Anna Sauerbrey adds at the same time that Germany must fill the post-American vacuum, however, Germany cannot do it. She thinks that talk of a strategic shift is a reverie - a way to escape the limitations to real action [35].

Nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe Judy Dempsey criticizes the USA for imposing new sanctions against Russia in summer 2017. In fact, these sanctions aiming at punishing Russia for its alleged interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election have further exacerbated ties between Germany and the USA. In reality, the bill punishes European companies working with Russia [6].

According to the latest Pew Research Centre survey made in November-December 2017, almost sevenin-ten Americans (68%) say relations between the U.S. and Germany are good, while only 22% say they are bad. Meanwhile, a majority of Germans (56%) say that relations with the U.S. are at least somewhat bad, with only 42% saying they are positive [31].

Erik Brattberg, who is director of the Europe Program and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, assumes that regardless of who is German Chancellor, Germany will continue to uphold transatlantic ties and cooperate with Washington where interests align, though Berlin will not hesitate to criticize U.S. policies it strongly disagrees with [3].

Unsolved part of the problem. This article gives a comprehensive research of the German-American relations development from the early 2000-s to the present day.

The purpose of the article is to show the evolution of the German-American relations in the context of political elites' changes on both sides of the Atlantic.

«…A pretext for a reorientation of German foreign policy in a more national direction»

It is common knowledge that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was originally founded as a military-political alliance, so that the relationships between its members have always been built both on the basis of military and political cooperation. In 1955 Germany joined NATO and this marked the final step of the FRG's integration into the Western defense system. In essence, for the whole period of the Cold War Western Germany was entirely dependent on the USA. In 1990 after the end of the Cold War the USA wanted the reunified Germany to play a more active role in international security. In October 1990 US-President George Bush addressed to Germany: «together, building on the values we share, we will be partners in leadership» [1].

After the reunification Germany expanded its engagement and took on more responsibility. It started to take part in a number of UN-led peace missions and since 1990-s it has been participating in 10 missions with its own security forces [46]. Besides, the FRG supported its NATO-allies in Yugoslavia in 1999. ExChancellor Gerhard Schroder wrote in his memoirs: «the Kosovo engagement taught Europe the lesson that without the help of the United States, it was not in a position to solve these kinds of conflicts» [42]. After the September 11 attacks on the USA Berlin promised Washington «unlimited solidarity» [11]. Germany deployed troops in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission led by NATO. According to World Press Review correspondent Eric Jansson, Schroder «cited both Germany's commitment to the United States and its national interest in combating terrorism, knowing that for the first time since World War II the country could be entering a war» [21].

However, in 2002-2003 the unity of NATO-allies was put under question. Due to several political reasons the German Chancellor refused to back the USA and even condemned the American military aggression against Iraq. In August 2002 he underlined that the FRG was a self-confident country. He added: «we didn't shy away from offering international solidarity in the fight against international terrorism<…> but we say this with equal self-confidence: we're not available for adventures, and the time of cheque book diplomacy is over once and for all» [18]. Hans Kundnani, a senior transatlantic fellow with GMF's Europe program, emphasizes that Schroder opposed the war in Iraq and spoke in his speech of a «German Way» which was an implicit contrast with the «American Way» [24].

There were several reasons why Germany participated in the Yugoslavian and Afghani missions and criticized the US-led operation in Iraq. Firstly, the overwhelming majority of the German citizens (nearly 71%) were against the war in Iraq [30]. In September 2003 (after the US-invasion) 50% of the Germans opposed the American's leadership in world politics [30]. And 68% of the voters supported Schroder's position towards Iraq [29]. That is why Chancellor Schroder probably tried in 2002 to take advantage of the mood against military intervention in Iraq for the election campaign in which he was successfully re-elected. Secondly, Germany wanted to establish closer political relations with France that did not intend to deteriorate relations with the Middle-East countries. Finally, the German government did not have enough evidence that Saddam Hussein supported terrorists (Al-Qaeda) and Iraq really had a weapon of mass destruction.

The refusal of Germany to support the USA in Iraq led to deterioration of political relations between Berlin und Washington. The George W. Bush pointedly omitted to congratulate Schroder on his victory in the parliamentary elections and his security adviser, Condoleeza Rice, said that relations between the USA and Germany had been «poisoned» [19]. Henry Kissinger wrote that «a kind of anti-Americanism may have become a permanent temptation of German politics» [22]. This rift between the two countries led some analysts to assume that it had been one of the most important landmarks in the history of transatlantic relations. According to Stephen Szabo, «the post-Cold War period in the German-U.S. relationship ended» [40].

The bilateral relations between Germany and the USA improved only when Angela Merkel took the office as Chancellor. Merkel wanted to strengthen the German-American ties and reduce tensions between Berlin and Washington that existed under former Chancellor Schroder. As for Merkel and Bush, they managed to create an atmosphere of fruitful communication and mutual trust. However, the new Merkel's transatlantic foreign policy could not return the relations of Germany and the USA to the times before the Red-Green coalition. Between Germany and the USA did remain contradictions on a number of political, security, ecological and even human rights aspects, such as Washington's desire for the ultimate leadership in the world, tortures in Guantanamo bay prison and intension to include Georgia and Ukraine in NATO in 2008. Germany identified the Alliance as a political forum where member-states discuss hot security issues and make joint decisions whereas for the USA NATO remained an instrument of its own global foreign policy. Eventually, in 2008 only 30% of the Germans were positive about the USA [30, 735].

Since the election of the US-President Barack Obama, American-German relations got a second wind, therefore the intensity of the relations maintained generally at a high level. In 2009 93% of the Germans had confidence in Obama to do the right thing regarding world affairs (G.W. Bush had only 14%) [49]. However, political conflicts broke out between Germany and the USA even under Obama. In 2011 Germany abstained from the vote on a UN security council-resolution to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. Merkel was even warned that by such actions Germany could drift even further away from the USA, the UK and France [48]. In 2013 Germany opposed possible aggression of the USA against Syria. In 2013 and 2014 broke out two spying scandals. Merkel was very furious when it emerged that the US secret services may have tapped her mobile telephone. She said: «Friends spying on one another. that's just not on» [15]. Moreover, Germany and the USA have different approaches to solution of the Ukrainian conflict. Berlin stands only for political settlement whereas Washington doesn't exclude arms sales to Kiev.

Overall, since 2002-2003 there have always been differences in political relations between Germany and the USA. Spying scandals showed lack of trust in relationships between the two allies. Apart from this, several political contradictions demonstrated that for the USA and Germany their own national interests are often more important than transatlantic ones. According to Henry Kissinger, «the issue of Iraq has become a pretext for a reorientation of German foreign policy in a more national direction» [22].

The USA is the most important partner for the German export

In autumn 2008 the world financial crisis broke out and this became the next critical juncture in Germany's incremental estrangement from the USA. Kundnani says that the crisis demonstrated to Germans how wrong the USA had been to focus on the «new economy» and on financial services [24]. The crisis strengthened anti-Keynesianism mood. Scepticism of Keynesianism led to disagreements between the USA (a deficit country) and Germany (a surplus country) about how to «rebalance» the global economy [24]. According to such American economists as Paul Krugman, «the problem in the global economy was a lack of aggregate demand and that the solution was economic stimulus» [28]. But the Germans were not of the same opinion. For example, in 2008 the German finance minister Peer Steinbruck criticised the British government under Gordon Brown who urged stimulus measures» [44]. In his turn, Mr. Krugman called the German government «boneheaded» [23]. In 2010 The U.S. Treasury called on Germany to do more to reduce its current account surplus and stimulate growth in the Eurozone but Germany dismissed critics and rejected such demands. In 2012 and 2015 President Obama tried to press Merkel to support a growth package to help Europe but it was useless [25].

It is necessary to note that the political differences between the USA and Germany under the «Red-Green» coalition did not affect the bilateral trade. Despite several political contradictions, economic cooperation was only increasing. In the period of 2000-2005 the turnover of the United States with Germany went up by US $ 30.974 billion [43]. In 2005 the accumulated FDI of the USA in Germany accounted for € 69.4 billion [39].

FDI flows continued to show an upward trend during the global financial crisis 2008-2009. In particular, in 2009 German FDI went up by US $ 16 billion, and as for FDI from the USA to Germany, they grew by US $ 8.6 billion [38]. Also, due to economic cooperation, there has been created a significant number of new jobs. Namely in the USA about 750.000 citizens were employed and roughly 500.000 people got new jobs in Germany [43]. In 2008-2009 only the bilateral trade suffered most of all, however, in 2012 it reached the level before the crisis.

In addition, since the early 2000s big business has been playing an important role in the bilateral economic relations between the two countries. American companies provided Germany with investments, supported the development of regions and created new jobs. American companies, in their turn, earned substantial profits.

Besides, in 2013-2016 the EU and the USA had been holding talks on Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement. This accord should have established the largest free trade zone in the world and covered almost half of the world's trade, if it had been concluded. It is needless to say that the EU and the USA are the closest trade partners. The USA accounted for about 17.6% of the EU's total trade in 2016 [4]. As for the EU, it accounted for 18.9% of the US total trade of goods [10]. The USA is the most important partner for the German export. Being the economic leader in the European Union, the Federal Republic tried to influence the results of the negotiations. Chancellor Angela Merkel has always backed the idea of TTIP calling it «one of the most cost-effective growth stimulators that anyone can imagine» [34]. Indeed, TTIP was strongly supported by big business as well. BGA President Anton Borner said: «TTIP may be the last chance for Europe to participate in a trade deal that allows us to set the standards for global trade» [12]. Only after Mr. Trump took office the negotiations were frozen.

Thus, economic cooperation between Germany and the United States has always been a solid foundation in the German-American relations. Such a partnership often smoothed sharp contradictions between the countries, as well as served as an incentive for further cooperation.

So, the war in Iraq caused a deep rift in the bilateral political relations of Germany and the USA. After the US-led invasion in Iraq Germany managed to rethink traditional transatlantic relations which were formed after the end of World War II and even the Cold War. Since 2003 Berlin has tried to follow its own «German Way» which slightly contrasts with the «American Way». The German foreign policy has always been less «hawkish» and more peaceful than the American one; Berlin conducts its own economic policy, the spying scandals also negatively affected the partnership between the two allies. Besides, Germany focused more on the European integration. As a result, the Federal Republic reoriented its foreign policy in a more national direction and since 2003 Germany has been gradually estranging from the USA. The war in Iraq launched the process of transformation of the transatlantic relations, but strong economic ties as well as membership in NATO always smoothed sharp contradictions.

«Germany is too big merely to comment on world affairs from the side-lines»

The financial crisis largely served to reinforce the positions of Germany and contributed to weakening of the other member states of the EU. By 2013 Germany had become the most significant and strongest economy in the EU. That is to say, Germany's GDP was at about 20.8% of the EU's GDP (France: 16%, the UK: 14.4%) [9]. As for unemployment rate, in Germany it accounted for about 5% (in France: 10.2%, the UK: 7.1%) [9]. Moreover, Germany's contribution to the EU's budget accounted for roughly €26 billion (France: €21.9 billion, the UK: €14.5 billion) [9]. Hence, positions of Germany in the EU rose significantly in the context of the global financial crisis.

Merkel's election in 2013 was considered as an approval of her policy. Surprisingly, she came to be called the chancellor not only of Germany, but also of Europe. Germany was expected to undertake practical steps to overcome the Eurozone crisis. However, the FRG faced complex contradictions connected with recognition of its power. On the one hand, such a position allows Germany to carry out a relatively independent domestic and foreign policy. On the other hand, the political weight of Germany is considered by some European countries as a threat of loss of independence (Southern Europe), and by others it is seen as an unwanted competitor (the UK and France).

Parallel to its economic and political strengthening, Germany realized that it can and should take greater part in solving international problems. In the latest Coalition agreement that was signed in 2013 it is stated that Germany recognizes international responsibility and it is ready to contribute to the crisis management, if it is necessary. Simultaneously in 2013 the German Marshall Fund in cooperation with German Institute for International and Security Affairs published a report according to which Germany should take more international responsibility and in scientists' view nowadays «power» is an ability to solve important-for-all problems. And they suppose Germany is able to do this.

In 2014 some ideas that were reflected in the agreement and the report were announced at the 50th Munich Conference. Minister for Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier stressed that «Germany must be ready for earlier, more decisive and more substantive engagement in the foreign and security policy sphere» [37]. He also added that «Yet a culture of restraint for Germany must not become a culture of standing aloof. Germany is too big merely to comment on world affairs from the side-lines» [37].

The intention of the Federal Foreign Office found its expression in practical actions. Germany participated in resolving issues regarding the nuclear program of Iran, contributed to the fight against Ebola and ISIS. What is more, Germany has taken an important part in management of the Ukrainian conflict, Greece debt and the refugee crises. Furthermore, since the early 90s Germany has been actively participating in International Crisis Management (ICM) under the auspices of the UN, the EU and NATO.

Besides, U.S. President Barack Obama also used to voice concern about Germany's duty to take on a more active leadership role in the modern world and especially in Europe. The reason is that the USA has been gradually developing a strategy implying a significant shift in American foreign policy from a Middle Eastern and European focus to an East and South Asian one (the so called pivot to Asia).

That being said, since 2013 Berlin has been pursuing a more active foreign policy, namely, in Europe and in the Middle East. Also, according to the German foreign policy settings «power» is an ability to tackle difficult international issues. Therefore, Germany is seeking to solve difficult problems mostly by means of diplomacy and economy.

Despite intentions of the German government to play a greater role in solving international problems, ordinary Germans assess this policy rather ambiguous. In 2014 the Korber Foundation published a report devoted to research of public opinion towards increase of German involvement in tackling international issues. According to the report, overwhelming majority of Germans does not want Germany to take more responsibility for resolving international crises. The share of those who were for active role of Germany in international affairs accounted for only 37% whereas the share who were against was 60% [8].

Minister for Foreign Affairs Steinmeier commented the results of the research in March in 2014. He explained that 60% of the Germans did not want Germany to play a more significant role in resolving the crisis because more involvement in solving international problems is usually associated with the use of military force and supply of arms [37]. 73% of the Germans think that Germany should better focus on solving internal problems instead of external ones [8]. Also, a lot of citizens still take into consideration German collective guilt which refers to the WWI and WWII. Finally, 37% of the Germans believe that the is too weak and small, so that it is unable influence on international affairs [8]. But at the same time the Germans are for diplomatic and non-military tools of foreign policy, therefore 86% support humanitarian assistance, negotiations (85%) and arms control (80%) [8].

Thus, the rethinking of German foreign policy goes along with skepticism in the society regarding the issue of Germany's participation in resolving international crises. Most people believe that more involvement will lead to taking part in military operations and unnecessary wars.

So, the growth of the German economic power caused an increase of its political positions within the EU that is why Germany became an informal leader of Europe. Economic and political strengthening encouraged Germany to conduct a more active foreign policy. However, the most Germans are actually against of more involvement in international affairs. But at the same time they approve non-military tools of foreign policy.

«Spying on your friends - that's really not on»

Since the beginning of 2013 (even before spy scandals) anti-American sentiment has started to increase Germany. The growth of anti-Americanism can be observed in the report of Allensbach which was published in 2013. According to the paper, Obama's ratio deteriorated in Germany. In 2009 Mr. Obama's foreign policy was approved by 78% of the Germans [45]. But nevertheless most of them saw the USA as a close partner and ally.

In 2013 Angela Merkel reacted negatively when she discovered her mobile phone had been bugged by American spies. She said: «Spying on your friends - that's really not on» [16]. German views on the USA changed negatively after spying scandals. According to Pew Research Center, only 35% of the Germans agreed that the USA respect the fundamental rights and freedoms (2013: 58%) [13]. Moreover, in 2009 64% of the Germans had a positive opinion about the USA and in 2014 this number fell by 13% [13].

The growth of anti-American sentiment encouraged the Germans to pursue a more independent internal and foreign policy. According to the German Marshall Fund research, for the first time in the history of German-American relations, most Germans would like to see the FRG conducting more independent of US foreign policy. In 2013 this wanted 17% of the Germans and in 2014 this number amounted to 57% [13].

Dissatisfaction with violation of human rights and freedoms, aggressive foreign policy of the USA, spying and prospects of signing the agreement on TTIP reinforce anti-American sentiment in the German society. All these things cause the formation of organized antiAmerican radical groups. The most striking example of such a group is PEGADA («Patriotic Europeans against the Americanization of the Old World»).

So, transformation of German-American relations can be observed even at the level of the society. Since 2013 the growth of anti-Americanism has been increasing gradually. This tendency shows that the Germans tend to rethink and review their traditional relationships with the Americans.

«The Germans are bad, very bad…»

It is needless to say that the USA and the European Union still need each other. By all means the EU is the most important sales market for the American companies. The same thing concerns the EU and especially Germany. What is more, US and EU investments are the real driver of the transatlantic relationship, contributing to growth and jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. Apart from this, the EU is seen by the USA as a tool to restrain Russia. In light of the Ukrainian conflict the West-Russia relations deteriorated significantly in 2014. Russia has always been a military-political rival of the USA therefore the war in Ukraine gave a great opportunity to press Russia with the use of economic sanctions. As for the EU and Germany, they feel protected by the US military forces. So, when it comes to security Europe needs the USA. Besides, the West is split now and in order to unite all the western countries they use a negative image of Russia that is seen as a common enemy. Both the USA and Germany derive benefit from Russia's bad image.

At the same time Germany and the USA have significant tensions today. Firstly, President-elect Donald Trump is sure that «Germany owes vast sums of money to NATO and the United States must be paid more for the powerful, and very expensive, defense it provides to Germany» [5]. The reason is that Germany spends just 1,2% of its GDP on defence. However, it should have spent 2% in accordance to the Wales Summit Declaration [47]. German foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel replied: «It's totally unrealistic to believe that Germany would increase its defense spending from €35bn now to €70bn… We respect 2% guideline - but we should not move the goalposts: it was formulated in Wales as a guideline and not as a goalpost» [2].

Secondly, President Trump criticized Germany's trade surplus with the USA. He said: «The Germans are bad, very bad… Look at the millions of cars they sell in the Us. Terrible. We'll stop that» [20]. Merkel pushed back against criticism of Germany's trade surplus from Mr. Trump. She tried to explain him during G7 summit in Sicily (May 26-27. 2017) that the surplus was due in part to factors out of Germany's control [33]. Now the U SA sees Germany as an economic rival.

Then, in June 2017 Donald Trump withdrew from the Paris climate agreement. The US-President said that the accord would have imposed a heavy economic burden on the USA and intruded on its sovereignty. Angela Merkel termed his position on climate change «regrettable» in her closing remarks at the G20 summit in Hamburg (July 7-8. 2017) [26]. Climate protection has always been very important for the Europeans and therefore they perceived this news rather painful.

Also in August 2017 Mr. Trump signed a bill that imposed new sanctions on Russia, Iran and North Korea. The bill imposed sanctions against any foreign person or entity that has significant investments in certain Russian energy projects. That means that the sanctions could affect some functioning infrastructure projects like the Blue Stream pipeline (run by Italy's Eni and Gazprom), CPC pipeline (run by Shell, Eni and Rosneft), the Baltic LNG project (run by Shell and Gazprom) and Nord Stream 1 (run by various European firms and Gazprom). The bill could also penalize companies involved in Nord Stream 2, a joint project between German and Austrian companies and Russia's Gazprom. Nord Stream 2 will enable Russian gas to be delivered to Germany without using the existing pipeline that runs through Ukraine. Germany, which strongly backs the new pipeline, opposes new sanctions. Foreign Ministry spokesman Martin Schafer said that it would be «unacceptable for the United States to use possible sanctions as an instrument to serve the interests of US industry policies» [36].

At last personal relations between Mr. Trump and Merkel seem to be far from perfect. It goes without saying that these leaders a very different and they have contrast views on a number of issues. For example, while Mr. Trump greeted Merkel with a handshake upon her first arrival at the White House in March 2017, he appeared to ignore requests to do so as the pair sat together later in front of TV cameras. The US-President looked rather disappointed and gloomy and judging by this can be made an assumption that they did not manage to establish good relations with each other.

So, it is clear that Germany and the USA have sharp political and economic contradictions. Consequently, German citizens feel these tensions as well. Over the period 2008-2016, the proportion of Germans confident that the USA protects personal freedoms decreased by 17 points [50]. According to ZDF, in May 2017 only 29% of the Germans thought that the relations between Germany and the USA are good (October 2016: 82%) [7]. Most German citizens (65%) think that the USA under Mr. Trump is not a reliable partner for Germany [7]. Just 22% of respondents trusted the US under its new leader - compared with 59% just before the November election [27]. Judging by these results Mr. Trump is probably the least popular US-President in Germany and it is obvious that the US image decreases in German society. That means that less and less Germans really feel the need of strong transatlantic ties. The Germans differ from the Americans in terms of ways of life and even values. What is more, there is also difference in generations. German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier put it: «To the generation of tomorrow, the value of the transatlantic partnership is in no way as self-evident as it is to my generation» [32].

In Germany as a democratic country anti-Americanism and appeals for more self-dependence can be used as tools to attract voters. In Twitter SDP-leader Martin Schulz wrote: «The best answer to Donald Trump is a stronger Europe» [41]. Angela Merkel during her campaign declared: «The times in which we could completely depend on others are, to a certain extent, over… We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands» [14]. That's very important because 89% of Germans think that the EU-countries should work more together because of Mr. Trump's foreign policy [7]. So, this tendency leads to gradual changes of the traditional transatlantic unity and it seems that Germany will pay more attention to Europe and the European integration than the relations with the USA.

Conclusion

• The US invasion in Iraq in 2003 was the turning point in the history of the bilateral relations between Germany and the USA. At that moment Germany condemned the USA and that issue «poisoned» German - American relations;

• elites in Germany and the USA are able both to deteriorate and improve the bilateral political and diplomatic relations;

• though increasing economic ties between the USA and Germany have always been a solid foundation for German-American relations and positively influenced their further cooperation;

• since the world financial crisis (2008-2009) Germany has become a leading state in the EU and the USA also wants the Federal Republic to take on a more active leadership role in the modern world;

• after Donald Trump took up office the value rift between the USA and Germany has become more significant;

• Mr. Trump sees Germany and Europe as economic competitors and he will strive for trade concessions from the European side;

• in recent years the rate of anti-Americanism in Germany has increased. Most Germans already distance themselves from Mr. Trump's America and they expect that the relations between Germany and the USA will only deteriorate;

• Germany will focus on cooperation with its European neighbors rather than on strengthening of the transatlantic relations.

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