Features of security and defense policy formation in EU

Source: created by author based on [4]

To conclude, necessary to mention that the security policy, as a relatively new area of EU activity, has demonstrated its effectiveness and has stood the test of time. One of the main difficulties in the formation and implementation of the CFSP is the process of harmonizing approaches within the Union, ensuring the conformity of the national policy of the Member States with the common positions of the EU, adequate response to the new challenges of our time. At present, in the face of new internal and external challenges, the European Union is faced with the task of strengthening its role as a global player, strengthening the world order based on democratic and market values.

The historical development of Europe shows that ensuring security has been and remains the task of various types of international political blocs and organizations. With the exacerbation of non-traditional threats, there was a need to strengthen the institutional and functional role of international organizations in the field of security.

Assessing the process of military-political cooperation in the EU after the Second World War, we can identify seven stages that reflect the emergence and formation of EU policy and strategy on international security. They include: search for general directions and forms of cooperation (1946-1949); rejection of supranational projects (1950-1954); the period of conceptual uncertainty (19551968); gradual revival of the dialogue on security issues (1969-1986); normativelegal and institutional definition of the sphere of security and defense cooperation (1987-1997); implementation and improvement of the institutional mechanism of European security and defense policy (EBDP, 1998 - mid-2000s); adaptation of the ESDP to the realities of the multipolar international system (since the mid-2000s)

In the process of European integration, the formation and development of a common foreign and security policy has gone through a number of stages. The first attempts at political integration within the European Community were made immediately after the creation in 1952 by six states (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) of the European Coal and Steel Community. However, the Treaty on the European Defense Community and the project of creating a European political community of six states in 1954 were not supported by the National Assembly of France. As a result, European integration focused mainly on the economic sphere, while the foreign policy sphere remained within the competence of the member states. Issues of defense and political cooperation between the countries of Western Europe during the existence of the bipolar system of international relations were resolved and implemented within the framework of the foreign policy of national states, a certain coordination of which was carried out on the basis of the participation of countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU).

The second stage in the formation of the CFSP dates back to the late 1960s - early 1970s. In December 1969, at a conference in The Hague, the heads of state and government of the EU countries made important decisions to strengthen integration, including the start of political cooperation (the Davignon Plan). On the basis of the decisions taken in 1970, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism was put into action, which provided for regular summit meetings, discussion of common political approaches to international processes, and exchange of information between representatives of the foreign ministries of the EU member states. The practical implementation of this area of activity was entrusted to the Political Committee composed of the ambassadors of the member countries.

It should also be noted that during this period in the European Communities, two approaches to creating a security system based on the EU were formed: “Europeanists” (France, Germany), who advocated the creation of additional foreign policy and defense structures in the EU; "Atlantists" (Great Britain), who traditionally focused on security issues in the United States and NATO. A new stage of European integration began in the second half of the 1980s. and was carried out in the favorable foreign policy conditions of the end of the Cold War, the dynamic development and sustainable growth of the EU economy. The Single European Act of 1986 finally formed the basis for intergovernmental cooperation in the field of foreign policy.

The Treaty on European Union (signed in February 1992, entered into force in November 1993) formalized the creation of the European Union based on three "pillars": 1) the European Communities; 2) common foreign and security policy; 3) cooperation in the field of internal affairs and justice. All three "pillars" were united by a single institutional structure. A feature of the "second pillar" (common foreign and security policy), like the third, was that the interaction of the EU member states was carried out exclusively on the basis of intergovernmental cooperation[5].

The main role in decision-making in the field of CFSP was assigned to the Council of the EU. In the second half of the 1990s - 2000s. in parallel with the deepening of integration and EU enlargement, the modernization of the CFSP was also carried out. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) clarified and detailed the mechanism for implementing the CFSP, expanded the rights of the European Commission in this area, consolidated the principle of unanimity in the decisions of the EU Council on the CFSP, introduced the post of High Representative of the EU Council for Common Foreign and Security Policy - EU Secretary General. In accordance with the agreement, a Political Committee was created, which brought together the heads of political departments of the ministries and departments of foreign affairs of the member states.

The Amsterdam Treaty also put into practice such means of implementing the CFSP as "common strategies", "advanced cooperation of a group of members". The Treaty of Nice (2001) provided for the possibility of "enhanced cooperation" in the field of common foreign and security policy, expanded the powers of the European Council in this area, extended the scope of security policy to defense issues, formulated the concept of "European Security and Defense Policy" (ESDP) , canceled the mention of the WEU as part of the development of the EU. In 2001, the permanent political and military bodies necessary for the implementation of the common foreign and security policy (Committee for Political and Security Affairs, the Military Committee of the European Union, the Military Headquarters of the European Union) were established, the deployment of military forces within the framework of the EEC was envisaged, and also civilian forces for crisis management.

The treaty establishing the EU Constitution, signed by the heads of state and government of the 25 member states in October 2004, provided for the strengthening of the legal personality of the EU, the strengthening of the role of supranational bodies and the simplification of decision-making in a number of areas. activities of the EU, including the sphere of foreign policy. An important step that strengthened the position of the EU in the international arena was the introduction of the post of EU Minister for Foreign Affairs, accountable to the European Council and the European Commission. This post combined the functions of the High Representative of the Council of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy and the member of the European Commission for External Relations, which existed earlier. The failure to ratify the EU Constitution in May-June 2005 in referendums in France and the Netherlands meant that plans for the EU to become a "supranational state" were premature [6].

Instead of the EU Constitution, the Treaty of Lisbon was signed in December 2007 amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, which entered into force in December 2009. According to the treaty, the European Union became a “legal entity” (in particular, an international legal personality implies that the EU can conclude international treaties in all areas of its competence) and became the only integration structure to which the powers of the European Community were transferred. The Lisbon Treaty redefined the objectives of the EU in the international arena: the protection of values, fundamental interests, security, independence, human rights and freedoms; consolidation and support of democracy, the rule of law and the principles of international law; maintaining peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security; promoting the integration of all countries into the world economy; support for an international system based on multilateral cooperation and global governance.

Under the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties, the European Union was to be based on three "pillars" - "pillars". The EU's Pillars, or Foundations, is a common metaphor for the European Union as a scientific work. Political science temple on three pillars. The pillars are components of the Treaty on European Union, namely: - the first "pillar" - the European Communities - the Treaties establishing the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. Covers a wide range of activities defined in the treaties: common agricultural policy, customs union and common market, economic and monetary union, etc .; - the second "pillar" - the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), defined in Section V of the EU Treaty; - The third "pillar" is cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, as defined in Chapter VI of the EU Treaty. The first "pillar" includes the areas in which the Member States have delegated the right to decide to the Community. Instead, the second and third "pillars" are mostly interstate, so decisions are made here by consensus between states.

The official document that marked the beginning of the innovation was the EU Treaty (1992 Maastricht Treaty). Given the content of previous documents (the Treaty of Rome and the EEA), the authors of the Treaty included in its content everything related to the general approach to foreign policy and security. It was assumed that the CFSP should be based on the concept of a common long-term defense policy, development of the disarmament process, arms control in Europe, as well as coordination of positions on other countries and the situation in the world as a whole. first, the protection of the common values of the Member States, the fundamental interests, the independence and the integrity of the Union; -secondly, strengthening the security of the Union and its members by all possible means; - thirdly, maintaining peace and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; international cooperation (Article 1.1, paragraph 2). The special nature of the EU CFSP / SBOP is presented in figure 2.

As of today, the hypothetical EU can deploy about 2 million military personnel, 2,500 combat units, and 800 combat troops to conduct missions. The Rapid Reaction Force can be seen as an indicator of the "military might" of the European Union. In addition to its own resources, the EU can also use NATO resources. This is provided for in the package of agreements "Berlin-Plus", adopted at the EU-NATO summit in 2002. The main thesis of the agreements is to reconcile the compatibility of ESDP and NATO actions and to eliminate possible duplication in the use of resources. The appointment of an EU representative to the post of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of NATO forces on the continent was also discussed. He also directs operations carried out within the framework of the EU. Together with the military, the civilian segment of the ESDP (police, administrative, expert structures) is actively developing. At the summit in June 2000, the EU member states took the first steps towards strengthening civilian crisis management (both at the European level and at the national level).

Over the last few years, the development of European security cooperation has acquired a fundamentally new quality - the so-called "European strategic autonomy" proclaimed in the European Union's Global Strategy (Common Vision, Joint Action: A Stronger Europe). Union ”, 2016). The new strategy is more focused on individual tasks aimed at addressing the risks and challenges that the EU may face in the future. Their order is characterized as follows: the interests of EU citizens; the principles that will guide the EU in pursuit of its interests; priorities pursued by these actions, as well as methods of implementation. The new security strategy creates an image of the European Union as a major world partner and defender of European values, while emphasizing the increasing responsibility of other 199 International law, international, regional organizations and government agencies.

Figure 2. The special nature of the EU CFSP / SBOP Source: created by author based on [7]

The proposed approach was mixed with Eastern European partner countries, as their governments feared that the United States might end its commitment to Europe's military defense. At the same time, even the most ardent supporter of European strategic autonomy, France, has given a clear signal that the North Atlantic Alliance must continue to be the main guarantor of European security. Although strategic autonomy is understood differently in EU Member States, the common approach remains to work with partners when not possible and on their own when needed. European strategic autonomy involves cooperation in political, economic, humanitarian, military and other important areas, among which security and defense are the most sensitive. Therefore, gaining more effective strategic autonomy in this area is a key factor in the perception of the EU as an equal geopolitical guarantor of international security.

A key prerogative of European strategic autonomy in the field of security and defense is the ability to decide on the deployment of forces, including when American and European interests do not coincide. Therefore, the construction of the declared strategic autonomy should take into account the need to create institutions and governance structures that will allow EU member states and European NATO member states to identify common priorities and directions for the development of security and defense. However, the above political and institutional dimensions of the European security system are the most heated debates due to the differing understanding of the political leadership of a number of European states of threats to national interests.

In this regard, according to a number of researchers, the EU faces not only a lack of supply capacity, but also a problem of demand due to "chronic reluctance of most EU member states to act in the event of a crisis." The problem of "demand" is not due to the lack of organizations or formats that would allow it to form: the EU and NATO already have a wide range of political, legal and institutional instruments in the field of security and defense. However, European countries often create a number of other formats with diametrically different goals, which leads to reduced efficiency and dispersion of decision-making processes. On the other hand, the need to harmonize all key documents by EU member states (unanimity principle) often leads to unjustified delays. Most researchers believe that the potential of the relevant mechanisms enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty (2007) needs to be used more widely to enhance the role and fulfillment of responsibilities as a guarantor of European security[8].

It states that the Common Security and Defense Policy must be an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It must provide the Union with operational capabilities involving civilian and military assets. The Union may use them during missions outside its borders to maintain peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter ''(Article 28, paragraph 49 of the Agreement). In addition, the Treaty contains provisions on mutual assistance (Article 42.7) and provisions on solidarity in the event of terrorist threats or catastrophes (Article 222). Provisions for permanent structured cooperation between its members in the field of security and defense (Article 42.6 and Protocol 10) are extremely important, as well as the possibility to delegate CSDP missions to a group of states under the EU common flag (Article 44).

The current debate on EU-NATO cooperation is conducted in two main areas: - examining Europe's commitment to strategic autonomy through the prism of competition with NATO; - affirming the different roles, commitments and mandates of the EU and NATO, which makes any competition impossible. Obviously, the truth must be sought at the intersection of two theories - the possibilities of strategic partnership are quite significant, but NATO must continue to be somewhat "Europeanized" to effectively ensure the process of strategic autonomy.

In addition, the United States has rightly criticized the Alliance in the context of a fairer distribution of the organization's funding burden. This has raised concerns in Europe about further US security guarantees and the search for models for hedging potential risks. One option for a relevant European policy is to declare NATO's enduring value, while another involves building its own defense capabilities. While strategic autonomy in the field of security and defense remains a desirable rather than a mandatory component of EU security policy, increasing the EU's economic potential can lead to increased opportunities to overcome crises and conflicts without the use of military force. More effective tools in the form of diplomatic cooperation, the use of trade and investment mechanisms, visa policy, etc. can be used for this purpose.

As strategic autonomy makes it possible to limit the economic influence of other states on the EU (for example, Russia by restricting energy supplies, China by direct investment or the United States by extraterritoriality of its financial sanctions), multipolar competition can become an incentive for European security. policy. The European Union is not a supranational state, and therefore the expectations from its security policy should not fully coincide with the standards applied in the practice of international relations with respect to individual leading states. It is this approach that will provide additional opportunities for pooling EU assets in terms of actors, mechanisms and formats of European security cooperation.

Among the main problems that the European Union is experiencing in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the following can be singled out, firstly, the reluctance of a number of countries to deepen cooperation in the defense sphere. Secondly, the difference in approaches between individual EU countries on the issue of the prospects for the development of the defense component (development of an autonomous system or reliance on NATO capabilities). The pro-Atlantic EU members are in favor of the option with NATO, while in France and Germany ideas are being discussed about the possible transformation of NATO from a militarypolitical organization into a political one, which would undoubtedly give impetus to the development of the European defense component within the European Union, but without US involvement. Thirdly, the divergence of EU members on the issue of the foreign policy pursued by the United States and the use of forceful methods. Fourthly, the dissatisfaction of the small EU countries with the dictatorship of Paris and Berlin and, as a result, their orientation towards Washington, which also hinders the development of the European security and defense policy.

Speaking about the future of the CFSP, there are several main points. First, apparently despite the many difficulties in this process, this area will continue to develop. This process will be difficult and hardly quick. Secondly, in connection with the expansion of the European Union and, as a result, the strengthening of the pro- American pole within the EU, preference will be given to the development of a NATO-oriented defense component, but the development of autonomous European security and defense structures is not ruled out. Thirdly, it is likely that a number of EU countries that are more resolute in deepening the integration process (France, Germany, etc.) will create joint elements of a common defense without the participation of other EU members. Fourth, it is quite possible to further increase the role of the EU in a number of regions of the world. This is due to the fact that the American administration, pursuing its foreign policy line, may soon provoke a number of new conflicts, not only in the Middle East, but also in the Middle and Far East. This will lead to the fact that US attention to other regions of the world may be weakened, which the EU can take advantage of [9].

european security policy foreign

Conclusion

To conclude with, it is necessary to mention that the presentation of the EU Security Strategy was an application for a strategic vision, backed by real rapid reaction forces. The absorption of EU structures and the incorporation of security-free guarantees into EU structures are a testament to the process of building a European security identity. This is the situation with the duplication of security systems between the European and Euro-Atlantic ones. Most EU countries acknowledge the dominance and indisputability of NATO's leadership in the security environment of the region, but a minority of countries openly criticize the security situation and build up the situation.

Thus, over the last 20 years, political and institutional changes in the EU have created the preconditions for a new perception of the concept of a "purely European" security space. The development of the concept of European security is characterized by an integrated approach, the identification of qualitatively new threats and at the same time emphasizes the recognition of common values for European countries.

1. Whereas in the past the EU countries relied entirely on NATO's political and defense mechanism and the OSCE and UN political mechanism, security issues have recently become more relevant to European policy and become an "internal priority" of the European Union. The EU's concern for its own security, the creation of an appropriate system and its organization was realized in an effort to intensify the Common Foreign and Security Policy. However, since its inception, the CFSP has proved to be an ineffective political, legal and institutional mechanism. Therefore, in 1999, the European Union launched a new, more successful initiative called European Security and Defense Policy. It should be noted that the area of soft security, ie post-conflict settlement and assistance in civilian management, is currently the most successful and best-functioning element of the ESDP. The field of military settlement is still ambiguously perceived by the majority of EU member states and has many obstacles to achieving effective functioning.

2. The European Union is persistently and gradually approaching the possibility of influencing the solution of European and international security problems. Over the last decade, the EU has managed to significantly develop its military component as an important part of the ESDP. In particular, the creation and development of military contingents have allowed the European Union to undertake peacekeeping missions both on the European continent and beyond. 3. The intensification of EU efforts in the field of foreign and security policy was due to the EU's inability to resolve the conflict in the Balkans, awareness of its own military technological backwardness, understanding of changes in the content and scale of threats and recognition of the need to respond. This has led to conceptual changes in European security policy and the emergence of initiatives to create their own European military instruments to influence world politics (within the so-called "tight security").

4. Over the last decade, the EU has conducted 23 civilian missions and military operations on three continents. These include, in particular: peacekeeping operations following the tsunami in Aceh (Indonesia); refugee protection in Chad; the fight against piracy in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. This shows that the EU's role as a security player is becoming more tangible. As of November 2010, the EU is conducting thirteen military and civilian missions simultaneously in 4 regions of the world: on the European continent (Balkans, Moldova / Ukraine), the Middle East, Asia and Africa. In addition, 11 military and civilian operations were completed in the Balkans, the South Caucasus, Asia and Africa. The EU uses NATO material and technical resources in its operations. Thus, we can talk about complementary efforts and mutually beneficial cooperation between the EU and NATO.

5. In the EU, the priority of further development of the ESDP is not the quantitative increase of indicators, but the qualitative realization of capacity in this area, which, in turn, puts before the EU member states the following tasks: reaching consensus in all aspects of common security and defense policy; development and mastering of a new methodology of crisis management; effective use of opportunities for international cooperation; strengthening the defense industry and military technology.

6. Motivation to improve national security, stabilize internal and external situations, reduce dependence and further break free from Russian influence, and a number of other reasons force Ukraine to be more active in foreign and security policy. The overall process of integration into the EU involves appropriate changes in all areas and spheres, including security, so further participation in the CFSP should have a positive impact on the position of our country in the security dimension of Europe's geopolitical space. Achieving this goal is possible only if all political forces, the government and the president have a common interest in improving the geopolitical position of our country both in Europe and in the international arena.

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Література

1. Холявко Н., Попова Л., Марич М., Ганжуренко І., Коляденко С. Ниценко В. Комплексний методичний підхід до оцінювання впливу дослідницької компоненти на розвиток інформаційної економіки. 2020. № 4 (178). C. 192-199.

2. Коданева С.И. “Гибридные угрозы” безопасности России: выявление и противодействия. 2020. 13(2).С. 44-71

3. Yi Y., Meng M., Wei Z. Bottom-up learning, strategic flexibility and strategic change. Journal of Organizational Change Management.2017.№ 30 (2).P. 161-183.

4. Каретна О.Ю. Теоретичний аналіз інтеракції влади і громадянського суспільства та їх прояви в українському суспільстві. Актуальні проблеми політики. 2019. № 63. С. 48-59.

5. Baharun R., Jing Mi T., Streimikiene D., Mardani A., Shakeel J. Innovation in healthcare performance among private brand's healthcare services in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Acta Polytechnica Hungarica.2019.№ 16(5). P. 151-172.

6. Awwad M. Influences of Frege's Predicate Logic on Some Computational Models. Future Human Image.2018.№ 9.P. 5-19.

7. Lebedeva M.M., Kharkevich M.V., Zinov'eva E.S., Koposova E.N. Arkhaizatsiya gosudarstva: rol' sovremennykh informatsionnykh tekhnologii [Archaization of a State: the Role of Modern Information Technologies. Polis. Political Studies. 2016. № 6. P. 22-36.

8. Breznik K. Knowledge Management - from its Inception to the Innovation Linkage. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences.2018. P. 141-148.

9. Yi Y., Meng M., Wei Z. Bottom-up learning, strategic flexibility and strategic change. Journal of Organizational Change Management. 2017. №30 (2), С.161-183.

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