Flag of Romania: visual-semantic and social-political parallels

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Flag of Romania: visual-semantic and social-political parallels

Y. Romanenko, Dr of Science (Sociology), Prof. Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine

Flag of Romania: visual-semantic and social-political parallels

The article on the basis of colorful semantics as one of the modern effective tools for revealing the ethnic identities of states, which allows to reveal implicit manifestations of their geopolitical orientation and influence on them of different cultural systems and societies, analyzes the Romanian flag. The analysis concludes that the macro-identity of Romania as a state containing elements of other cultural systems, political and legal institutions can be characterized as diffuse. Attention is drawn to the fact that Romania, which is a member state of the EU, however, is facing problems not quite typical for Europe. The article reveals how the figurative and colorful components of Romania's national flag are related to its political history and the diffusion of macroidentity that has emerged under the influence of various actors of external influences.

Introduction

Color semantics is one of the modern effective tools for identifying the ethnic identities of states, which allows revealing the implicit manifestations of their geopolitical orientation and the impact on them of different cultural systems and societies. The macroidentity of the state, which contains elements of other cultural systems, political and legal institutions, can be characterized as diffuse. However, these countries include Romania, which is an EU member state, however, faces not exactly typical European problems. The article reveals how the figurative and colorful components of Romania's national flag are related to its political history and the diffusion of macro-identity that has developed under the influence of different invading states.

Fundamentals of color semantics are explored in the works of M. Lusher, L. Sobchik, and Y. Romanenko. These authors explore the value of basic colors in their projection to understand different identities, which allows them to reveal their meanings and determine the peculiarities of behavioral strategies. Romania as a society with a certain identity and political history is analyzed in the works of O. Branitsky, S. Grigorishin, J. Grishin, I. Iliescu, I. Pop and L. Bolovan, L. Spatkay [1-10]. Most of these authors conclude that, in terms of its macro identity, Romania remains a fragmented society with a tendency to accept and influence foreign states with their ideologies and political strategies.

The purpose of the article is to build a descriptive characterization of the relationship between the figurative and colorful elements of Romania's national flag and the features of its diffuse macro-identity, influenced by Germany, Austria, Hungary and Russia.

Visual-analitic interpretation Flag of Romania. The national flag of Romania is a tricolor with dark blue, yellow and red stripes located from left to right. The past of the country is assessed as self-directed (concentric) with a prevailing tendency towards cultural, socio-economic and political stagnation (we are talking about the stagnant provincialism that prevailed in Romania before the revolution of 1821 [9, р. 305].

The measurement of the present tense is associated with demonstrativeness (easy assimilation into different roles (which corresponds to diffusion and fragmentation of identity - see the table "Identity Inversions" in Section 1) when striving to receive positive mirroring signals from the geopolitical environment, as well as dependence on environmental influences, and extrovertively-directed intercultural communication, political orientations towards Europeanism, which is combined with inconsistency, arbitrariness and increased authoritarianism of the political leadership country

It is worth paying attention to the pronounced similarity of the scarcity and diffuseness of macroidentity in Romania and Ukraine, as well as to the fact that this combination of yellow and blue in the state attributes is accompanied by this deficiency (the Ukrainian flag has yellow and blue stripes, the Romanian coat of arms shows the image of a yellow eagle on blue background).

L. Sobchik, in his study of the Luscher MVS, rightly notes that "the combination of yellow and blue reveals a pronounced sensitivity to environmental influences due to the fact that each color individually is in its own way associated with high sensitivity to external factors" [8, p. 39].

Anticipating possible objections to the fundamental differences between blue and blue, we note that their differentiation is associated with a concomitant increase in the intellectual and mental components in subjects who prefer blue.

The blue color corresponds to the type of individual and group (ethnic) psyche, which expresses a tendency to maintain inner peace and stability while minimizing the number of environmental stimuli. For the state, the predominance of blue in state attributes accompanies a policy of isolationism, autarchy and ethnocentric selfdirection, rather a position of social and geopolitical neutrality than a tendency to create alliances. These features express weak resistance to various stressors, and therefore the blue color characterizes the state of the emotional sphere rather than thinking [8, p. 39; 5, p. 26-46].

And the reason for the "yellow-blue" problem lies in the fact that the mental function is placed at the service of unstable emotionality, which generally corresponds to a carrier of changeable, vacillating, prone to frequent changes in identity preferences. The mental function "in blue" "serves" this emotionality "in yellow" in the context of the search for intellectual reasons for political decisions, often taken to suit personal needs, whims of family members, situational wishes of the environment of the political leadership, etc.

The red color that follows blue and yellow, in its meanings, coincides with inconsistent aggression and ethnic expansion, belated attempts to revive the empire in the framework of the Romanian project, which provides for the absorption of Moldova and other neighboring territories.

Also, Romania as "woman-society", in tune with the choice of color preferences in state attributes, has a cycloid type of "personality with a tendency to mood swings, easily provoked by external causes, with quick transitions from sadness to exalted gaiety, experiencing great loneliness, experiencing an increased need for communication, which makes a society-person dependent on an authoritative person for her and the opinion of the reference group" [7, p. 39].

There is practically no time left for development in such a community and state, because the fluctuating emotionality (once again, on an individual, individual, and collective societal, ethnic scale) does not know the time, or rather, does not even want to know it. Emotionality in most cases is either "above time", i.e. in fact, beyond reality in the realm of imagination, or "under time," which corresponds to a plant- animal method of adaptation (for the state, an agrocentric feudal society). Corruption of the feudal patriciate here reaches an extremum point, which is fully consistent with Romanian realities [7, p. 148].

The inability to break the intergenerational chain of continuity with the Ceausescu regime is combined in Romanian society with dissatisfaction with the facts of corruption and episodically flashing scandals. On the other hand, constant indulgences to corrupt officials, incomplete lustration processes and the interference of EU emissaries in them indicate the limited state sovereignty due to the weak ability of the titular ethnic group (Romanians) to fulfill a state-forming function and ensure the maintenance of institutional forms of political domination (both in Ukraine and in Romania functions, as yet, the familialist quasi-feudal oligarchies with limited state sovereignty).

In Romania, not so long ago, in February-March 2017, mass protests took place, the cause of which was all the same corruption. The reason for the action was the adoption by the Romanian government of a decree amnestying officials who committed corruption offenses in the amount of less than 48 thousand dollars.

The protesters were sure that the authorities were adjusting the criminal code to their own interests. Moreover, it was the current ruling party that, according to experts, was most affected by the fight against corruption, which had begun by its predecessors. The innovation, according to the protesters, would have avoided the responsibility of thousands of politicians. Obvious benefit would be received by the head of the ruling Social Democratic Party, who was accused of abuse of power [10].

This scarcity and diffuseness are accompanied, on the one hand, by a flexible adjustment to the situational geopolitical conjuncture, on the other hand, by a tendency to ideological eclecticism and confusion of value orientations, expressed by the Romanian elite's attempts to "combine incongruous".

In the history of Romania there are many examples confirming this thesis. They relate to the expressed desire of Romanian politicians to uphold Romanian nationalism, yielding, at the same time, to open collaboration with external centers of power, "caving in" under these centers in the name of self-preservation [1; 2, p. 37-49].

External influences and diffusion Romania's croidentity. So, the Romanian prince Cuza abdicated the throne in 1866 in favor of Karl from the Hohenzollern- Zigmarinen dynasty, which predetermined the Catholicization and Germanization of Romania until 1947. The short period of triumph of the ethnic authenticity of the dictatorship of Jelea Codreanu and Antonescu was replaced by another historical mimicry under the Stalinist socialism of G. Deja and N. Ceausescu, who sought to introduce, in Romania, the Romanian historian C. Pop, "an ideological mixture of primitive communism with romantic nationalism" . [5; 9, p. 305].

The disgraced oppositionist A. Pauker, who managed to legitimize the admission to the Communist Party of Romania of the former members of the Iron Cross Antonescu, proved to be similar to the "Orthodox" Stalinists, which, of course, not only confirmed her own unprincipledness, but also demonstrated the manifestation of this mental peculiarity among Romanians[1; 2, p. 37-49].

The familialist model of the organization of political power in Romania, whose odious features during the Ceausescu dictatorship became most apparent after the dictator's spouse's favor, E. Ceausescu, was incompatible with ideological orthodoxy. For Romanian society, this has repeatedly led to repressions and the establishment of the regime of a familialist dictatorship. Neither Karol II with Mihai I, nor Antonescu with his son, nor Ceausescu with his wife represent an exception [3; 4, p. 20-56].

If a community is culturally heterogeneous, then there is the problem of creating authentic and holistic structures of higher censorship. Since the process of formation of these structures can take time, and their absence or underdevelopment in the cultural system can be fatal for the community (in particular, in terms of the implementation of border-forming and state-forming functions), the community itself, in order to avoid decay and overcome centrifugal tendencies, resort to the import of censorship (axiostases of higher levels of the cultural system) from other societies [7, 5].

With regard to Romania and Ukraine, the experience of such imports took place not only due to the long occupation, but also the presence of ethno-contact zones with the presence of non-assimilated (semi-assimilated) ethnic minorities. In Ukraine, we are talking about the Russianspeaking population (not necessarily Russian), the Crimean Tatars, in Romania - the North Transylvanian Hungarians, Banat Serbs, Moldavians.

Imported censorship as the highest, in relation to thinking, structural level of management of society and the psyche, forms a parallel world of axiostases that are incompatible with the real life of society, which allowed itself such an "implementation". This means that all the higher levels of the cultural system are filled with the contents of the culture of another society. In the case of Romania, it is, in particular, Germany, in the case of Ukraine - Poland, Austria-Hungary and Russia. So, the world of censorship parallel to reality (that is, the contents of "culture in culture" and "society in culture") controls thinking contrary to the authentic collective unconscious, which is suppressed in favor of imported censorship. The "answer" of the unconscious to the development of censorship standards that contradict instincts, needs and requirements, is the development of pseudo-standards. Thinking in the conflict between imported censorship and the unconscious is split, i.e. becomes compelled to follow double standards. It is, in particular, about the obvious standards of imported censorship and non-obvious (un-articulated) standards of authentic (but crowded out into the collective unconscious) censorship. Unhappy thinking must agree with alien censorship contents "from above" and verbally articulate support for these contents and, at the same time, adapt to the requirements of the collective unconscious. The latter implements its own queries in a roundabout way, forming, like censorship, a parallel shadow world. This shadow world in Ukraine and Romania is what corresponds to the social reality of these communities. At the same time, the Euro- American standards of public democracy and civil society, a market economy are predominantly censorship constructs artificially imposed due to the inability of intellectual and political elites to form authentic censorship.

Conclusions

In the diffusion / fragmentation of the identity of Romania, three vectors are distinctly traced: pro- German-Austrian, pro-Soviet and pro-American. Confirmation of the thesis about fragmented macroidentity can be obtained, inter alia, by analyzing the composition of the Romanian coat of arms, in which there are five coats of arms of historical provinces: Wallachia, Moldova,

Transylvania, Dobrudja and Banat. The pronounced cultural and religious "disaccordances" between the Orthodox Wallachia, the Catholic-Calvinist Transylvania with the Hungarian ethnic minority, the Bulgarian-Ukrainian-Russian Dobrudja, the Serbo-Romanian Banat and the slowly Romanized, but still not wishing to completely lose their sovereignty Moldova, give reason to conditionally centralized states with high ethnocultural heterogeneity. Ethnocultural heterogeneity in some cases becomes one of the factors of corruption, which also shows the example of Ukraine, the coloristic attributes of its identity are also presented in yellow and blue tones. At the risk of seeming intrusive, the author, nevertheless, considers once again to note that the connection between corruption and the diffusion / fragmentation of identity as a product of foreign cultural influences is quite clearly expressed in the history of the two states. Permeable boundaries of identity lead in practice to the loss of internal sovereignty, which is accompanied by collaboration of elites with external centers of geopolitical influence and the socio-historical infantility of the titular ethnic group, condoning corruption precisely because of religious and moral defects. Therefore, the phenomenon of "betrayal of the elites", which occurs both in Ukraine and in Romania, with renewed attempts to blame the "betrayal" on the elites, portraying the people as a "victim of betrayal", seems scientifically untenable.

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