China’s belt and road initiative: opportunities and challenges for Georgia

One way to explain China's hesitance in this regard is Beijing's continued scepticism of the viability of the “Middle Corridor”. As Mardell argues, “it may be the shortest route between Europe and China, but the middle corridor involves crossing five borders and transiting one or two seas, depending on where the cargo's heading” (Mardell, 2019). This means dealing with several different languages, cultures, and legal systems, which makes navigating customs procedures even more difficult. As a result, it is difficult for the “Middle Corridor” to “compete with the `main overland route through Russia'”, which remains an easier, and cheaper way to transport goods between China and Europe (Mardell, 2019).

As already mentioned above, the key here is Beijing's interest in diversifying its transport routes. In the words of Russia's President Vladimir Putin, at present China and Russia enjoy “an unprecedented level” of bilateral partnership and cooperation In the past few years alone, the two countries have signed agreements worth billions in US dollars, such as the $400 billion gas supply deal between Russia and China signed in 2014, for instance (Anishchuk, 2014).. The two leaders - President Putin and China's Xi Jinping - “have met nearly 30 times” since Xi assumed power in 2013 and the latter has previously described Putin as his “best friend and colleague” (As Relations With U.S. Sour, Xi Describes Putin As `Best Friend' At Moscow Meeting). However, as Revaz Topuria points out, “here an important issue at play is the issue of trust. How much these two countries - China and Russia - actually trust each other” (author's interview, 16 July 2020). Many have cast doubt over how long this seemingly good relationship between these two powerful and ambitious leaders might last (see: Putin and Xi: Not Quite the Allies They Seem). “I think this is temporary”, argues Topuria, “until one of them becomes strong enough to show the other its real power and influence So, there are several reasons why China does not want to be dependent solely on Russia” (author's interview, 16 July 2020). According to another Georgian analyst, China is also concerned about Moscow's strained relations with its neighbours, especially Ukraine, but also its occasional disputes with Belarus and the Baltic states. “Apart from that, an alternative railway route would become an important bargaining chip for China in its tariff negotiations with Russian Railways” (David Avalishvili cited in: Menabde, 2016). Similarly, Moscow is also suspicious of China and sees growing Chinese influence in Russia, especially in its Far East, as a threat. As one government official in Georgia noted, “in one way they have a perfect relationship but if you zoom-in, long-term, China can be a problem for Russia. China can `swallow' Russia together with its far East” (author's interview, 5 July 2020).

Thus, the main appeal of the “Middle Corridor” for China “is that it bypasses Russia”. However, while “Beijing likes to build redundancies into global trade networks” and probably views the “Middle Corridor” as “an insurance policy .... should problems arise along the Northern Corridor”, this project does not seem to be at the top of its current “list of priorities” (Mardell, 2019). So, despite strong Chinese interest and support at the rhetorical level, some suspect that Beijing might be “playing something of a waiting game”. Thus, at present, as Mardell notes, “the Middle Corridor remains a firmly regional initiative” and “faces serious obstacles to becoming an alternative China-EU route” (Mardell, 2019).

Anaklia: A Geopolitical Conundrum?

The future prospects of this route were further questioned last year when the termination of the ADC's contract was announced, putting the construction of the Black Sea Deep Water Port in Anaklia under threat (Georgian Gov't Cancels Anaklia Development Consortium Contract for Construction of Deep Sea Port on Black Sea Coast). However, this time, the decision was down to the Georgian government rather than reluctance from the Chinese counterparts.

From the very start, Anaklia project has been marred with controversy and has turned into a geopolitical conundrum involving the China, US, Russia triangle. When the Georgian government first announced its plans to build port in Anaklia, it opened doors to both Georgian and international investors. 12 companies participated in the tender, and from seven longlisted ones, two were shortlisted in June 2015: the above-mentioned ADC and Power China-Hubei Hongyuan Power Engineering Company, Ltd. (Chinese Power Company Front-Runner in Anaklia Port Project). The latter - “one of the largest Chinese state companies”, had an estimated wealth of $70.4 billion in 2015 and was employing some 200,000 people worldwide. It was widely considered to be the front-runner and was tipped to be the favourite to win the tender (Menabde, 2015). At the time Georgia's Prime Minister Garibashvili even held high profile meetings with the company officials (Chinese Power Company Front-Runner in Anaklia Port Project).

Indeed, for many, having a Chinese government backed company take charge of the construction of this project seemed like an obvious choice. As one analyst explained, “China was considered the preferred partner because the construction of the port in Anaklia would explicitly be part of Beijing's new `Silk Road' trans-Eurasian transit development policy” (Menabde, 2016). Others believed that “only a power as strong as China” would be able to protect the project from any Russian interference. After all, Russian military, stationed in Abkhazia, are within several kilometers away from Anaklia, and were always deemed a threat to the completion of the project. China's involvement might have somewhat deterred Russians. As journalist Zurab Gogoberidze noted, “Moscow still takes China's position into consideration, when it attempts foreign policy gambles” (cited in: Menabde, 2015). Thus, it came as a huge surprise to many when in 2016, “[a]fter a long period of negotiations”, it was the ADC that was announced as the winner of the tender, not Power China (Menabde, 2016).

At the time, some were already predicting that “without Beijing's direct involvement” it would be difficult to complete the Anaklia project. As one Georgian economist noted, “[t]he transportation infrastructure in Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and in Kazakhstan will not be able to carry 100 million tons of goods per year. For example, Georgian railways cannot service such throughput. These problems could have been solved only with significant interest from and active participation of the Chinese state. Yet the Georgian government made another decision” (Giorgi Khukhashvili cited in: Menabde, 2016). At this point we can only speculate whether China's enthusiasm, and engagement with the “Middle Corridor” might have been different had it been granted access to the Anaklia project.

Similarly, while it is hard to confirm this information, many have long suspected some kind of US involvement in the Georgian government's decision to reject the Chinese bid in favour of a consortium with an American partner - Conti Group International. “In general, the fact that the US is not thrilled about the BRI is well known”, notes Revaz Topuria, “but the US cannot go against us signing free trade agreements [and developing economic ties] with other, big countries and think that this is a bad thing because this is clearly a good thing” (author's interview, 16 July 2020). But Georgia of course remains conscious of the considerations of its most valuable strategic partner - The United States. As one Georgian official noted, Americans consider China as the main strategic opponent nowadays and they also confirm this rather openly. For them, “Russia is a tactical problem, but China is a geopolitical and strategic (geo-strategic) problem. ... So, whether we want or not we have to take this into consideration. It might be that it actually is indeed beneficial for Georgia to attract Chinese investment and actually it might even be that it does not even pose that much threat but you just have to take into account the interests of your strategic partners” (author's interview, 5 July 2020).

While the Chinese companies might have missed out in participating in the construction of the Anaklia port, it seems both in the Chinese and American interests to successfully see this project through. With China, the benefits of having another sea route available via Georgia have already been outlined above, but with the US, one of the main interests in this project might be security related and linked “to the existing disbalance with Russia” (Glurjidze & Dzamukashvili, 2020). In recent years, NATO and Georgia have been conducting some military exercises in Poti. However, currently, Poti port does not have “adequate capacity to accommodate large vessels”. In this way, as some point out, “the much larger Anaklia deep-sea port” could play “a pivotal role for the development of these military activities, further enhancing the country's strategic significance for NATO” (Glurjidze & Dzamukashvili, 2020; see also: Menabde, 2019a; Daly, 2020). The US has also been vocal in support of this project. As the US Secretary of State stated in June 2019, “[t]hese and other projects will strengthen Georgia's relations with countries with market economies and avoid the danger of becoming a victim of the economic influence of Russia and China. These imaginary friends do not care about the interests of Georgia” (Georgian Gov't Cancels Anaklia Development Consortium Contract for Construction of Deep Sea Port on Black Sea Coast).

So why did Georgia suddenly put breaks on the project which could potentially have such important economic and security implications for the country? Some have argued that it has to do with “economic corruption” and the in-fight among different political groupings and business interests in Georgia (Daly, 2020; see also: Menabde, 2019b). Former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, In office in 2012-13. Billionaire Ivanishvili is Georgia's richest man. He is a prominent businessman and philanthropist who founded the current ruling party of Georgia - the Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia party in 2012 (Ex-PM Ivanishvili to Chair Georgian Dream Party). He served as the chairman of the party in 2018-21. who many have dubbed as the “informal”/ “de facto ruler” of the country, has been engulfed in a bitter personal rivalry with Mamuka Khazaradze - founder of the ADC, and this has been reflected on the developments surrounding the Anaklia project too. This affair, labelled as the “millionaire vs billionaire” of the Georgian politics, has gripped the country after charges of money laundering of $17 million were brought against Khazaradze and his Deputy in 2019 (Lomsadze, 2019a). Many have labelled the charges as manufactured and “politically motivated” (Zalinger, 2020). Since then, Khazaradze has even founded a political party - Lelo for Georgia, and plans to challenge Ivanishvili's ruling party (Georgian Gov't Cancels Anaklia Development Consortium Contract for Construction of Deep Sea Port on Black Sea Coast).

However, others have claimed that developments in Anaklia also might have something to do with the Georgian government trying to appease the Kremlin. In fact, some have even called Russia “[t]he main foreign enemy of the Anaklia project” (Georgian Gov't Cancels Anaklia Development Consortium Contract for Construction of Deep Sea Port on Black Sea Coast). Indeed, Moscow has never shied away from stating “that it does not like the idea of the construction of a port in Anaklia” and that it “is not in its interests” (Georgian Gov't Cancels Anaklia Development Consortium Contract for Construction of Deep Sea Port on Black Sea Coast; see also: Menabde, 2019b, Daly, 2020). For the Kremlin, any US/NATO-Georgia rapprochement is perceived as a threat and by default, a US-supported project is also viewed as such. If completed, the port in Anaklia could have capacity to host US and NATO “warships” and “US submarines”, which Kremlin sees “as a geopolitical threat”. Besides, Anaklia's proximity to the Russia- backed Abkhazia poses further threats to Moscow's interests in the region (Georgian Gov't Cancels Anaklia Development Consortium Contract for Construction of Deep Sea Port on Black Sea Coast). Many in Georgia consider that if successful, Anaklia port would bring much needed economic prosperity to the region and could even act as a “pull factor to attract the estranged Abkhazians closer to Georgians and possibly build bridges between the communities” (Rukhadze, 2015).

Moreover, as mentioned above, such a port in Anaklia poses threat to Russia's economic interests too. It will serve as a serious competition to the Russian Black Sea ports for transporting Asian goods to European markets as well as potentially threatening Russian rail cargo transportation routes too (Georgian Gov't Cancels Anaklia Development Consortium Contract for Construction of Deep Sea Port on Black Sea Coast). Thus, many in Georgia's opposition parties have voiced concerns and have accused Ivanishvili and the Georgian government of “completing] the Kremlin's task” by cancelling the ADC's contract (Khazaradze cited in: Georgian Gov't Cancels Anaklia Development Consortium Contract for Construction of Deep Sea Port on Black Sea Coast). Among others, Giorgi Kandelaki, a member of the European Georgia Party has argued that “[t]here are only two governments in the world that oppose the Anaklia project. This is the Georgian government - which says one thing, but actually undermines the project, and the second - the Russian government” (Georgian Gov't Cancels Anaklia Development Consortium Contract for Construction of Deep Sea Port on Black Sea Coast) In fact, this would not be the first time Moscow has attempted “to influence strategically important infrastructure projects in the South Caucasus” (Menabde, 2019a). In 2019, Russia signed a tripartite cooperation memorandum with Azerbaijan and Turkey in Ankara which could potentially significantly transform the BTK railway project (Menabde, 2019a). Given the BTK “was initially meant to facilitate bypassing the Russian Trans-Siberian route” and is viewed as one of its competitor routes, the signing of this memorandum and Georgia's exclusion from it understandably raised concerns in Tbilisi (Garibov, 2019). While Georgia is not opposed to transporting Russian cargo to Turkey through its territory (it already acts as a transit route between Russia and Armenia), it was not happy about “being sidelined in the important decisions regarding the [BTK] project”. Moreover, of particular concern to Tbilisi was Moscow's proposal to construct a new gauge rail line from the Georgian border to Kars, Turkey. At present, “the transition from the broad gauge to the standard European gauge (1,435 mm), which is used in Turkey, is done in Ahalkalaki [Georgia]” and requires a stop at the Georgian- Turkish border (Garibov, 2019)..

It has to be noted that the competition in the region for the best and most viable land or sea routes means that Anaklia project is not in the interests of Georgia's other powerful neighbour Turkey either. The project would undoubtedly compete with other ports in Turkey too and would weaken its standing in the Black Sea (Georgian Gov't Cancels Anaklia Development Consortium Contract for Construction of Deep Sea Port on Black Sea Coast). Currently, Georgia-bound “larger panamax size vessels” are dependent on other ports, mainly Istanbul, where they “are reloaded to feeder ships” before making their way to Poti and Batumi (Govt Selects Two Final Bidders for Anaklia Deep-Sea Port). Thus, the Anaklia project is largely viewed as “a Georgian-American project” and the US is seen as “the largest international lobbyist and supporter of this project” (Georgian Gov't Cancels Anaklia Development Consortium Contract for Construction of Deep Sea Port on Black Sea Coast).

In September 2020 it was further revealed that the ADC and Bob Meyer - one of the major foreign investors in the project have filed independent arbitration claims against the Georgian government “over their infringed rights in the Anaklia Port project” (Anaklia Development Consortium: Gov't Reneged on Support for Port Project, Wiping out Economic Benefits for Georgia). This is likely to further deter any other new investors from the Anaklia project (Zalinger, 2020). In any case, whether it is Georgia's internal “political squabbling” or the invisible hand of Russia that is threatening to sabotage a project of such strategic importance, many agree that it is damaging Georgia's international reputation and is undermining the country's security (Zalinger, 2020; see also: Will Georgia still build the ambitious Anaklia port? New tender in the works) The Georgian government has recently announced that they will be re-starting the selection process for a new investor for the Anaklia port project in the near future (PM Garibashvili: 'we will start selecting new potential investor for Anaklia Deep Sea Port project in near future')..

Conclusions

Many have been sceptical from the very start about the aims and objectives, and the viability of the BRI considering it “unrealistic and over-ambitious” and as some would argue, “over time some of the predictable and also less predictable signs of that have already started showing”. In other words, for many analysts, whether in Georgia or abroad, the BRI remains largely “more like a communist propaganda tool” directed mainly at domestic audiences and used to assert China's place globally (author's interview with Revaz Topuria, 16 July 2020). So where does this leave Georgia and its ambitious plans to become a key “regional logistics hub” and play a vital role in the BRI?

As many have pointed out there is “a strong sense of competition between participating states” along the “Middle Corridor” route (Mardell, 2019). Whether it's Georgia or Azerbaijan, officials are quick to point out their respective countries achievements, highlight their desirable geographic location and their efforts to build better infrastructure and offer best business environment. However, “the race” to be the best is not necessarily bad and it can work in the advantage of the entire region (Mardell, 2019). Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that while an important player in Asia and the wider world, when it comes to Europe- Asia trade, China is not the only player. As Mardell (2019) notes, “[b]ecause of a persistent global obsession with the BRI, stories about East-West connectivity often choose China as their main protagonist, but there are other markets and producers out there”. In other words, “Trans-Caspian traffic can still flow without support from Beijing. ... China is big, and the BRI is important, but there's a lot going on in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia besides Beijing-sponsored initiatives” (Mardell, 2019). Georgia has a potential to play a significant role in the US trade with the entire Caucasus region and Central Asia too. In 2017, for instance, 61% of the US-Central Asia trade balance was transited through Georgia (mainly through ports). This accounted to overall 1 billion USD of US exports to Central Asia. Georgia also accounts to an “almost 100% transit share” of US exports to the Caucasus, equalling 0.8 billion USD in 2017 (Bochorishvili, 2020).

There is no doubt that Georgia should continue its efforts to strengthen economic ties with China but at the same time, it cannot count on China's change of heart, or fortunes, in prioritising the “Middle Corridor” over other routes. Thus, it needs to be on the lookout for other options too in order to maximise its transit/logistics hub potential.

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