Collision trends in the bilateral relations of Egypt and Ethiopia during the last decade

Размещено на http://www.allbest.ru/

Odesa I. I. Mechnikov National University,

Department of International Relations

Collision trends in the bilateral relations of Egypt and Ethiopia during the last decade

Poble D.K.

Professor Assistant,

Mindelis A.N.

Postgraduate Student,

Odesa

Abstract

The fluctuations in Egypt's and Ethiopia's foreign policies, in general, and in relation to a non-consumptive hydropower project being built by Ethiopia on the Nile, in particular, go back centuries. The purpose of this article is to study the collision tendencies of bilateral relations between Egypt and Ethiopia in the last decade. The article indicates a certain degree of uniqueness due to its actuality from a practical point of view, and, despite the availability of numerous research works and publications on the subject written by Ukrainian-, US-, and British-based researchers of Ethiopian and Egyptian origin, and official documents of the concerned countries, it reveals a certain scientific demand. The inter-disciplinary nature and subject of the research resulted in the use of two basic research methods, such as case study and event analysis, supported fragmentarily by historical, functional, geopolitical, and empirical methods. The two methods mentioned allowed for reviewing the quantitative and qualitative peculiarities of the problem. The application of the historical method gave a reference to the initial source of a legal settlement in the last century; the use of the functional method determined the level of development of relations between Egypt and Ethiopia; the use of the geopolitical method made it possible to determine the situation and the involvement of main actors in the region during the last decade; and the empirical component is presented in the form of statistical, sociological, financial, and economic data, as well as archival materials. A cautious prognosis was added with the purpose of forecasting the further outcome of the conflict around the waters of the Nile.

Key words: collision trends, foreign policy priorities, bilateral relations, a nonconsumptive hydropower project, the main actors in the region, legal settlement.

Резюме

Побле Д. К., Мінделіс А. Н.

кафедра міжнародних відносин,

ОНУ імені І. І. Мечникова,

м. Одеса

КОЛІЗІЙНІ ТЕНДЕНЦІЇ У ДВОСТОРОННІХ ВІДНОСИНАХ ЄГИПТУ ТА ЕФІОПІЇ ПРОТЯГОМ ОСТАННЬОГО ДЕСЯТИЛІТТЯ

Коливання в зовнішній політиці Єгипту та Ефіопії загалом, а також стосовно про- єкту неспоживчої гідроелектростанції, що будується Ефіопією на Нілі, зокрема, сягають глибини століть. Метою даної статті є дослідження колізійних тенденцій двосторонніх відносин Єгипту та Ефіопії в останнє десятиліття. Стаття вказує на певну унікальність через її актуальність з практичної точки зору та, незважаючи на наявність численних досліджень і публікацій на цю тему, написаних українськими, американськими та британськими дослідниками ефіопського та єгипетського походження, офіційних документів зацікавлених країн, це виявляє певний науковий попит. Міждисциплінарний характер і тематика дослідження призвели до використання двох основних методів дослідження, таких як кейс-стаді та аналіз подій, фрагментарно підкріплених історичними, функціональними, геополі- тичними та емпіричними методами..Зазначені два методи дозволили переглянути кількісні та якісні особливості проблеми. Застосування історичного методу дало посилання на першоджерело правового врегулювання минулого століття; використання функціонального методу визначило рівень розвитку відносин між Єгиптом та Ефіопією; використання геополітичного методу дозволило визначити ситуацію та участь основних акторів у регіоні за останнє десятиліття; емпірична складова представлена у вигляді статистичних, соціологічних, фінансово-економічних даних, а також архівних матеріалів. Додано обережний прогноз з метою прогнозування подальшого результату конфлікту навколо вод Великого Нілу.

Ключові слова: колізійні тенденції, зовнішньополітичні пріоритети, двосторонні відносини, неспоживчий гідроенергетичний проєкт, головні актори в регіоні, правове врегулювання.

Introduction

The raised tension in bilateral relations between Egypt and Ethiopia, due to the difference in their opinions and motivations regarding the use of water from the Nile River, is prompting regional states to start a real competition for water, food, and energy security. The role of water may dominate in the future, and it will be more important than oil. The water supply may turn into the main geopolitical problem of the 21st century, so the mentioned subject seems to be the topic of the day. Therefore, it is obvious that the scarcity of water resources, on the one hand, and the lack of efficient distribution and management, on the other hand, initiate the conflicts.

Construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a nonconsumptive hydropower project being built by Ethiopia on the Nile, has strained relations between Ethiopia and Egypt, two nations that respectively frame the project as a matter of urgency and an existential threat. However, this conflict is not only about physical resources but also extends to the very identities of the two states.

This research work highlights the essential points related to the factors escalating tension between the two countries, the role of historical perspectives for the use of Nile waters, and the formulation of resource allocation policies.

The aim of the study is to analyze comprehensively and reveal the evolution of the formation and establishment of international relations between Ethiopia and Egypt over the last decade, as well as review the events that have triggered the current conflict between the countries.

The preparation of the article inquired into the following main tasks for the research, i.e., to:

review the historical background of the bilateral relations between both countries;

analyze Egyptian-Ethiopian relations in the context of disagreements regarding the construction and engagement of the "Renaissance" dam;

highlight the relevance of the Egyptian-Ethiopian conflict as a factor in the emergence of certain problems and threats in international relations.

Different types of literary sources were used to conduct the study: research works of Ukrainian and international scientists, scientific articles and publications of foreign researchers, documents, statistical data and photos, and electronic resources. It is advisable to cite the publications and studies of Ukrainian authors, such as Bovsunivskyi (2015), Woloshyn (2020), Kryvega & Sukhareva (2022), Pavlyvoda (2017), Panchenko (2020), Kucherenko (2020), Zelinskyi (2022), etc. The research works of Ukrainian scientists give us an objective assessment, which allows us to create a comprehensive view and to understand more correctly the essence of the relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia from an unbiased outsider's point of view through the prism of events and news. Thus, Bovsunivskyi (2015) explains the collision trends from a historical point of view, which is the origin of the problem between the two countries. Kryvega and Sukhareva (2022) examine the conflict from the point of view of water resources as a key factor of social development, especially in Africa, and a vital factor in encouraging people to fight for the right to possess them. Kucherenko (2020) explains the reasons why the iconic project has led to a large-scale crisis in northeastern Africa. The variety of sources for foreign researchers includes the publications of such authors as Mercy (2020), Hamdy & Rasheedy (2007), Smiegel (2020), Ramani (2021), Ahmady (2020), Aboye & Metcalfe (2021), Zegeye (2022), Zekhal (2009), Rennick (2013), Kirk (2016), Kendie (2018), Hailemichael (2019), Langer (1935), and Kalpakian (2015). The specific reference to the research works of foreign scientists is subjective in terms of thoughts and perceptions; since the list of references includes the publications of American, Arab, European, and African researchers, etc., this contributes to the creation of your personal opinion towards the bilateral relations of these countries. For example, Ahmady (2020) argues and explains the origin of the situation in which Ethiopia threatens Egypt and what this indicates. Aboye & Metcalfe (2021) inform on the political ideology in contemporary Ethiopia, which may make obvious the country's motivation for the commission of the Renaissance project. Kendie (2021) writes about Egypt and the essence of hydropolitics on the Blue Nile River, which in turn explains Egypt's position on the conflict. The chronological framework of the study dates back to the 1900s as the initial boundary, and it ends in 2023. The lower limit is due to the conclusion of the treaty between England and Ethiopia in 1902, which indicated the first attempts to mark the border between Sudan and Ethiopia. The upper limit of the chronology ends with the present, where the conflict between the two countries still worries international relations.

The basic material

The African continent is currently facing far more conflict than any other. The most common reason for the emergence of such a conflict is the competition between countries due to a lack of resources. A vivid example of such conflicts can be the conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia due to the construction of the Addis Ababa "Renaissance" dam on the Nile River, which may, in turn, escalate the further conflict between the two countries. It is appropriate to mention that it concerns precisely the economic factors that aggravate regional conflicts. To understand what is happening in the relations between Egypt and Ethiopia, it is worth paying attention not only to the statements of the two countries' officials, dictated at times by the momentary conjuncture but also to look at the situation from a wide perspective. It may include the public opinion of the world community on this problem, the position of the key actors in world politics, as well as a review of the problem in retrospect since everybody knows well that the conflict situation did not appear right now, not even 10 years ago, when the construction project was on the discussion stage, but much earlier. foreign policy hydroelectric

"Egypt is a gift of the Nile," said the ancient Greek historian Herodotus. More than two thousand years have passed, but the river still has no less, if not more, importance in the lives of the Egyptians. Egypt's water resource is estimated at about 60 billion cubic meters annually, most of it from the Nile River, in addition to very limited amounts of rainwater and deep groundwater in the deserts. (Afifi, 2021). The river provides both drinking water and moisture for irrigating crops such as wheat, cotton, corn, sorghum, and sugarcane, as well as many types of fruits and vegetables. Over 90% of Egypt's territory is occupied by hot and dry tropical deserts, and almost the entire population of the country (95.7%) is located along the banks of the Nile (Zahran, 2014).

Egypt, with its more than 100 million populations, uses less than 600 cubic meters of water per capita annually, while a normal existence, according to the UN, needs at least 1000 cubic meters per capita (Worldometer, 2023). The problem of water resource shortages will become increasingly acute in the future due to climate change, population growth, and increased water consumption, including for the needs of industry and agriculture. Diagrams of agricultural production's growth in both countries over the past several decades can serve as a demonstration of the increase in the consumption of Nile waters (see fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Agriculture production in Egypt and Ethiopia Source: CEIC Data Global Base

Thus, in February 2014, the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation of Egypt published the report "Water deficit in Egypt. Urgent need for regional cooperation of the Nile Basin countries", which states that by 2030, only because of population growth, the amount of water per capita in Egypt annually will fall below the mark of 500 cubic meters, which is the threshold of absolute scarcity. The availability of fresh water in Egypt is 660 cubic meters per person - this is one of the lowest indicators in the world. The Nile River provides water for more than 90% of Egypt. Almost the entire population of the country lives densely in the Nile Valley. About 60% of the water comes from the Blue Nile, one of the two main tributaries (Pavlyvoda, 2017).

Next, it is worth finding out why Ethiopia itself is the main reason for the growth of the Egyptian problem. The reason is that the sources of the Nile River are located outside of Egypt.

The Nile is formed by three main rivers: the White Nile, the Blue Nile, and the Atbara River, which carry their waters from the Ethiopian highlands. The White Nile and the Blue Nile merge into a single Nile river near Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, and a little further downstream, near the Sudanese city of Atbara, the river of the same name (sometimes it is called Atbarah) joins the Nile. According to various data, the contribution of the Blue Nile to the total volume of Nile waters ranges from 65% to 85% (Bovsunivskyi, 2011). And now Ethiopia is completing the construction of a huge dam on this river with a volume of 74 cubic kilometers (for comparison, the annual flow of the Nile in the Aswan area is about 84 cubic kilometers) and is preparing to fill it within three years. It is clear that under such a development, Egypt may annually face the lack of a huge amount of water, which will inevitably lead to serious consequences of both ecological and socio-economic origin. The problem is compounded by the fact that the substantive legal documents regulating the use of Nile waters grant such a right only to Egypt and Sudan. It is to them that Cairo refers, calling for support from the world community and demanding Ethiopia stop construction (Aboye, 2021).

For a more precise understanding of the situation, the legal position of Egypt should be considered. The legal status of the Nile was determined at a time when most modern African states did not yet exist as independent actors on the world political stage. The territories in the upper reaches of the Nile were British and Belgian colonies, and only Egypt and the Ethiopian Empire were independent states in the Nile basin. In 1902, a treaty was signed between England and Ethiopia (see fig. 2).

Fig. 2. Treaties between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia, and between the United Kingdom, Italy, and Ethiopia, related to the Frontiers between the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea Source: E-Marefa (Digital Arabic Database).

The Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1902 was intended to define the border between Sudan and Ethiopia. In addition to this treaty, the governments of Great Britain, Italy, and Ethiopia agreed to make a series of changes to the border between Sudan and Eritrea (the original colony of Italy) and to the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Although the latter lasted until the Italian-Ethiopian War of 1935--1936 (and was essentially restored by the British military administration in 1941 and existed until the Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation in 1952), the Sudanese-Ethiopian border has remained virtually unchanged to this day. The treaty was the culmination of lengthy negotiations between Emperor Menelik and the British agent in Ethiopia, Lt. Col. J.L. Harrington. Another agreement, determining the water use of the Nile, was concluded between Great Britain, under whose leadership Sudan was then, and Egypt in 1929 (Langer, 1936). The title of this set of documents is "Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and Egypt: Exchange of Notes on the Use of Nile Waters for Irrigation." The documents, including a letter from the head of Egypt's Council of Ministers, Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha, to the High Commissioner to Egypt, Lord George Lloyd, include a proposal to include a clause in the treaty that would prevent Sudan from withdrawing more than 126 cubic meters of water per second (4 cubic meters) from the Nile during floods (km per year) (Zeghal, 2009).

Immediately after gaining independence in 1956, Sudan demanded a revision of the agreements. It is clear that 4 cubic kilometers per year for the largest territory of the African country at the time was unacceptably small. As a result, on November 8, 1959, a new agreement was signed: "Agreement between the Republic of Sudan and the United Arab Republic on the full use of Nile waters" (Kryvega, 2022). Over time, the annual flow of the Nile in the Aswan area reached its current volume of 84 cubic kilometers, of which, according to the new agreement, Egypt received 55.5 cubic kilometers and Sudan 18.5 cubic kilometers. Another 10 cubic kilometers were determined by the parties as annual losses due to evaporation. Also, Egypt undertook to pay Sudan compensation in the amount of 15 million Egyptian pounds for the damage that will be caused to the environment during the construction of the Sadd El-Aali reservoir.

In the same agreement, it is stated that in the event of any questions concerning the use of the Nile waters or the carrying out of any works on the Nile by other Nile basin states, Egypt and Sudan must develop a joint position and agree to or impose a ban on conducting works on the river (Ahmady, 2022). Egypt primarily refers to these agreements in its dialogue with Ethiopia and other Nile basin countries, justifying the inviolability of its rights to 55.5 cubic meters per km of water annually. But the subject of these agreements is not a single Nile country, except for Egypt and Sudan, due to the fact that the countries at that time could not be participants in these negotiations as they were not independent. In 1993, Egypt concluded a framework agreement with Ethiopia, in which the parties undertook to carry out joint projects to reduce the discharge of waste into the river and increase the inflow of water and not to act to the detriment of each other's interests; however, none of the measures led to the joint implementation of mutually beneficial projects in the field of water resources. Egypt's tough position on the use of Nile waters and long fruitless negotiations among the Nile Basin countries, especially active in the last two decades, led to the signing of the Agreement on May 14, 2010 by Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, despite the protests of Egypt and Sudan on the basics of interaction in the Nile basin, where in paragraph 6 of Article 3 there is an undisputed reference to the right of the countries of the Nile basin to use Nile waters within their borders at their own discretion. Over time, the Ministers of Water Resources of Egypt, Muhammad Nasr al-Din Alyam, and Sudan's Kamal Ali condemned the signing of the agreement. In a joint statement, the ministers emphasized that they support the initiative of the Nile Basin countries to implement hydropower projects, but this should not come at the expense of reducing Egyptian and Sudanese water quotas (Hamdy, 2007).

Soon, the signed agreement became the basis for the implementation of the practical project. In 2011, in the Ethiopian region of Benishangul-Gumuz, 40 km east of the border with Sudan, on the Blue Nile River, the construction of the "Great Renaissance of Ethiopia" hydroelectric power plant began (see fig. 3), which will become the largest construction of its kind in Africa.

Fig. 3. Construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)

As it was planned before, the construction was supposed to be completed in the summer of 2017, but due to critical changes that had to be made to the project, the work is still ongoing. The design capacity of the HPP is 6,000 megawatts, and the cost is $4.7 billion. The start of the implementation of this project coincided with the events of the "Arab Spring" in Egypt, which captured the public's attention to the country's internal problems and gave them the opportunity to actively engage in construction (Mersie, 2020). Many believed that Ethiopia could not afford such an ambitious project in financial terms, especially since the country's authorities planned to commence it with their own funds and minimal borrowing in order to gain all the rights to the object after construction. When the situation in Egypt stabilized, it turned out that the construction of the dam was actively developing. Today, Egyptians blame former President Mohammed Morsi, who was unable to solve the construction problem due to a lack of true information. Muhammad Morsi, like other presidents of Egypt before him, drew attention to this problem and threatened war with Ethiopia in case of a decrease in Nile waters entering the country. Muhammad Morsi, like other presidents of Egypt before him, drew attention to this problem and threatened war with Ethiopia in case of a decrease in Nile waters entering the country. The American private intelligence and analytical company Stratfor even considered the possibility of a military operation by Egypt with the help of regular troops or special forces to destroy the dam but concluded that the probability of such an intervention is extremely unlikely since Egypt and Ethiopia do not share a common border and the distance between the countries is fairly considerable. Despite the aggressive actions on the part of the Egyptians, Ethiopia continued the construction of the hydroelectric power plant, convincing Egypt and Sudan that nothing is in danger for these countries and, on the contrary, the appearance of such a powerful source of electricity will make the entire region more developed. And finally, in Khartoum on March 23, 2015, the leaders of the three countries signed the Agreement on the Declaration of Principles between the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, and the Republic of Sudan. This document defines 10 principles that all three states agree on. The main opinion is that Egypt and Sudan agree that Ethiopia can build a hydroelectric power plant, but Ethiopia must share information about all stages of construction and further operation of the facility with its neighbors, sell excess energy in priority order to Sudan and Egypt, and also voluntarily comply with all recommendations of experts. The most important point is the 5th point, which is called "Principle of Cooperation in the First Filling and Management of the Dam", where the three countries, based on expert opinions, proposed to develop rules for filling the dam under different scenarios and rules for annual management of the facility, which the owner (i.e., Ethiopia) can sometimes adjust (Woloshyn, 2020). Undoubtedly, the conclusion of this agreement was a victory for Ethiopia. Now a new facility under construction (strategic for the entire region) is becoming a given that countries cannot refuse.

Was the signing of the Declaration of Principles a defeat for Egypt? On the one hand, the benefit from it is not very small. After the commissioning of the hydroelectric power plant, Egypt will have the opportunity to purchase energy at discounted prices. On the other hand, the new dam will be a powerful lever of pressure on Egypt, which is completely dependent on the Nile. It would seem that the second argument is much stronger than the first, but only at first glance. The signing of the agreement gave Egypt the opportunity to claim at least some advantages in the future; besides, there were still several years of construction ahead, during which Cairo planned to agree with Addis Ababa on all disputed issues. Otherwise, Egypt could be left with nothing. As of now, in 2023, when the construction of the facility is nearing completion, we see that, despite dozens of meetings, the parties have not reached a consensus on the most important point of the Declaration of Principles: when and how to fill the dam and who will manage it. This time, the rhetoric from Cairo and Addis Ababa is even tougher. Both with their words and actions, the leaders of the two countries show determination in defending their positions and even talk about readiness for a possible armed conflict. When studying this conflict, it is difficult to say with confidence on whose side the power is now, so it is necessary to focus attention on the assessment of the armed forces and mobilization of resources.

According to the data from the Global Fire Power non-governmental organization, the population of Egypt in 2023 was 107,170,524. The total military personnel was 1,220,222; active personnel: 440,000; reserve personnel: 480,000; paramilitary units: 300,000; among them: Air Force personnel: 50,000; Army personnel: 682,000; Navy personnel: 32,500.

The Egyptian Army had 4,664 (stock) and 3,032 (readiness) tanks; 77596 (stock) and 50,437 (readiness) vehicles; about 4,500 artillery systems; and about 3,000 anti-aircraft weapons (including more than 2,000 portable anti-aircraft missile systems, MANPADS). Military aviation includes 245 fighters, 88 attack aircraft, and 325 helicopters. The Navy had at its disposal 8 submarines, 2 helicopter carriers, 13 frigates, 7 corvettes, 48 patrol boats, and 23 mine sweepers (Global Fire Power, 2023).

According to the data from the Global Fire Power non-governmental organization, the population of Ethiopia in 2023 was 113,656,596. The total military personnel was: 150,000; active personnel: 150,000; reserve personnel: 0; paramilitary units: 0; among them: Air Force personnel: 5,000; Army personnel: 65,000; Navy personnel: 11,000.

The Ethiopian Army had 468 (stock) and 281 (readiness) tanks; 6,240 (stock) and 3,744 (readiness) vehicles; and about 600 artillery systems (Global Fire Power, 2023).

As military experts believe, Ethiopia currently has a well-trained army at its disposal. From 2005 to 2015, it was the subject of a deep modernization. The country actively participates in UN peacekeeping missions in Darfur and South Sudan, as well as in Somalia. In 2015, Ethiopian peacekeepers made up the second-largest group in the "blue helmets" of the UN and the African Union. Ethiopia's armament is mainly represented by Soviet weapons, but in recent years the supply of Chinese equipment has increased.

To understand the situation more correctly, two main factors should be taken into consideration, namely: Egypt and Ethiopia are, firstly, very large countries (in terms of population, territory, and GDP), which play an important role in regional politics; and, secondly, these are countries that conduct a very active foreign policy, maintaining good relations with the key world powers and international organizations, and their leaders enjoy certain authority in the area of foreign policy.

On May 19, 2020, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres spoke about overcoming differences between concerned countries and concluding a mutually beneficial agreement (UN News, 2021). A month later, Stephane Dujarric, the official representative of the UN Secretary-General, called on Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan "to work together to intensify efforts for the peaceful settlement of outstanding differences." Nicolas Rivery, the Chairman of the UN Security Council and French Representative, asked Cairo and Addis Ababa to adhere to the Declaration of Principles and resolve all issues during an online meeting held on June 29, 2020, at the request of Egypt.

The European Union also sees no other alternative for overcoming differences between countries other than continuing negotiations and is even ready to promote the attraction of finances to find a mutually acceptable solution. Ursula von der Leyen, the head of the European Commission, made a field visit to Addis Ababa in early December 2019, just a week after taking office. And this is not accidental. Ethiopia is one of the main partners of the European Union in Africa; several hundred European companies work there (Hailemichael, 2019). It should be noted that Europe could hypothetically suffer the most in a hypothetical conflict if one does not take into account its main participants, since the refugee flows in the event of hostilities will move primarily to European countries. Residents of European cities have already experienced the large number of refugees from Africa since the start of the civil war in Libya, as well as the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Speaking of the US's position in the conflict, it is necessary to highlight its special role in the developments around the construction. After the failure of another round of negotiations in October 2019, Egypt asked the USA to be a mediator in the negotiation process. Several meetings were held with the participation of Washington, and it was announced that the parties would sign a final tripartite agreement on the Ethiopian dam at the end of February. The US Ministry of Finance even issued a statement describing the details of the future agreement: it will present a schedule for the gradual filling of the reservoir and prescribe an algorithm for actions during droughts, rains, and normal weather (Pavlyvoda N., 2017).

However, there was no breakthrough: Ethiopia refused to sign the agreement in the version proposed to it and accused the presidential administration of playing along with Egypt. To date, only the League of Arab States has expressed unequivocal support for Egypt. In March 2020, a statement signed by representatives of 21 countries stated that Ethiopia's construction of a dam on the Blue Nile is a violation of Egypt's historic rights. The Arab League (LAS) foreign ministers called for a negotiated settlement of disputes between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia in connection with the construction of the Ethiopian Great Renaissance Dam (GERD) during a special meeting on June 16, 2021, in Doha, Qatar's capital. The released statement said that "the water security of Egypt and Sudan is an integral part of Arab national security." The aggravation of the situation around the "Renaissance" hydroelectric power station determines the intensification of the international community's efforts to find possible approaches to blurring the Egyptian-Ethiopian contradictions and preventing a forceful solution to the problem.

Conclusions

Based on this analysis, the following conclusions have been drawn. The analysis of Egyptian-Ethiopian relations shows the continuation of the tendency toward the deepening of contradictions between Cairo and Addis Ababa regarding the water use of the Nile River. The leadership of Egypt considers the construction of the "Renaissance" dam by Ethiopia a threat to national security and expresses its readiness to guard the country's interests. In their turn, the Ethiopian authorities have no intention of stopping the implementation of the project, which is strategically important for the state's economy.

First, there is no legal ban on Ethiopia launching the project. Colonial treaties are scant, and the 2015 Declaration of Principles only recommends preparing an agreement on filling and managing the dam but does not prohibit its filling and operation until such an agreement is in place.

Secondly, the largest countries and the most influential international organizations, except for the League of Arab States, are in favor of continuing the dialogue. They do not categorically support any of the countries.

Third, a war between Egypt and Ethiopia is unlikely since the countries do not have a common border and the distance separating them is enormous. Intervening under such conditions in an armed conflict on the territory of Ethiopia for Egypt will most likely mean defeat. Moreover, the consequences of such a war would be catastrophic not only for the participants but also for the entire region. The option of resolving the issue by force could be considered at the initial stage of dam construction. However, this moment was lost by Egypt. To destroy such a huge and powerful structure from a distance is an overwhelming task for Egypt.

Fourth, by signing this Declaration of Principles, Egypt actually recognized Ethiopia's right to build the facility. In the near future, Egypt will be forced to conclude similar agreements with other countries in the Nile basin in order to have at least some legal basis for controlling their activities on the river.

Therefore, it is possible to suggest that the parties will continue to try to find a realistic solution to the "water conflict" that would satisfy both Egypt and Ethiopia. The development of events demonstrates that the international community and major world powers are paying close attention to the disagreements between the two countries.

References [Список використаної літератури]

1. Aboye, A., Metcalfe, A. (2021). Political Ideology and Academic Autonomy in Ethiopia. Journal of Comparative & International Higher Education, 13(4), 16--27 [in English].

2. Afiifi, E. (2021, December 29). River Nile; the Lifeline of Egypt's Water Economy. Nile Basin Discourse/One Nile -- one family [in English].

3. Agreement on Declaration of principles between the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia And the Republic of the Sudan on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP) (2015) [in English].

4. Ahmady, M. (2020, June 7). Ethiopia's threats to Egypt. AhramOnline [in English].

5. Bovsunivskyi, P. (2015). The Problem of Nile Water Distribution in International Relations on the African Continent. Educational and Research Institute of International Relations, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, History of International Relations, 3 (26), 325--336 [in Ukrainian]. [Бовсунів- ський П. Проблема розподілу вод Нілу в міжнародних відносинах на африканському континенті. Навчально-науковий інститут міжнародних відносин / КНУ ім. Т. Г. Шевченка / Історія міжнародних відносин. 2015. Вип. 3(26). С. 325--336.

6. Global Fire Power (2023). Egypt 2023 Military Strength [in English].

7. Global Fire Power (2023). Ethiopia 2023 Military Strength [in English].

8. Hailemichael, A. (2019, May). Hydro-Political discourse analysis of the Ethiopian and the Egyptian Government Foreign Affairs office press releases on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam [in English].

9. Hamdy, H., Rasheedy, A. (2007). The Nile River and Egyptian Foreign Policy Interests. JSTOR Collection/ African Sociological Review, 11(1), 25--37 [in English].

10. Kalpakian, J. (2015). Ethiopia and the Blue Nile. ASPJ Africa & Francophonie - 2nd Quarter [in English].

11. Kendie, D. (2018). Egypt and the Hydro-Politics of the Blue Nile River. Northeast African Studies, 6(1), 141--169 [in English].

12. Kirk, J. Beattie (2016, March 9). Egypt during the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Society. Cambridge University Press, Review of Middle East Studies. [in English].

13. Krivega, L. & Sukhareva, K. (2022). Water as a factor of social development and confrontation of countries over water resources. Humanities studies: Collection of Scientific Papers / Ed. V. Voronkova. Zaporizhzhia: Publishing house "Helvetica", 13(90), 40--45 [in Ukrainian]. [Кривега, Л., Сухарева К. Вода як чинник соціального розвитку та протистояння країн щодо водних ресурсів. Humanities studies: Collection of Scientific Papers / Ed. V. Voronkova. Zaporozhzhia: Publishing house “Helvetica”. 2022. Vol. 13 (90). P. 40--45.

14. Kucherenko, E. (2020, November 12). "The Dam of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance": How did a symbolic project lead to a large-scale crisis in North-East Africa? ADASTRA Think Tank [in Ukrainian]. [Кучеренко Е. «Гребля великого ефіопського відродження»: як проєкт-символ призвів до масштабної кризи на північному сході Африки? Аналітичний центр ADASTRA. 2020. 12 листопадa

15. Langer, W. (1936, January). The Struggle for the Nile. Foreign Affairs / An American Quaterly Review, 14(2), 259--273 [in English].

16. Mersie, A. (2020). The Ethiopian-Egyptian Water War Has Begun. Foreign Policy [in English].

17. Neville, C. (2020, November 17). Antonio Guterres reiterates call for Ethiopia to immediately release UN staff . United Nations News [in Ukrainian]. [Невіл К. Антоніу Гутерріш знову закликав Ефіопію негайно звільнити співробітників ООН. Новини. Організація Об'єднаних Націй. 2020. 17 листопада.

18. Panchenko, O. (2020). Information Technologies in Ensuring of the State Security. Science Review, 5(32), 30--35 [in Ukrainian]. [Панченко О.А. Інформаційні технології в забезпеченні державної безпеки. Science Review. Vol. 5. Is. 32. P. 30--35.

19. Pavlyvoda, N. (2017). Ethiopia blocks the Nile with a reservoir: Egypt faces water problems. Mind UA/ News [in Ukrainian]. [Павливода Н. Ефіопія перегородила Ніл водосховищем: Єгипту загрожують проблеми з водою. Mind UA/Новини. 2017. 2 жовтня.

20. Ramani, S. (2021, August 16). Russia and the GERD: An uneasy balancing act. Middle East Institute [in English].

21. Rennick, S. (2013). Contested Meanings in the Egyptian Revolution. SOCIO, 2(2), 81-98 [in English].

22. Rwamball, F. (2004, February 9). Tanzania Ignores Nile Treaty, Starts Victoria Water Project. Nothern Tanzania Information Portal. Nile Water Agreement/Extract. [in English].

23. Smiegel, M. (2020, July 3). Egypt and Ethiopia dispute the dam. Is there a real risk of conflict? Warsaw Institute [in English].

24. Woloshyn, V. (2020). Wars for water -- new wars that may arise in the world. ArmyInform. 18 June [in Ukrainian]. [Волошин В. Війни за воду -- нові війни, які можуть виникнути у світі. АрміяInform. 2020. 18 червня.

25. Worldometer (2023). Egypt population (live) [in English].

26. Zahran, M., El-Amier, Y. (2014). Ecology and establishment of fiber producing taxa naturally growing in the Egyptian deserts. Egyptian Journal for Basic and Applied Sciences, 1(3-4), 144--150 [in English].

27. Zelinsky, S. (2022). Water supply and water security in the context of Russian aggression. Public organization Flora/Krоpivnitsky [in Ukrainian]. [Зелінський С. Водопостачання та водна безпека у контексті російської агресії. Громадська організація Флора/Кропивницький. 2022. 44 с.

28. Zegeye, A. (2022). Revolutionary Democracy: A Terminus or Way Station for Ethiopia? Journal of Developing Societies, 38(4), 463--482 [in English].

29. Zeghal, M. (2009, January 29). Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of Al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State (1952--94). Cambridge University Press. International Journal for Middle East Studies, 31(1), 371--399 [in English].

Размещено на Allbest.ru