The role of nuclear weapons in modern global politics

After analysing the available alternatives and strategies, the researcher suggests that the resumption of the nuclear deal looks like the most effective option. By imposing sanctions, opting for covert sabotage, or resorting to military aggression, Israel is unlikely to benefit significantly in the long run. The final decision is being made because of uncertainty about the possibility of regime change and the lack of clear information about when and how it might happen. The re-conclusion of the agreement gives Israel additional time and an opportunity to consider new prospects if the agreement is extended. But ultimately, Israel may be left with no alternative but to launch a military operation, perhaps to put pressure on the international community and encourage it to take decisive action.

It is worth noting that Israel's nuclear policy is complex and contradictory, since Israel has not officially recognised its status as a nuclear power, and on the one hand, this can be considered as a means of ensuring national security in the face of a persistent threat to the existence of the state. However, on the other hand, implicit positive confirmation of the presence of nuclear weapons, as indicated by this study, can push other countries in the region into an arms race and create additional tension.

Conclusions

In modern global politics, the role of nuclear weapons remains a complex and crucial component of international security. Nuclear weapons continue to be not only a means of national defence, but also an instrument of geostrategic influence. However, its use poses a huge threat to humanity and the whole world.

Efforts to disarm and control nuclear weapons are important for reducing the risk of nuclear weapons use and threats to global security. International agreements play a key role in this context. Some states use nuclear weapons as a tool of influence and pressure on their opponents, which creates additional complexity in geostrategic relations and affects the security and stability of the world order, or disguise the existing arsenal in case of a response to any act of aggression. This policy discourages potential opponents from carrying out aggressive actions. The possession of nuclear weapons allows states to influence international decisions and processes. Competition in the field of nuclear weapons can lead to an arms race, when several states become holders of nuclear weapons in order to increase their influence and security. Such a race could be a source of tension and danger to international stability. The increase in spending on nuclear weapons in 2022 indicates a negative trend towards nuclear security. Other states, on the contrary, can use their nuclear arsenals as motivation for other states to accede to treaties on disarmament or the cessation of nuclear programmes. One of the key problems is the dynamics of the development of the nuclear strategy of states, in particular, the rejection of the policy of unconditional no first use of nuclear weapons (NFU), as indicated in the example of China. This dynamic can affect overall stability and trust between countries and requires careful analysis and diplomatic efforts to maintain peace. In addition, conflicts and strained relations between states, such as the Russian-Ukrainian war, highlight new challenges for managing the nuclear arsenal and its role. Such situations require careful monitoring and a response from the international community to prevent the possible use of nuclear weapons. The very manipulation and threats of its use should also lead to serious sanctions against states and their leaders.

It is worth noting that there are prospects for further study on this topic, which may include examining the effectiveness of verification instruments and nuclear disarmament treaties, and developing proposals for improving these mechanisms. When studying the issue in the future, it is necessary to consider the latest developments in nuclear technologies and their impact on international security and politics. In addition, it is necessary to analyse new opportunities for international cooperation to ensure peace and security in the presence of nuclear weapons.

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