The problem of the criterion ofknowledge in Hegel’s philosophy: is a non-criterialjustification ofknowledge possible

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The problem of the criterion ofknowledge in Hegel's philosophy: is a non-criterialjustification ofknowledge possible

Bondar O.V.

Is there any criterion that would give us the opportunity to identify our knowledge as true knowledge, and whether this criterion in this case means any additional knowledge that finds its place in objective knowledge, along with something that this knowledge has in the knowledge Knowledge of the object knows? When we ask the question, "What do we know when we know something?", At the same time we realize what we know and that we know, d. H. our knowledge, to which certain "something" (object) refers, is at the same time self-referential; and on the basis of this distinction, it seems that the possibility of identifying this knowledge is based on objective knowledge, therefore knowledge about knowledge does not signify a particular knowledge, but only a condition for the relation of this knowledge to its object. As we see, such justification of the essence of knowledge is that any particular knowledge is limited to the externality of this knowledge objectivity (ie, there is always knowledge about something), so criterion for the truth of that knowledge is its adequate correspondence with the object ( that is, what this knowledge knows). Such a justification of Aristotle's criterion of the truth of knowledge leads to the following: "A false statement is the statement that what is not is or that what is not is; on the other hand, a true statement is the statement that what is is, and that what is not is not "[1, p. 87]. As we see, the falseness of all sorts of knowledge, according to Aristotle, consists in the discrepancy between the object and the knowledge of that object. His own arguments are explained by Aristotle in the fifth book: (1) Knowledge is false when its object is false, which is possible in two cases: (a) "two determinations are either not actually connected, or because they can not possibly be connected";

(b) "But what is really there, but what nature has to appear as it really does not, or as what it really is not, is also false" [1, p. 87]; (2) Knowledge is false because it does not correspond to the object of knowledge; Aristotle makes a key conclusion from this: "But a statement is false as a statement about that which is not real, insofar as it is false as this" [1, p. 87], knowledge can only be real in the case when its object is real, and accordingly, the object itself is the origin of the objective validity of knowledge.

Thus the strategy of such a rationalization of knowledge can be generalized in two complementary terms: (1) An object that always remains beyond knowledge itself is a real object from the very beginning; (2) Knowledge, to be an important knowledge, only needs to properly map that external, independent subject. Thus, the criterion for the truth of knowledge should be its adequate agreement with the object; but in point (1) it is shown that reality is a characteristic of an object, therefore, just as the object itself must be regarded as the criterion of truth, all knowledge and not its conformity with knowledge, since such a conformity is a characteristic of knowledge itself, and not a feature of the item. From this point of view, ambiguity will discover the truth criterion of knowledge based on the ambiguity of the term "reality": "reality" serves both as a feature of the object and as a characteristic of knowledge, thus: a) knowledge can only in the case really be, if its object really is, but b) a certain object can be defined as really only by knowledge. Accordingly, the power of propositional justification of knowledge leads to the circle of justification. H. Rickert points out this contradiction in this way: "The answer that the object of this knowledge of reality is the actual material of fact may, as I said, suffice for the standpoint of the individual sciences, but is completely meaningless to epistemology. It would amount to the tautology that the object for the form of the knowledge of reality is that which is really known. "[11, p. 145]. Accordingly, to prove that a particular item is an important item, any item must be set as an important one before any justification.

However, propositional argument is burdened with further unsolvable aporia: if Aristotle states that «A statement is wrong but as a statement about that which is not really, if it is wrong as this», such relationship should be («statement about such») to produce its non-existence, because according to this justification strategy, any knowledge is possible only on the basis of the uncertainty of the object of that knowledge. As we see, the main drawback of this argument lies in the critical description of knowledge, so that first, in order to determine the truth of this knowledge, we must compare the object of knowledge with knowledge itself, but not before acquiring knowledge of the object exists and therefore can not be compared with the object. Second, the identification of the truth of this knowledge requires the recognition that this identification criterion is a particular knowledge, with which we check the correctness of the agreement of knowledge and its object; but in this case the criterion of such knowledge would be that it is subject to additional identification through knowledge, and this identification (knowledge of knowledge) would in turn require new knowledge as the basis of identification, so that such identification could never be realized. These considerations bring us to a fundamental question that can be formulated as follows: is the noncritial affirmation of knowledge possible, that is to say, such a gratification that makes it impossible to reduce the content of knowledge to the content of its object? B. Spinoza showed for the first time the necessity of such an argument: "By adequate idea I mean an idea, insofar as it is considered in itself and without relation to the object, has all the properties or intrinsic features of a true idea ...

I say inwardly, in order to exclude what is outside, namely, the agreement of the idea with your object "[12, cf. 44]. But Spinoza did not explain how the self-identification of this knowledge ("idea") is possible, and what is the relation of this knowledge to the knowledge of the object. If such a knowledge is only a condition of the relation of knowledge to object, this leads to considerable difficulties in providing the knowledge of knowledge, because the basis of this knowledge, for its own self-thematization in knowledge of itself, seems to itself to be the nature of knowledge propositional knowledge (ie the knowledge of the object) must be, ie relate themselves to new object in the manner of their objective relationship, thereby transforming the mode of their knowledge of something to something, to the other "something", thereby objectifying the conditions of the formation of objective knowledge, and making difference of knowledge of the object impossible. It follows that the principle of self-knowledge can not be established by the structure of propositional knowledge, and therefore the self-identification of knowledge is impossible. In the search for the solution of this paradox, we try to turn to the arguments of G. Hegel in "Phenomenology of the Mind." The purpose of such an appeal lies in the ability of Hegelian method to solve such paradoxes.

Let's begin our analysis with the fallback description of consciousness in "Introduction":

For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object and, on the other hand, consciousness of itself; To be aware of what is truth for him, and to know his knowledge of it "[5, p. 74].

As we see, consciousness not only means the relationship ("consciousness of the object"), but includes an additional principle ("self-consciousness") that makes the reduction of consciousness exclusively to objective knowledge impossible. But this description of consciousness at the same time contains a new threat to the generalization of the principle of objective knowledge, because the something that consciousness knows in its knowledge of the object signifies its knowledge of the object as a self-independent fact, and therefore the content of his knowledge is conditioned solely by the object, and the knowledge which arises in the objective relation, as it appears at first glance, should be regarded as a true ("consciousness of what that is to him) only of this independent original object True is ») only passively portray. Such interpretation of consciousness inevitably leads to the aporia described above, and it makes impossible the explanation of what the consciousness of knowledge itself is, because that knowledge known in consciousness is not knowledge of the object; and at the same time the object of this knowledge, which is known in the knowledge of knowledge, is itself determined by something to which it refers in the objective relation ("something"), therefore the truth of this knowledge should be related to its object only in relation to that knowledge be acquired. As we can see, these difficulties are based on the assumption that the truth of any knowledge is acquired only in relation to knowledge on the facts independent of it, and accordingly the truth means something that is originally beyond knowledge itself. Hegel describes this everyday idea of knowledge as follows:

"This (consciousness - О.b.), for example, distinguishes something from what it refers to at the same time; or as this is expressed, it is something the same; and the definite side of this being, or being of some consciousness, is the knowledge. But from this being for another we distinguish the being-in-itself; that which is related to knowledge is likewise distinguished from it, and posited as being apart from this relation; the side of this being-in-itself is called truth "[5, s. 72]. knowledge philosophy hegel consciousness

But how can we know what is reflected in this passage as "something the same," namely, consciousness? This knowledge immediately transforms into "in itself", i. into an object of knowledge, which itself should exist independently of knowledge itself, and therefore the knowledge that we know in the knowledge of knowledge must exist completely independently of the knowledge, that is, of itself. From the standpoint of propositional gratification, this knowledge can by no means be true, for what is true in accordance with these principles must also exist beyond the limits of knowledge itself, leading to irresolvable difficulties. At the same time, the assertion that truth is a feature of the object, and that knowledge is true only in relation to the object, leads to aporia, because the knowledge in the context of its propositional gratification does not have its own characteristics, therefore knowledge of knowledge would be empty, i. meaningless. But in the question of what the knowledge of knowledge means, we find that we do not know what knowledge means, so we ask for the knowledge that is not knowledge; and at the same time propositional interpretation of truth, which would lie in the correspondence of knowledge to its object, becomes impossible within self-consciousness, namely, because knowledge acquires knowledge, because knowledge is only acquired in this knowledge, nor knowledge and knowledge Accordingly, not "in itself" is. Therefore, in the knowledge of knowledge, the statement, "Truth is the correspondence of knowledge to the object," apparently changes to the statement, "Truth is the correspondence of the object to knowledge," because this object is itself knowledge. And at the same time this object is knowledge, i. such an object which, according to the initial conditions of the propositional foundation of knowledge, is the opposite of knowledge itself; and the truth of this knowledge is obviously impossible, because this knowledge has no content of its own ("in itself"), and therefore what is known in the knowledge of knowledge is not knowledge of knowledge, since either (1) is the object of that knowledge Knowledge, to create knowledge, not knowledge, but something independent of it should be; or (2) the knowledge knowing in the knowledge of knowledge should, in turn, be distinguished from that knowledge which knows it, and consequently transforms into an object, which led to the emergence of the paradox, according to which not the knowledge of the object know, but know the object of the knowledge.

As one can see, this is confirmed by the above-mentioned opinion that these difficulties inevitably arise when the object of knowledge is regarded as such a fact that exists independently of knowledge, and therefore the truth of what knowledge is, lies beyond Knowledge. The necessary consequence of such an interpretation of the truth of knowledge is that it should be regarded as such a principle to be achieved in an additional cognitive relationship. But both that through which we attain the truth of knowledge and that which we attain in this knowledge is one and the same knowledge, therefore the demand, the truth of knowledge, leads as the "ap-self" (ie, beyond the Knowledge relation existing facts) to reach an incontrovertible paradox, according to which (1) what we attain in knowledge of the knowledge, is "in itself", and therefore what is known in the knowledge of knowledge is not knowledge itself ; (2) but when we know about knowledge ("ap-self") only in knowledge, it turns out that what we know in such knowledge is knowledge, as it is in relation to knowledge itself, but not In-itself is; Accordingly, if we know of knowledge, we know no knowledge, but only knowledge of knowledge, never to gain knowledge about how knowledge exists not only in knowledge, but in fact ("ap-self"), as we see illustrated the first part of the paradox that we know knowledge not knowledge, but something completely different. The second part shows that in relation to knowledge we do not know knowledge, but something else, because we have no means of distinguishing knowledge in itself from knowledge for us (in knowledge). Thus, the basis upon which the described paradox emerges is based on the requirement to regard the knowledge ("for itself") and the truth of that knowledge (the object, "ap-self") as independent facts. Hegel tries to refute this view in the following section:

"Examining the truth of knowledge, it seems we are investigating what it is in itself. In this investigation alone it is our object, it is for us; and the inheritance of the same, which results, would rather be his being for us; what we claim to be his being, rather not his truth, but only our knowledge of him »[5, p. 73].

As can be seen from this passage, the subject of such knowledge ("ap-self") is no different from the knowledge itself ("for us"), therefore that which is the object in itself and what it is in the knowledge of it , actually one and the same object. Moreover, not only the object itself is what it is in the knowledge of the object, but the principle of "ap-itself" (immediate existence of the object), as it turns out, is no different from "for us" ( the indirect existence of the object) as another available existence: "But the nature of the object which we examine overcomes this separation or appearance of separation and presupposition" [5, p. 73]. The origin of this difficulty stems from the fact that consciousness, which knows of the object, does not know that the object itself is formed by the self-distinction of consciousness: "This (consciousness - О.b.) distinguishes something from itself on what it is at the same time; or as this is stated, it is something for the same ... »[5, s. 72]. Therefore, it is not worth talking about the object distinguished from the consciousness as a definite "ap-self", because the content of this "in itself" would be wholly determined by what it differs in this distinction. Therefore, both the content of our knowledge (something, an object), as we see, as well as the way we know this content ("distinguishes something" I "refers), is in fact one and the same object.

This passage contains a threat to interpret the relation of knowledge to its object in such a way that what distinguishes consciousness from itself (the object) is attained in an additional cognitive action, in such a way reference is made to the difference; such an interpretation would make the thesis of the identity of knowledge and the object of knowledge impossible, since the differences as "in themselves" beyond the limits of knowledge also exist independently, and the knowledge of them became only in the next act of consciousness ( "At the same time") can be acquired. In contrast to such interpretation of the relations of knowledge and object, Hegel exposes the main thesis on the simultaneity of distinction and relation, since without such an argument it would obviously be impossible to explain how the differentiated (object) can be adapted to what it is (Consciousness) because the object of knowledge should be independent of knowledge according to everyday ideas about knowledge, and therefore consciousness would require the third principle to facilitate the unification of knowledge and object.

It may seem, however, that such a third principle is necessary in any case, because the relation of knowledge to the object in which knowledge arises about the object, would require the presence of a criterion which would determine the truth of that relation, i. had to confirm the knowledge about the object. But according to Hegel's arguments above, both the object ("distinction") and the knowledge ("relationship") are identical dimensions of consciousness, therefore consciousness creates both the form ("relation") and the content ("relationship"). Distinction ") own knowledge, and therefore it has and can not have a criterion, unlike the knowledge itself. As we see, when knowledge knows about itself, it is both what it knows (object) and how it knows (knowledge), and therefore the object in itself is knowledge; accordingly knowledge of knowledge does not need new knowledge for self-agreement, for both what it knows and how it knows something are two dimensions of the same fact - consciousness. Therefore knowledge in the knowledge of knowledge does not constitute an additional principle that would not be present in known knowledge, for every knowledge is both the object and the knowledge itself:

The agreement of the "ap-self" of the object with the knowledge which constitutes the essence of the examination of the object by its knowledge shows that the condition of acquiring a truthfulness of such knowledge consists in the correspondence of how the object "in itself" is, and as the object for consciousness appears, and criterion of correspondence of knowledge to its object is based on the agreement of the object "ap-self" and the object "for consciousness" in objective knowledge in one and the same consciousness in one and the same consciousness and on the occasion of one and the same object, therefore that which is the object of consciousness becomes a measure of what it is in itself. As we can see, the criterion of the verification of the truth of such knowledge is self-examined in this knowledge, because the point "for consciousness" is at the same time something that relates to the object, and at the same time the truth-measure of such relation, therefore the possibility of contentual coincidence or agreement rests of the object "in itself" with what it is in knowledge, on the assertion that knowledge of the object belongs to the object itself and does not reveal itself only in its relation to the consciousness. At the same time, the criterion of this knowledge ("for consciousness") shows that what the object is in can only be tested in knowledge, and therefore the object to which knowledge refers is an abstraction of knowledge about it ; therefore, to match the object of knowledge with the knowledge itself, knowledge of object must be regarded as a sign of what that object is "ap-self", and at the same time the criterion of this agreement proves both a knowledge that the knowledge agrees with its object , as well as a substantial knowledge of this object, because it is of course a criterion for the relation of knowledge to the object and therefore, it is a criterion for an objective knowledge. Thus, these considerations express that in knowing about object (1) knowledge of the object at the same time as the side of that relation (knowledge I "for consciousness") and as the whole relationship in general (criterion I knowledge of the object) which thus indicates a state of affairs in which the object («Ап-» ») is essentially the property of knowledge itself; 2) The object of knowledge is both as what the knowledge relates to (ie a side of knowledge) and as that in relation to which the knowledge acquires the experience of truthfulness I dishonesty own relation (one must keep that truth is based on a correspondence of the knowledge of the object ("for consciousness") with the object itself ("in itself"); therefore, what the object is in itself is its knowledge of itself as "in itself." From this it follows that knowledge about the object is an essential property of the object, therefore the object appears in the knowledge-related relation both as part of this relation ("one knows about it") and as a whole relation in general.

As we see, knowledge and object are not two independent facts; and moreover, the distinction between the one and the other within the framework of objective knowledge is problematic: if the object, as it has been established, is in fact what the knowledge about it is, that knowledge, which knows about the object, must enter Objective knowledge, or knowledge as an object, it is impossible within the limits of consciousness to distinguish an object from the knowledge of an object. This refutes the illusion of the consciousness that it is possible to change the knowledge of an object without changing the object itself: "... the consciousness seems to have to change its knowledge in order to make it fit the subject, but in the change of knowledge, in fact, the object itself changes; for the existing knowledge was essentially a knowledge of the object; with knowledge he, too, becomes another, for he essentially belonged to this knowledge "[5, p. 74]. The experience of this change is based on the assertion that what knowledge refers to in objective knowledge is in fact knowledge itself, namely knowledge as object; at the same time the object to which this knowledge refers is not an object as "in itself," but only in the same relation:

"It becomes clear that what was before him the in-itself is not in itself, or that it was only for itself in itself" [5, p. 74].

As we can see, therefore, such a statement cancels out the idea that the object is in fact what it is in itself; and the source of this everyday conception of objective knowledge is an external reflection for which what is known in knowledge is necessarily to differ from knowledge itself, and knowledge must have its own knowledge with the given givenness ("in and of itself"). ), which opposes knowledge without realizing that what it defines as "ap-self" is its own definition: "Outer reflection thus presupposes being, firstly not in the sense that its immediacy only exists Being posited or moment is, but rather, that this immediacy is the relation to self and determinateness only as a moment »[6, p. 28].

It follows from this passage that what is the object of knowledge (immediacy I in itself) is self-relation ("this immediacy is the relation to itself ...)". Therefore, what a natural conception of the object as being "in itself" knew was, in fact, only a part of this object, separate from those for which the object was "in itself." At the same time it turns out that what is "in itself" for this idea is not a property of the object, but its relation to knowledge, for it turns out during this relationship that the object itself in such a relationship is a self-distinction of the object Knowledge is. Therefore, what manifests itself in the natural representation as either an object or an object "in itself", can be explicated in this relation as a self-determined activity of knowledge ("it ... in itself was"). Thus, the disadvantage of reflection is that the reflection takes on this fact as one ("ap-sich"), whereas it is actually set, i. E. formed by the activity of reflection itself:

"So she thinks of it as something from which she starts, and from which she first begins to go back, negating that which is her negative. But that this presupposed is a negative or a settled thing does not concern it; this determinateness belongs only to the setting reflection, but in the presupposition the positedness is only as suspended. What external reflection determines and sets in relation to the immediate is insofar the same external determinations "[6, p. 29].

In this section, Hegel attempts to clarify the action of external reflection, which is a means of knowledge characteristic of everyday conception of knowledge. As we see, such knowledge means that what it knows is not a property of knowledge itself, but has been given from the outside to knowledge, and the mechanism of such knowledge apparently consists in the fact that the object ("presupposed") in knowledge by adaptation The "ap-self" of the object is revealed to knowledge, and the knowledge itself knows about itself ("returning to itself") insofar as it knows about the object. Therefore, the object for such knowledge is considered to be (1) something that resists knowledge ("negative"), i. the object is so far as to what extent the knowledge itself is not present; (2) but knowledge can only ever know on the basis of the knowledge of something, and this "something" is just an object, therefore knowledge acquires knowledge of knowledge, only knowledge of the object acquired, i. to contradict the object itself ("Negate this of its negative"). But as a consequence a contradiction arises, because, as we see, an object at the same time means both as a condition of the possibility of knowledge, and as a condition of its impossibility. It is difficult to solve this contradiction by remaining within the framework of propositional knowledge, that is, preserving the difference between knowledge and object. In contrast to this way of thinking, Hegel means that what makes an object as an object is neither an object nor a property of the object ("but that this presupposed is a negative or a law is not the same"). On the contrary, Hegel consistently proves that the object itself ("presupposed") is a product of the setting reflection, and therefore the definition of the object as the "in itself" is actually not the definition of the object, but the definition of the reflection itself, i. of knowledge («this certainty belongs only to the setting reflection»). But, as we can see, reflection can not express what it sets itself as the law of reflection, that is, what sets the object, and what is posited in this setting remains for reflection two independent states of affairs , Therefore, when consciousness strives to reach the object as an object "in itself," it turns out that this "in itself" does not actually belong to the object, and therefore that consciousness of the object knows, is at the same time the object ( "In itself") and his existence for consciousness (knowledge), ie consciousness itself. This means that consciousness, as knowledge of the object, i. as a part of the knowledge-relation, essentially different from consciousness as unity of object and knowledge about the object, therefore, from the point of view of the natural representation, this is exclusively knowledge of something interpreted consciousness, only consciousness in itself or only concept of consciousness, thus consciousness that does not know itself. Hegel shows this in the "phenomenology of the mind" as follows:

"The transition from the first object and the knowledge of it to the other object, where it is said that the experience has been made, has been given so that the knowledge of the first object, or the fulness of the first to become the second object itself. On the other hand, it seems that we make the experience of the untruth of our first concept in another object, which we happen to find by chance and externally, so that in us only the pure apprehension of what is in and for itself falls within us. In this view, however, the new object appears to have become, through a reversal of consciousness itself. This consideration of the thing is our ingredient, whereby the series of experiences of consciousness rises to scientific activity, and which is not for the consciousness that we consider »[5, s. 75-76].

Thus, Hegel's justification of the essence of knowledge shows that the essence of the object, or what is an object in itself, remains inaccessible to the objective knowledge, since such knowledge omits the content of knowledge about itself, which is an implicit part, that is the object of knowledge. Thus, the justification strategy proposed by Hegel demonstrates the need to describe the knowledge of the object as an ontological category, i. as a property of the object itself and not only as a property of our knowledge about it.

Literature

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Annotation

The investigation is an attempt to answer the question: is objective knowledge a universalform of all knowledge, andfurther, based on the knowledge of object, can we know about knowledge? These issues are explored through the optics of speculative philosophy of G. Hegel. The main idea of the research is that relation between an object and knowledge does not imply an additional knowledge (i.e. the relation ofknowledge to itself as to the object), so this relationship is stay immediate. Keywords: knowledge, object, self-grounding, consciousness.

Дослідження є спробою дати відповідь на питання, чи є предметне знання універсальною формою всякого знання і чи можемо ми знати про знання на підставі знання про предмет. Ці питання досліджуються крізь оптику спекулятивної філософії Г. Гегеля. Основна ідея дослідження полягає в тому, що ставлення знання до предмету не передбачає додаткової самотематізаціі знання (-тобто відношення знання до себе як до предмету), тому це ставлення є безпосереднім.

Ключові слова: знання, предмет, самообґрунтування,