The discourse semantics of attitudinal relations: continuing the study of lexis

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The discourse semantics of attitudinal relations: continuing the study of lexis

J R Martin

Martin Centre for Appliable Linguistics

Shanghai Jiaotong University

University of Sydney

The University of Sydney,Australia

Abstract

This paper explores some aspects of the problem of categorizing attitudinal relations in English, as part of a description of evaluation informed by systemic functional linguistics (SFL) -- APPRAISAL. It reviews paradigmatic and syntagmatic orientations to lexis within this tradition, and the development of typological and topological representations of systemic relations. Corpus based argumentation is considered in relation to work on evaluation by Bednarek 2008; and proposals for continuing the study of lexis are suggested, focusing on resources for negotiating sadness and negative reactions to behavior (e.g. embarrassed, ashamed) and the affordances of topological representation. The paper highlights the possibilities and challenges involved in continuing the study of lexis in descriptions using SFL as their informing theory.

Keywords: Appraisal, attitude, affect, topology, lexis, discourse semantics

Дискурсивная семантика передачи эмоционального отношения: перспективы исследования лексики

Дж. Р. Мартин

Центр прикладной лингвистики Мартина,

Шанхайский университет Джао Тонг

200240, Шанхай, Китай, 800 DongchuanRoad

Университет Сиднея

NSW2006, Австралия linguistic vocabulary emotion evaluation

В данной статье рассматриваются некоторые аспекты проблемы категоризации оценочных отношений в английском языке как части описания оценки (Appraisal), основанной на системнофункциональной теории лингвистических исследований. В рамках данной традиции рассматриваются парадигматические и синтагматические подходы к лексике, а также развитие типологических и топологических представлений о системных отношениях. В статье высказывается отношение к возможности изучения оценки на основе корпусных данных, проведенного Беднарек (Bednarek2008). Предлагается изучение лексики, выражающей негативные эмоции (грусть) и негативные реакции на поведение (например, смущение и стыд) на основе топологического подхода. Намечаются перспективы дальнейшего изучения лексики с применением основных положений системнофункциональной лингвистики.

Ключевые слова: оценка, системные отношения, эмоции, топологический подход, дискурсивная семантика

THEORY AND DESCRIPTION

In late 2012 I was approached by a very concerned research student who reported that some people were saying `Appraisal Theory' wasn't a theory at all, but just a description. To which I replied: “Yes, of course. That's right. Systemic Functional Linguistics (hereafter SFL) is the theory. APPRAISAL is a description of resources for evaluation in English”.

A comparable confusion around the relation of theory to description arises in the introduction to a recent collection of papers on language education informed by SFL (Whittaker et al. 2009: 2): “While SFL recognised an `interpersonal' component of meaning, the model as stated did not readily support the analysis of speaker attitudes in text. During the 1990s, Peter White, Jim Martin and others developed an approach to attitudinal analysis, complementary to SFL, called `Appraisal Theory'”. Chapter 1 of Martin & White's The Language of Evaluation on the other hand is quite explicit that its “model of evaluation evolved within the general theoretical model of SFL” (2005: 7) and introduces appraisal resources in relation to relevant dimensions of SFL theory, including metafunction, realization, axis, system, structure, instantiation, genesis, register and genre. It concludes by situating “appraisal as an interpersonal system at the level of discourse semantics” (2005: 33). To my mind, the relation of theory to description is made clear. That said, colleagues working with appraisal, and I include myself among them, have made countless references to `Appraisal Theory' in presentations and publications, as a short-hand for a `description of appraisal resources in English within the general theoretical framework of SFL'. We need to be more careful.

The confusion at play here is of course between theory and description, or what Bernstein (2000: 131--141) refers to as L1 (the internal language of description) and L2 (the external language of description). As Maton 2014: 127 explains (elaborating Bernstein's (2000: 132) definitions): “L1 `refers to the syntax whereby a conceptual language is created' or how constituent concepts of a theory are interrelated; and L2 `refers to the syntax whereby the internal language can describe something other than itself' or how a theory's concepts are related to referents”. In these terms SFL is the L1 informing appraisal, which is the L2. As Matthiessen & Nesbitt 1996 clarify, there is no such thing as a theory neutral description. Descriptions which purport to be theory neutral are simply assuming a naturalized taken for granted theorisation, much as citizens who claim to be free of ideology enact a naturalized hegemony in which only those trying to redistribute power are viewed as political. I won't pursue the discussion of internal and external language of description here; for elaboration see Muller 2007 on verticality and grammatically, and Maton 2014 (especially his discussion of specialization, semantic gravity and semantic density). But the distinction between what linguists think of as theory and as description is crucial, and one aspect of the relation between L1 and L2 as far as the categorization of attitudinal relations is concerned is the main focus of this paper.

SFL AS A RELATIONAL THEORY OF MEANING

As is well known, SFL has evolved as a theory of language foregrounding paradigmatic relations as the basic organizing principle of both theory and description. Formalisation of these relations on the basis of the structures through which they are realized gives rise to crucial derived concepts such as rank, metafunction and stratification -- which function as comments on the bundling of paradigmatic relations in the organisation of language. As such, the theory builds on Saussure's understanding of the sign and valeur, Hjelmslev's interpretation of language as a stratified system of signs and Firth's notion of meaning as function in context. For a basic introduction to these ideas see Matthiessen & Halliday 2009 and Martin 2013. The critical concept arising from this intellectual history is the idea that language is a network of relations, an orientation shared with what was originally known as stratificational linguistics (Lamb 1996, Lockwood 1972), which has a comparable theoretical heritage. As far as meaning is concerned, this gives rise to a relational theory of meaning in which meaning is formalized as networks of options. In an L1 of this kind, language is conceived as a resource, and meaning as choice. Asking what a choice means involves explicitly relating that choice to other options in relevant systems (on a higher or lower rank, on a higher or lower stratum, and in one or another metafunction).

It is important to contrast this relational theory of meaning with the common sense referential one that is often taken as the basis for alternative conceptualisations in linguistics, philosophy and psychology. In common sense terms it makes sense to ask what a word means, and answer by pointing to some concrete object it refers to, or, where this is not possible, to offer a definition (the dictionary strategy). In this approach, words for example are conceived as having meaning (as realizing or encoding meaning if we want to say this more formally). From a relational perspective on the other hand, words don't have meaning; rather they do meaning -- they mean in relation to the other words that might have been chosen. Similarly groups and phrases mean in relation to other groups and phrases, clauses in relation to other clauses, exchanges in conversation in relation to other exchanges, phases of discourse is relation to other phases, genres in relation to other genres and so on. So the task of description in a relational model of language is to relate choices to one another, as explicitly as possible (as opposed to offering definitions or relating meanings to real world entities or cognitive concepts). As far as appraisal resources are concerned, this means describing how evaluative meanings are related to one another. And if we are focusing on feelings (i.e. attitude), as we are in this paper, this means building up a picture of the feelings we mean, describing how they are related to one another (looking round), specifying how they are realized (looking down) and outlining what they realize (looking up).

Note in practical terms that a relational theory of meaning implies that a good thesaurus is going to be a much more valuable resource than a dictionary. On the whole, definitions in dictionaries are not very well coordinated with one another, since dictionary makers tend to work a word at a time rather than with sets of related meanings. It also implies that consulting a translator will be far more insightful than introspecting about the meaning of an attitudinal expression. This is because most of us are not very good at bringing the relational meaning of a feeling expression to consciousness, whereas translators spend their whole life worrying relationally about the meaning of a word in one language and its relation to alternative translations in another. Their relational perspective is an invaluable resource in this regard (cf. de Souza 2010 on translating evaluative language from English into portuguese). The basic message I am trying to get across here is that a relational perspective on meaning means that we need to think relationally. Formally speaking, this means looking closely at how paradigmatic relations are modeling typologically and topologically as far as the discourse semantics of APPRAISAL is concerned.

TYPOLOGY AND TOPOLOGY

SFL's usual strategy for formalizing paradigmatic relations is a system network. A system network is a two-dimensional static display of logical relations among choices for meaning. In Fig. 1 below, the kind of traffic light system used in Hjelmslev 1947 to illustrate Saussure's concepts of the sign and valeur is formalized in SFL terms as a system network with three options (technically features). The basic meaning of each choice is its relation to other choices (its valeur). Since this is a very simple semiotic system, there is not much to say from round about, above or below, since choices do not bundle into metafunctions, ranks or strata. Out of respect for Saussure's concept of the sign I have used a yin/yang symbol to represent each option, and double-labeled each sign with respect to its fusion of signifiйand signifiant(stop/red, speed up/yellow and go/green). The arrow and square bracket organize the signs as alternatives; in this system you have to choose one of the three options (not none and not more than one).

Fig. 1 : Traffic light typology (after Saussure and Hjlemslev)

System networks also afford the possibility of cross-classification as in Fig. 2 below. In this abstract network, the choice of [a]¹ or [b] is simultaneous with the choice of [c] or [d], and so [a/c], [a/d], [b/c] and [b/d] are all possible combinations of meanings. Where two systems are involved the relations involved can be easily displayed as a paradigm -- a two-dimensional static display table with rows (for one system) and columns (for the other). The boxes in the table can then be used to show how features are realized. Tables of this kind are often used in language teaching materials for languages with portmanteau morphemes (i.e. morphemes realizing more than one system, such as verb inflections in Romance languages -- which may realise tense and mood, person and number). Syntagms typically realize more than one system, and so paradigms are commonly used in SFL to display the realisations of simultaneous group, phrase, clause, clause complex, exchange or genre systems. The limitation of paradigms is that they effectively display the interaction of two simultaneous systems but a third dimension (involving reformulation as an imaginary cube) makes them difficult to view I follow here the standard SFL convention of enclosing features in square brackets (for this and related conventions see Martin 2013). Consider in this regard the front over of the third edition of Halliday & Matthiessen's Introduc-tion to Functional Grammar (2004) where three dimensions are deployed (for strata, metafunction and instantiation) and a fourth dimension (rank) has been pulled out as a parallel image.; anda fourth dimension strains the visual affordances of a two-dimensional page or screen. System networks on the other hand can cross-classify any number of systems using the curly bracket (the brace) -- which specifies the [a/b] system as simultaneous with the [c/d] system in Fig. 2.

Fig. 2 : Cross-classification in relation to a paradigm

Turning to the relation of typology to topology as far as modeling paradigmatic relations is concerned we need to introduce the notion of clined systems. Clined systems scale meanings from one pole to another. There is no standard representation for this kind of system in SFL; in Fig. 3 I have tilted the systems clock-wise to signal that they involve a cline rather than a categorical opposition between features [a] and [b] and between features [c] and [d]. Where two systems are involved, this kind of network can be re-expressed as a topology -- with one clined system taken as the vertical axis and the another clined system as the horizontal one. This creates a space in which meanings can be graded as more or less [a] or [b] and more or less [c] or [d]. Theoretically speaking a topology is not limited to two dimensions; but practically speaking (as with paradigms) a third dimension is challenging as far as viewing is concerned, and additional dimensions require considerable ingenuity to display. The advantage of the topological perspective is that meanings can be graded in relation to one another instead of categorically opposed.

Interpersonal meanings in particular Compare however the PROCESS type topology on the front cover of the second edition of Halliday & Matthiessen's Introduction to Functional Grammar (1994) or Martin & Rose's 2008 to-pologies for register and genre. (e.g. Halliday's account of the semantics of modality in English in Chapter 10 of Halliday & Matthiessen 2014) lend themselves to description of this kind. For further discussion of the complementarity of modeling paradigmatic relations as typology and topology in SFL see Martin & Matthiessen 1991. As indicated in Fig. 3, the regions construed in a topological display can be further interpreted as having their own centre/margin structure, with the centre deployed for ideal types (e.g. prototypical [a/c] below) and the margins for the less ideal (e.g. extreme [a] or almost [b] or extreme [c] or almost [d] below).

Fig. 3: Simultaneous clined systems in relation to topology

Fig. 4: A topological display for vowel articulations

The complementarity of typology and topology will be familiar to linguists from their introductory courses in phonetics and phonology, where vowel systems tend to be presented typologically in terms of ideal types, and their phonetic realisations topologically in relation to tongue position. For Australian and New Zealand English, which have the same vowel system phonemically speaking, a topological diagram such as that in Fig. 4 might be used to show how New Zealand short vowels are spoken higher and further back than Australian ones (so that an Australian might hear New Zealand /s^ks/ as /seks/, New Zealand /seks/ as /siks/ and New Zealand /siks/ as /suks/ and so on and delight in such misunderstandings).

For an exemplary exploration of the complementarity of typology and topology in relation to appraisal see Bednarek 2007. Below I will review the two modeling strategies in relation to English ATTITUDE, in particular AFFECT, as presented in Martin & White 2005; Bednarek 2007 discusses typology and topology across a fuller range of attitude systems.

BEGINNING THE STUDY OF LEXIS

For Halliday's teacher Firth, “The first principle of phonological and grammatical analysis is to distinguish between structure and system” (1957/1968: 186). As far as the structure of lexis is concerned Firth emphasized the importance of studying mutual expectancies between words as texts unfold, which expectancies he referred to as collocation. This corpus perspective on lexis was developed by Sinclair and his colleagues at Birmingham, beginning with his seminal 1966 paper `Beginning the study of lexis'. Hunston 2011 presents an overview of the contributions of this work to our understanding of evaluative language, including critical contributions by Bednarek (2006, 2008). The complementary lexis as system perspective was developed by Halliday (1961, 1966), in relation to his proposal that the “grammarian's dream is (and must be, such is the nature of grammar) of constant territorial expansion. He would like to turn the whole of linguistic form into grammar, hoping to show that lexis can be defined as "most delicate grammar”” (1961: 267). This proposal was insightfully explored by Hasan 198 7 For a book length exploration of lexis as delicate grammar, see Tucker 1998 on the lexicogram- mar of adjectives. in relation to a small set of material processes (gather, collect, accumulate; scatter, divide, distribute; strew, spill, share). Her typology takes material processes of disposal and their interaction with benefaction as a starting point and pushes the description in delicacy until the realization of choices can be specified in terms of specific disposal lexis.

I'll use an interpersonal example here to illustrate this conception of lexis as delicate grammar -- drawing on Halliday & Matthiessen's classification of Comment Adjuncts (2014: 190--193). Their first distinction is between what they call propositional and speech-functional comment (I use the features [feeling] vs [dialogism] for this in order to orient the discussion towards work on the appraisal system engagement). The more attitudinal comments only appear in statements (group 1 below), whereas the dialogic ones position a speaker's voice in statements and invite the addressee to position hers in questions (group 2 below).

Fortunately, we won the match.

*Fortunately, did we win the match?

*Fortunately, win the match.

Honestly, they won the match.

Honestly, did they win the match?

*Honestly, win the match.

Halliday & Matthiessen then break the dialogic comments down into a what they call a qualified and an unqualified comment; the criteria they use for this distinction is the ability of the qualified type to be followed by the word speaking: e.g. generally speaking, frankly speaking, strictly speaking (cf. * admittedly speaking, *actually speaking).

Honestly speaking, I doubt they'll win.

Strictly speaking, it's invoking not inscribing feeling.

Admittedly, they won.

*Admittedly speaking, they won.

Actually, it's invoking.

*Actually speaking, it's invoking.

The qualified type is subsequently split, without explanation, into validity (generally, broadly, roughly etc.) and personal engagement subtypes. The distinctions introduced to this point are formalized as a system network below (which has as its unspecified point of origin the feature [indicative] in the system mood -- since imperative clauses cannot be commented on).

Fig. 5 : Comment Adjunct systems (cf. Halliday & Matthiessen 2014)

The personal engagement class is then divided, without explanation, into [honesty] (e.g. frankly), [secrecy] (e.g. confidentially), [individuality] (e.g. personally), [accuracy] (e.g. strictly) and [hesitancy] (tentatively). The last of these categories, hesitancy, has only one realisation -- tentatively. This means that we have reached the point where we can in fact lexicalise the realisation of the feature [hesitancy] as the lexical item tentatively. This additional delicacy is formalised in Fig. 6 below (with the feature [qualified] from Fig. 5 as its point of origin); the realisation statement CMwtentatively specifies the realisation of the feature [hesitancy] as the lexical item tentatively.

Fig. 6: Comment Adjunct systems, further delicacy

In effect what SFL is doing here is treating the relation between function words like do and open class lexical items like most nouns and verbs as a cline. From a paradigmatic perspective the difference is simply that function words realise grammatical options that are more general in delicacy than those realised by lexical items. In English, do for example is part of the realisation of general choices in MOOD, [negative] and [imperative] for example (i.e. Don't look now!); tentatively on the other hand realises more delicate options -- via the realisation path [major: indicative: commented: dialogism: qualified: personal engagement: hesitancy].

Note particularly that Halliday & Matthiessen motivate the [feeling/dialogism] opposition via interaction with MOOD and the [qualified/unqualified] distinction via potential combination with speaking, but that no criteria are offered for [validity] vs [personal engagement]. Similarly, no grounds are offered for differentiating types of personal engagement. This reflects a general problem as far as argumentation is concerned, namely that as we move from relatively closed system items to word classes with more members, the kind of motivations for features we are used to deploying for more general `grammar' systems get harder to find.

CONTINUING THE STUDY OF LEXIS: ATTITUDE

In section 4 above we exemplified the way in which an analysis of feeling can be approached from the perspective of lexis as delicate grammar. Significantly, this meant taking one dimension of grammar (indicative mood to be precise) as a starting point and asking how Comment Adjuncts can be deployed to negotiate an attitude towards a declarative or interrogative clause -- for example Sadly, they lost. But unhappiness can be realized through a number of grammatical resources, not just Comment Adjuncts. Across languages, nominal groups appear to provide the richest lexical resources for expressing feeling, through attitudinal Epithets (e.g. a sad fan). But feelings can also be realized as Circumstances of manner (e.g. they walked home sadly), and as mental processes (e.g. the loss distressed them) or behavioural ones (they frowned).

a sad fan (nominal group Epithet)

they walked home sadly(Manner circumstance)

the loss distressed (mental process)

them they frowned(behavioural process)

And grammatical metaphor can of course be deployed to reconstrue any of these realisations of unhappiness as a Thing in a nominal group:

It is with great sadness that I have to inform you that they lost. The fans' sadness...

They walked home in sadness.

Their distress at the loss...

Their frown...

This means that as far as feeling is concerned the grammarian's dream has to be pursued in several regions of a grammar, each it must be acknowledged with a distinctive set of relational resources for negotiating feeling. That said, positioning lexis as delicate grammar means we cannot in lexicogrammar generalise the kinds of attitude that may be realised across different lexicogrammatical systems. To capture these generalisations we have to move up a level in abstraction to discourse semantics and make room for appraisal. We move in other words from the grammarian's dream to a discourse analyst's nightmare!

Not knowing quite where else to turn, our basic strategy for proposing attitudinal relations was to lean on grammar, implicitly based on the feeling that if the grammar can be bothered generalising parameters related to evaluation, they might prove useful. Note in passing the assumption here of a `natural' relation between lexicogrammar and discourse semantics at play, in relation to SFL's conception of a stratified content plane (as lexicogrammar and discourse semantics in a model such as that proposed in Martin 1992 and assumed in Martin & Rose 2003/2007 and here). Although we will focus on just affect at this point in the discussion, space precludes a detailed presentation of the relevant grammatical parameters. In short, as summarized in Table 1 below, our [irrealis/realis] opposition derives from the distinction between desiderative and emotive mental process (I wanted them to win/I like them winning); our [desire/fear] opposition from the distinction between positive and negative expanding purpose clauses (They played aggressively so that they'd win/they played conservatively lest they lose); our [surge/disposition] opposition from the distinction between behavioural and mental processes (I cried when they lost/It upset me that they lost); our [mood/directed at] opposition from the distinction between relational and mental processes (I felt sad (but wasn't sure what made me feel that way)/The loss upset me); our [high/median/low] opposition on modality (They're certainly/probably/possibly upset); and our [positive/ negative] opposition on polarity (I was/wasn't sad).

Grammatical sources for affect relations