PhD, Senior Specialist, Institute of National Remembrance, Office for History Research, Regional Branch

Purchasing a license legally did not necessarily solve the problem, and rather caused them given the unfavorable background of the state planned economy in PPR. Some especially serious problems arose during the launch of the production-line of modern antibiotics in TZF during the seventies. ZbigniewFallenbuchl describes an unlucky investment and gives a very profound analysis of the east-west trade and technology-transfer prepared in 1983 for the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): “In 1973, the Planning Commission approved of the purchase of the license to produce penicillin G and some other antibiotics by the pharmaceutical enterprise `Polfa' in Tarchomin. After a survey of various alternatives, the license was purchased from an American firm Squibb and an arrangement was made with an American engineering firm McKee for technical assistance in the construction of the plant and in the installation of the production lines. The amount of $5 million which was paid for the license was expected to be recovered by 1981 from exports of the antibiotics to be produced on its basis. The Planning Commission decided, however, not to include the construction of the Tarchomin plant in the investment plans of the chemical industry for 1976 and 1977, and the R&D work in connection with the utilization of this license was abandoned in 1976. The construction of the plant was then among the `priority investments' in the plan for 1978. The construction was, however, delayed for lack of free productive capacity in the construction and the installation enterprises, lack of building materials and various pieces of equipment. It had not been completed by September 1981 when the contractual obligations of the license support and the guarantees on the already delivered machines and equipment were terminated. Completion of the project, which because of a very acute shortage of antibiotics in the country was again classified as important, was shifted to 1982. It became necessary to extend the license for an additional period of 3 years in order to secure a guarantee for the first period of its utilization. Because of reductions in other sectors of the economy there will [from this point Fallanbuchl anticipates. -- M. S.], however, be no supply of necessary materials from domestic production and most of them will have to be imported from the advanced countries in the West. It seems that in this case the Planning Commission is responsible for the failure to include the project in the investment plan as soon as it had approved the purchase of the license and [for the failure. -- M.S.] to secure for it all necessary complementary machines, equipment and materials. The cause is not technical but systemic” Fallenbuchl Z. M. East-West Technology Transfer.P. 80..

Such accidents, resulting from weaknesses of the planned economy, gave Polish authorities an additional incentive to replace legal means of trade by intelligence along with its capabilities to obtain solutions on the “black market”. Thanks to the intelligence's trade channels, valuable foreign currencies could possibly be collected and spent in other crucial areas, in particular by repaying loans to western European creditors For more, see: Zloch-Christy I. Debt problems of Eastern Europe. Cambridge, 1987. P. 105-113.. Additionally, the cost of technologies purchased “illegally” was several hundred percent lower than the purchase of official licenses. It is confirmed in many dozens of cable exchanges between the Ministry of Chemical Industry and intelligence. Based on analyzed materials, it is possible to initially note that intelligence focuses mainly on one of around a dozen, though most costly segments of medicine production -- i. e. antibiotics, which obviously did not exclude leading selective operations in other key segments, such as vaccines or cardiology. However, even during the most intense periods, its input could not exceed more than twenty percent of solutions implemented by the Polish pharmaceutical industry in the mass production every year.

In the second part of the article, I will analyze intelligence documents on operations aimed at bringing technology of medicine production to Poland. Moreover, I will try to quantify the economic effects of illegal purchases approved by the authorities of the People's Republic of Poland. I will also discuss the assets and modus operandiof the Division of Chemical Scientific and Technical Intelligence. On the example of HIV, I will also present analytical, informational and prognostic functions of the intelligence service of PPR operating in the area of health care.

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