Background: The term «hard cases» trace back to Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart who was one of the first legal philosophers who directly used it in his works and Ronald Myles Dworkin to whom the development and establishment of this concept in legal language is linked. Even though these two legal philosophers in one of the most famous - The Hart-Dworkin - legal debate couldn't agree on certain things, they both agreed that when dealing with hard cases, there is a need to act creatively in order to resolve such a case properly. The division of cases into easy ones and hard ones gradually lost its popularity, even in legal theory, but perhaps it can be resurrected and used these challenging times to help meet the challenges prompted by technology?

Methods: This paper analyses the dichotomy of hard and easy cases as well as circumstances relating to the courts' decision-making processes in such cases. The essay examines whether the solutions proposed by legal positivism (such as applying syllogisms and precedents) are sufficient to deal with easy cases. The paper also examines what factors analysed by legal realists have an impact on judges while making decisions in hard cases (for example, psychological factors, such as hindsight bias, intuition, hunches, the anchor effect, laziness, unwillingness to take responsibility, or the gambler's fallacy, as well as social factors, like upbringing, life experience, social relations, gender, age, education, etc.). Given that the article is theoretical in nature, logical, systemic, teleological methods dominate. Both descriptive method and scientific research method were used as well.

Results and Conclusions: The author concludes that easy cases should eventually be delegated to artificial intelligence to resolve, whereas hard cases will remain in the competence of human judges, at least until technological development reaches a certain level.

Keywords: hard cases, legal positivism, legal realism, artificial intelligence.

Introduction

The uncertainty regarding how judges make decisions raises doubts about compliance with both the principle of legitimate expectations and the principle of legal certainty and contributes to the lack of trust in the judiciary in general. The analysis of court decisions is important not only for private interests (parties of the proceedings) but for the public interest as well, since court decisions that shape case law are also important to society. Moreover, the analysis of what lies behind the discretion of judges and for which types of cases certain decision-making methods are most appropriate and effective is useful not only for the parties in a court case and society but also for the judges and courts themselves.

In 2019, France became the first country in the world to criminalise research on individual judges and predictions of their future decisions.² These violations are currently punishable by up to five years in prison. Naturally, the question arises, why should the activities of judges not be analysed? This paper invites us, in R. A. Posner's words, to focus on helping judges cope with complexity because, inter alia, they need instruction in the cognitive abilities and psychological characteristics of judges, jurors, and witnesses, as well as instruction in avoiding fallacies in reasoning.³ The analysis of the decision-making process is considered to be beneficial for the courts, individual judges, and the public.

The administration of justice is the prerogative of the courts, implemented when the courts make decisions that are subject to requirements of legality and reasonableness. The proper exercise of this exclusive competence directly correlates with greater trust in the courts. Increasing public confidence in the judiciary system is a constant goal of all courts worldwide. The absence of a single common formula for judicial decisions poses a risk of mistrust in the courts and directly correlates with the principle of legal certainty. Accordingly, this analysis of a judge's decision-making is likely to provide some legal certainty and thus promote greater trust in the judiciary.

Art. 109 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania enshrines that: `When considering cases, judges shall obey only the law'.⁴ The positivistic approach to decision-making embedded expressis verbis raises the question of whether this decision-making approach is still sufficient in modern times.

1. Dividing cases into hard ones and easy ones

Before analysing the dichotomy of hard and easy cases, it should be noted that there are no uniform definitions of these concepts in legal doctrine. The theory of hard cases has been proposed by representatives of legal positivism - H. L. A. Hart's `The Concept of Law' describes hard cases as situations where rational and informed lawyers may disagree on which of the answers is legally correct. According to him, in such cases, the law itself is fundamentally incomplete - it simply does not provide an answer to the questions raised in such cases. As H. L. A. Hart claims, different principles supporting competing analogies may arise in each hard case; therefore, a judge will often have to choose between them, relying, like a conscientious legislator, on his or her sense of what is best and not on any pre-established order of priorities prescribed by law.⁵ R. Dworkin, a representative of a unified theory of law, categorically opposed these ideas and argued that those are the cases where the result is not clearly dictated by statute or precedent, but the judges duty, even in hard cases, remains the same: to reveal the rights of the parties rather than to retrospectively create new ones. According to Hart, the structure of law is complete - it is an all-encompassing empire of law - so every legal question has right and wrong answers, answers in accordance with the law and contrary to the law. The judge must discover the law, not create it.⁶ Without going into the discourse of whether judges in hard cases create law or interpret it, the opposite views outlined above show something in common regarding this chapter: hard cases cause uncertainty about to what approach to choose - which legal norm or which method of interpreting a certain norm. Thus, cases in which alternatives arise from which the judge must choose are deemed to be hard cases.

This definition of hard cases is quite abstract and requires a little more detailed investigation. The word hard is defined as difficult to understand or solve.⁷ Linguistically speaking, the cases that require a great deal of effort from a judge to resolve them correctly are indeed hard. In fact, another definition of the word hard is simply the opposite of the word easy. This is how the concept of hard cases will be explored further - as an opposite to easy ones. As mentioned before, there are different approaches to the concept of easy cases. Both the initiative of the Estonian Ministry of Justice to create a `robotic judge' to solve disputes on petty cases amounting to less than €7000 and the initiative to reform the judiciary system in England and Wales to enable new technological solutions to decide cases under Ј25,000 online show that in some countries, cases are divided into easy and hard ones based on the amount of a claim.

Naturally, the question arises as to whether such a correlation between the amount of the claim and the complexity of a case is justified. After all, there are many cases where the financial expression of a dispute related to morality or religion is relatively small, but its value and significance for the law and thus, the complexity, are enormous. A claim to recover damages in the amount of several thousand euros, but arising from, for example, a failure to satisfy the conditions of an agreement of purchase and sale, could be resolved in a very simple manner, even though the amount of the dispute would be relatively high. Consequently, the division of cases into hard and easy based on the amount of a dispute, as well as, for example, based on the scope or a number of parties or charges, are relative and do not reflect the real complexity of the case.

It seems most appropriate to understand easy cases as ones where there are only primitive, uncomplicated legal questions to which the answer is obvious, and such a case can be resolved by applying the relevant legal norm. This approach is supported by professor V. Mikelиnas - if the applicable legal norm is completely clear both from the linguistic and other points of view, there is no need to interpret it. In easy cases, the judge may resolve a case without interpreting the law. Easy cases are those in which judgments are easily reasoned and made - they are made almost without thinking. D Mikelиnienи, V Mikelиnas, Teismo procesas: teisиs aiskinimo ir taikymo aspektai (Justitia 1999) 21. In principle, in an easy case, the judge does not have to decide which of several possible options to choose, and legal reasoning becomes essentially unnecessary, as no one questions why that particular legal norm is applicable, and the case is resolved in that way. To conclude, simplicity, obviousness, and comprehensibility of the arguments of the adopted judgment are the features by which an easy case should be defined. According to R.A. Posner, such cases are easy to decide by virtue of being controlled by existing law. RA Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Harvard University Press 1990) 161. Therefore, hard cases are fundamentally different from easy cases since easy cases are clearly governed by existing law, and the right decision is obvious, whereas in hard cases, other factors must be used to make the right decision.

Hard cases are special, non-traditional, atypical, exceptional cases where there is a lack of legal regulation or improper enshrining of legal norms. Thus, in hard cases, it is not enough for judges to rely on a legal norm (as in easy cases), considering that there is no appropriate legal norm, or its application would be manifestly incorrect. In such cases, judges seek a solution, for example, while trying to determine the legislative intent of the legislature or with the help of principles of law.

After discussing the common features of both hard and easy cases, it is important to analyse the importance of this division. First of all, the decisions in hard cases must be fairly and convincingly reasoned by judges. The judge must, in a sense, convince others why he or she has chosen a certain way to resolve the case (as mentioned, in hard cases, there is no single, clear solution), whereas the legal norms applicable in easy cases are clear, so there is no need for a judge to interpret them. In these cases, over-argumentation could even have a negative effect -the judge could risk saying too much about a certain established practice or the meaning of a legal norm. Secondly, the role of the judge in the decision-making also depends on where the particular case will be assigned. In easy cases that can be resolved by deduction, a detailed legal analysis would be redundant and would not be in line with the principle of legal effectiveness.

In difficult cases, on the contrary, judges must put a lot of effort into finding the right solution. In this essay, the division of cases into hard and easy is particularly important, as the aim will be to show that the methods of resolving cases proposed by legal positivism are only suitable for easy cases, while in hard cases, judges are often influenced by factors identified by legal realism.

2. The ways of resolving cases proposed by legal positivism

A judge in a democratic mechanism does not have the right to be Shakespeare. T Berkmanas, Ar lingvistinis neapibrиztumas uzkerta keli^ teisиs viespatavimo (rule of law) jsigalиjimui?' (2002) 1 (1) International Journal of Baltic Law 52.

A. Comte's positivist philosophy, which laid the foundations for the doctrine of legal positivism, sought to formulate new, clear, and precise principles of the social world, analogous to the laws of nature. As a result, the representatives of legal positivism sought to purify the law, separate it from values, and objectify it. In a much-simplified version of legal positivism, a judge's activity in interpreting the law and making decisions is considered an almost mechanical process in which the court's decision cannot be based on illegal arguments, political or social values, or the judge's opinion. The law perceived by the paradigm of legal positivism is a clear system of instructions of the legislator in which a rational, logically reasoned answer to practically any question of law can be found. Thus, there is no need for the judge to find a way to resolve the case on the basis of subjective non-judicial criteria - the decision of the case for the positivist judge is dictated by the duty to find that single logical, obvious, and ultimately predictable solution.

The spirit of legal positivism is perfectly reflected in the provision entrenched in para. 3 of Art. 109 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, which states that when considering cases, judges shall obey only the law. Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, 1992. It is in the law that the judge finds the right answer - by applying the pre-existing law. Legal positivism recognises these ways of resolving cases as deduction and adherence to the principle of stare decisis, which is the essence of court precedent. Firstly, both methods of resolving cases ensure the principle of legal certainty - they are predictable. Secondly, both methods also find answers in law, which means that decisions are based exclusively on legal norms.

It is worth analysing the criticism of the ways of resolving cases suggested by legal positivism. Some claim that the correct answer cannot be found by following the rules of formal, ambiguous logic alone. In each case, the answer is found only after a value decision has been made, that is, by applying certain evaluation criteria: fairness, reasonableness, equality, and other general principles of law. However, these values and principles are not sufficiently defined and clear, so their content and application to specific life situations also must be interpreted. D Mikelйnienй, V Mikelйnas, Teismo procesas: teisйs aiskinimo ir taikymo aspektai (Justitia 1999) 140. The question arises as to whether it is really effective to insist on a value decision in a legal dispute that can be resolved with the help of a simple legal syllogism. Is it really necessary to apply the principles of justice, reasonableness, fairness, equality, and other general principles of law in each and every case? Given the axiom that justice delayed is justice denied, the essence of both the principles of efficiency and effectiveness, and the constant problem of judicial backlog, it can be argued that not all cases require a thorough legal assessment - the fabula of some cases can be fitted into a mathematical formula and solved much more efficiently with the help of formal logic. Criticising the analysed approach to the activities of a judge, R. A. Posner points out that in this way, the law is treated as a set of data having no chronological dimension and the principles themselves as timeless, like the propositions of Euclidean geometry. In this way, law is separated from life because a formal system, such as geometry, is a system of the relationship between ideas and not the relationship between ideas and physical reality. RA Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Harvard University Press 1990) 16. Nevertheless, assessing such a criticism within the limits of pure legal positivism, it should be noted that a positivist judge does not create law - on the contrary, he interprets the law created by the legislator. The principle of the separation of powers is particularly prevalent in democratic countries; hence it is the legislator that must deal with the discrepancy between the rules in force and real life, not the judges. The courts must respect the will of the legislator, presume that the legislator is rational and prudent, seek to identify its real objectives, and see whether the content deriving from the legal text is in line with those objectives and intentions. In summary, there should be a presumption that legal norms are relevant, and the correlation between the law and the actual legal relationship in easy cases must be followed and steered in the right direction by the legislator.

It is claimed that the approach of legal formalism (the model of extreme legal positivism) does not assess the difference between hard and easy cases but treats all cases as if they were easy. Accordingly, a judge's activity is limited in the field of interpretation of the law, without recognising their choice or creative contribution in determining the meaning of the legal norm. R Latvelй, Teisйjo vaidmuo aiskinant teisз. Daktaro disertacija (Vilniaus universitetas 2010) 49. However, perhaps on the basis of this reason alone, the benefits of legal positivism in resolving court cases in general should not be underestimated. After all, the fact that the methods of resolving cases promoted by legal positivism are not sufficient for some cases does not per se presuppose the fact that these methods are completely unusable. After identifying the main features of easy cases, the rest of this chapter will seek to demonstrate that the methods of resolving cases proposed by legal positivism are not only sufficient but should also be deemed a priority - they should be considered the first option in easy cases.

2.1 Syllogisms as a way to resolve cases

According to N. MacCormick, an easy case is one in which there is no dispute as to the relevant facts or the applicable law and where the decision can, in principle, be justified by deduction. N MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Clarendon Press 1978). Syllogism, as one of the oldest and most popular kinds of logical argument that apply deductive reasoning, can be understood as a scheme consisting of a legal norm (the major premise), the factual circumstances of the case (the minor premise), and a deducted conclusion. For example, on the basis of syllogism, (certain) administrative offences (for example, speeding more than 10 km / h but not more than 20 km / h) may be subject to half the minimum penalty provided for in the relevant article (the major premise). Person X has committed an administrative offence referred to in the major premise (the minor premise); consequently, person X will be subject to half of the statutory minimum fine for the violation. This example was chosen to show that by putting the routine and mechanical process of compiling an administrative order into a legal syllogism - starting with 1 January 2019 - certain amendments that introduced the automation of administration order without any human intervention came into force in Lithuania. Art. 611(4) of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Republic of Lithuania. law court judge

When considering the application of syllogisms in the decision-making of judges, it should be emphasised that, in principle, when a judge is making decisions, a connection is established between the legal norms and the facts, which determines a certain conclusion. It is a mechanical, logical sequence of actions when moving from assumptions to conclusions. As J. Gumbis fairly points out, when a judge's decision is based solely on the applicable law, it is not the decision of an individual. It is a decision of the state that acts through that person - it is the exercise of power. J Gumbis, `Teisйs samprata: logikos taikymo problematika' (2010) 76 Teisй 50. This model, also known in academic literature as the doctrine of mechanical justice, is based on the so-called static doctrine of legal interpretation, according to which a judge must always follow only the letter of the law and cannot interpret law praeter legem or contra legem. Consequently, a judge, even if he or she sees that the application of a certain legal norm may lead to a violation of legal principles (for example, proportionality, equality), he or she must apply such a norm anyway. Thus, legitimacy > proportionality, equality, etc. Such a conclusion is presupposed by the principle of separation of powers promoted by legal positivism - a positivist judge merely carries out the will of the legislator and must follow and apply it until the legislator (and not the court itself) decides to change it.

Syllogisms as a means of resolving cases in legal doctrine are often criticised for 1) proving only the fairness of the thought process, rather than establishing the truth in the process, RA Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Harvard University Press 1990) 54-55. or 2) that in such cases, the work of judges is more similar to the administration of justice rather than the execution, J Gumbis, `Teisйs samprata: logikos taikymo problematika' (2010) 76 Teisй 51. or 3) that the judge treats the law as a set of data without a chronological dimension and views the principles and norms of law as truths that are independent of changes in time or the environment. R Latvelй, Teisйjo vaidmuo aiskinant teisз. Daktaro disertacija (Vilniaus universitetas 2010) 48. However, the advantages solving cases using syllogisms provides - such as ensuring legal stability (judgments are based on norms that were agreed by the public), recognising the authority of the legislature, and ensuring the principle of legal certainty - are essential for the sustainable existence of a sound legal system.

Legal doctrine states that a syllogistic approach in cases is necessary in order to protect legal certainty and stability and to ensure the principle of the rule of law. Ibid 40. It is obvious that such regulation expresses respect for the legislative body and encourages the presumption of reliability and validity of the norms developed by the legislator. It also creates more legal certainty and predictability, as the conformity of court decisions with legal norms is visible. The principle of legal certainty is ensured because such decisions are easy to predict in the future. For example, a litigant expects that the judgment of the court will not be determined by any subjective factors, and the judge will be objective and will apply the law properly. More generally, this means that the public wants to know what competence is given to a judge to act as a representative of state power and to make a binding decision that affects individual freedoms and property and can be enforced by state coercion. The public wants a court decision to be a legitimate exercise of state power. J Gumbis, `Teisйs samprata: logikos taikymo problematika' (2010) 76 Teisй 50. Consequently, the use of syllogisms helps to ensure the objectivity of judges and thus of the decision taken - the autonomy and objectivity of the law are secured by confining legal analysis to the formal level, requiring only an exploration of relations among legal ideas. Autonomy and objectivity are threatened when the legal outcome depends on facts surrounding the world, which might be facts of a dispute or social or ethical facts relevant to creating or interpreting a rule. RA Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Harvard University Press 1990) 40. It is believed that it was the closure of the system and the mechanisation of dispute resolution that determined the success of eBay - one of the largest online auctions and e-commerce sites, resolving an average of 60 million consumer disputes a year through an online dispute resolution centre. Disputes over goods of poor quality, late delivery, or improper delivery through this platform are resolved remotely through alternative dispute resolution. For more information, see www.ebay.com It was the limited possibilities of the cases and solutions that determined the efficiency and people's confidence in the system.

It is indisputable that legal syllogisms are difficult to apply in hard cases where several possible solutions compete and/or the solution proposed by the rules of reasoning is questionable from the point of view of common sense and/or justice. Hard cases are not usually resolved in accordance with established formal legal rules, but they result in decisions that are atypical, extreme, and incompatible with normal legal standards. They also usually provide for exceptions to the legal rules. G Lastauskienй, `Teisinis kvalifikavimas formaliosios logikos poziuriu' (2009) 73 Teisй 51. However, syllogisms are an excellent basis and starting point from which judges should resolve cases, and in easy cases, it should be deemed a sufficient and priority way to do that. The principle of separation of powers presupposes that the legislator is entrusted with a special legislative function, so it should be reasonable to expect that the clearest, easiest model cases will be properly regulated by the legislators. It should be noted that the rule of law requires laws to be consistent, stable, and comprehensible. Consequently, authoritative legislators have a constitutional obligation to ensure the adoption of such laws. In summary, the presumption that the least that can be expected from an authoritative legislator is the proper enactment of the most basic `rules of the game' and, accordingly when noting that it would be manifestly incorrect to apply a rule which is appropriate to a clear, elementary ordinary legal dispute, such gaps in easy cases should be filled by the competent legislature and not by the courts, seems reasonable. Advantages of the formal application of rules identified by J. Gumbis are as follows: rule makers are often in a better position to decide what justice is and how to achieve it in a particular case, and in general, the legislature generally has more time to analyse problems and systematically consider more elements. It has more sources of information, is not bound by gathering evidence and/or other procedural rules. Rules are often more effective than discretion because they essentially consolidate experience. A rule is a certain crystallised element formed by the lengthy process of how certain conflicts are to be resolved. J Gumbis, `Teisйs samprata: logikos taikymo problematika' (2010) 76 Teisй 47. It is argued that, in easy cases, the judge would, in a sense, become an administrator of the law. Rather than insisting on seeking justice by deviating to various discourses, the principles of legal expediency and economy would be better ensured, the workload of courts would be significantly reduced, the law would be more predictable, and that would encourage greater public confidence in the judiciary. Perhaps, this would even reduce the number of cases in the courts in general, as individuals would be able to resolve disputes in easy cases themselves, and judges would be able to focus more on difficult cases.

We refer to a legal precedent as a decision of a state institution, usually a court, made in a specific case and later considered as an example in resolving similar cases. It can be understood as an authoritative opinion on how to resolve a problematic dispute. The application of precedents helps to ensure compliance with the stare decisis principle (similar cases must be dealt with in a similar way). Relying on precedents is a condition for uniform (consistent) case law and thus for the full administration of justice. Therefore, the precedents of the courts cannot be unreasonably ignored when resolving similar cases. E Kыris, `Teismo precedentas kaip teisйs saltinis Lietuvoje: oficiali konstitucinй doktrina, teisinio m^stymo stereotipai ir kontrargumentai' (2009) 2 (116) Jurisprudencija 134.

The origin of court precedents is often linked to the medieval kingdom of England. The axiom is that in the common law countries, where court precedent is recognised as the main source of law and case law was the basis for the formation of the whole legal tradition. Precedent is of far greater importance than in the continental legal tradition. However, the institution of precedent is also extremely important for the states of the Romano-Germanic tradition. Lithuanian legal doctrine notes that the dominance of court precedents as sources of law is a natural stage of legal development, which each evolving legal system goes through. J Machovenko, Teisйs istorija (Vilniaus universiteto leidykla 2013) 98-99. For example, the doctrine of stare decisis prevailing in the Anglo-American legal tradition can be summarised in the following instructions: (1) the court is bound by the decisions of the higher courts, the courts of the highest levels (sometimes any level), and their own; (2) the decision of any other court in the present case is a compelling argument and must be considered; (3) the decision is binding only to the extent of its ratio decidendi; (4) a precedent does not automatically lose its binding force over time, but a very old one may be disapplied if it no longer meets the changed social relations. For example, in Lithuania, although the principle of stare decisis is not explicitly established, even without using this concept, a court decision is not considered to be a mere act of law, but an authoritative source of law, binding not only other courts dealing with similar cases but also the precedent-maker him/ herself. Thus, court precedent is a source of law in both vertical and horizontal terms. E Kыris, `Teismo precedentas kaip teisйs saltinis Lietuvoje: oficiali konstitucinй doktrina, teisinio m^stymo stereotipai ir kontrargumentai' (2009) 2 (116) Jurisprudencija 135. In Lithuania, the peculiarities of the institute of court precedent have mainly been developed by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, which states that the following factors are decisive (among other important factors) in ensuring the continuity of jurisprudence: courts of general jurisdiction of higher instance must, when reviewing decisions of courts of general jurisdiction of lower instance, always assess those decisions in accordance with the same legal criteria; those criteria must be clear and known ex ante to legal persons and inter alia to courts of general jurisdiction of a lower instance (hence, the jurisprudence of courts of general jurisdiction must be foreseeable). See, e.g., Ruling of 24 October 2007, no. 111-4549 and ruling of 28 March 2006, no. 36-1292 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. Subsequently, the duty of courts to formulate uniform case law allows precedent a special place in the legal system, regardless of whether the principle of stare decisis is explicitly enshrined or not. Such adherence to consistent case- law ensures the safeguarding of constitutional principles, such as the principle of equality - if similar cases were to be handled differently or different cases were to be treated equally, we would face unjustified unequal treatment of persons; the principles of legal certainty and legal predictability encourage clear precedents, and there should be no deviation from them without reason - this fosters legal clarity and predictability. In summary, in Lithuania, which does not belong to the Anglo-American legal tradition, the special place of precedent as a source of law is determined not by the explicit establishment of the stare decisis principle, but rather by such constitutional principles of law as equality, predictability of law, and legal certainty.

After describing the essential features of precedent, it is appropriate to discuss its applicability in easy cases. It should be noted that, in principle, the process of deciding on the application of precedent in a particular case can be divided into the following essential steps: identification of precedent content, assessment of its suitability for the case, and the actual application. There are a number of legal problems in the first step of applying precedent, but this discourse is not the subject of the present paper. This paper presupposes the existence of criteria for relying on precedents, which can be used to identify the need to apply certain precedents in specific cases. It should be noted that the second and third steps are very similar in nature to the application of syllogisms in decision-making analysed in section A of this chapter. For example, when we have a clear and appropriate precedent, we equate it with a certain legal norm. Such an approach is also supported in legal doctrine, where it is stated that the ratio decidendi part of a court precedent can be understood as having a normative nature. R Cross, JW Harris, Precedent in English Law (Oxford University Press 1991) 72. Equating the application of analogy by precedent to the application of legal syllogism, it can be concluded that this way of resolving a case, which reflects the ideas of legal positivism, should also be sufficient and the main approach in easy cases.

The main advantages of applying analogy (precedent) in easy cases will be analysed below. First, the fact that in a similar situation, the court will have to decide the case in the same way as in the case law allows individuals to predict court decisions, even when such legal instruction is not explicitly disclosed in law. In this way, as was already mentioned, the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations are ensured. When similar situations are resolved in the same way, the court's decision by analogy makes its arguments more convincing to the parties, the judge is considered more objective, and his or her decision is determined by the application of obvious law and not by non-legal factors, promoting greater public confidence in the judiciary. The application of precedents in easy cases is also in line with the principles of economy and efficiency of the process because of the following reasons. 1) The efficiency of court proceedings increases (it can be objectively perceived that the productivity of judges would be significantly reduced, whereas the workload would increase significantly if relevant decisions made in the past could not be relied upon) - it should also be mentioned that the consistent application of precedents in easy cases would also reduce the workload of courts of appellate and cassation instances. 2) Clear and widely applied precedent rules are expected to lead to less litigation and encourage individuals to settle disputes out of court, the outcome of which can be easily predicted (this would, of course, also contribute to a lower workload of judges). In summary, the automatic application of precedent (analogy) in easy cases would give courts more time to focus on hard ones. Another particularly important argument is the duty of courts to shape common practice. As mentioned above, when resolving a specific dispute, the court enforces not only the private interests of the parties to the proceedings but also the public interests, as the prerogative exercised by the judge to interpret legal norms in the form of judgments are duty-bound by the public.

It should be noted that this paper does not analyse the problems of the application of precedent in difficult cases, such as, for example, competition between precedents or a situation where precedent is legally valid but does not reflect the existing relationship, since the aim was to defend the idea that the application of the analogy is a comprehensive and sufficient way of dealing with easy cases specifically. Summarising the above, it can be stated that this hypothesis was defended on the grounds that not applying precedents in easy cases and re-establishing the compliance of the subject matter with the legal norms each time would be ineffective, and this would not guarantee the principles of legal expediency and economy. In addition, once the application of precedents in easy cases became common practice in the courts, greater predictability in court decisions would be seen, which would lead to greater public confidence in the courts and the judiciary (this would happen due to the perception that the decisions of such courts are objective and their adoption is not influenced by subjective factors) and encourage the search for a solution to such cases without turning to courts. As was emphasised, the principle of legal stability requires at least a minimum degree of predictability in how judges will decide a case. Therefore, we can argue that easy cases could constitute that minimum. The rule of law and respect for trustworthy authorities should presuppose respect for the laws they enact and a reasonable presumption that legal regulation in the clearest, simplest, easiest cases is legal and fair. In the event of a situation where such regulation does not correspond to the actual situation, the solution should not be to allow courts to be creative in easy cases, but rather to oblige the entity that created such regulation to ensure its relevance and the `vitality' of the law.

3. Legal realism and hard cases