Dynamics of public support for Ukraine’s independence as a basis for adjusting the state humanitarian policy

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Legislation Institute of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

Scientific and Organization Department

National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies

Dynamics of public support for Ukraine's independence as a basis for adjusting the state humanitarian policy

Myshchak I.M., Doctor of History, Professor

Liashenko O.O., PhD (History), research scientist

Abstract

The aim of the article is to analyze the results of the all-Ukrainian referendum on Decemberl, 1991, to compare them with the sociological modeling of the all-Ukrainian referendum, to identify the dynamics and trends of public support for independence by the population of Ukraine.

Scientific novelty. The latest sociological data on public support for Ukraine's independence are analyzed and summarized, trends and features of changes in the level of support for Ukrainian citizens' independence are clarified.

Conclusions. According to opinion polls conducted by various services, public support for independence over the past 30years remains unquestionable. At the same time, there were periods of significant reduction in comparison with the results of the will of Ukrainians during the all-Ukrainian referendum on December 1,1991.

Key words: Ukraine, referendum, independence, identity, security.

Анотація

Динаміка суспільної підтримки незалежності України як основа для коригування державної гуманітарної політики

Мищак І.М., д.і.н., професор, завідувач науково-організаційного відділу Інституту законодавства Верховної Ради України

Ляшенко О.О., к.і.н., науковий співробітник Інституту політичних і етнонаціональних досліджень ім. І. Ф. Кураса НАН України

Formulation of the problem

The existence and success of any state is based primarily on the ability to protect themselves from the enemy and on a developed economy that can ensure a decent life and defense capabilities. In addition to such purely substantial factors, public consensus on the inviolability of the status of an independent state and the general awareness of the people of their national identity are equally important. This is especially important for national security and defense. The cohesion of society in such matters is no less effective in deterring the external aggressive plans of other countries, as it significantly strengthens the state's ability to withstand internal and external security threats. And, conversely, a lack of public consensus on the inviolability of an independent state status and a stable national and state identity often provokes aggression from other states. In fact, Ukraine faced these problems in 2014, when it was subjected to military aggression by the Russian Federation, and the country's independence was in real danger for the first time since its proclamation in 1991.

Presenting the main material

It has been 30years since the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed the Act of Independence of Ukraine on August 24, 1991 and its confirmation in an all-Ukrainian referendum on December 1, 1991. However, 23years later, in 2014, Ukraine had to fight for its independence in armed confrontation with the Russian Federation. The results of popular support for the Declaration of Independence in 1991 were not convincing, as in the following years the relevant public mood changed for various reasons and thus, not least, pushed Russia to invade and temporarily occupy Ukrainian territories.

The latest Russian propaganda is largely fueled by the spread of the notion of Ukraine as a «failed state», the «artificiality» of the Ukrainian nation, and, ultimately, the outright recognition by Russian ideologues of Russia's impossibility of territorial expansion. And this is a kind of ideological front of undeclared war, which for the aggressor is no less important than purely military. Thus, in 2021, V. Putin's article «On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians» [14] and V. Surkov's «Where did the chaos go? Unpacking stability» articles became resonant [15].

The first «substantiates» the thesis that Russians and Ukrainians are one people who belong to the same historical and spiritual space. In other words, the Ukrainian identity itself is denied. A significant part of the article is a «summary of the history» of Ukraine and Russia from the times of Ancient Russia until the proclamation of Ukraine's independence. In particular, about the events of 1991, V. Putin says literally: «In 1991, all these territories (union republics - author), and most importantly - the people who lived there, at one time became abroad. And they were already really detached from the historical homeland» [14]. That is, Putin completely ignores the fact that the independence of Ukraine was supported by the vast majority of the population of all administrative-territorial units of the USSR. It should be understood that this is done consciously and intentionally, in order to doubt the Ukrainian public consensus on the independent status of the state. The author of the second publication goes even further, arguing that «for centuries, the Russian state with its stern and sedentary political interior has survived solely due to its tireless pursuit of its own borders. She forgot a long time ago, and most likely never knew how to survive in other ways. For Russia, constant expansion is not just one of the ideas, but a real existential of historical existence». And Russia will do this by chaotizing neighboring countries, as in the case of the «Crimean consensus» [15].

These and similar plans are much easier to implement in Ukraine if the Ukrainian public consensus on the independence of one's own state is undermined and the national and civic identity of Ukrainians is blurred as much as possible. To confirm the vulnerability of Ukrainian society to such information and ideological attacks, we can cite the results of a poll conducted by the «Rating» Group in July 2021. According to them, 41% of the population of Ukraine generally agree with Putin's thesis that Russians and Ukrainians are one people belonging to one historical and spiritual space, and in the East and South such are the majority - 65% and 55% respectively. As O. Antipovych, the head of the Group «Rating», explained, this result is due to the effectiveness of manipulation with a combination of «one nation» and «single historical and cultural space» in one message and rather indicates the effectiveness of Russian propaganda [16].

Thus, the technology of influencing and manipulating the mass consciousness with the use of historical facts occupies an important place among the factors of political struggle, governance and hybrid warfare. Of course, there is no point in entering into a professional scientific discussion with V. Putin or V Surkov. However, in scientific discourse there is such a notion as «historical politics». A distinction should be made between «historical policy» as the activity of state elites aimed at rewriting history and deformation of public memory, and «memory policy» as understanding the conditions of coexistence of different layers of public memory and relevant experiences [17]. Control over historical policy is exercised through the direction of state symbols, including holidays and rituals, interpretive schemes of the most commonly used narratives, organization of historical education, direction of museum exhibits, monumental propaganda, toponymic changes, burial sites, symbols and portraits on banknotes, stamps, etc. [18, p. 108].

In the early 1990s, interest in historical politics was heightened by the collapse of the Soviet Union. In independent states, interest in archival materials relating to national histories has erupted. The result was the removal of many «white spots» in the history of post-Soviet countries, the formation of new assessments of the Soviet past. In Ukraine, there was a large-scale rethinking of national history in search of acceptable to society versions of the Ukraine-centric historical narrative. The peculiarity of the Ukrainian version of historical policy demonstrated the complex intertwining of issues of identity, collective memory and the lack of legitimacy of the post-Soviet state [19, p. 549-553]. After all, it was not least because of these shifts that the December 1, 1991 referendum demonstrated such a high level of support for Ukraine's independence.

In the period up to 2014, there are three main stages of historical policy, which had their own characteristics:

1) 1991-2004: nationalization of the public sphere, symbols and educational system with the dominance of the Ukrainian national narrative;

2) 2005 - early 2010: radical revision of the policy of memory in the direction of nationalism, anti-communism, the creation of the Institute of National Memory, «places of memory», construction of memorials, commemorative practices;

3) from the beginning of 2010 to 2014: combining the national-patriotic version of Ukrainian history with a partially symbolic rehabilitation of the Soviet past [20, p.396].

After the beginning of Russian military aggression and its occupation of Ukrainian territories, the fourth stage began, the leading trend of which was the destruction of the political myth of the «brotherhood of the three Slavic peoples» (especially for generations living in Soviet times). Painful gaps in the collective social imagination created a demand in Ukrainian society for alternative sources of meaning, renewal of historical symbols and modernization of state historical policy with the heroization of defenders of Ukrainian statehood, under the pressure of civil society during the war, a large-scale attempt was made to decolonize the state policy of memory [19, p. 582, 586].

Thus, in the context of the hybrid war imposed by Russia, opposition to Russian propaganda on the symbolic field has not lost its relevance. One such symbol, perhaps somewhat underestimated, is the December 1, 1991 all-Ukrainian referendum, as it is the cornerstone of the national state consensus and the common denominator of the Ukrainian nation, despite differing current political preferences or attitudes toward individual historical figures.

The first thing that made the referendum of December1, 1991, an effective means of counteracting the distortion of history by Russian propaganda was its compliance with the legislation of the time. After all, the proclamation of Ukraine's independence in the very way in which it was implemented, not only corresponded to the internationally recognized right of the people of Ukraine to self-determination, but also took place legally. This is a great merit of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which ensured the process of legalization and legitimization of independence, which was confirmed in the all-Ukrainian referendum on December1, 1991. The observance of all necessary legal procedures, including during the referendum also the fact that the international recognition of Ukraine began not after the adoption of the Act of Independence of Ukraine, but immediately after the announcement of the results of the all-Ukrainian referendum. Its results, including the desire of the Crimean population to live in independent Ukraine, were recognized by the international community and are unconditionally perceived today as a sovereign right of the Ukrainian people, implemented in accordance with international law and current legislation of the USSR [5, p. 45].

The results of the referendum on independence of Ukraine showed its support by residents of all regions of Ukraine (except Crimea and Sevastopol) at over 83% (Table 1). The highest level of support for independence was recorded in the Western region (96.48%), in particular in the three Galician regions, and almost the same in the Central region (94.46%). In contrast, in eastern Ukraine, independence was approved by 86.12% of voters (but over 90% in Dnipropetrovsk region), and in the south - 80.93% of voters (mainly due to significantly lower than in the region as a whole, the level of support in Sevastopol and Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic - 57.07% and 54.19% respectively). Within the Central Region, differences in the will of voters were minimal.

Table 1

Results of the All-Ukrainian referendum on December 1, 1991