Argumentation in legal interpretation activity

At the same time, the characteristic features of interpretative legal instructions are that they are formulated by entities authorized to create them in accordance with the procedure established by law; are a rule-explanation - a logically and grammatically completed judgment, which is based on the clarification of the content of the norm or principle of law; the legal form of its objectification is a legal interpretative act; it should not be contradictory with the system of law sources; it does not have independent significance and can only act in unity with the regulatory legal instruction in the spheres and within its validity; it does not create and does not cancel the current regulatory legal instructions; its validity is limited to the effect of the regulatory legal instruction under interpretation; it must have a prescribed structure.

Consequently, the interpretive legal instruction is a formally binding rule-explanation based on the judgment of the same-type understanding of the content of the norm or the principle of law. The entire process of legal interpretation (both at the stage of interpretation-identification and at the stage of interpretation-explanation) is accompanied by legal argumentation. The long-term goal - the proper settlement of social relations due to the same understanding of the content of the norm or the principle of law, as well as the short-term one - the creation and objectification of the interpretative legal prescription, is definitive for both legal interpretation and argumentation. Each stage has its own goals and objectives. At the stage of interpretation-identification, the following goal is achieved: clarification of the content of the norms or principles of law (due to the clarification of the will of the subject of rule-making recorded in the source of the law or the opportunities for their implementation in specific conditions actually existing for the period of their application). In the context of achieving this goal, it is necessary to solve the following tasks: to establish the circumstances that lead to the right explanation; to substantiate their availability and need for interpretation; to identify the necessary ways of interpretation-identification, to substantiate the most appropriate ones for the interpretation of the relevant norm or principle of law; to clarify their content and justify it using the chosen methods; to substantiate the veracity, objectivity of the right interpretation judgment.

In Western legal interpretative practice, the methodology for applying methods of interpretation-identification is formalized in sources of law or other official documents, and in domestic practice such a methodology is not fixed in the relevant documents (including regulatory acts). Such rules are usually reflected only in scientific sources.

The purpose of the second stage of legal interpretation is the formation and objectification of the interpretative legal instruction, and the tasks (including argumentation) are as follows: formation of the interpretative-legal prescription and justification of its content; establishment of its compliance with formal technical and process design requirements (the availability of powers in the subject of legal interpretation; compliance with the regulated procedure - the procedure for the implementation of legal interpretation, structural and essential parameters) and content (compliance with the current system of law sources); objectification of the interpretative legal prescription in the legal interpretation act. The content of the argumentation largely depends on the peculiarities of a particular type of legal activity (in particular, procedural features). It seems that the issue of argumentation, as well as the process of legal interpretation activities as a whole, should be enshrined in sources of law (or, at least, in regulatory acts). This would prevent some deformations and substitute the concepts of “judicial regulatory precedent” (source of law) and “judicial legal interpretation precedent”. First of all, attention should be paid to the fact that any type of legal activity is carried out by authorized entities, in particular, entities of law-making or legal interpretation. If the subject of legal interpretation does not have legal authority, it cannot create sources of law. The beforementioned also applies to judicial regulatory precedents, but it can create legal interpretative precedents. They may contain typical models of interpretation of law reflected in interpretative legal instructions. Thus, the legal positions of judges can be arguments when considering similar cases.

In Ukraine, the scope of such precedents is currently limited, since the CCU is only vested with legal interpretation powers. It carries out the official interpretation of the norms of the Constitution of Ukraine. However, according to the preceding Law of Ukraine “On the Constitutional Court of Ukraine”, it also carried out the official interpretation of the laws of Ukraine. Currently, no entity has the authority to interpret laws or other sources of law officially. Consequently, the provisions of normative legal acts (except for the Constitution of Ukraine) or other sources of law cannot be officially interpreted by any subject pursuant to domestic legislation. But they may be subject to unofficial interpretation or clarification of the procedure for the application of the rules of law, or causal interpretation in the process of law enforcement.

The legislator, narrowing the powers of the CCU on the official interpretation of the laws of Ukraine, should delegate them to another subject, e.g., the Supreme Court, or determine the order of authentic official interpretation of law. It should be noted that the Law of Ukraine “On the Constitutional Court” and the CCU Rules largely contain formal requirements for the procedure for implementing legal interpretation and the formulation of legal interpretative act, but there are no content-related requirements, in particular, for argumentation. This negatively affects the legal interpretation practice, which is characterized by insufficiently reasoned decisions; the lack of provisions on the methods of interpretation, which facilitate the justification of the rule-explanation; or the substitution of interpretation methods; reduction to a systemic method of interpretation and legal arguments; the lack of understanding of the interpretative legal instruction as a logically and grammatically completed judgment on the same-type understanding of the content of the norm or the principle of law; the lack of understanding of its structure. It seems that the official interpretation of the CCU norms of the Constitution of Ukraine is based on the legal consciousness of judges. legal interpretation law act

Another problem of legal interpretative activity is its narrowing only to the application of legal acts and the lack of understanding of legal arguments in a broad sense. In particular, legal positions in the context of domestic legislation could be currently used as arguments in similar cases, but provided that the court will argue the appropriateness of their use for legal interpretation, justify their veracity and objectivity, and thus they will be able to acquire the nature of legal arguments. The above and other issues require further conceptualization both from the standpoint of the general theory of law and branch legal science and practice.

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Анотація

Аргументація у правоінтерпретаційній діяльності

Людмила Луць, доктор юридичних наук, професор, професор кафедри теорії та філософії права, Львівський національний університет імені Івана Франка