Legal status of offshore (deep-water) oil rigs: coastal state jurisdiction and countering oil spills threats

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Legal status of offshore (deep-water) oil rigs: coastal state jurisdiction and countering oil spills threats

Kishore Vaangal, PhD, Alagappa University

Abstract

This research aims to assess and find possible ways to improve the international legal framework to exercise state jurisdiction to prevent pollution from offshore oil rigs. In effect, the paper analyzes the legal status of offshore rigs to provide for the necessary jurisprudential, geo-political, and energysecurity dimensions. While doing so, the pertinent provisos (sections) of all the international conventions relatable to offshore oil & gas production have been examined. The study has found that the legal status of offshore rigs is not clear in international law, and as such, it concludes that the 1982 UNCLOS convention has addressed specific issues, albeit not in an extensive way. The extant international regulations for the protection of offshore oil rigs have not been effective, even in cases of allision and collision. Right from the legal status of offshore rigs to security zones, they have been debated much and have been the subject of dispute for over 40 years. There are specific and pivotal jurisdictional issues in matters to do with the location of oil rigs in the high seas, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, which has proved to be an area of contention.

The Legal status of offshore rigs has become a source of much disagreement in International Law. There are fundamental questions about whether a type of rig could be considered a ship under national and international law. Should an oil rig be considered a ship, some international law rules relatable to ships, such as the law offlag, allision, collision, and pollution, would become applicable in equal verve to oil rigs as well? As a natural corollary of those above, a query would come up: how else can oil rigs be classified? Traditionally, oil rigs, offshore installations, artificial islands have been dubbed to be part of one category. A meticulous examination of the legal status of offshore rigs would reveal that it is one of the most contumacious and troublesome areas of International Law.

The aforementioned is significant because there are many practical and legal consequences, given specific situational dictates. Indeed, the legal status could directly impact issues with the jurisdiction a state may have in matters relatable to the exercise of the states ' legal prowess over offshore rigs, and the applicability of certain maritime law principles and rules centric to offshore rigs need to be studied astutely. As an indicative archetype, should an offshore rig be located at an exclusive economic zone, it could be considered a ship in the eyes of the law, and hence, the flag state would have exclusive jurisdiction over it. Nonetheless, the coastal state would have exclusive jurisdiction if it were considered an installation. Quintessentially, the legal status of offshore oil and gas rigs would determine the rights, duties, and obligations of the different states, and hence the subject could throw up some complicated issues.

The key words: offshore oil rigs, security, legal status, pollution, jurisdiction, UNCLOS.

Introduction

Eventuating vilely on disasters akin to the BP fiasco For an insightful overview, see: National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2011). Report to the President on Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the future of Offshore Drilling. in the Gulf of Mexico are events waiting to happen. Averting such disasters that would be eventuated on by terror groups on offshore rigs is the dire need of the hour. Indeed, this is a grave area that needs to be recognized as such, and any failure to do so would portend much misery. Hence, an examination of the adequacy of the legal status Esmaeili, H. (1997). The Legal Status of Offshore Oil Rigs in International Law. Ravue Hellenique Droit International, 50, 107-138. See also: Esmaeili, H. (2001). The Legal Regime of Offshore Oil Rigs in International Law. Chapter 4. Routledge. of offshore rigs would be dire necessities to face the future with dlan.

Offshore rigs are meant to denote offshore installations to explore and exploit oil and gas. The aforementioned would be inclusive of all types of rigs, and as such, it would also encompass storage structures meant to store oil and gas. While researching the subject, some articles that were dovetailed to explicating on offshore installations were read, and as they included artificial islands as well, mention must be made that this dissertation is not meant to cover such installations. Hence, one of the fundamental themes of this research initiative is centric to examining the international law framework to produce oil and gas using offshore rigs. The issues considered significant were put through a rigorous evaluation analysis, and the clear objective was centered on upholding pragmatism. As indicative reference points, contentious issues, such as the very legal basis (Esmaeili, 2001) of the existence of offshore rigs, and matters involving safety and security measures, have been the subjects of much dispute over the past several decades. Concomitant matters like that of the location of offshore rigs in the high seas have raised a plethora of jurisprudential (systems of law) issues.

Ejusdem Generis (of or as the same kind), the safety zones surrounding offshore rigs have forever been a subject of intense acerbic debate, and these queries need to be addressed in no uncertain terms. The protection (Esmaeili, 1999) of offshore rigs and the conflict between the production of oil and gas and the other uses of the sea have been at the very epicenter of much disgruntlement and disagreement. Ironically, there is, and very shockingly at that, not much quality literature available in journal articles, dissertations & monographs. Meticulous research on the subject using AI (Artificial intelligence improves real-time drilling data analysis) and other empirical means have led to the writing of this dissertation. The Artificial Intelligence era is here to stay and given that both operators and terrorists could be able to access the information, the issue has to be meticulously examined. For the record, it must be stated that all the important international legal issues have been covered as part of this research initiative.

For long, the legal status of offshore oil rigs has become a bone of contention and a significant issue in international law. The purpose of this research initiative is indeed very objective as it in effect is dovetailed towards examining critical issues, concerning, costal state jurisdiction over deep-water mobile oil rigs in the exclusive economic zone and countering related ecological threats (Bernaerts, 1988).

Methodology

The research topic embracing offshore rigs and the adequacy of the Maritime Legal Framework has been examined through accessing literature in the field and relevant international legal instruments. The research is based upon a detailed analysis of the Deepwater Horizon case. The research is conducted given the central hypothesis that the current legal status of offshore oil and gas rigs limits the abilities of states to protect them and prevent environmental threats. The UNCLOS and the IMO stipulations must be geared to update pathways to address the issue.

A Definitional Perspective

The first issue, would by necessity, have to be dovetailed, to provide for apposite (apt in the circumstances or about something) definitional perspectives in matters to do with the following: an explication of what constitutes a ship and whether an offshore rig and an offshore vessel would be considered as one. The need to do so gains momentum in the light of well-researched judgments See Offshore Company v Robinson 266 F2d 769 - it was held that a mobile offshore rig was a vessel under the Jones Act and that the word `vessel' had a `wide range of meaning'. In T.J. Schoenbaum, (2004). Admiralty & Maritime Law. (4^th edition). Thomson/West. that have been laid down by the courts in the United States and elsewhere.

The definitional issues of offshore (deep-water) oil rigs are primarily arose from their basic technical features that are covered by three main facts.

1. The crux of the issue is that deep-water mobile oil rigs, often referred to as MODUs or Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, are drilling rigs that float on water, and they are bottom supported or floating based on their status during drilling. Floating MODUs are extremely popular for eventuating on deep water drilling simply since they do not need any contact with the seabed. In juxtaposition, bottom- supported MODUs drill in shallow waters as they require seabed contact while engaging in drilling operations.

2. Semisubmersibles and drill ships are the two types of floating MODUs, and neither are fixed to the seabed while drilling operations are in progress. As a matter of detail, semisubmersibles use anchors to stay in place, and they are of two types - the first kind requires the help of towboats to move from one site to another, and the second has the capability of independent mobility. The central archetype of this research initiative, British Petroleum's Deepwater Horizon, was a semisubmersible deep-water mobile oil rig.

3. Drill ships are like many cargo vessels because of the standard features (Esmaeili, 2001) of mobility, self-propelled nature, cargo spaces, and the like, and stay in position over the well via dynamic positioning systems. Contemporarily, Al-enabled software programs employ sensors that activate the propellers in the front and the back of the rigs to offset any movements caused by ocean currents, waves, and winds. Given that deep water mobile oil rigs have deft navigational capabilities, and as mobility is an inherent feature and their physical similarities with reference to vessels, many member states of the UNO and the international treaty regime have legally treated them as vessels (Esmaeili, 2002). As an indicative archetype, in the United States, the laws have been drafted in such a way as to consider deep-water rigs as vessels, and a MODU would denote a vessel that can engage in drilling operations for exploration and exploitation of subsea resources. As an addendum, case law in the United States simply treats all mobile rigs as vessels, and this legal treatment is highly incongruous, and several infirmities have ensued. The judicial implications of such a treatment have led to many vexatious situational dictates.

A meticulous examination of the legal status of offshore installations would reveal that it is one of the contumacious and troublesome areas of international law. This is of much signification, simply because, given specific situational dictates, there are many practical, and legal consequences. Indeed, the legal status could directly impact the issues to do with the jurisdiction that a state may have in matters relatable to the exercise of the states' legal powers over offshore rigs. The applicability of certain maritime law principles (art. 58 of UNCLOS) and rules centric to offshore rigs would need to be studied astutely. As indicative reference points should an offshore rig be in an exclusive economic zone, it could be considered a ship in the eyes of the law, and hence, the flag state would have exclusive jurisdiction over it.

Nonetheless, should it be considered an installation, the coastal state would alone have exclusive jurisdiction. Quintessentially, the legal status of offshore oil and gas rigs would simply be determinative of the rights, duties, and obligations of the different states, and hence the subject could throw up very complicated issues. One of the major issues centric to offshore rigs in the realms of international law (the international regulatory framework) is dovetailed towards its legal treatment Refer, Offshore Co. v Robinson, 266 F 2d. 769 (5th Circuit 1959) - the mobile oil rig was a vessel under the Jones Act and that “vessel” had a wide range of meaning per se.. This is because the term ship could have a few different meanings based on the international convention and the definitional perspective provided for. Both fixed and mobile offshore rigs can be treated as ships in international law though fixed offshore rigs are not treated as ships in a generic context. There are at least two international conventions that treat both fixed and mobile offshore rigs as ships. Hence, some conventions treat mobile offshore rigs as ships, and some others clearly do not treat them as ships. The result (Schoenbaum, 2004, p. 122) is one of confusion, and to add to the same, some of the other approaches treat mobile offshore rigs as ships while they are in transit and as installations when they are fixed - the dual status approach. So, the definition is based on the convention, so to say, and this dissertation in effect highlights the fact that the definitional perspectives have proved to be albatrosses. As an indicative reference point, under the laws in the United States, the issue Refer, National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2011). Report to the President on Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the future of Offshore Drilling. of classification has been highlighted for its problematical moorings but no solution has been provided for and it has been the onus of this dissertation to postulate a proper definitional perspective even whilst riveting the solution via recommending the necessary amendments in the UNCLOS agreement and the IMO stipulations.

Offshore Oil Rigs Classification Issues

A seminal issue is whether an offshore rig can be classified in any other way, and herein mention must be made about the UNCLOS agreement. The UNCLOS, when it was drafted and considered in circa 1982 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on December 10th, 1982, entered into force on November, 19^th, 1994., ironically considered all types of offshore installations under one category. By doing so, everything from artificial islands to oil rigs and offshore installations meant to explore and exploit any kind of natural resource were all bracketed under the same category. Given the humungous advancement of technology, it would be perceptive to define what this dissertation covers clearly. For the record, this dissertation only covers offshore rigs that are exclusively meant for oil and gas exploration, and this would be inclusive of offshore oil and gas storage facilities.

The explication as aforementioned is required as due to the functional differences of various offshore installations, distinct and vastly different legal issues could crop up. Issues could be ecological or jurisdictional, or centric to installations, and hence, clear enunciation of what this dissertation aims to elucidate (Esmaeili, 2000) is of paramount signification. This dissertation has after explicating on the situational dictates, as it is, provided for an espousal. The espousal has advocated on a proposed legal regime, one that would be apposite to handle the present's exigencies and meet the future challenges. Jurisdiction concerning oil and gas and the action permissible on board the oil and gas rigs are indeed momentous, by nature. Hence, a meticulous study of the needs, both from the owners' perspective and the establishment, was a condition-precedent as the whole objective of this research exercise is to establish the right kind of legal regime. It must be recognized that the rights of coastal states are sacrosanct in matters to do with the construction of offshore rigs.

It could be rightly premised that the construction of offshore rigs at various areas of the sea has been highly contumacious exercises. A scrutiny of the various ideation concerning the location of the offshore rig would reveal the contumacy. As indicative reference points, the areas that have been christened the EEZ and the Continental shelf have been areas of darkness for long, and despite some good work by UNCLOS to provide for clarity, grey For a generic overview, see: O'Connell, D.P. (1982). The International Law of the Sea. Vol. I. The Clarendon Press. areas still exist. The rights of coastal states were harped on first in circa 1940, and it has been religiously done thereafter, on many occasions, over the years. Nonetheless, the duties of the coastal states concerning the eventuation of preventive and remedial measures centric to the ecology have not been fully recognized. In the years since 1940, there were many unresolved issues centric to the rights of coastal states to construct offshore installations, and despite some good work of recent vintage, grey areas still exist. The issue is just not about the construction of offshore installations in the waters of the respective coastal states, but it goes far beyond the limits of their respective national jurisdictions. Despite some meaningful measures by UNCLOS and the IMO, disgruntlement (art. 60(4) of UNCLOS) exists in the permissible areas, defined as up to 200 nautical miles from the coastal state.

Additionally, there are issues centered around the rights of the coastal states to construct offshore installations in the high seas, and this must be seen in a contextual perspective, as the rights of other states could be infringed. Certainly, there are many criminal and civil issues that have arisen, and the bone of contention has been the applicability of a coastal state's law. Concomitant matters involving fiscal issues, health, safety, and immigration have been bones of contention as well till UNCLOS intervened. Issues relatable to the construction and protection of offshore installations by coastal states have been dealt with comprehensively by this research initiative. In so far as the protection goes, the various UNCLOS clauses have been examined even while the IMO stipulations in the matter have been studied for their efficacy. There have been certain other soft law instruments as well like that of Rome Protocol in circa 1988 centric to the suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf. In effect, an examination of the various resolutions of the IMO, the 1988 Protocol for Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Against Fix Platforms on The Continental Shelf and the practice of states would be suggestive (Esmaeili, 2000) of a a dire need to enhance protection for oil platforms.

One singular fact must be recognized, and the fact remains that offshore rigs are indeed fancied targets of the terror groups. As a matter of detail, the humongous-sized offshore rigs that have been built on the high seas and the EEZ are sitting ducks for terrorists these days due to the inadequacy For an insightful overview, see: Kraska, J., & Pedrozo, R. (2018). International Maritime Security Law. Chapter Ten - Security Claims in the Exclusive Economic Zone. Brill Nijhoff. of the 500-meter zone of safety. Given that hundreds of people work on these big offshore rigs, it makes the scenario frightening, to state the least. All that terror groups must do is to ram ships against these offshore rigs, and an explosion could be triggered off in a jiffy. The IMO stipulations, or the pronounced lack of it, in this regard, must be paid cognizance to with utmost seriousness. In the absence of an international regulatory body directly concerned with offshore oil and gas activities, the IMO is considered to be the competent international organization authorized under UNCLOS to make recommendations on the extension of breadth of safety zones around offshore installations in the EEZ beyond 500 m. The extension Article 60 allows for wider zones of safety, and as a matter of detailing interest, pro-viso 5 in effect stipulates that the allowance is permissive, provided that generally accepted international standards are subscribed to or when an authoritative recommendation is made by a recognized global body - The IMO. of safety zones beyond 500 m was considered by the IMO in 2008-2010, but the IMO ultimately concluded that there was no demonstrated need to establish safety zones larger than 500 m. The obvious non-cooperation of certain member states indeed served as an albatross relatable to ushering in progressive measures akin to widening the zones of safety et al. As an addendum, both UNCLOS and IMO have not much of pragmatic verve on account of their nonbinding nature. This is the ironic situational dictate of the present.

There are many crucial issues apropos the operational aspects centric to offshore rigs even whilst, the safety and security dimensions, if they get out (Kaye, 2007) of hand, could lead to catastrophes. Apart from the usual rigmarole that goes with ensuring a pollution-free situational dictate, the emphasis clearly ought to be on ensuring that preventive measures are in place. Given that the use of drilling mud and the wastages from platforms are of signification, measures must be in place that would be enabling, from a stemming perspective. As both drilling mud and wastage could be causative of much pollution, studies must be conducted on a periodical basis. With heightened offshore rigging activity, the one issue that needs to be considered adroitly is protecting the fragile marine ecological systems. The aforementioned has to be incorporated into both UNCLOS (Prows, 2007) and the IMO and the concomitant soft- law instruments like SUA. The overriding need is that the soft-law instruments must be made binding. Though there are many national legislative measures at the level of various member-states, all legal aspects regarding pollution are intertwined with global issues due to the interconnectivity of the seas. Everything from decommissioning offshore rigs to handling wastages have become global issues and in the aftermath For a generic overview, see: Richards, R.K. (2011). Deepwater Mobile Oil Rigs in the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Uncertainty of Coastal State Jurisdiction. Journal of International Business and Law, 10, 2, art. 10. of Deepwater Horizon, they have become acerbically contumacious for sure.

At this juncture, it would be prudent to outline the various legal issues of signification to enable a decisive overview, and in effect, by doing so, the legal nature and the international ramifications could be much better appreciated.

A Knotty Coastal State Jurisdiction

The looming uncertainty of coastal state jurisdiction apropos deep water mobile oil rigs in the exclusive economic zone must be addressed as soon as possible (Esmaeili, 1997). The fact of the matter remains that coastal states run a great risk on account of the catastrophic harm that could be caused in the event of an act of terrorism being perpetuated. As an indicative archetype, the event that occurred on 10 April 2010, involving the British petroleum oil spill disaster in the EEZ of the United States, is a poignant reminder of what is in store for humanity. The event happened in the Gulf of Mexico. In many ways, it has showcased the potential that deep water rigs have to cause enormous devastation. This has to be juxtaposed with that of fixed oil rigs that operate in shallow waters, and in effect, it has to be realized that the coastal states exercise plenary jurisdiction.

Rather ironically, the plenary jurisdiction of the coastal states over deep-water mobile oil rigs is presently very uncertain (Esmaeili, 2001). The stark raving ambiguity of coastal state jurisdiction over deep-water mobile oil rigs indubitably raises many concerns as in the event of an accident or an act of terrorism, the concerned coastal state would have to bear the brunt of the harm even while assuming the responsibility centric to the clean-up operations (Anderson & Talley, 1995; Esmaeili, 1999). Nonetheless, it does not have the plenary authority to engage in a comprehensive exercise aimed at regulating the drilling and production operations that are eventuated over the water line by deep-water mobile oil rigs operating in the EEZ, and this is inclusive of having to put up with a 500 feet safety zone. This is a lacuna in international jurisprudence.

The jurisdiction of coastal states over deep-water mobile oil rigs must be made certain as the potential to effectuate enormous harm is very high. As a matter of detail, the farther off an oil rig is located, the chances of causing harm are that much more simply because of the high oil flow rate, the enormous quantum of oil, and the spill's distance from the coastline. International law has failed to define and explicate what constitutes deep-water mobile rigs, and this has specific reference to the lack of plenary jurisdiction (Esmaeili, 2001) for the coastal state. As an indicative archetype of recent vintage, the British Petroleum leased oil rig, the Deepwater Horizon operating in the EEZ of the United States, was registered in the Marshall Islands. As such, it was treated as a vessel, subject of course, to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Marshall Islands (Hagerty & Ramseur, 2010).

The court system in the United States, and the prevailing systems across many jurisdictions and geographies, have inevitably treated deep-water mobile oil rigs as vessels. Such a brazen classification has indubitably ensured detrimental legal consequences, about, the coastal states' abilities to exercise plenary jurisdiction over the activities of deep-sea rigs in its EEZ. As an indicative reference of an alarming order, the Coastal state would be proscribed from engaging in preventive (Esmaeili, 2001) action to enable the stymieing of accidents. Given that Deepwater rigs can eventuate on humungous devastation, as a natural consequence and logical upshot, a huge geographical area could be contaminated. The bottom line is that treating deep-water mobile oil rigs as vessels is a faux pas in international jurisprudence considering that the rigs operate as installations, and this is a seriously limiting feature, concerning, the prowess of the coastal states' jurisdiction to engage in preventive action.

The need of the hour is for a solution, and this research initiative points to the need to adopt sensible jurisprudence (Esmaeili, 1999) that would effectively prevent environmental (Moore, 2010) disasters by providing preventive mechanisms that would empower the respective coastal states. The ironic situation dictates point to the fact that unless a major overhaul of international jurisprudence is eventuated on, deep water mobile oil rigs will continue to be subject to the same standards as cargo/passenger vessels, based on exclusive flag state jurisdiction and minimal (Esmaeili, 2001) coastal state jurisdiction. It will therefore denote that the law governing deep-water mobile oil rigs is the very quintessence of ambiguity. In the 1982 United Nations Law of Sea convention, there is a serious lacuna in that no proper definition has been provided to define either a ship or a vessel. At this point there is no proper definition as well. To add to the confusion, the words carry different meanings in different jurisdictions, and in effect, the definition is based on the inputs of various coastal states. Additionally, coastal states could have entered various treaties, and these treaties have had a penchant to treat deep-water oil rigs to suit their conveniences. As such, it is completely and comprehensively unclear at this point whether deep-water oil rigs should be categorized as vessels, and the ambiguity concerning how to classify them has its origins in the work of the professionals and diplomats who got to deliberate and draft UNCLOS III (Churchill & Lowe, 1988). Since deep-water oil rigs were not very popular then, they failed to pay cognizance to the subject matter, and indeed their act was an exercise in failure with regard to displaying anticipatory leadership.

Dangers Posed by Deepwater Oil Drilling

The British Petroleum disaster was the vilest of its kind, and it took almost three months to successfully cap the well and staunch the flow of oil into the Gulf of Mexico (Robertson & Fountain, 2010). A total of 4.9 million barrels of oil had spilled, and a report by the think tank, Oxford Economics, in effect stipulated that the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill would cost the Gulf region a total of USD 22.7 billion by 2013 (Di Natale, 2010). Additionally, a federal group of scientists in the United States, the Flowrate Technical Group, have categorized the oil spill as the `largest accidental release of oil into maritime waters'.

When it is realized that the British Petroleum (Clark, 2010) disaster is not a random event, the gravity of the situation becomes apparent. As a matter of detail, from the beginning of this millennium, in the Gulf of Mexico alone, concerning oil rigging, there have been 1150 human injuries, 948 fires and explosions, and 60 deaths (humans). 1.3 million gallons of oil have been spilled on an average every year, and from a global perspective, the number works out to a staggering 1,000,000,000 gallons of oil every year. As an illustrative example, the Montara Australian Oil Spill in the Timor Sea lasted for 74 days in 2009, and 400 barrels of oil were spilled into the water each day. The bottom line is that oil spills have a devastating effect on the planet, people &profits, and the 1989 Exxon Valdes oil tanker disaster would be considered a sordid fiasco and an ironic example of the same. A deep-water oil well is about a thousand feet below the ocean surface, and drilling at these depths could be a very hazardous exercise, and as such, it could be very detrimental to the interests of the coastal state. The large amounts of oil and the nature of the drilling exercise would make it a very tedious task to contain the oil spills in cases involving disastrous eventualities. Deepwater drilling, in effect, involves the deft handling of different pressure levels, water currents, and there is a dire requirement of highly skilled personnel as critical equipment needs to be handled astutely.

In circa 2020, a decade after the disaster, it was found by a particular research study that the environmental impact in the Gulf of Mexico was far worse than what it was previously believed to be. The study established that the spill's effects were 30% larger and that it had reached the shores of Texas, the Florida Keys, the coast of Tampa, and parts of the east coast of Florida. By using advanced and sophisticated techniques like that three-dimensional computer simulations, the researchers established that vast areas of the Gulf of Mexico were exposed to toxic oil and that the area damaged was far greater than what was stipulated at the time of the accident. Professor Claire Paris-Limouzy has observed that “when the oil comes to the surface, it comes as a thick layer that you can easily be deciphered, with a satellite.” A report (Transocean Limited provided for a Press release dated April, 21, 2010) by Transocean has squarely blamed British Petroleum (Martin, 2011), citing the situational issues that they had failed to assess properly.

Ineffective governance, and the inept communication of risks were also cited even whilst special mention was made, vis a vis, Halliburton, the cement contractor, and British Petroleum failing miserably in matters to do with effectuating a proper test of the cement slurry that was used to seal the well. Needless to state, an internal report by British Petroleum squarely passed on the blame to several other companies that were involved in some way. Ultimately, British Petroleum had to spend billions of dollars to do the cleanup job, provide for compensation for victims' families, and defray expenses on account of losses of local businesses. In the end, British Petroleum sold off its US initiative, paid out a humungous amount on account of damages while Halliburton reached a USD 1 billion settlement and as this event had become a political football in the United States, President Barack Obama appointed Established by Executive Order 13543, and signed by Barak Obama on May 21, 2010. a bipartisan investigatory commission.

The commission's findings (Report to the President on Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the future of Offshore Drilling) established severe technical failures, incompetent crew, and overall safety shortcomings concerning the regulators of the oil industry. New assessments of the British Petroleum disaster in the Gulf of Mexico are perceptive exercises simply because, given the global increase of petroleum production, careful assessments of oil spills would enable far more conducive environmental and public safety regimes.

Results and Discussion

A Given the situational dictates that oil rigs were not that very popular until 1992, it did not become the hot discussion topic during the negotiations leading up to UNCLOS III. As a matter of detail, the primary concern of most of the member states was to ensure that they had economic control over fishery zones, and this can be deciphered by the fact that the word exclusive was meant to indicate exclusivity, via, the use of fishery resources (Esmaeili, 2002). The 1989 discovery by Shell Oil, of oil, 3000 feet beneath the surface of the Gulf of Mexico, enthused the verticals to engage in more discoveries. It may be recalled that in circa 1982 UNCLOS III was riveted, and as deep-sea rigging was not very popular, much emphasis was not laid on the coastal states' jurisdiction over Deepwater Mobile oil rigs operating in the EEZ. This faux pas has led to much uncertainty as UNCLOS III does not provide for a coastal states' jurisdiction over deep water mobile oil rigs, should they be considered vessels. The actual practice is that the jurisdiction over deep water mobile oil rigs operating as `vessels' in the EEZ is divided between the flag state and the coastal state. It should be worthwhile to make a note of the following:

1. The fact of the matter remains that international practices have led to jurisdictional uncertainty, regarding, the coastal states' rights. Following UNCLOS III, the EEZ is considered the high seas for every other purpose other than the Coastal States' Jurisdiction over resources. Hence, any vessel that navigates through the EEZ is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state, and as a natural corollary, they are guaranteed the right to the freedom of navigation. Indubitably, therefore, should a deep-water mobile oil rig that operates in the EEZ be considered a vessel, uncertainty See Offshore Company v Robinson 266 F2d 769 - it was held that a mobile offshore rig was a vessel under the Jones Act and that the word `vessel' had a `wide range of meaning'. Schoenbaum, T.J. (2004). Admiralty & Maritime Law. (4th edition). Thomson/West. ensues - the sovereign rights over all living and nonliving resources below the water line belongs exclusively to the coastal nation but the jurisdiction, regarding, operations above the water line rests with the flag state. Thus, if an oil entity were to convert the rig into a more permanent platform while engaging in the production phase, some of these production platforms could just as well fall under the category of a vessel, and an awful mess will ensue - divided jurisdiction.

2. Deepwater mobile oil rigs have been treated as vessels by many states because of their tremendous physical similarities and seagoing and navigational capabilities. The irony is that international law has not concretely categorized deep water mobile oil rigs, leading to uncertainties. To add to the confusion, UNCLOS III does not define (Esmaeili, 1999) either ship or vessel and has used the words interchangeably and hence, the categorization of deep-water mobile oil rigs has been dependent upon a states' domestic laws or the oil rig's use or upon the treaty that would be of relevance. As an indicative illustration, in the United States, domestic laws define Deepwater mobile oil rigs (MODUs) primarily as vessels, and then a MODUs classification changes from vessel to outer continental shelf facility when the MODU is in contact with the seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf for exploration and the exploitation of subsea resources. The problem is that such an ambiguous categorization leaves the coastal states' jurisdiction on oil rigs indeterminate and treating deep-water water mobile oil rigs as vessels in some cases but not in others leads to confusion . The coastal nation would have a bewildering question - when and to what extent can a coastal state assert its jurisdiction?

3. The bottom line is that up and to now, there has been no definition that has been evolved to ideate on what constitutes a vessel or, for the matter, what describes a deep-water mobile oil rig. The plethora of definitions that have emerged from various states only adds to the confusion. It will be in sync with things to point out here that the legal consideration of deep-water mobile oil rigs as vessels is not restricted to the United States alone. Many states do likewise, and the resulting jurisdictional split that arises on account of the different legal regimes between the coastal nation and the flag state is indeed at the heart of the misunderstanding. The sooner the comity of states get ... their act together (Fitzgerald et. al., 2014), about, providing for universally acceptable definitions, concerning, what constitutes a vessel and what describes the deep-water mobile oil rig, the better it will be for the planet, people, and profits.

4. As an indicative archetype of the issues mentioned above, many Asia-Pacific states define a ship as a kind of vessel capable of navigating the high seas and while doing so, they include any structure that can float or is made to float. Therefore, the unit can be moved from one place to another. This definition brings within the ambit of what defines a ship that which describes a deepwater mobile oil rig. Hence, when a deep-water mobile oil rig is considered a vessel and flies a foreign flag, no single nation has full control over the above and below water operations. The faux pas involving various definitions of what constitutes a ship must be sorted out at the earliest to bring forth clarity in what has become a very complex world. The British Petroleum caused maritime environmental disaster in effect showcases why there ought not to be jurisdictional uncertainties. It is obvious that the need of the hour is to have an internationally accepted definition for both ships and deep-water mobile oil rigs. In fact, despite the categorical classification of deep-water Mobile Rigs as vessels in the United States, it was a case of discordance concerning the Deepwater Horizon. There were confabulations, various memory disorders in which made-up narratives filled in the gaps in memory, in the testimonies of both the crew at Transocean and the employees of British Petroleum, and the genesis of the same was as a result of the confusion that emanated as to whether the rig should be still considered a vessel even when it was latched-up, in effect, when connected to the blow out preventer and the underlying well. A seminal report (Transocean Limited provided for a Press release dated April, 21, 2010) had averred to the fact that that the manager of Transocean was obviously in charge when latched-up, even whilst elucidating that weightage ought to be given to the fact that it was the rigs' captain who was the authoritative head when the rig was unlatched - hence, when considered as a vessel. The aforementioned was in clear contradistinction with US regulations as the regulations do not make a distinction between latched conditions. In effect, the regulations lucidly consider deep water mobile oil rigs as vessels, immaterial of the fact whether they are latched-up or not.

5. In cases where in deep-water mobile oil rigs are considered vessels, they will be subject to the supervision (Bustillo & Smith, 2010) of the US Coast Guard. Though the above water jurisdiction will be with the relevant flag state, any unit engaged in the Outer Continental Shelf will be subject to US jurisdiction, and this will include the exploration, exploitation, and production of minerals from the subsoil and seabed. The Coast Guard regulates the safety of life and property on the Outer Continental Shelf and the entire gamut of vessels, facilities, installations, and other such units. They are entitled to examine the equipment, structures, construction, artificial edifices, and crew members' overall safety and health working aboard the oil rig. It must be noted here that whenever the Coast Guard examines a US-flagged deep-water mobile oil rig that operates in the US EEZ, the examination may run into several weeks as an elaborate and meticulous system is followed. Ironically, when the rig carries an overseas flag, the examination is over in a few hours as all that they do is engage in an exercise aimed at looking into the design, operating standards, construction methodology, and equipment. As the Coast Guard has only limited examination rights regarding overseas deep-water mobile oil rigs, their role is limited to ensuring that Industry safety standards are upheld and it would be an infringement of flag state rights should they go in for an exhaustive examination. As overseas deep-water mobile oil rigs are concerned, the United States Coast Guard (Bustillo & Smith, 2010) verily depends on overseas governments to engage in examination work. Given the fact that some overseas governments outsource the job to private contractors, it ... raises severe issues of security, and it could even be a welcomed move by a rouge state. British Petroleum had leased the Deepwater Horizon, and it was a foreign-flagged rig, having been registered in the Marshall Islands (BP Oil Rig Registration Raised in Congress Over Safety Concerns). Elementally, it denoted that the establishment in the Marshall Islands would prima facie be responsible for ensuring compliance with the regulations in place regarding, quality and safety standards. Hence, it will be the prerogative of the Marshall Islands to ensure that the Deepwater Horizon complied with the regulations in place even though the rig operated in the EEZ of the United States.

oil rig ecological economic

Conclusions

A simple, succinct, and straightforward answer would effectuate on a solution wherein deep-water mobile oil rigs that are engaged in drilling activity should be considered in the same category as the other installations involved in the exploitation of natural resources in the EEZ. In effect, on the commencement of drilling operations, deep water mobile oil rigs need to be differentiated from vessels. Such a differentiation would be of crucial signification simply because a coastal nation would require to have plenary jurisdiction over foreign-flagged deep water mobile oil rigs operating in its EEZ. A vast plethora of professionals and professors have vouched for the conclusion that has been enunciated above, or some such similar conclusion (Richards, 2011), as overlapping leads to confusion, and therefore, it would not be in the highest interest of regulatory efficacity when responsibility is vested with one regulator.

The fact remains that efficiency would abound and the conclusion of this research initiative proposes that Deepwater mobile oil rigs should not be treated as vessels on the commencement of drilling operations. In effect, while in operational mode, deep-water mobile oil rigs would need to be considered seabed installations, and they should be considered as such throughout the drilling and production phases of a deep-water oil initiative. One such treatment will alone provide for plenary jurisdictional authority, and as a logical upshot, it would provide for conclusive certainty. Given that the coastal nation ends up bearing the brunt of an accident or an act of terrorism and has all the responsibility to handle the consequences, it is but logical that they would also have to have plenary jurisdiction over deep water mobile oil rigs when they are engaged in drilling and production as one such jurisdiction would pave the way for much safety and security in the EEZ and the maritime realms (Gjerde et al., 2008).

Given that UNCLOS III provides for a coastal states' jurisdiction over the establishment and use of installations, artificial islands, and structures in the EEZ, it would be in the sync of things to consider deep-water oil rigs as seabed installations legally. Then, the coastal states would have plenary jurisdiction, during both drilling and production over deep-water oil rigs as well. This would allow for a routine examination, inspection, and implementation of the various precautionary measures to prevent accidents and stymie acts of terrorism. As an addendum, the treatment of deepwater mobile oil rigs as seabed installations would be in keeping with the overall purpose of establishing the continental shelf and the EEZ maritime zones as it would provide coastal states with plenary jurisdiction. It would recognize their sovereign rights, with regard to, the exploitation, and exploration of natural resources. A sensible and very logical (Mossop, 2018) solution is required as the coastal states would have to bear the most significant risk in the event of an accident or an act of maritime terrorism being eventuated on.

As suggested, should they be considered as seabed installations, they will possess total jurisdiction. As a corollary, they would have the control (preventive measures included) and responsibility for dealing with any eventuality, should it arise. Hence, classifying deep water mobile oil rigs as seabed installations during both the drilling and production phases would remove the unnecessary uncertainties that currently exist regarding the status and definitional perspective of deep-water mobile oil rigs operating in the EEZ of a coastal nation. Given that the state (Currue, 2017, p. 32) of the environment has worsened progressively in a plethora of crucial areas, the sooner the uncertainties are tackled, the better it would be.

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